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Experts are persons who are very knowledgeable about or skilful in a particular area. The aim 
of this Research Topic is to advance knowledge in the understanding of the phenomenon 
of expertise by putting together different lines of research that directly or indirectly study 
expertise. 
Herbert Simon’s expertise studies initiated two lines of research. One is interested in 
elucidating the cognitive processes underlying expertise, and the other investigates how 
expertise develops. These lines of research started with studies comparing experts and novices 
in chess, and then they extended to numerous areas of expertise such as music, medical 
diagnosis, sports, arts and sciences. 
In the field of judgment and decision making researchers investigate the quality of judgments 
and decisions of experts in different professions (e.g., clinical psychologists, medical 
practitioners, judges, meteorologists, stock brokers).
Those lines of research explicitly investigate the topic of expertise, but there are other 
research areas that make a substantial contribution to understanding expertise. Scholars in 
language acquisition and in face perception, for example, investigate cognitive processes and 
development of expertise in areas in which almost everyone becomes an expert. Furthermore, 
skill acquisition research informs in detail about short term cognitive changes that may be 
important to understand how expertise develops.
We are interested in original research that advances knowledge in the understanding of 
decision making, cognitive processes and development of expertise in sports, intellectual 
games, arts, scientific disciplines and professions, as well as expertise in cognitive abilities such 
as perception, memory, attention, language and imagery. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 
ON EXPERTISE
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We are also interested in theoretical articles in any of these areas, articles that describe 
computational or mathematical models of expertise, and articles offering a framework that 
would guide expertise research. Articles that offer integrative approaches of some of the areas 
described above are strongly encouraged.
The goal of this Research Topic is to produce a hallmark piece of work in the field of expertise, 
which complements and does not overlap with the “Neural implementations of expertise” 
Research Topic in Frontiers in Human Neuroscience.
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Introduction
This Research Topic sought to advance psychological understanding of expertise by drawing
together lines of research from many different domains of expertise. The outcome is a collection
of 35 articles in such diverse areas as chess, music, perception, teaching, intensive-care diagnosis,
video-games, sports, dance, mathematics, climbing, and fingerprint analysis.
The articles can be classed into five broad categories based on their focus: (a) the cognitive pro-
cesses in expertise, (b) the development of expertise, (c) the relationship between expertise and
general cognition, (d) the transfer of skills between domains, and (e) methodological issues and
frameworks in expertise research. We give a brief overview of the research across these five themes.
Cognitive Processes in Expertise
Articles in this research topic used a number of different methodologies to investigate cognitive
processes in expertise. Four articles examined experts’ eye movements as a way of studying what
experts focus on when performing domain-relevant tasks. Sheridan and Reingold (2014), for exam-
ple, found that expert chess players rapidly differentiate regions of the board that are relevant to the
best move from irrelevant ones. Similarly,McCormack et al. (2014) found that expert intensive-care
physicians directed their attention to more relevant areas of the situation, compared to competent
non-experts. In addition, Godau et al. (2014) found that experts in arithmetic problem solving
spontaneously used arithmetic shortcuts. Finally, Ellis and Reingold (2014) examined the Ein-
stellung effect (i.e., where the first idea that comes to mind blocks finding the best solution to a
problem) using this methodology and noted its relevance to understanding expert flexibility (see
Bilalić and McLeod, 2014).
Two articles focused on perceptual expertise. Curby and Gauthier (2014) found that acquiring
expertise with a category of stimuli (i.e., car expertise) increases the interference between the visual
processing of other familiar stimuli (e.g., faces) and that of the learned category (cars). In a study
with novel objects, Cheung and Gauthier (2014) found that acquiring perceptual expertise involves
integrating perceptual and conceptual representations of stimuli.
Four studies investigated expertise involving physical movements. In a study on dancing,
Bläsing (2015) found that making a sequence of movements influenced the subsequent percep-
tion of that sequence, but not to the same degree if one was a dancing expert. In a study of
climbing experts, Bläsing et al. (2014) found that expertise was associated with better percep-
tion of climbing holds and action-relevant objects. In a study of athletes and musicians, Braun
Janzen et al. (2014) showed that training affects performance involving timing and rhythmic
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movements: athletes were more precise making continuous
movements, whereas musicians were more precise for discrete
movements. In a study of skill acquisition in a flight simulator,
Wiggins et al. (2014) found that a general capacity for acquiring
and using cues was related to performance in landing an aircraft
in the simulator.
Finally, four articles focused on experts’ pattern recognition
(the ability to identify meaningful relationships in complex stim-
uli). In a review of research on fingerprint experts, Thompson
et al. (2014) concluded that such expertise relies on rapid pattern
recognition and discrimination rather than in analytic thinking.
In an observational study, Kretz and Krawczyk (2014) found that
academic economists use many analogies in research meetings.
Trench (2014), however, suggests that these results may be due
to the naturalistic setting of the study, rather than expertise per
se. Bialek and Sawicki (2014) showed that participants asked to
take an expert perspective become more risk aversive and patient
in decision making tasks. Finally, Leone et al. (2014) examined
the relationship between expertise and representations of space
using a large dataset of chess games from an internet server. They
found that novices, relative to experts, use strategies to reduce
their cognitive load (see Connors and Campitelli, 2014, for a
commentary).
Development of Expertise
Six studies examined how expertise is developed. Gaschler et al.
(2014) examined the learning curves in skill acquisition by ana-
lyzing the tournament performance of 1383 chess players over 10
years. They found that exponential learning curves better fitted
players’ improvements over time than power function learning
curves. Gobet and Ereku (2014) discussed the case of Magnus
Carlsen, current world chess champion, and argue that his level
of performance cannot be accounted for by the deliberate prac-
tice account, which suggests that amount of deliberate practice is
the critical determinant of expertise.
Citing limitations in an earlier meta-analysis by Hambrick
et al. (2014a), Platz et al. (2014) conducted a meta-analysis on
the influence of deliberate practice in musical achievement. They
found amoderate average effect size (rc = 0.61), which they inter-
pret as showing the importance of deliberate practice. In response
to Platz et al.’s criticisms, Hambrick et al. (2014b) noted a num-
ber of conceptual problems in Platz et al.’s arguments and observe
how Platz et al.’s findings can also be interpreted to show that
practice, while undoubtedly an important factor in expertise, is
not the sole determinant.
Healy et al. (2014) proposed a number of training principles for
developing expertise. These include the acquisition of expertise
(e.g., scheduling of feedback), retention of expertise (e.g., item
chunking, depth of processing) and transfer (e.g., variability of
practice, seeding the knowledge base). Finally, Speelman (2014)
argued that treating numeracy as a form of expertise and using
computer programs in teaching would address some shortcom-
ings in current teaching and, in particular, foster a greater focus
on practice and feedback in learning.
Expertise and General Cognition
Three articles examined the relationship between expertise and
general cognition. First, Gobet et al. (2014b) discussed how
artificial intelligence and engineering could be used to design
a brain. Based on expertise research, they propose that a bet-
ter brain would have less concepts and more low-level per-
ceptual processing. Second, Guida and Lavielle-Guida (2014)
combined findings from memory research with the normal
population with theories of expert memory. They argue that
a less sophisticated version of the spatial method of loci
used by memory experts is also used by ordinary people to
encode items in working memory. Third, Christophel et al.
(2014) observed that amount of teaching experience is a very
poor predictor of a teacher’s actual effectiveness, including, for
example, the teacher’s ability to offer constructive feedback to
students.
Transfer of Skills
Three articles examined the transfer of skills across domains.
First, Gobet et al. (2014a) investigated the possibility of
training transfer from videogame playing to selective atten-
tion and working memory capacity. Consistent with over
a century of research, there was no evidence for transfer,
even in videogame experts. In contrast, Lampit et al. (2014)
reported evidence for transfer of computerized cognitive train-
ing to a bookkeeping task. Finally, Bart (2014) reviewed
research published after Gobet and Campitelli’s (2006) crit-
ical review on the effects of chess education, showing sta-




Seven articles discussed expertise in general. First, Vaci et al.
(2014) consider alternative approaches to studying expertise,
and in particular, how studying only individuals from highly
restricted ranges of skill may yield different findings than
studying individuals who represent wider ranges of skill. Sec-
ond, Kaufman (2014) identifies points of disagreement and
agreement in different views of expertise and suggests some
directions for future research. Third, Bourne et al. (2014),
categorize expertise as elite, peak, or exceptionally high lev-
els of performance on a particular task or within a given
domain.
Fourth, Shen et al. (2014) use birdwatching as an illus-
trative example to discuss such issues as selecting an appro-
priate domain of perceptual expertise for study, recruiting
experts, assessing their level of expertise, and experimentally
testing the experts’ performance. Fifth, MacIntyre et al. (2014)
propose that athletes are not just experts in movement exe-
cution but also in planning, metacognition, and reflection.
Similarly, Toner and Moran (2014), extending Sutton et al.’s
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(2011) framework, argue that expert athletes do not com-
pletely automatize their skills and that an important com-
ponent of their expertise is to be able to rapidly reflect on
their movements. Finally, de Oliveira et al. (2014) build upon
Gigerenzer’s (e.g., Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1999) heuristic-
based approach to decision making. They propose that expert
athletes develop a toolbox of heuristics to guide their decision
making.
Conclusion
The diversity of articles in this research topic illustrates
the many different approaches to studying expertise. It also
indicates the keen interest in the topic. We believe that
many articles in this research topic are of lasting impor-
tance and can help to guide future research in the field of
expertise.
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The present study explored the ability of expert and novice chess players to rapidly
distinguish between regions of a chessboard that were relevant to the best move on the
board, and regions of the board that were irrelevant. Accordingly, we monitored the eye
movements of expert and novice chess players, while they selected white’s best move
for a variety of chess problems. To manipulate relevancy, we constructed two different
versions of each chess problem in the experiment, and we counterbalanced these versions
across participants. These two versions of each problem were identical except that a
single piece was changed from a bishop to a knight. This subtle change reversed the
relevancy map of the board, such that regions that were relevant in one version of the
board were now irrelevant (and vice versa). Using this paradigm, we demonstrated that
both the experts and novices spent more time fixating the relevant relative to the irrelevant
regions of the board. However, the experts were faster at detecting relevant information
than the novices, as shown by the finding that experts (but not novices) were able to
distinguish between relevant and irrelevant information during the early part of the trial.
These findings further demonstrate the domain-related perceptual processing advantage
of chess experts, using an experimental paradigm that allowed us to manipulate relevancy
under tightly controlled conditions.
Keywords: visual expertise, expert performance, chess, eye movements, attention, relevancy
The remarkable perceptual skill of experts is exemplified by expert
radiologists who can detect abnormalities in chest X-rays that
were briefly presented for only 200 ms (Kundel and Nodine,
1975), and by chess experts who can memorize chessboards
that were presented for only a few seconds (De Groot, 1946,
1965; Chase and Simon, 1973a,b). Furthermore, while examining
visual displays that require multiple eye fixations for encoding,
experts are adept at rapidly focusing their attention on relevant
areas, such that radiologists can rapidly fixate on abnormalities
(Kundel et al., 2008), and chess experts can rapidly fixate on the
best move on a chessboard (Charness et al., 2001). Given that
this fast extraction of relevant information is a key component
of skilled performance in many different domains of expertise
(for a review see Reingold and Sheridan, 2011), the goal of the
present experiment is to further explore expert/novice differences
in the detection of relevant information during a chess game.
Accordingly, we will begin by briefly reviewing prior work on per-
ceptual skill in the domain of chess, and we will then describe the
present study’s paradigm and rationale.
Of relevance to the present study, there is a long history of
studying the perceptual component of expertise in the domain
of chess (for reviews, see Charness, 1992; De Groot and Gobet,
1996; Reingold and Charness, 2005; Gobet and Charness, 2006;
Reingold and Sheridan, 2011). The chess domain provides
numerous methodological advantages, such as well-segmented
visual stimuli for eye movement interest areas, and an official
rating system for objectively quantifying levels of expertise (Elo,
1965, 1986). Capitalizing on these methodological advantages,
chess expertise has been linked to numerous perceptual pro-
cessing advantages, including superior memory performance for
briefly presented chessboards (De Groot, 1946, 1965; Chase and
Simon, 1973a,b), the ability to process chess configurations auto-
matically and in parallel (Reingold et al., 2001b), and a larger
visual span such that experts process larger configurations of
pieces than novices (Reingold et al., 2001a). Consistent with these
behavioral and eye movement findings, neuroimaging work has
shown expert/novice differences in brain activation in regions
associated with object and pattern recognition (Bilalić et al.,
2010a, 2011a,b, 2012). Taken together, the above findings col-
lectively support the view that perceptual skill is a key aspect
of expertise in chess (De Groot, 1946, 1965; Chase and Simon,
1973a,b) as well as in other domains of visual expertise (for a
review see Reingold and Sheridan, 2011).
To provide a theoretical account of the perceptual skill shown
by chess experts, Chase and Simon (1973a,b) proposed that
through thousands of hours of practice chess experts acquire
memories for a large number of “chunks,” which consist of
groups of chess pieces, and these chunks are supplemented by
larger memory structures called templates (Gobet and Simon,
1996, 2000). Such memory structures facilitate performance by
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enabling chess players to rapidly retrieve useful information,
such as advantageous strategies and moves. Thus, Chase and
Simon (1973a,b) argued that chess experts use their memory
for chess-configurations to constrain their search for a move to
the most promising candidates, rather than performing a slow
and exhaustive search of all of the possible moves on the board.
This theoretical perspective echoes earlier arguments by De Groot
(1946, 1965) that chess expertise stems from advantages in mem-
ory and perception, rather than from a greater breadth and depth
of search during problem solving.
Consistent with this hypothesis that chess experts rely on their
memory for chess configurations to efficiently guide their search
for the best move, the eye movements of chess experts reveal
that they can rapidly fixate on information that is relevant to the
best move on the board (Tikhomirov and Poznyanskaya, 1966;
Simon and Barenfeld, 1969; Charness et al., 2001; Reingold and
Charness, 2005). For example, to examine the impact of relevancy
on eye movements, Charness et al. (2001) monitored the eye
movements of expert players (mean Elo rating = 2238) and inter-
mediate players (mean Elo = 1786) while they selected white’s
best move in a series of chess problems (henceforth, the choose-
a-move task). Compared to intermediate players, the experts
produced a greater proportion of fixations on pieces that were rel-
evant to the best move, and this advantage of the experts emerged
as early as the first five fixations in the trial (for a discussion
of similar findings, Tikhomirov and Poznyanskaya, 1966; Simon
and Barenfeld, 1969). As a follow-up to Charness et al. (2001),
Reingold and Charness (2005) analyzed the first 10 s of choose-
a-move trials to demonstrate that experts rapidly completed a
perceptual encoding phase (characterized by shorter fixations)
and then shifted to a subsequent problem-solving stage (charac-
terized by longer fixations). In marked contrast, the intermediates
continued to display shorter fixations throughout the 10-s period,
which indicates that they needed more time to complete the per-
ceptual encoding phase. Taken together, these studies indicate that
chess experts are more efficient at encoding chess configurations
during a choose-a-move task.
Beyond the choose-a-move task, there is further evidence that
experts are better than novices at rapidly encoding relevant chess
configurations. For example, in a memorization task, De Groot
and Gobet (1996) demonstrated that the number and total dura-
tion of fixations on chess pieces was at least partially correlated
with the relevance of these pieces to the position, and the magni-
tude of this correlation increased as a function of skill. Moreover,
using a chess-related visual search task that required participants
to search for relevant pieces on a chessboard, Bilalić et al. (2010a)
revealed that chess experts (but not novices) were able to rapidly
and exclusively fixate on task-relevant rather than irrelevant fea-
tures. Finally, Bilalić et al. (2012) examined relevancy effects in
a threat detection task, in which experts and novices had to
examine chessboards to determine the number of black pieces
that were attacking white pieces. The experts displayed a higher
percentage of fixations on relevant objects (i.e., the pieces that
formed a threat relationship) relative to novices, and this differ-
ence between experts and novices emerged as early as the first
three seconds in the trial. Based on these results, Bilalić et al.
(2012) concluded that the “experts’ advantage lies in the ability
to immediately focus on relevant objects and relations between
them in the environment and ignore the irrelevant ones.”
Building on this prior work, the present study introduces a
new paradigm for studying relevancy effects in chess. Similar to
prior work (Charness et al., 2001; Reingold and Charness, 2005;
Bilalić et al., 2008a,b, 2010b; Sheridan and Reingold, 2013), the
present paradigm monitored the eye movements of chess players
during a choose-a-move-task, which is an ecologically valid task
given that it resembles the challenges confronting chess players
during a chess match. To provide a well-controlled manipulation
of relevancy, the present paradigm employs two counterbalanced
versions of each chess problem, which differed by a single piece
such that a bishop was changed to a knight (see Appendix A
in Supplementary material for examples). This subtle change
reversed the relevancy map of the board, such that the regions that
were relevant to the best move in one version are irrelevant in the
other version, and vice versa. Thus, the present paradigm extends
prior work by employing large relevant and irrelevant regions
of interest that were well-matched on a variety of characteristics
(e.g., number of squares, location, etc.).
Our rationale for using this paradigm was to contrast the
time-course of relevancy effects in both novice and expert play-
ers. Thus, we asked strong expert players (average Elo = 2223)
and novices (unrated club players) to solve a series of problems
that were designed to be simple enough that both the novice and
expert players could frequently detect the best move on the board.
In light of past findings concerning the perceptual encoding
advantage of experts, we expected that the expert’s eye move-
ments would reveal an earlier differentiation between relevant
and irrelevant regions. Such a finding would provide additional
support for the importance of perceptual processing in chess skill,




Forty-one chess players (17 experts and 24 novices) were recruited
from online chess forums and from local chess clubs in Toronto
and Mississauga (Canada). The mean age was 30 (SD = 14.2)
in the expert group, and 27 (SD = 10.0) in the novice group.
There was one female player in the expert group, and there were
five female players in the novice group. For the expert players,
the average CFC (Canadian Chess Federation) rating was 2223
(range = 1876–2580). All of the novice players were unrated club
players who were familiar with the rules of chess, but had never
participated in a rated chess tournament. All of the participants
had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
MATERIALS AND DESIGN
There were eight experimental problems (See Appendix A in
Supplementary material for the complete list of problems). To
manipulate relevancy, we constructed two versions of each of the
problems, and these two versions were identical except that a
single piece was changed from a bishop to a knight. As shown
in Appendix A in Supplementary material, this subtle change
reversed the relevancy map of the board, such that regions that
were relevant to the best move in one version were no longer
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relevant (and vice versa). Similar to Charness et al. (2001), rele-
vancy was determined by asking an international master who did
not participate in the study to classify the squares on the board
as either relevant or irrelevant (see also De Groot and Gobet,
1996). For example, in the first version of Problem #3 (see panel
3a in Appendix A in Supplementary material), the best move on
the board is “Rook to a8 (checkmate),” and the squares associ-
ated with this move are located on the left side of the board (see
relevant region in orange), whereas the other side of the board
contains squares that are irrelevant to the best move (see irrel-
evant region in blue). In contrast, in the second version of the
problem (see panel 3b in Appendix A in Supplementary material)
we changed a single piece from a bishop to a knight (see piece
inside the dotted lines), such that the best move on the board
became “Knight to f4,” and the relevant and irrelevant regions
were reversed. The relevant and irrelevant regions were always
located near the edge of the board, and never overlapped with
the center of the board. The two versions of the problems were
counterbalanced such that each player only saw one version of a
given problem. The same order of problems was used for all play-
ers, and each chess player completed a total of eight experimental
problems. It was always white’s turn to move, and the problems
incorporated a variety of solutions that ranged from checkmate
to material gains to defensive tactics.
APPARATUS AND PROCEDURE
Eye movements were measured with an SR Research EyeLink
1000 system with high spatial resolution and a sampling rate
of 1000 Hz. The experiment was programmed and analyzed
using SR Research Experiment Builder and Data Viewer soft-
ware. Viewing was binocular, but only the right eye was mon-
itored. A chin rest and forehead rest were used to minimize
head movements. Following calibration, gaze-position error was
less than 0.5◦. The chess problems were presented using images
(755 × 755 pixels) that were created using standard chess soft-
ware (Chessbase 11). These images were displayed on a 21 in.
ViewSonic monitor with a refresh rate of 150 Hz and a screen
resolution of 1024 × 768 pixels. Participants were seated 60 cm
from the monitor, and the width of one square on the chessboard
equaled approximately 3.4 degrees of visual angle.
Prior to the experiment, the participants were instructed to
choose white’s best move as quickly and as accurately as possi-
ble, and they were told that they would be given a maximum
of 3 min to respond to each problem. At the start of each trial,
the participants were required to look at a fixation point in the
center of the screen, prior to the presentation of the chessboard.
The participants were asked to press a button as soon as they had
made their decision, and they then reported their move verbally
to the experimenter. If 3 min elapsed prior to the button press
(this occurred on less than 1% of the experimental trials for the
novices, and 0% of trials for the experts), then the chessboard was
removed from the screen and the chess player was prompted to
immediately provide their best answer.
RESULTS
Our main goal was to use eye movements to examine expert
vs. novice differences in how attention was allocated to the
relevant and irrelevant regions of the chessboard. However, prior
to reporting the eye movement results, we will first report several
global measures of performance (i.e., accuracy, reaction times) as
a function of the chess player’s level expertise (expert, novice).
To assess move quality, we asked an international chess mas-
ter who did not participate in the study to rate the quality of
each move on a scale from 1 to 10 (1 = a blunder, 10 = one of
the best moves on the board), and we consulted the evaluation
function from a chess engine (Houdini 2 Pro), which provides a
score (expressed in pawn units) to quantify the change in White’s
positional advantage as a result of the move chosen. For both of
these measures of accuracy, the experts showed superior perfor-
mance than the novices (df = 39; all ts > 2.0, all ps < 0.05).
Specifically, the average move quality rating was 9.5 (SE = 0.12)
for the experts and 6.9 (SE = 0.26) for the novices, and the aver-
age chess engine score was 2.1 (SE = 0.17) for the experts and
1.5 (SE = 0.16) for the novices. Moreover, the experts selected
the best move on the board (i.e., a move that received a rat-
ing of 10), on an average of 93 % of trials (SE = 2%), whereas
the novices selected the best move on an average of 52% of
trials (SE = 5%), and this expert/novice difference in accuracy
was significant: t(39) = 7.12, p < 0.001. In addition, there was
a marginally significant trend toward faster reaction times for
the experts (M = 28, 946 ms; SE = 5441 ms) than for the novices
(M = 41, 854 ms; SE = 4748 ms), t(39) = 1.78, p = 0.084. More
interestingly, within the expert group there was a negative correla-
tion between the mean reaction time of each player and their Elo
rating (r = −0.617, p < 0.01), which indicates that increases in
chess rating were associated with faster performance. Finally, the
experts’ (but not the novices’) reaction times were significantly
faster when the relevant region was on the right rather than the
left side of the board, t(16) = 2.16, p < 0.05 (for similar findings,
see De Groot and Gobet, 1996).
Next, we analyzed eye movements to examine the extent to
which the expert and novice chess players directed their atten-
tion toward the relevant and irrelevant regions of the board.
For all of the eye movement analyses reported below, we ana-
lyzed correct trials only (i.e., trials that elicited a 10-rated move),
to ensure that the experts and novices were matched for accu-
racy. Given our interest in the time-course of relevancy effects,
we began our analysis by examining an early measure of pro-
cessing (i.e., first-dwell duration, which is the duration of the
first dwell on a given region, where a dwell is defined as one
or more consecutive fixations on the target region, prior to the
eyes moving to a different region of the board) as well as a later
measure of processing (i.e., total time, which is the sum of the
duration of all of the dwells on a region for the entire trial).
To explore the pattern of results for each measure, we exam-
ined 2 × 2 ANOVAs that included relevancy (relevant, irrelevant)
as a within-subjects factor, and expertise (expert, novice) as a
between-subjects factor. For both the first-dwell and total time
measures, there was a main effect of relevancy (i.e., longer dwells
on relevant than irrelevant regions), all Fs > 8, all ps < 0.01,
and a main effect of expertise (i.e., longer dwells for novices than
experts), all Fs > 60, all ps < 0.001. More importantly, there was a
significant interaction for the first-dwell measure [F(1, 39) = 4.38,
p < 0.05], but not for the total time measure (F < 1). As can
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be seen from Figures 1A,B, this interesting dissociation between
these two measures occurred because the first dwell measure pro-
duced significant relevancy effects for the experts [t(16) = 3.51,
p < 0.01] but not for the novices (t < 1), whereas the total time
measure produced relevancy effects for both groups (all ts > 2,
all ps < 0.05). Interestingly, the interaction between expertise and
relevancy for the first-dwell measure was solely due to an increase
in the number of fixations for relevant compared to irrelevant
regions for the experts [relevant: M = 2.19, SE = 0.21, irrele-
vant: M = 1.39, SE = 0.07, t(16) = 3.95, p < 0.01] but not for
the novices (relevant: M = 2.05, SE = 0.16, irrelevant: M = 1.98,
SE = 0.23, t < 1) as shown by a significant interaction, F(1, 39) =
8.28, p < 0.01. In contrast, the mean fixation duration for the
first dwell did not vary as a function of relevancy or expertise (all
Fs < 1).
The above first-dwell findings imply that experts are faster
than the novices at detecting relevant information. To further
FIGURE 1 | The duration of the First Dwell (A) Total Time (B), and the
Cumulative Time of the first five ordinal fixations in the trial (C) as a
function of relevancy (relevant vs. irrelevant) and level of expertise
(expert, novice).
explore this effect, we analyzed the first five fixations of the
trial to quantify the amount of time that experts and novices
spent fixating the relevant and irrelevant regions at the start of
the trial (a similar analysis of the first five fixations was con-
ducted by Charness et al., 2001). Specifically, for each fixation
position ranging from one to five (fixation position one corre-
sponded to the fixation which began following the initial saccade
in the trial), we calculated the cumulative sum of all of the fixa-
tions on the relevant and irrelevant regions up to and including
the current fixation position. This analysis was conducted sepa-
rately for each participant and each condition (i.e., relevant vs.
irrelevant), and then averaged across participants to produce the
figure shown in Figure 1C. As can be seen from this figure, the
experts showed stronger and earlier relevancy effects than the
novices. This pattern of results was reflected in a three-way inter-
action, F(4,36) = 2.74, p < 0.05 when we examined a 5 × 2 × 2
ANOVA that included fixation position (1,2,3,4,5) and relevancy
(relevant, irrelevant) as within-subjects variables, and expertise
(expert, novice) as a between-subjects variable. Consistent with
this three-way interaction, the experts showed a significant rele-
vancy effect [F(1, 16) = 6.64, p < 0.05] that became stronger over
time as shown by a relevancy by time interaction [F(4, 13) = 6.67,
p < 0.01], whereas the novices did not show a relevancy effect or
an interaction (all Fs < 1).
Taken together, the first-dwell findings and the cumulative
time analyses indicate that experts are faster at detecting relevant
information than novices, which supports the notion that chess
expertise reflects an advantage in encoding chess-related visual
configurations (De Groot, 1946, 1965; Chase and Simon, 1973a,b;
De Groot and Gobet, 1996; Charness et al., 2001; Reingold
et al., 2001a,b; Bilalić et al., 2010a, 2011a,b, 2012; for reviews
see Reingold and Charness, 2005; Reingold and Sheridan, 2011).
During the present study, this perceptual processing advantage
enabled skilled players to rapidly focus on chess configurations
that were relevant to the best move on the board.
DISCUSSION
The present experiment examined the time-course and magni-
tude of relevancy effects on expert and novice chess players’ eye
movements during a choose-a-move task. Our most important
finding was that the eye movements of the experts, but not the
novices, revealed a rapid differentiation between regions of the
chess board that were relevant vs. irrelevant to the best move
on the board. Specifically, the experts, but not the novices, spent
more time looking at relevant than irrelevant regions during the
early part of the trial (i.e., during the first-dwell on a region,
and during the first five fixations of the trial), whereas both the
experts and novices showed strong relevancy effects later on in the
trial. Importantly, these findings were obtained using an experi-
mental paradigm that provided a well-controlled manipulation
of relevancy, such that the relevant and irrelevant regions of the
board were counterbalanced across participants (see Appendix A
in Supplementary material).
Similar to the present findings, prior studies have also shown
enhanced relevancy detection by chess experts (Tikhomirov and
Poznyanskaya, 1966; Simon and Barenfeld, 1969; De Groot and
Gobet, 1996; Charness et al., 2001; Bilalić et al., 2010a, 2012).
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Moreover, this relevancy detection advantage is a particular
instance of the perceptual encoding advantage that has been
shown by chess experts in a variety of tasks employing domain-
related stimuli (De Groot, 1946, 1965; Chase and Simon, 1973a,b;
De Groot and Gobet, 1996; Charness et al., 2001; Reingold
et al., 2001a,b; Bilalić et al., 2010a, 2011a,b, 2012; for reviews
see Reingold and Charness, 2005; Reingold and Sheridan, 2011).
To explain this perceptual encoding advantage, Chase and Simon
(1973a,b) proposed that chess expertise develops due to exten-
sive practice with domain-related visual-configurations. Over the
course of thousands of hours of practice, chess experts store mem-
ories for configurations of chess pieces in memory in the form
of chunks (Chase and Simon, 1973a,b), which are supplemented
by larger memory structures called templates (Gobet and Simon,
1996, 2000). These memory structures lead to a perceptual encod-
ing advantage such that chess experts are able to process chess
stimuli in terms of larger configurations of pieces, rather than
individual features. Consequently, chess players are able to use
their memory for chess configurations to guide their search for
the best move on the board, rather than exhaustively searching
all possible moves. This theoretical account is consistent with the
present study’s finding that the chess experts were able to rapidly
focus on information that was relevant to the best move on the
board.
Beyond the chess domain, the present findings are also con-
sistent with findings from other domains concerning the impor-
tance of perceptual processing during skilled performance. As
reviewed by Reingold and Sheridan (2011), experts in many
domains of expertise have been shown to efficiently process
domain-related material in terms of larger configurations, as
shown by findings that radiologists can rapidly fixate abnormal-
ities in less than a second (Kundel et al., 2008). Moreover, this
key role of perceptual processing in expertise coincides with other
evidence for perceptual specificity effects in memory and learn-
ing (for reviews, see Levy, 1993; Roediger and McDermott, 1993;
Reingold, 2002), such as recent findings that eye fixation times
are shorter for words that were read twice in the same typography
(i.e., font) rather than in two different typographies (Sheridan
and Reingold, 2012a,b), and findings that chess experts perform
better when viewing familiar chess symbols compared to a condi-
tion in which letters (i.e., B = Bishop, P = Pawn, etc.) were shown
instead of the symbols (Reingold et al., 2001a).
More generally, the relevancy effects from the present study
add to the growing evidence that higher level cognitive processes
can rapidly influence eye movement control (e.g., the duration
and location of fixations) on a variety of tasks. In fact, ever since
the seminal eye tracking work by Yarbus (1967), it has been well-
known that our eye movements are biased toward aspects of a
visual image that are relevant to our current goals, and away
from areas that are irrelevant. As further evidence for the role
of higher cognitive processing in guiding eye movements, par-
ticipants in visual search studies spend more time fixating on
distractors that are related (e.g., visually similar) rather than unre-
lated to the target (e.g., Findlay and Gilchrist, 1998; Reingold and
Glaholt, 2014), participants in face perception tasks preferentially
look at relevant features, such as the eyes (e.g., Henderson et al.,
2005), participants in scene perception tasks spend more time
fixating information that is task-relevant rather than irrelevant
(Glaholt and Reingold, 2012), and the eye movements of skilled
readers reveal rapid effects of a variety of higher-level lexical, lin-
guistic and cognitive variables (e.g., Rayner, 1998, 2009; Staub
et al., 2010; Staub, 2011; Reingold et al., 2012; Sheridan and
Reingold, 2012c,d). Taken together, these findings lend support
to models of eye movement control that predict a strong eye-
mind link, such that ongoing cognitive processing can have a rapid
effect on lower-level perceptual and oculomotor processing (for
recent reviews, see Reingold et al., 2012, in press). Moreover, these
findings underscore that skilled performance reflects a complex
inter-play of perceptual and cognitive processing, and future work
can examine the extent to which similar findings from multiple
domains are reflective of common underlying mechanisms.
Finally, a key contribution of the present study is that we
introduced a new experimental paradigm to provide a carefully
controlled manipulation of relevancy. As shown in Appendix A
in Supplementary material, we created two counterbalanced ver-
sions of each chess problem that differed by a single piece, and
the regions that were relevant in one version were irrelevant in
the other version (and vice versa). Given that the relevant and
irrelevant regions of the board were well-matched, we can con-
clude that the relevancy effects in the experiment were solely due
to the relevancy of a given region to the best move, and not to
some other confound (e.g., differences in visual saliency, location
on the board, number of pieces in the region, etc.). The present
paradigm could be used in the future to investigate additional
topics concerning the impact of relevancy on a variety of aspects
of chess expertise.
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Bilalić, M., Langner, R., Ulrich, R., and Grodd, W. (2011b). Many faces of expertise:
fusiform face area in chess experts and novices. J. Neurosci. 31, 10206–10214.
doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.5727-10.2011
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Bilalić, M., McLeod, P., and Gobet, F. (2008b). Why good thoughts block better
ones: the mechanism of the pernicious Einstellung (set) effect. Cognition 108,
652–661. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2008.05.005
Bilalić, M., Turella, L., Campitelli, G., Erb, M., and Grodd, W. (2012). Expertise
modulates the neural basis of context dependent recognition of objects and their
relations. Hum. Brain Mapp. 33, 2728–2740. doi: 10.1002/hbm.21396
Charness, N. (1992). The impact of chess research on cognitive science. Psychol.
Res. 54, 4–9. doi: 10.1007/BF01359217
Charness, N., Reingold, E. M., Pomplun, M., and Stampe, D. M. (2001). The per-
ceptual aspect of skilled performance in chess: evidence from eye movements.
Mem. Cogn. 29, 1146–1152. doi: 10.3758/BF03206384
Chase, W. G., and Simon, H. A. (1973a). Perception in chess. Cogn. Psychol. 4,
55–81. doi: 10.1016/0010-0285(73)90004-2
Chase, W. G., and Simon, H. A. (1973b). “The mind’s eye in chess,” in Visual
Information Processing, ed W. G. Chase (New York, NY: Academic Press),
215–281.
De Groot, A. D. (1946). Het Denken Van Den Schaker. Amsterdam: Noord
Hollandsche.
De Groot, A. D. (1965). Thought and Choice in Chess. The Hague: Mouton.
De Groot, A. D., and Gobet, F. (1996). Perception and Memory in Chess. Assen: Van
Gorcum.
Elo, A. E. (1965). Age changes in master chess performances. J. Gerontol. 20,
289–299.
Elo, A. E. (1986). The Rating of Chessplayers, Past and Present, 2nd Edn. New York,
NY: Arco chess.
Findlay, J. M., and Gilchrist, I. D. (1998). “Eye guidance and visual search” in Eye
Guidance in Reading, Driving and Scene Perception, ed G. Underwood (Oxford:
Elservier), 295–312.
Glaholt, M. G., and Reingold, E. M. (2012). Direct control of fixation times in scene
viewing: evidence from analysis of the distribution of first fixation duration. Vis.
Cogn. 20, 605–626. doi: 10.1080/13506285.2012.666295
Gobet, F., and Charness, N. (2006). “Expertise in chess” in The Cambridge
Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance, eds K. A. Ericsson, N. Charness,
P. J. Feltovich, and R. R. Hoffman (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press),
523–538.
Gobet, F., and Simon, H. A. (1996). Templates in chess memory: a mechanism for
recalling several boards. Cogn. Psychol. 31, 1–40. doi: 10.1006/cogp.1996.0011
Gobet, F., and Simon, H. A. (2000). Five seconds or sixty? Presentation time in
expert memory. Cogn. Sci. 24, 651–682. doi: 10.1207/s15516709cog2404_4
Henderson, J. M., Williams, C. C., and Falk, R. J. (2005). Eye movements are
functional during face learning. Mem. Cogn. 33, 98–106. doi: 10.3758/BF031
95300
Kundel, H. L., and Nodine, C. F. (1975). Interpreting chest radiographs without
visual search. Radiology 116, 527–532. doi: 10.1148/116.3.527
Kundel, H. L., Nodine, C. F., Krupinski, E. A., and Mello-Thoms, C. (2008). Using
gaze-tracking data and mixture distribution analysis to support a holistic model
for the detection of cancers on mammograms. Acad. Radiol. 15, 881–886. doi:
10.1016/j.acra.2008.01.023
Levy, B. A. (1993). “Fluent rereading: an implicit indicator of reading skill devel-
opment,” in Implicit Memory: New directions in Cognition, Development, and
Neuropsychology, eds P. Graf and M. Masson (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates Inc.), 49–73.
Rayner, K. (1998). Eye movements in reading and information processing: 20 years
of research. Psychol. Bull. 124, 372–422. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.124.3.372
Rayner, K. (2009). Eye movements in reading: models and data. J. Eye Mov. Res. 2,
1–10. doi: 10.1017/S0140525X03520106
Reingold, E. M. (2002). On the perceptual specificity of memory representations.
Memory 10, 365–379. doi: 10.1080/09658210244000199
Reingold, E. M., and Charness, N. (2005). “Perception in chess: evidence from eye
movements,” in Cognitive Processes in Eye Guidance, ed G. Underwood (Oxford:
Oxford University Press), 325–354.
Reingold, E. M., Charness, N., Pomplun, M., and Stampe, D. M. (2001a). Visual
span in expert chess players: evidence from eye movements. Psychol. Sci. 12, 48.
doi: 10.1111/1467-9280.00309
Reingold, E. M., Charness, N., Schultetus, R. S., and Stampe, D. M.
(2001b). Perceptual automaticity in expert chess players: parallel encoding
of chess relations. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 8, 504–510. doi: 10.3758/BF031
96185
Reingold, E. M., and Glaholt, M. G. (2014). Cognitive control of fixation duration
in visual search: the role of extrafoveal processing. Vis. Cogn. 22, 610–634. doi:
10.1080/13506285.2014.881443
Reingold, E. M., Reichle, E. D., Glaholt, M. G., and Sheridan, H. (2012). Direct
lexical control of eye movements in reading: evidence from a survival analysis
of fixation durations. Cogn. Psychol. 65, 177–206. doi: 10.1016/j.cogpsych.2012.
03.001
Reingold, E. M., and Sheridan, H. (2011). “Eye movements and visual exper-
tise in chess and medicine,” in Oxford Handbook on Eye Movements, eds S. P.
Liversedge, I. D. Gilchrist, and S. Everling (Oxford: Oxford University Press),
528–550.
Reingold, E. M., Sheridan, H., and Reichle, E. D. (in press). “Direct lexical and non-
lexical control of fixation duration in reading,” in Oxford Handbook on Reading,
eds A. Pollatsek and A. Treisman (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Roediger, H. L., and McDermott, K. B. (1993). “Implicit memory in normal human
subjects,” in Handbook of Neuropsychology, Vol. 8. eds H. Spinnler and F. Boller
(Amsterdam: Elsevier), 63–131.
Sheridan, H., and Reingold, E. M. (2012a). Perceptual specificity effects in
rereading: evidence from eye movements. J. Mem. Lang. 67, 255–269. doi:
10.1016/j.jml.2012.05.005
Sheridan, H., and Reingold, E. M. (2012b). Perceptually specific and percep-
tually non-specific influences on rereading benefits for spatially transformed
text: evidence from eye movements. Conscious. Cogn. 21, 1739–1747. doi:
10.1016/j.concog.2012.10.002
Sheridan, H., and Reingold, E. M. (2012c). The time course of contextual influ-
ences during lexical ambiguity resolution: evidence from distributional analyses
of fixation durations. Mem. Cogn. 40, 1122–1131. doi: 10.3758/s13421-012-
0216-2
Sheridan, H., and Reingold, E. M. (2012d). The time course of predictability effects
in reading: evidence from a survival analysis of fixation durations. Vis. Cogn. 20,
733–745. doi: 10.1080/13506285.2012.693548
Sheridan, H., and Reingold, E. M. (2013). The mechanisms and boundary con-
ditions of the Einstellung effect in chess: evidence from eye movements. PLoS
ONE 8:e75796. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0075796
Simon, H. A., and Barenfeld, M. (1969). Information-processing analysis of
perceptual processes in problem solving. Psychol. Rev. 76, 473–483. doi:
10.1037/h0028154
Staub, A. (2011). Word recognition and syntactic attachment in reading: evi-
dence for a staged architecture. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 140, 407–433. doi:
10.1037/a0023517
Staub, A., White, S. J., Drieghe, D., Hollway, E. C., and Rayner, K. (2010).
Distributional effects of word frequency on eye fixation durations. J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 36, 1280–1293. doi: 10.1037/a0016896
Tikhomirov, O. K., and Poznyanskaya, E. (1966). An investigation of visual search
as a means of analyzing heuristics. Sov. Psychol. 5, 2–15.
Yarbus, A. L. (1967). Eye Movements and Vision. New York, NY: Plenum Press.
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was con-
ducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Received: 02 April 2014; paper pending published: 08 June 2014; accepted: 06 August
2014; published online: 25 August 2014.
Citation: Sheridan H and Reingold EM (2014) Expert vs. novice differences in the
detection of relevant information during a chess game: evidence from eye movements.
Front. Psychol. 5:941. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00941
This article was submitted to Cognition, a section of the journal Frontiers in
Psychology.
Copyright © 2014 Sheridan and Reingold. This is an open-access article distributed
under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, dis-
tribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s)
or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in
accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is
permitted which does not comply with these terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition August 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 941 | 16
ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE
published: 26 August 2014
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00949
Expert and competent non-expert visual cues during
simulated diagnosis in intensive care
Clare McCormack 1, Mark W. Wiggins1*, Thomas Loveday1 and Marino Festa 2
1 Centre for Elite Performance, Expertise, and Training, Macquarie University, North Ryde, NSW, Australia
2 Paediatric Intensive Care Unit, Kim Oates Australian Paediatric Simulation Centre, Children’s Hospital at Westmead, Westmead, NSW, Australia
Edited by:
Guillermo Campitelli, Edith Cowan
University, Australia
Reviewed by:
Guillermo Campitelli, Edith Cowan
University, Australia
Merim Bilalic, Alpen-Adria Universität
Klagenfurt, Austria
*Correspondence:
Mark W. Wiggins, Centre for Elite
Performance, Expertise, and Training,
Macquarie University, Balaclava Road,
North Ryde, NSW 2109, Australia
e-mail: mark.wiggins@mq.edu.au
The aim of this study was to examine the information acquisition strategies of expert
and competent non-expert intensive care physicians during two simulated diagnostic
scenarios involving respiratory distress in an infant. Specifically, the information acquisition
performance of six experts and 12 competent non-experts was examined using an eye-
tracker during the initial 90 s of the assessment of the patient. The results indicated
that, in comparison to competent non-experts, experts recorded longer mean fixations,
irrespective of the scenario. When the dwell times were examined against specific areas
of interest, the results revealed that competent non-experts recorded greater overall dwell
times on the nurse, where experts recorded relatively greater dwell times on the head and
face of the manikin. In the context of the scenarios, experts recorded differential dwell
times, spending relatively more time on the head and face during the seizure scenario than
during the coughing scenario. The differences evident between experts and competent
non-experts were interpreted as evidence of the relative availability of task-specific cues or
heuristics in memory that might direct the process of information acquisition amongst
expert physicians. The implications are discussed for the training and assessment of
diagnostic skills.
Keywords: expertise, cue utilization, diagnosis, medicine, simulation
INTRODUCTION
The accurate initial assessment of clinical patients in time-critical
emergencies is an essential component of timely and appropriate
intervention by critical care teams (Pham et al., 2012). It mit-
igates the further deterioration of the patient’s condition and
potentially reduces mortality and the additional burden on an
already strained healthcare system. Nevertheless, it is a process
that occurs within a short time-period and with potentially min-
imal information, thereby increasing the likelihood of error (Ely
et al., 2011).
On the basis that assessments are required within a relatively
short period and with minimal information, it is likely that a
physician will engage lean and rapid cognitive strategies such
as satisficing, relying on productions or relationships between
patterns of information to guide the initial process of diagno-
sis (Simon, 1972; Marewski and Gigerenzer, 2012). Productions
comprise rules-of-thumb or condition-action (IF-THEN) state-
ments that are resident in memory and that can be used to assist
the interpretation of a situation or event (Anderson, 1982; Hamm,
2014). For example, in the medical context, IF a patient presents
with an elevated temperature, THEN it is normally associated with
the presence of an infection.
The development and application of productions is gener-
ally associated with a reduction in cognitive load, since their
application obviates the requirement for compensatory strategies
that require the retention of task-related information in working
memory (Sweller, 1988). However, such rules-of-thumb are, by
definition, not necessarily applicable in all situations, and there are
many cases where the application of productions has been asso-
ciated with the commission of errors (Croskerry, 2003; Norman
et al., 2014).
The acquisition of information as a prelude to the diagnosis of
a particular condition is based, in part, upon the features that are
immediately apparent on presentation to the physician (Croskerry,
2009a; Stolper et al., 2011). Where an association exists in memory,
a feature or combination of features is presumed to trigger a pro-
duction that will be interpreted as the basis of a diagnosis or will
provide the impetus for the acquisition of additional information
necessary to form a diagnosis (Khader et al., 2011). This process
is consistent theoretically with the initial stages of recognition-
driven decision-making where the condition-action statements
that comprise productions are referred to as cues (Klein, 2008).
The acquisition and application of cues is thought to explain
the rapid and consistently accurate behavior of genuine experts
(Mann et al., 2007; Kahneman and Klein, 2009). In the context of
the Recognition-Primed Decision model, cues trigger associations
in memory that subsequently provide the basis for mental sim-
ulations that, in turn, guide a response (Klein, 2008). Brunswik
(1955), in his Lens Model, also proposes that the likelihood of
an association being triggered is dependent upon the frequency
with which features in the environment match features in mem-
ory. Finally, Stokes et al. (1997) incorporate cues as the precursor
to diagnosis in their theoretical model of expert decision-making
in the aviation context.
Like productions, cues are essentially feature-event/object
relationships in memory that enable the rapid assessment of
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a situation and, subsequently, the formulation of a response
(Wiggins, 2006, 2012). Establishing the existence of cues has gen-
erally been inferred on the basis of responses to domain-specific
stimuli. For example, Morrison et al. (2013) demonstrated that,
in comparison to non-experts, expert forensic investigators were
relatively consistent and responded more rapidly in assessing the
relatedness of feature/event pairs relating to a murder investi-
gation. Similarly, Wiggins and O’Hare (1995) established that
the acquisition of weather-related information differed between
experts and non-expert pilots, with the former being less likely to
access information in the sequence in which it was presented. This
behavior has been interpreted as evidence to suggest a greater level
of cue utilization amongst experts.
The association between levels of cue utilization and expertise
has been established in squash (Abernethy, 1990), power con-
trol (Loveday et al., 2013a), pediatric assessment (Loveday et al.,
2013b), and aviation (Wiggins et al., 2014). Measures of cue uti-
lization have also differentiated performance in the context of
software engineering (Loveday and Wiggins,2014). However, these
approaches have been based on generalized behavior and there is
no indication as to the specific cues involved and how they might
be activated in response to the presence of features.
As experts gain experience within a particular context,
Anderson (1982) suggests that productions are revised so that they
become more precise and discriminate between different circum-
stances. Referred to as discrimination, it is a process that coincides
with generalization where it becomes evident that a particular
production is equally applicable across a range of conditions. This
combination of discrimination and generalization may explain
both the domain specificity of experts, together with their capacity
to perceive underlying similarities between situations (Shanteau,
1988).
If experts possess a highly refined repertoire of task-related
cues in memory, then the immediate features associated with two
diagnostic scenarios that differ in their immediate features but
incorporate a similar intrinsic etiology, should trigger the bottom-
up application of distinct cues, and these differences should be
evident in differences in the process of information acquisition
(Patel and Groen, 1986; Croskerry, 2009b). Empirical support for
this capacity for bottom-up discrimination can be drawn from
research into the Einstellung Effect in which visual attention dur-
ing expert problem-solving is implicitly drawn toward familiar
solutions, even at the expense of novelty (Bilalić et al., 2010). Since
competent non-experts have yet to develop highly specialized cues,
they are not expected to alter their information acquisition in
response to the differences in the immediate features of the task.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
The participants in the present study were drawn from a conve-
nience sample of medical practitioners of different levels of grade
and seniority, working in the pediatric and neonatal intensive care
units of a tertiary children’s hospital. The local research and ethics
committee approved the study, and individual participant consent
was obtained from each clinician examined.
The participants comprised 11 male and seven female physi-
cians employed in either pediatric or neonatal intensive care.
Their mean age was 40.5 years, SD = 10.6. Establishing that
expertise, rather than experience, has been acquired, requires
that some formal criterion be established that is typically based
on measures of performance. In the context of medical prac-
titioners, an indirect measure of expertise is the seniority of
their role (Patel and Groen, 1991). This constitutes recogni-
tion that they have successfully attained a level of performance
where their medical interventions are both accurate and consis-
tent over an extended period of time. While a positive relationship
will inevitably exist between years of accumulated experience
and performance, the recognition of expertise amongst peers
presumes that a level of performance has been reached that is
exceptional in comparison to other practitioners (Loveday and
Wiggins, 2014). Therefore, consistent with this perspective, the
participants were classified as expert or competent non-experts
based on their occupational position (consultant/staff special-
ist, n = 6, or trainee registrar/fellow, n = 12) according to
the criteria established by Patel and Groen (1991). Their accu-
mulated experience working in medicine was between 6 and
42 years, m = 16.5, SD = 10.6, with a range of 1–35 years in
the intensive care environment, m = 9.9, SD = 10.3. Experts
recorded a mean 23.0 years experience working in intensive
care, SD = 9.33, compared to a mean 4.8 years for competent
non-experts, SD = 4.57.
SIMULATION
A realistic scenario and naturalistic environment was created
for the study by using a high-fidelity infant manikin (Laerdal
SimBaby) connected to a monitor that displayed simulated phys-
iological parameters and appropriate corresponding alarms and
sounds in situ in an intensive care cot in a bedspace within the
pediatric intensive care unit of a tertiary children’s hospital. The
configuration of the room was typical of a bedspace in the pediatric
intensive care unit and was familiar to all study participants (see
Figure 1). A nasogastric feeding tube was inserted and attached to a
continuous feeding pump with enteral feed attached. The manikin
was also connected to nasal prong oxygen with a wall-mounted
oxygen flow-meter, an intravenous drip via a peripherally inserted
intravenous cannula, and an appropriately sized blood pressure
cuff was attached to the right arm. A familiar and experienced
pediatric intensive care nurse with a pre-scripted dialog was used
as a confederate actor within the scenario.
An IVIEW XTM HED eye tracking system manufactured by
SensoMotoric Instruments was used to record the eye movements
of participants, in addition to scene video and audio recording.
The system consists of a fully mobile, head-mounted device with
two cameras attached, one recording the scene and one trained
on the participant’s eye, recording gaze and pupil data. A piece
of clear plastic was fixed in front of one eye. The device was con-
nected to a notebook computer, which powered the cameras and
stored gaze, video and audio data. The gaze sampling rate used
was 50 Hz, and a fixation was defined as 100 ms with maximum
dispersion of 20 pixels. Based on the limitations imposed by frame
rate acquisition and the need to include all features in the intensive
care environments, features were broadly categorized as belong-
ing to one of six areas of interest (AOI). Each area of interest was
defined by anatomical or environmental relationships.
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic showing the location of the various areas of
interest (AoI), relative to the participant.
SCENARIOS
The two scenarios used during the study were written by two
subject-matter experts, both of whom were senior intensive care
specialists working in the pediatric intensive care unit. The sce-
narios were designed around two immediate features, the first of
which related to the head and face of the manikin. In particu-
lar, the level of consciousness of the child would be an important
determinant in the seizure scenario, but would be less significant in
the context of the coughing scenario. This information would be
determined through the child’s facial features, including the eyes.
In the coughing scenario, the information provided spontaneously
by the assisting nurse was the immediate feature, since this would
be an important determinant as to whether any respiratory assis-
tance had been provided. Participants were randomly allocated to
either the coughing or the seizure scenario as their first scenario,
and all participants completed both scenarios.
The initial disease state was identical for both scenarios with
the immediate features becoming evident as the symptomatology
emerged. A simple respiratory arrest scenario in a self-ventilating
monitored patient was used as the initial disease state, since it
avoided potentially confounding effects that might be introduced
by complex or unfamiliar equipment.
In the first minute of the coughing scenario, the patient demon-
strated a heart rate of 150 beats per minute (BPM), blood pressure
of 77/40 and a respiratory rate of 66 breaths per minute. Satura-
tion was at 94% on 1 liter/min of nasal prong oxygen with good
connections. This information, and electrocardiography (ECG),
was displayed on the monitor. The patient showed see-saw breath-
ing with bilateral crackles as well as grunting that was cycling with
breaths. The cot was tilted at 30◦. The scenario began with the
nurse introducing the patient, saying: “The ward is about ready to
take this baby with bronchiolitis, but I’m concerned about whether
he’s OK to be discharged from PICU as he’s had a couple of short
desaturations as I’ve been looking after him this morning.” They
were also advised that the patient presented to the emergency
department the previous evening with increased respiratory work,
and was found to have respiratory syncytial virus (RSV) – pos-
itive bronchiolitis, and hyperinflation shown on a chest x-ray.
The patient was admitted to PICU late on the previous after-
noon for possible continuous positive airway pressure therapy,
but improved with nasal oxygen. Feeds were started at 6.00am
that morning, but had been stopped a few hours later following a
second desaturation episode. Desaturations were associated with
coughing and not with vomiting or the reflux of feed. No apnoea,
bradycardia, or seizure was noted at the time. The temperature
was at 37.6◦C, and the patient was not on antibiotics. A pertussis
swab had not been taken. A full blood count on admission showed
hemoglobin (Hb) of 10.7 g per deciliter, white cell count (WCC)
was 9.3 cells per cubic millimeter (Neutrophils 5.3, Leukocytes
4.0), and platelets at 210 cells per cubic milliliter.
After 1 min had elapsed, the manikin was set to cough for 20 s,
desaturate to 84% over 40 s, and become bradycardic to 104 bpm
over 40 s. At this point, the nurse prompted participants, say-
ing: “This is what he did before you came in.” After 2 min and
10 s, saturation increased to 99% if the participant had used an
oxygen bag, or to 94% if no adjustment to oxygen administra-
tion was made. Heart rate increased to 160 over 20 s, and the
patient showed grunting and see-saw rasps as had occurred previ-
ously. The scenario concluded following a duration of 3 min and
30 s.
Prior to commencing the second scenario, participants were
advised that this was a “new patient,” not related to the previous
scenario. In the first minute of the seizure scenario, the patient had
a heart rate of 120 bpm, blood pressure of 99/70 and respiratory
rate of 33 breaths per minute. Saturation was at 94% on 1 liter/min
of nasal prong oxygen with good connections. This information,
and ECG, was displayed on the monitor. The patient showed see-
saw breathing with bilateral crackles as well as grunting that was
cycling with breaths. The cot was tilted at 30◦ and the scenario
began with the nurse introducing the patient, saying: “This baby
has just been brought up from the ward by the nurse practitioner
as he has had a couple of episodes of desaturation with stiffening of
his arms and legs on the ward. I’m a little bit worried about him
as he’s just had another similar episode and dropped his ‘sats’ to the
mid 80 s. I’ve just done a capillary gas, which is in the gas machine
now.”
The participants were also advised that the patient was a 6 week
old baby delivered at full term with no neonatal problems. The
patient was presented to the ward 2 days previously with RSV pos-
itive bronchiolitis and hyperinflation shown on a chest x-ray. Since
then, the patient had been on full maintenance intravenous fluids
(N/4 and 5% dextrose) and nil by mouth. The patient was admitted
to PICU an hour earlier. Since then, he had shown desaturation
to the mid 85 associated with unusual movements of the torso
and stiffening of limbs, and an increase in heart rate. The desat-
urations would self-correct after a minute of nasal prong oxygen,
increased to 2 liter per minute. The temperature was at 37.6◦C,
and the patient was not on antibiotics. A pertussis swab had not
been taken. A full blood count on admission showed Hb of 10.7 g
per deciliter, WCC was 9.3 cells per cubic millimeter (Neutrophils
5.3, Leukocytes 4.0), and platelets at 210 cells per cubic milliliter.
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After 1 min had elapsed, the manikin was programmed to show
rapid and slow torso movements over 20 s, desaturation to 84%
over 40 s and tachycardia to 180 over 40 s. At this point, the nurse
prompted participants, saying: “This is what he did before you came
in. Here’s the cap gas (hands over blood gas analysis).” After 2 min
and 10 s, saturation increased to 99% over 20 s if the participant
had used an oxygen bag, or to 94% if no adjustment to oxygen
administration was made. Heart rate dropped to 160 over 20 s,
and the patient showed see-saw rasps with the respiratory rate
still at 33 breaths per minute. The scenario concluded following a
duration of 3 min and 30 s.
PROCEDURE
The participants completed a pre-scenario questionnaire that
included demographic questions and questions related to par-
ticipants’ subjective levels of fatigue and stress, and familiarity
with the type of scenario encountered. The eye-tracker was
then demonstrated to each participant, and the device fitted
and calibrated using the recommended five-point calibration
procedure.
Each participant took part in two consecutive scenarios sepa-
rated by a 5 min interval. They waited outside the cubicle as the
scenario was set up. The two scenarios were each of 3 min and 30 s
duration and involved acute desaturation in a baby with bron-
chiolitis, due to either coughing (Scenario A) or a seizure/apnoea
(Scenario B). A nurse was present in each scenario and briefed the
clinician on the condition of the child over an equivalent period
of time. The condition recovered spontaneously regardless of the
treatment given.
Prior to each scenario, participants were reminded that they
should regard the simulator as a real patient and that their individ-
ual performance was not being reported. The scenario began with
the participant called to the bedspace by the confederate bedside
nurse who introduced the scenario with a pre-scripted state-
ment and a series of responses, and remained present throughout
each scenario. Three researchers were also present in the cubi-
cle during the study to monitor the eye-tracker, video-recording
and simulator. All remained silent and out of view during the
scenarios.
The eye-tracker automatically recorded eye movement data.
Data for each participant were collated, including the number of
fixations, the duration of fixations in milliseconds (dwell time),
the number of blinks, the number of saccades, and the range of
gaze. Video footage, taken from the perspective of participants,
was also recorded throughout the tasks. The software package
BeGazeTM was used to align longitudinal data with video footage
for the purposes of analysis. Video footage was analyzed frame by
frame to identify AOI. There were six AOI defined in the visual
scene, namely the nurse, the monitor, the manikin’s head and face,
the manikin’s torso, the manikin’s limbs, and the wall on which
the equipment and oxygen outlets were located.
RESULTS
DATA REDUCTION
To derive information on the process of visual information acqui-
sition during initial clinical assessment, the video analysis was
limited to the first 90 s of the scenario. Eye-tracking data for one
expert and three competent non-experts were excluded from fur-
ther analysis due to failed eye-tracking calibration. There was no
airway opening, bag and mask support, or cardiac compression
initiated by participants during the period of analysis.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Descriptive statistics were generated for each of the dependent
variables. Across the participants and the scenarios, the mean dwell
time was 448.16 ms, SD = 9.75. The mean dwell times for each of
the AOI is summarized in Table 1.
FIXATIONS AND SACCADES
Three independent, mixed between-within analyses of variance
were undertaken to establish whether a relationship existed
between participants’ level of expertise, the nature of the scenario,
and eye tracking behavior, including the frequency of fixations and
saccades and the mean duration of fixations (dwell time).
No statistically significant differences were evident between
experts and competent non-experts in the frequency of fixations,
F(1,10) = 1.97, p = 0.19, η2 = 0.17, or saccades, F(1,10) = 4.00,
p = 0.07, η2 = 0.29. Similarly, eye gaze data were not signifi-
cantly different between the scenarios in the frequency of fixations,
F(1,10) = 3.89, p = 0.07, η2 = 0.28, the frequency of sac-
cades, F(1,10) = 2.46, p = 0.15, η2 = 0.20, or the mean dwell
time, F(1,10) = 0.49, p = 0.50, η2 = 0.04.
Differences were, however, evident between experts and com-
petent non-experts in the mean dwell time, F(1,10) = 6.48,
p = 0.03, η2 = 0.39, with experts’ mean dwell time,
X̄ = 472.36 ms, SD = 14.89, greater than non-experts,
X̄ = 423.36 ms, SD = 12.58. No significant interaction was
evident between expertise and scenario for the frequency of fix-
ations, F(1,10) = 0.01, p = 0.91, η2 < 0.01, the frequency of
saccades, F(1,10) = 0.04, p = 0.85, η2 < 0.01, nor the mean dwell
time, F(1,10) = 0.58, p = 0.46, η2 = 0.05.
AOI DWELL TIME ANALYSIS
For the “head and face” and “nurse” signature features, a 2 (exper-
tise) × 2 (scenario) mixed-between ANOVA was used to test
whether differences existed in the overall dwell time for experts
and competent non-experts during the 90 s, initial assessment of
the patient. It was assumed that differences in dwell time would
reflect differences in the relative attention to features associated
with the particular scenario. Consistent with expectations, the
results revealed a significant difference between competent non-
experts and experts’ mean overall dwell time for “head and face,”
Table 1 | Mean dwell time (ms) by area of interest.
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F(1,12) = 6.16, p = 0.03, η2 = 0.34, whereby experts recorded
significantly greater dwell time within the AOI, X̄ = 11358.83 ms,
SD = 2698.77, in comparison to competent non-experts, X̄
= 3007.98 ms, SD = 2011.55. A significant difference was also
evident in the mean dwell time for the “nurse,” F(1,12) = 5.89,
p = 0.03, η2 = 0.34. However, in this case, experts recorded a
significantly lower dwell time within the AOI, X̄ = 433.63 ms,
SD = 2619.36, in comparison to competent non-experts, X̄
= 8358.76 ms, SD = 1952.38 (see Figure 2).
In the context of scenarios, a significant main effect was evident
for the “head and face” AOI, F(1,12) = 5.69, p = 0.03, η2 = 0.32,
whereby participants recorded a greater overall dwell time for this
AOI during the seizure scenario, X̄ = 9438.06 ms, SD = 2452.35,
in comparison to the coughing scenario, X̄ = 4928.75 ms,
SD = 1199.43. This suggests that, as a cohort, both experts and
competent non-experts responded to the differences between the
scenarios by changing their pattern of information acquisition
in relation to the head and face. However, there was no change
evident in the overall dwell time on the nurse.
At a more detailed level, an expertise by scenario interaction
was evident for the mean overall dwell time on the “head and
face,” F(1,12) = 4.82, p = 0.04, η2 = 0.29. An inspection of the
means indicated that, where there was relatively little difference
between the mean dwell times for competent non-experts across
the two scenarios, a difference was evident for experts with the
mean dwell time greater during the seizure scenario than during
the coughing scenario (see Figure 3). In combination, these results
suggest that, although competent non-experts may recognize the
relative importance of signature features during different diag-
nostic scenarios, their pattern of interaction with these features
remains relatively consistent. This contrasts with expert clinicians
who appear to alter both the overall time that they devote to the
acquisition of information from signature features, together with
the pattern of acquisition.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The aim of this study was to examine the information acquisition
strategies employed by expert and competent non-expert inten-
sive care physicians during two diagnostic scenarios that differed in
FIGURE 2 | Mean total dwell time (ms) and standard error on the
“confederate nurse” for experts and competent non-experts,
distributed across the two scenarios.
FIGURE 3 | Mean total dwell time (ms) and standard error on the
“head and face” for experts and competent non-experts, distributed
across the two scenarios.
their immediate features, but incorporated a similar intrinsic etiol-
ogy. It was anticipated that where competent non-experts would
adopt a relatively consistent pattern of information acquisition
across the scenarios, experts would vary their approach consistent
with the differences in the immediate features that were presented.
The results revealed differences in overall mean fixation times
between experts and competent non-experts, with the former
maintaining visual gaze on AOIs for significantly longer periods.
Further, experts spent significantly more dwell time within the
“head and face” AOI and significantly less time within the “nurse”
AOI in comparison to competent non-experts.
The differential performance amongst experts and competent
non-experts during information acquisition is consistent with the
proposition that experts and competent non-experts differ in their
repertoire of cues in memory (Ericsson and Kintsch, 1995; Jaro-
dzka et al., 2010). Experts attended to the immediate visual features
associated with the patient (“head and face”), where competent
non-experts tended to spend a greater proportion of the time fix-
ated on the confederate nurse. Since this occurred independent
of scenarios, it might be surmised that experts were integrating
the auditory information being delivered by the confederate nurse
with the visual information that was evident from the head and
face of the manikin. It also implies that the“head and face”embod-
ied a greater level of diagnostic information than was available
from the nurse in isolation.
Despite the fact that, overall, experts tended to spend relatively
more time than competent non-experts attending to the “head
and face,” differences were evident in the mean dwell times across
the scenarios. For competent non-experts, the relative empha-
sis on the “head and face” and “nurse” did not change with the
change in scenario, suggesting that non-experts did not necessar-
ily discriminate between the scenarios based on the immediate
features.
As hypothesized, expert physicians recorded greater mean dwell
times on the “head and face” during the seizure scenario, than
during the coughing scenario. This reflects the potentially greater
utility of the “head and face” in yielding diagnostic information
during the coughing scenario. The dwell time for the “confeder-
ate nurse” did not change statistically for experts, possibly due
to a restriction of range associated with the mean dwell times.
In combination, the outcomes suggest that overall, experts spent
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more time examining cues arising from the “head and face” of
the patient, but that differences in the immediate features were
associated with differences in the time spent examining the cues.
Although the results confirm that experts differ from competent
non-experts in their acquisition of information during diagnostic
scenarios, it also suggests that their attention toward features in the
environment is influenced by the interaction between their task-
related experience and the immediate features that are present.
For example, it is possible that, for competent non-experts, the
situation was relatively unfamiliar and, therefore, they were seek-
ing information that would correspond to a relatively limited
number of patterns in memory. Since the “confederate nurse”
was delivering an initial assessment of the symptoms, and may
have experienced the event previously, directing attention toward
the nurse represents a reasonable strategy, where a scenario is
unfamiliar.
By contrast, experts possess a repertoire of cues in memory
and therefore, are drawn toward features that are implicitly diag-
nostic of a particular condition (Croskerry, 2009b). The relative
proportion of attention that is directed toward signature features
is consistent with a bottom-up recognition process, whereby the
environmental features trigger associations in memory, and a serial
process of pattern matching is undertaken until a corresponding
(or near to corresponding) pattern is identified (Patel and Groen,
1986; Klein, 2008).
At an applied level, the results suggest differences in the diag-
nostic strategies employed by experts and competent non-experts,
and there are implications for training. For example, the fact that
competent non-experts tended to attend to the nurse, suggests
that they lacked a repertoire of cues in memory, necessary to rec-
ognize and adapt to the differences in the immediate features that
were presented. This was not the case for experts who were able
to identify the immediate features associated with the different
scenarios and respond appropriately. One approach to the devel-
opment of cues in memory involves cue-based training in which
learners participate in a series of scenarios, the aim of which is
to establish the relationship between features and events/objects
in memory in the form of cues (Wiggins and O’Hare, 2003). The
utility of cue-based training has been established in other domains
(e.g., Auditors), and may be appropriate for diagnostic tasks in the
medical context (Earley, 2001).
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
While a weakness of this study is the relatively limited number
of participants, the fact that differences were observed between
experts and competent non-experts in relation to dwell times
points toward the underlying power of the effects that were
observed. Moreover, the study demonstrated that, in naturalistic
environments, where the number of features available is relatively
constrained and where the least experienced operators are in fact
competent, differences in information acquisition were evident.
Since the focus of this study was information acquisition behav-
ior during the initial assessment of a potentially deteriorating
patient, the complexity associated with therapeutic interventions
was excluded. Nevertheless, it is possible that a more extended
observation may have revealed new information in the attention
to cues, and the interactions with auditory and tactile stimuli.
While these stimuli, were experimentally controlled in the present
study, future research should be directed toward examining the
relative impact of communication, and the social processes that
are engaged by different groups of physicians. This builds on the
baseline data that has been established in the present study and
contributes to a broader understanding of non-visual stimuli or
cues, and the role of team and social interactions in the recognition
of the deteriorating child by skilled clinicians.
CONCLUSION
This study demonstrated differences in the information acqui-
sition behavior of experts and competent non-experts during
assessments of a deteriorating child during two in situ simulations.
Compared to competent non-experts, experts attended to specific
visual features for longer periods, and exhibited longer dwell times
on the manikin’s “head and face,” particularly during the seizure
scenario. By contrast, competent non-experts displayed longer
dwell times on the “confederate nurse.” These results were inter-
preted as evidence of differences between experts and competent
non-expert physicians’ diagnostic cues in memory. The methodol-
ogy offers a potential framework to develop behavioral standards
of cue acquisition and utilization that could ultimately be used
for the assessment of the diagnostic performance of physicians,
particularly in time-constrained situations.
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One crucial feature of expertise is the ability to spontaneously recognize where and
when knowledge can be applied to simplify task processing. Mental arithmetic is one
domain in which people should start to develop such expert knowledge in primary
school by integrating conceptual knowledge about mathematical principles and procedural
knowledge about shortcuts. If successful, knowledge integration should lead to transfer
between procedurally different shortcuts that are based on the same mathematical
principle and therefore likely are both associated to the respective conceptual knowledge.
Taking commutativity principle as a model case, we tested this conjecture in two
experiments with primary school children. In Experiment 1, we obtained eye tracking
data suggesting that students indeed engaged in search processes when confronted
with mental arithmetic problems to which a formerly feasible shortcut no longer
applied. In Experiment 2, children who were first provided material allowing for one
commutativity-based shortcut later profited from material allowing for a different shortcut
based on the same principle. This was not the case for a control group, who had first
worked on material that allowed for a shortcut not based on commutativity. The results
suggest that spontaneous shortcut usage triggers knowledge about different shortcuts
based on the same principle. This is in line with the notion of adaptive expertise linking
conceptual and procedural knowledge.
Keywords: expertise, numerical cognition, arithmetic, commutativity, spontaneous strategy application
INTRODUCTION
Expertise has various manifestations and could be defined as
consistently superior performance within a specific domain rel-
ative to novices and relative to other domains (Ericsson and
Lehmann, 1996). The development of expertise in real-world
domains involves a complex interplay of changes in perception,
categorization, memory, problem solving, coordination, skilled
action, and other components of human cognition (Palmeri et al.,
2004). Expert’s flexibility has been frequently discussed and there
exist two contradictory perspectives. Research on creativity and
skill acquisition has been used to illustrate that more knowl-
edge can make one less flexible (i.e., Luchins, 1942; Logan, 1988).
However, research on expertise suggested that experts are more
flexible and creative in their thought patterns (see summary in
Bilalić et al., 2008a). Both options might be possible depending on
the expertise level and the problem difficulty. Investigating chess
experts Bilalić et al. (2008a) found that “super experts” were flex-
ible and find the optimal solution first or at least find it quickly
after perceiving a salient but non-optimal solution.
Here, we focus in the domain of mathematics on spon-
taneously spotting and applying shortcuts in arithmetic and
whether with further experience students become increasingly
able to generate rapid adequate actions with less and less effort
(Ericsson, 2008). Mathematic students used significantly larger
numbers of appropriate strategies than adults with less expertise
(Dowker et al., 1996). Experts have to be able to recognize spon-
taneously and without instruction that a specific element of their
knowledgebase can be applied in a specific situation. It would not
suffice if they possessed elaborate conceptual knowledge as well
as procedures to apply it, but needed to wait for someone to tell
them that the knowledge can be applied in the given situation.
This someone would rarely drop by.
In recent years, research in primary school arithmetic has
started to tackle this issue for a domain in which everyone
should acquire elaborate knowledge. Learning about mathemati-
cal principles and procedures should lead to knowledge that can
be applied across a wide range of situations (e.g., Hatano and
Oura, 2003). Given the role of self-guided learning and perfor-
mance in the development of mathematical abilities and concepts,
recent studies have focused on the question how and when chil-
dren spontaneously recognize that an everyday situation can be
tackled by mathematical thinking (Hannula and Lehtinen, 2005;
Hannula et al., 2010; McMullen et al., 2011). Furthermore, chil-
dren should develop the skills necessary to flexibly spot and
apply shortcut strategies spontaneously. It is not sufficient if they
can apply a shortcut when explicitly told to do so. Adaptive
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expertise (Verschaffel et al., 2009) includes to autonomously reg-
ulate whether (a) to solve an arithmetic problem in a standard
way or to (b) search for / apply a shortcut.
Taking the commutativity principle as a model case, past
research has explored how children spontaneously spot and apply
shortcuts that allow saving effort in addition problems by flexibly
changing the order of addends. Wealth of research has shown that
children have at least some understanding of the concept of com-
mutativity before entering school (Baroody and Gannon, 1984;
Resnick, 1992; Cowan and Renton, 1996; Wilkins et al., 2001;
Canobi et al., 2003). After interviewing elementary school chil-
dren how they solved problems with two addends, (Baroody et al.,
1983) report an extensive use of commutativity. During develop-
ment children increasingly integrate conceptual knowledge about
mathematical principles and procedural knowledge about short-
cuts (Haider et al., 2014). Knowledge integration should lead to
transfer between procedurally different shortcuts that are based
on the same mathematical principle and therefore likely both
associated to the respective conceptual knowledge. In a first step,
(Gaschler et al., 2013) provided a correlative study to explore
this idea. They assessed spontaneous usage of two procedurally
different shortcuts that are both based on the commutativity
principle in children of different age. While shortcut usage was
observed from second grade onwards, correlations between the
usage of the two different shortcuts only emerged by grade four.
In the current study we aimed at moving beyond correlational
data. We tested whether being exposed to one commutativity-
based shortcut helps to spot and apply a different shortcut option
based on the same mathematical principle. Note that in a par-
allel line of research, we have observed that instructions do not
seem to do the job. Instructing children to use one specific short-
cut does hinder rather than assist them in spontaneously spotting
and applying a different shortcut based on the same mathemat-
ical principle later on (Godau et al., submitted). Instructions
about specific procedures might corrupt flexibility in shortcut
usage (cf. ErEl and Meiran, 2011). Even when participants knew
that a formerly instructed rule would no longer apply, they
found it difficult to search for different shortcut options (see also
Bilalić et al., 2008a,b; Bilalić and McLeod, 2014). Therefore, in
the current work we focused on spontaneous use of the strate-
gies. We explored whether it is possible to foster the discovery
and application of shortcut strategies by transfer between dif-
ferent non-instructed shortcut strategies that are based on the
same mathematical principle. Note that according to Baroody and
Gannon (1984) understanding of commutativity was not evident
in all those who invented shortcuts, but in all those who compre-
hend addition as a binary rather than as a unary operation. The
unary view would suggest that one number is added to another,
rather than that they are added together.
Specifically, the commutativity principle enables students to
flexibly change the order of addends within a problem. For
instance, given the problem 4 + 7 + 6, it might be easier to cal-
culate (6 + 4) +7 (6 + 4 adds up to 10 which makes it easy to
finally add 7, i.e., “Ten-strategy”). One can also use commutativ-
ity across problems. If, for instance, a student receives the problem
8 + 5 + 7 =?, and then 5 + 7 + 8 =?, he/she can refrain from
calculating the second problem presupposed he / she recognizes
the applicability of the commutativity principle (i.e., “addends-
compare strategy”). Three-addends problems were used, because
we wanted to investigate usage of the commutativity princi-
ple with unfamiliar problems. It is debatable if three-addends
problems imply only the commutativity principle or additionally
also the associativity principle. Associativity is the property that
problems in which terms are decomposed, and recombined in dif-
ferent ways, have the same answer [(a + b) + c = a + (b + c)]. In
the problems we used, children have to change the order of the
addends [a + b + c = (a + c) + b], because otherwise it is not
possible to add a + c first. Commutativity justifies changing the
order or sequence of the operands within an expression while
associativity does not.
In Experiment 1, we used eye tracking to explore how chil-
dren search and apply different commutativity-based shortcuts.
Verschaffel et al. (1994) presented third-graders with three-
addends problems and assessed eye movements combined with
verbal report and found that in 71% of all possible cases com-
mutativity was used. We used a different approach, as we rather
were interested in whether children spontaneously start search
processes when, after a change in the material one shortcut option
is no longer present. The findings suggested that being offered an
opportunity to apply one commutativity-based shortcut can help
to search for and apply a different shortcut based on the same
principle when the first one is no longer feasible. In Experiment 2,
we explored whether transfer from shortcut to shortcut might be
concept specific: on the one hand, it seems plausible that short-
cuts based on the same mathematical principle trigger each other
because they are linked to one-another directly or indirectly (as
they are both linked to the common conceptual knowledge). This
perspective is in line with research suggesting that mathemati-
cal knowledge develops in an iterative fashion, with conceptual
change influencing procedural change and vice versa (Byrnes and
Wasik, 1991; Hiebert and Wearne, 1996; Rittle-Johnson et al.,
2001; Waldmann, 2006). For instance, Canobi (2009) showed
that children’s conceptual advances were predicted by their ini-
tial procedural skills. On the other hand, transfer from shortcut
to shortcut might occur place for motivational reasons unrelated
to the specific shortcut and underlying mathematical principle.
After having experienced that task processing can be simplified
by a shortcut, one might be more apt to search for and apply any
shortcut, as one has learned that attractive shortcut options do
seem to exist in the material provided.
EXPERIMENT 1
In Experiment 1, we used eye tracking in order to explore the fix-
ation patterns reflecting the usage of shortcut strategies. We were
furthermore interested in how fixation patterns reflect how peo-
ple accommodate to being presented with new sets of arithmetic
problems within which the previously feasible shortcut no longer
applies (but instead a different shortcut). To this end, children at
first had to solve problems that could be facilitated by the ten-
strategy (of three addends, the first and the last add up to 10).
After that, they were presented with problems that allowed for
the use of the addends-compare strategy (some problems con-
tained the same addends as their precursor in different order).
Both strategies are based on the commutativity principle.
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METHOD EXPERIMENT 1
Participants
Twenty children participated in Experiment 1 (mean age 8.6
years). They were tested individually in a laboratory at Humboldt-
Universität, Berlin.
Procedure and Materials
Research procedures of these experiments were approved in a
peer review process for applying for public funding (German
Research Foundation, DFG) and were completed with approval of
the Institutional Review Board of the Department of Psychology
at Humboldt-Universität, Berlin. Students were informed about
the content of the study and that data analysis would preserve
anonymity. We ensured written informed consent of the parents.
Children were than tested individually with a 250 Hz video-based
eye tracker (SMI RED 250). Packages of six problems in black
on a gray background were shown on a 22 TFT monitor, with
the student sitting at approximately 50 cm distance. Digits were
approximately 0.5 cm wide and 1 cm tall.
Children started with a five-point calibration. Afterwards the
experimenter showed a single example problem and explained
that the children should utter the result as quickly and as accu-
rately as possible. Children started the main part by working on
two screens with six ten-strategy problems each (first and last
addend add up to 10). They then completed two screens with
addends-compare problems intermixed with baseline problems.
Two of six problems per screen contained identical addends in
different order as the preceding problem (problems listed in the
Supplementary materials). Each problem was presented in one
line and consisted of three different addends between 2 and 9
(maximum result was 24; 0 and 1 were excluded as addends). We
balanced problem size between the addends-compare problems
and the baseline problems so that they were equally difficult for
children unless they used the shortcut (for more details Gaschler
et al., 2013; Haider et al., 2014).
Children were presented the first screen (of two) with six ten-
strategy problems. The experimenter moved the cursor to the
right of the equal sign of the first problem and waited for an
answer. The answer was immediately entered as the time log of
the first key press served to determine the calculation time as
the span from the cursor allocation to the first (i.e., two-digit
results) key press of entering the result for the current problem.
After entering the answer, the experimenter moved the cursor to
the next problem. The entered results remained visible on the
screen while working on the remaining of the six problems of
the package. This was especially important for the work on the
two screens with addends-compare problems later on. If they had
spotted that the addends of a problem were the commuted version
of the preceding problem, that way they were provided with the
opportunity to access the solution they had given on the previous
problem.
RESULTS
The computerized assessment allowed to track solution times
on the level of single problems. As previously mentioned, stu-
dents calculated 12 ten-strategy problems (Screen 1 and 2) and
afterwards worked on yet another 12 problems, four of them
allowed for the addends-compare strategy (Screen 3 and 4).
Figure 1 shows the mean solution times per problem for each
screen. Students were faster on addends-compare problems as
compared to baseline problems. A 2 (screen: first vs. second) × 2
(problem type: addends-compare problem vs. baseline problem)
ANOVA with solution times as dependent variable revealed a sig-
nificant main effect of problem type, [F(1, 19) = 7.46, p = 0.01,
η2p = 0.28]. Neither the main effect of screen, [F(1, 19) = 1.67,
p = 0.21, η2p = 0.08], nor the interaction effect were significant,
[F(1, 19) = 0.72, p = 0.41, η2p = 0.04]. We did not find signifi-
cant effects when repeating the above analyses with error rate as
dependent variable (see Supplementary materials).
The analysis of the eye tracking data suggests that the ten-
strategy and the addends-compare strategy can be identified by
specific fixation patterns. Using the ten-strategy, adding the first
and last addend first to receive the result ten, should be fast and
necessitates little fixation time on the outer numbers. Adding
the middle number afterwards and uttering the result might
therefore result in more fixation time on the middle number rel-
ative to the other numbers. Figure 2 suggests that the percent
fixations falling on the middle vs. outer numbers of the three-
addends problems are distributed in line with this reasoning. The
percentage of fixations on the middle number increased from
the first to the second screen of the ten-strategy problems, as












































FIGURE 1 | Mean calculation time per arithmetic problem in Experiment 1. Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean.
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FIGURE 2 | Percent fixation frequency on second addend for
ten-strategy and addends-compare strategy booklets. The error bar
displays the standard error of the mean.
When the ten-strategy could no longer be used (first screen with
addends-compare problems), the percent fixations on the middle
digit were low again. Surprisingly, it increased on the second
screen with addends-compare problems. A 2 (screen: first vs. sec-
ond) × 2 (ten-strategy problems vs. addends-compare problems)
ANOVA with percentage of fixations falling on the middle num-
ber as dependent variable revealed a significant main effect for
strategy [F(1, 17) = 6.02, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.26]. Children fixated
the middle digit more in problems, in which the ten-strategy
could be used compared to problems on the addends-compare
screens. There was also a significant main effect of screen,
[F(1, 17) = 7.91, p = 0.01, η2p = 0.32], but no interaction, F < 1.
In the ten-strategy problems, addends should be checked
within a line in order to identify shortcut options. In contrast,
for the addends-compare strategy, it is necessary to compare the
addends between the lines. Children should thus not only fix-
ate the addition problem they are currently solving but also the
previous one or the subsequent one in order to check whether
a set of addends repeats. Figure 3 presents the mean differences
between (a) line fixated and (b) line of current problem. If, for
instance, a student during solving a problem was fixating back on
the problem in the line before, this would lead to a value of −1 for
this particular fixation. While the majority of fixations were on
the line of the current problem, some fixations were directed at
previous (negative difference) or subsequent (positive difference)
problems. We focused on comparing the above index of fixation
position between the addends-compare problems and their pre-
ceding problems. Thus, addends are identical and only differ in
order. We found a significant difference in the index of fixation
position for these problems. In line with our assumption, students
were fixating ahead on problems preceding the addends-compare
problems and fixating back, once a set with identical addends was
discovered, [t(18) = 5.44, p < 0.001].
In addition to identifying eye movement patterns that are spe-
cific for the shortcuts we found a significant correlation between
the increase of the fixation on the middle digit in the ten-
strategy problems (Screen 2—Screen 1) and the time benefit on
addends-compare strategy problems r = 0.49, p = 0.05. Thus,
increased usage of the commutativity-based shortcut offered on
Screen 1 and Screen 2 might help in spotting and applying the
other commutativity-based shortcut offered on Screen 3 and 4.
DISCUSSION
Providing children with the opportunity to spontaneously (with-
out instruction or other hints) use one commutativity-based
shortcut might help them to spot and apply another shortcut
based on the same mathematical principle once the first one does
no longer apply. Furthermore, the eye tracking data are in line
with the interpretation that search processes might start once one
shortcut no longer applies. We found that children in some cases
checked addends of subsequent addition problems in advance
(i.e., before uttering the result to the current problem and the
allocation of the cursor to the next problem). Note that this
implies that the accuracy to attribute calculation time to specific
arithmetic problems might be limited in setups in which multi-
ple problems are simultaneously presented. Such arrangements
resemble work on arithmetic problems on worksheets in the
schooling context. Eye tracking or reliance on aggregate measures
from paper-and-pencil versions might both be useful approaches
to this variant of the dilemma of external vs. internal validity.
Experiment 1 provided a first hint in line with the idea that
there might be transfer from one shortcut to another one. This
suggests two different explanations. On the one hand, sponta-
neously spotting and applying shortcuts on Screen 1 and 2 might
affect processing of Screens 3 and 4 on a motivational route.
Participants learn that shortcut options seem to exist and can be
exploited. This would suggest that such transfer could take place
from any easily identifiable shortcut to a second one. On the other
hand, transfer might involve specific mathematical knowledge. It
might first and foremost take place between shortcuts based on
the same mathematical principle. We tried to disentangle these
two perspectives in Experiment 2.
EXPERIMENT 2
This experiment focused on the question if the ten-strategy facil-
itated the usage of the addends-compare shortcut. For this pur-
pose, we compared three conditions: students in the ten-strategy
warm-up condition started with the ten-strategy problems fol-
lowed by problems that allowed for applying the addends-
compare strategy (similar to Experiment 1). In the baseline
warm-up condition, children worked on material with no short-
cut option at all before being transferred to the addends-compare
booklet. The inversion warm-up condition started with inver-
sion problems (e.g., 9 + 2 − 2). Thus, a shortcut not based on
the commutativity principle was offered first. This was impor-
tant in order to test whether all shortcut strategies would alter
the usage of the addends-compare shortcut simply by motivation
children to look for shortcuts. Alternatively, it might be that only
the ten-strategy increases the probability to spot the addends-
compare strategy, as it is the only shortcut strategy, which is
also based on the commutativity principle. It is conceivable that
offering problems with an easy-to-find shortcut option (inversion
or ten-strategy) might lead students to assume that it is worth-
while to search for shortcut options in general in later material.
This could accordingly lead to transfer which is simply based on
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FIGURE 3 | Mean difference between current line fixated and line of current problem. Negative values indicate fixations on preceding problems while positive
values result from fixations on subsequent problems. Error bars indicate the 95% CI of the comparison of addends-compare problems vs. preceding problems.
the motivation to search for shortcuts. In contrast, a finding of
transfer for the ten-strategy problems but not for the inversion
problems would suggest that indeed triggering the basic principle
of commutativity is important for transfer to occur.
METHOD EXPERIMENT 2
Participants
We tested 153 children at the end of second grade (most of them
were taught in combined classes of first and second grade) and
140 children in third grade. We ensured written informed con-
sent of the parents in collaboration with the schools. Either group
was provided with advance information concerning the content
of the study (calculating mental arithmetic problems) and was
informed that participation was voluntary. Parents and students
were also informed that data analysis would preserve anonymity.
Data were acquired in a classroom setting with paper and pencil.
Gender was balanced as much as possible. Eleven children (sec-
ond grade) and 20 children from the third grade were excluded
by median ± 3 MADs. The MAD is a robust method to detect
outliers by using absolute deviation from the median; for further
information see (Leys et al., 2013). For the descriptive data of the
sample see Table 1.
Procedure and Materials
The arithmetic problems were the same as in Experiment 1 and
are listed in the Supplementary materials. Each problem was
presented in one line and consisted of three different addends
between 2 and 9 (maximum result was 24; 0 and 1 were
excluded as addends). The different types of problems were
presented as a paper pencil test in separate booklets. As depen-
dent variable we measured the number of problems solved in
the booklet that allowed vs. the booklet that did not allow for
the addends-compare strategy. We took care that the amount
of time provided per booklet was not sufficient to solve all
problems so that we could use number of problems solved per
time as a dependent variable (see Table 1 for time provided per
booklet).
Table 1 | Sample data and time provided per booklet in Experiment 2.
Grade Condition/ Outliers N Mean Seconds for
warm-up (female) age (SD) addends-compare
booklets
2 Ten-strategy 4 48 (25) 7.1 (0.69) 240
Baseline 1 49 (26) 7.1 (0.72)
Inversion 6 45 (25) 7.1 (0.62)
3 Ten-strategy 5 41 (24) 8.0 (0.35) 180*
Baseline 7 40 (20) 8.2 (0.71)
Inversion 8 39 (25) 7.8 (0.64)
*We started with 210 s and than reduced it after testing one group of students
in order to avoid ceiling effects.
Experimental conditions differed in the warm-up booklet.
The ten-strategy warm-up started with problems in which chil-
dren could use the ten-strategy. The baseline warm-up conditions
started with addition problems of comparable size, but that did
not include any option for applying the commutativity princi-
ple to solve the problems (e.g., 4 + 3 + 5 or 7 + 6 + 2). A second
control condition, the inversion warm-up condition, started with
problems that allowed for a shortcut, but, importantly, not for
a commutativity-based one. Inversion problems (e.g., 9 + 2 − 2)
allow refraining from calculation by comparing the numbers
involved in the problem mixing addition and subtraction. Thus,
while the ten-strategy and addends-compare strategy are both
based on the same arithmetic principle, inversion and addends-
compare are not. However, on the surface the latter two shortcuts
are similar as they both enables students to avoid calculation alto-
gether (in contrast, the ten-strategy does reduce instead of avoid
calculation demands).
After the warm-up phase, all children worked on five more
booklets. Starting with (1) a booklet, where the addends-compare
strategy could be used, they then were presented (2) a baseline
booklet with no shortcut opportunities, followed by (3) another
booklet, where the addends-compares strategy could be used.
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This second addends-compare booklet was applied as we had
obtained high variability across students as well as large general
practice effects in the first booklets in earlier work (Gaschler et al.,
2013). Booklets 4 and 5 served the purpose to control whether the
induced shortcut is known and would be used (see Table 2). The
children in the ten-strategy warm-up condition received another
booklet with addition problems allowing for the ten-strategy (4)
plus afterwards a matched baseline booklet (5). This was also the
case for children of the control condition with the baseline warm-
up. The children of the inversion warm-up condition worked
for the second time on a booklet with inversion problems (4)
followed by a matched baseline booklet (5).
Students were instructed to solve the problems as quickly and
as correctly as possible. The time for each booklet was fixed and
we counted the number of problems solved and errors. Students
were additionally informed that it would be almost impossible
to solve all problems during the period of time given for each
booklet. As dependent measure we calculated the average time per
problem on addends-compare booklets as compared to baseline
booklets.
RESULTS
After the short warm-up phase, children were still rather slow in
calculating the first set of addends-compare booklets and between
students variability was rather high (see Table 3). On closer exam-
ination, we found that the practice effects were stronger than the
effect of problem type. For further analysis we focused on the sec-
ond addends-compare booklet. We first analyzed the effects of our
different warm-up phases on the addends-compare problems. For
calculating the addends-compare benefit in second graders, we
subtracted for each child the average solution time per problem
in Booklet 3 (addends-compare strategy) from the average time
Table 2 | The order of the booklets in Experiment 2.
Condition/
Warm-up











per problem in Booklet 2 (baseline). The benefits are depicted
in Figure 4 separately for each of the three conditions in sec-
ond and third graders. In addition, Table 3 presents the average
time per problem for every booklet for the second and third
grade.
For the second graders with the ten-strategy warm-up phase,
we observed a significant benefit on the addends-compare strat-
egy problems compared to baseline problems t(47) = 2.48, p =
0.05. Second graders with the warm-up problems not allow-
ing for any shortcut did not benefit from the addends-compare
booklets relative to the baseline booklets. The inversion prob-
lems group also did not show such a benefit either. Third
graders, however, seemed to use the addends-compare strategy
in every warm-up condition. Each of the three warm-up groups
significantly benefitted from the addends-compare strategy [ten-
strategy: t(40) = 2.64, p = 0.05; baseline: t(39) = 3.71, p = 0.001;
inversion: t(38) = 3.79, p = 0.001]. The time used to solve the
addends-compare strategy problems was shorter than that needed
to calculate the baseline problems.
We calculated a 2 (problem type: baseline vs. addends-
compare booklet) × 3 (warm-up condition: ten-strategy vs.
baseline vs. inversion warm-up) × 2 (grade: second vs. third
grade) mixed ANOVA with mean benefit time as dependent
variable. This ANOVA yield significant main effects of prob-
lem type [F(1, 256) = 14.98, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.055] and grade
[F(1, 256) = 38.44, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.131] and a significant three-
way interaction of problem type × warm-up condition × grade
[F(2, 256) = 3.75, p = 0.05, η2p = 0.028]. We found neither a sig-
nificant main effect for warm-up condition, nor other interaction
effects (see Table 4). The three-way interaction suggests that
the different warm-up phases differentially affected second and
third graders. Whereas the ten-strategy warm-up increased the
probability of applying the addends-compare strategy in second
graders, it did not in third graders. The results suggest that short-
cut to shortcut transfer specific to the underlying mathematical
principle was observed in second graders. Third graders, on the
other hand, maybe spontaneously used the addends-compare
shortcut anyways and thus did not profit from a prior task with a
conceptually related shortcut.
One could argue that second graders did not show trans-
fer from an inversion warm-up to addends-compare prob-
lems, because they did not discover the shortcut option in the
Table 3 | Mean time per problem and standard deviation analyzed for booklet type and grade in Experiment 2.
Grade Condition Warm-up Booklet 1: Booklet 2: Booklet 3: Benefit Booklet 4: Booklet 5:
Addends-compare Baseline Addends-compare (baseline—addends- Same as Baseline (2)
strategy (1) strategy (2) compare strategy (2)) warm-up*
2 Ten-strategy 26.4 (26.8) 28.1 (34.6) 25.2 (23.0) 20.1 (12.0) 5.1 (14.3) 21.9 (22.7) 18.4 (9.2)
Baseline 23.8 (15.2) 28.3 (24.3) 22.9 (13.4) 22.6 (14.6) 0.3 (5.7) 23.0 (18.4) 22.0 (18.3)
Inversion 26.3 (29.0) 28.2 (20.4) 25.0 (19.6) 24.4 (16.6) 0.6 (10.7) 17.8 (24.9) 24.4 (21.7)
3 Ten-strategy 10.4 (3.9) 13.2 (3.3) 13.5 (3.7) 12.4 (3.6) 1.1 (2.7) 11.1 (4.6) 12.3 (5.6)
Baseline 13.9 (7.4) 14.6 (4.5) 15.8 (5.8) 13.3 (2.9) 2.4 (4.2) 13.2 (7.3) 13.4 (5.5)
Inversion 12.3 (10.3) 15.6 (8.1) 15.8 (6.3) 13.4 (4.5) 2.4 (3.9) 5.9 (5.7) 13.1 (8.2)
*See Table 2.
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inversion problems. Our manipulation checks do not support
this alternative explanation. We analyzed the Booklets 4 and 5
(induction shortcut—and respective baseline). The results sug-
gested that students were capable of using the inversion strategy
(see Table 5). For the second graders, a 2 (Booklet 4 vs. 5) × 3
(warm-up condition) ANOVA revealed a significant interaction
effect of both factors, [F(2, 139) = 3.20, p = 0.05, η2p = 0.044]. It
depended on the warm-up condition, whether the shortcut in
Booklet 4 was used.
For the third graders we also found an interaction effect
of Booklet 4 vs. 5 and warm-up condition, [F(2, 117) = 15.41;
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.208]. While there was a pronounced inversion
effect, surprisingly, neither baseline warm-up condition nor the
ten-strategy warm-up condition showed a ten-strategy effect in
the booklets administered at the end of the experiment. We did
not find relevant effects when repeating the above analyses with
error rate as dependent variable, but needless to say we found
different error rates in grade two and three (see Supplementary
materials).
DISCUSSION
In Experiment 2, we tested whether it is possible to make stu-


































FIGURE 4 | The mean benefit in seconds of booklets allowing for the
addends-compare strategy compared to baseline booklets for the
three different warm-up conditions (ten-strategy, baseline and
inversion) for the second grade (dark gray) and the third grade (light
gray) in Experiment 2. The error bar displays the 95% confidence interval
of the comparison with zero benefit.
an easy-to-find shortcut strategy based on the same mathemat-
ical principle vs. one based on a different principle. Our findings
suggest that in second graders, transfer was related to the math-
ematical principle rather than to general motivational factors.
There was no indication that second graders were motivated to
search for and apply any shortcuts after being offered the first
one. If the additional conceptual link between the two differ-
ent strategies is the reason for the transfer, this would support
understanding of adaptive expertise as the ability to apply mean-
ingfully learned procedures flexibly and creatively (Hatano and
Oura, 2003). The inversion warm-up phase—an easy-to-find
shortcut that is not based on commutativity—did not lead to
increased usage of the addends-compare strategy. While inver-
sion did not promote transfer, our manipulation check suggested
that inversion was indeed used. This is in line with Robinson and
Dubé (2009) who found that the inversion shortcut is easier to
apply than associativity (which is similar to commutativity). In
both studies (Robinson and Dubé, 2009; Dubé and Robinson,
2010), inversion shortcut use was far more frequent than the
associativity-based strategy. Focusing on commutativity as model
case a limitation of the experiment is that we so far only used one
shortcut not based on commutativity (i.e., inversion) in order to
differentiate between transfer effects based on motivation vs. on
mathematical principles shared by subsequently offered shortcut
options. For instance, it would be interesting to know whether
the current setup can be turned around with inversion usage as
dependent variable and commutativity vs. inversion warm-up as
independent variable (cf. Dowker, 2014). Generalizability beyond
the specific pairing of shortcuts tested here might for instance
depend upon the relative difficulty of shortcuts used as warm-up
and dependent variable.
While the results suggest that second graders profited from
shortcut-to-shortcut transfer based on commutativity, third
graders did not seem to benefit from such extra scaffolding.
Spontaneous usage of the addends-compare strategy was not
improved further by a warm-up condition with a shortcut-option
based on the same mathematical principle. We assume that in
this age group, the concept of commutativity is more developed
so that extra support is less needed. With further experience,
students become increasingly able to rapidly generate adequate
actions with less and less effort (Ericsson, 2008). In line with
these findings, differences between second and third graders in
their mathematical abilities are mirrored in functional changes of
the brain. Rosenberg-Lee et al. (2011) examined the behavioral
Table 4 | Experiment 2: Results of the ANOVA problem type × grade × condition.
F p η2p
Main effect: Problem type (addends-compare strategy vs. baseline) 14.98 0.00 0.06
Grade 38.44 0.00 0.13
Warm-up condition 0.49 0.61 0.00
Inter action: Problem type (addends-compare strategy) × grade 0.00 0.96 0.00
Problem type (addends-compare strategy) × warm-up condition 1.57 0.21 0.01
Warm-up condition × grade 0.14 0.87 0.00
Problem type (addends-compare strategy) × warm-up condition × grade 3.75 0.02 0.03
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Table 5 | Results of the ANOVA problem type × condition separately for grade 2 and 3.
Grade 2 Grade 3
F p η2p F p η
2
p
Main effect: Problem type (addends-compare strategy) 4.92 0.03 0.03 35.04 0.00 0.23
Warm-up condition 0.23 0.80 0.00 1.95 0.15 0.03
Inter action: Problem type (addends-compare strategy) × warm-up condition 2.97 0.06 0.04 1.73 0.18 0.03
and neurodevelopmental changes between grades 2 and 3 and
found that arithmetic complexity was associated with regions
implicated in domain-general cognitive control but also regions
for numerical arithmetic processing. The results showed that
brain response and connectivity relating to an arithmetic task
significantly change within the narrow 1-year interval.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We presume that one crucial feature of expertise is the ability
to spontaneously recognize where and when knowledge can be
applied to simplify task processing. In some domains, it is neces-
sary for everyday life to develop this ability. Research of expertise
showed that experts are more flexible and creative in their thought
pattern. For instance, “super experts” were more flexible to find
an optimal solution despite distraction by a non-optimal but
salient solution of a chess problem (Bilalić et al., 2008a). Players
at lower levels of expertise reported that they were looking for a
better solution, but their eye movements showed that they con-
tinued to look at features related to the solution they had already
thought of (Bilalić et al., 2008b). For expertise in object recog-
nition, Harel et al. (2013) developed an interactive framework,
which posits that expertise emerges from multiple interactions
within and between the visual system and other cognitive sys-
tems, such as top-down attention and conceptual memory. The
interplay between these other, multiple cognitive processes and
perception are often not consciously accessible for the experts
themselves (Palmeri et al., 2004).
In some parts of arithmetic, procedural and conceptual knowl-
edge start to develop even before primary school. In the first years
of primary school, integration of different fragments of procedu-
ral and conceptual knowledge should lead to a knowledge base
that allows to spontaneously spot and apply shortcut options
already in primary school. If successful, knowledge integration
should lead to transfer between procedurally different shortcuts
that are based on the same mathematical principle and therefore
likely are both associated to the respective conceptual knowledge.
For the case of commutativity, we tested whether different strate-
gies that are based on the same principle trigger each other via the
concept and so could support flexibility in strategy use. According
to the adaptive expertise metaphor (e.g., Hatano, 1988; Star and
Rittle-Johnson, 2008; Verschaffel et al., 2009) children first of all
need to spontaneously recognize where knowledge can be applied.
Experiment 1 provided first evidence that children who are
provided an opportunity to spontaneously spot and apply one
shortcut might be more inclined to search for and use a sec-
ond shortcut, once the first one no longer applies. This is
in line with the suggestion to differentiate between (a) quick
and accurate routine-based solving from (b) an adaptive use
of solution strategies, which draws upon conceptual under-
standing (Hatano, 1988). Experiment 2 verified that transfer
occurred from one shortcut to another. It furthermore speci-
fied that this transfer effect was not only based on motivation.
While we obtained transfer (at least in second graders) from
one commutativity-based shortcut to another commutativity-
based shortcut, no transfer was observed between inversion
and commutativity. Thus, our results are in line with the view
that links between different elements of procedural knowl-
edge and potentially conceptual knowledge (compare Haider
et al., 2014) are used to spontaneously spot and apply shortcut
options.
Several studies on commutativity have shown that children
have at least some understanding of the concept of commutativity
before entering school (Siegler, 1989; Resnick, 1992; Cowan and
Renton, 1996; Wilkins et al., 2001; Canobi et al., 2003) and already
first graders seem to understand the commutativity principle
(Canobi et al., 2002). We thus focused on triggering the usage of
knowledge rather than knowledge acquisition as such. In primary
school, children should link different strategies based on the same
concept and develop the ability to select an efficient strategy for
the current problem (Verschaffel et al., 2009). As implied by these
authors in the adaptive expertise metaphor, the learner should be
able to spot and apply options for a shortcut independently with-
out having to rely on instruction or explicit cues. In a similar vein,
research on skill acquisition and expertise stresses the importance
of linking perceptual skills and principle-knowledge in order to
be able to spontaneously spot and apply shortcuts (e.g., Gentner
and Toupin, 1986; Koedinger and Anderson, 1990; Haider and
Frensch, 1996; Anderson and Schunn, 2000; Bilalić et al., 2008a;
Frensch and Haider, 2008). Adaptive strategy use can be regarded
as the ability to select procedures that can simplify the solution of
a problem (Selter, 2009). In the end the person should be faster
and/or the solution should be more accurate. Strategy use can
be seen as an indicator for the state of development of a mathe-
matical concept. Adaptive strategy use necessitates shifts between:
(a) calculating problems in the general mode (b) investing some
time and effort to search for shortcut options, and (c) using a
shortcut option. We are interested in factors that can tip the bal-
ance on the exploitation-exploration continuum. Experts know
when to search for a new shortcut strategy and when not, children
have to learn how much time and effort they want to spend for
searching. Teachers etc. cannot sustainably take over the regula-
tion of this dilemma calculating in standard way or flexible change
strategies—they can only help children to calibrate the balance
between flexibility vs. stability (or exploration vs. exploitation).
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We have to acknowledge that the effects of spontaneously using
a shortcut were small in many cases of the current experiments
and the variability across students was large. This is to be expected
when taking into account the difference between competence
and performance (i.e., principle knowledge and application).
Larger estimates of both procedural and conceptual knowledge
have been obtained when knowledge was probed more directly
(Prather and Alibali, 2009). Direct probing, however, does con-
vey to the students that and which shortcut options exist. It
is therefore not suitable when trying to measure the extent
to which knowledge about a mathematical principle is applied
spontaneously (cf. Haider et al., 2014). In addition, Robinson
and Dubé (2012) have suggested that personality characteris-
tics bridge between knowledge and application. They argued
that some children have more positive attitudes toward accepting
strategies that are highly efficient but are novel to their cur-
rent strategy repertoire of algorithmic approaches. In a similar
vein, (Guerrero and Palomaa, 2012) highlighted that some chil-
dren change their strategies during calculation while some do
not. Furthermore, children change their strategies for different
reasons. It is not always the goal to choose the most efficient
strategy (Newton et al., 2010) suggested that flexibility involves
the use of strategies, which are considered the most appropri-
ate for a given problem. They also discussed what “appropriate”
means. It could be the most efficient or the most understand-
able strategy in a given situation. Which strategy in general is
used depends on the problem, the numbers presented and other
contextual, developmental, or personal factors (Newton et al.,
2010; Guerrero and Palomaa, 2012). An U-shaped relationship
between knowledge/understanding and variety of strategy use
suggests that novices as well as experts may use a large vari-
ety of strategies (Siegler and Jenkins, 1989; Dowker et al., 1996).
Experts like mathematic students used large numbers of appro-
priate strategies (Dowker et al., 1996) whereas children (novices)
may use a large variety of appropriate and inappropriate strate-
gies, because they have not yet acquired a small set of well-learned
strategies (Dowker et al., 1996). In contrast to this assumption
Newton et al. (2010) argued that low achieving students might
be particularly appreciative and excited about a focus on multiple
strategies to compare the possible ways to solve the problem and
maximize the accuracy. Although the idea is prominent that an
educational approach for low achieving children should promote
routine mastery of a single well-thought solution strategy for a
given type of problems (e.g.,Woodward and Baxter, 1997; Baxter
et al., 2001). Future work should explore how students at differ-
ent ability levels profit from sequences of problems allowing for
different shortcuts based on the same mathematical principle.
In order to optimize the chances to measure spontaneous (i.e.,
no cues and no instruction) recruitment of knowledge about
the commutativity principle we chose a paper-and-pencil test in
the classroom in Experiment 2. Our informal observations sug-
gest that children taking part in an eye tracking study on mental
arithmetic appreciate that the measurement is (not only) about
whether they solve the problems correctly, but also on how they
solve them. The paper-and-pencil method was closer to usual
test situations in the classroom. Children focused on being fast
and accurate rather than on the fact that someone might be
trying to assess how they solved the problems. Verschaffel et al.
(2009) highlighted the importance of ecological validity for stud-
ies on adaptive expertise. We suggest that trial-by-trial process
measures (as in our eye tracking experiment) and ecologically
valid but less sensitive methods (as in Experiment 2) should be
combined to convey the full picture. For instance, eye tracking
can help to figure out whether increased time demands after a
change in shortcut option reflect prolonged solution times or,
alternatively, a mixture of prolonged solution times plus time
invested in search for alternative shortcut options. Potentially,
learners at different levels of expertise might differ in both the
efficiency in spotting shortcuts as well as in using them. For
instance, third graders might have discovered the options for
the addends-compare shortcut relatively quickly even without a
fitting warm-up condition.
In line with the research on adaptive expertise Verschaffel et al.
(2009) or Star and Rittle-Johnson (2008) defined flexibility in
problem solving as knowledge of multiple strategies and their
relative efficiency. In addition to weighing different strategies
according to their efficiency, students need to weigh the potential
costs and benefits of flexible strategy usage. There are time costs
of switching between strategies, once a shortcut option has been
discovered (Lemaire and Lecacheur, 2010). Luwel et al. (2009)
found longer response times but no reduced accuracy and the
size of these switching costs varied as a function of the associa-
tive strength between a strategy and a particular problem. More
importantly, there is a dilemma between (a) investing time and
attention in order to spot potential shortcut options that might or
might not exist and (b) using processing strategies readily avail-
able (e.g., Jepma and Nieuwenhuis, 2011). Thus, process measures
that provide evidence on when, how and to what extent stu-
dents invest in spotting and applying shortcuts (Haider and Rose,
2007) are necessary in order to better understand the bases of
the transfer effect observed in Experiment 2. To illustrate the
search process, we additionally used eye tracking assessment in
the Experiment 1. On the one hand this is a more specific method
than paper pencil and on the other hand we could measure the
shift of attention. The eye tracking results are in line with the view
of (Robinson and LeFevre, 2012). For discovering new strategies,
children need to shift their attention to the relevant part of the
problem. The eye movement patterns were different for the dif-
ferent shortcut strategies and fit to the points of interests of the
according strategies.
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The Einstellung effect is the counterintuitive finding that prior experience or domain-specific
knowledge can under some circumstances interfere with problem solving performance.
This effect has been demonstrated in several domains of expertise including medicine and
chess. In the present study we explored this effect in the context of a simplified anagram
problem solving task. Participants solved anagram problems while their eye movements
were monitored. Each problem consisted of six letters: a central three-letter string whose
letters were part of the solution word, and three additional individual letters. Participants
were informed that one of the individual letters was a distractor letter and were asked to find
a five-letter solution word. In order to examine the impact of stimulus familiarity on problem
solving performance and eye movements, the central letter string was presented either as
a familiar three-letter word, or the letters were rearranged to form a three-letter nonword.
Replicating the classic Einstellung effect, overall performance was better for nonword than
word trials. However, participants’ eye movements revealed a more complex pattern of
both interference and facilitation as a function of the familiarity of the central letter string.
Specifically, word trials resulted in shorter viewing times on the central letter string and
longer viewing times on the individual letters than nonword trials. These findings suggest
that while participants were better able to encode and maintain the meaningful word stimuli
in working memory, they found it more challenging to integrate the individual letters into
the central letter string when it was presented as a word.
Keywords: eye movements, problem solving, anagrams, Einstellung effect, insight problems
INTRODUCTION
The concept that stimulus familiarity and previously acquired
domain knowledge might impair problem solving performance
has been referred to by a variety of interrelated terms including
functional fixedness, negative transfer, mental set, and Einstel-
lung. Functional fixedness refers to cases where familiarity with
habitual uses of objects blocks other uses from being consid-
ered. For example, in the classic “candle-box” insight problem
introduced by Duncker (1945) the presented use of the box as a
container is hypothesized to interfere with the required consid-
eration of the box as a shelf for supporting the candle. Similarly,
negative transfer refers to the notion that the retrieval of pre-
viously acquired stimulus–response associations can impair the
establishment and maintenance of new stimulus-response associ-
ations (e.g., Schultz, 1960; Sweller, 1980; Chrysikou and Weisberg,
2005; Landrum, 2005; Osman, 2008). Finally, a problem solving
set or mental set refers to the negative impact of prior exposure
to similar problems (either pre-experimental or during the exper-
iment), which triggers a familiar but inappropriate solution and
prevents alternative solutions from being considered. The Ein-
stellung effect (Einstellung is German for attitude), which was
originally demonstrated by Luchins’ (1942) seminal series of water
jar experiments, constitutes an excellent illustration of the nega-
tive impact of a mental set (for a review see Bilalić and McLeod,
2014). In this paradigm, habitual approaches to problem solv-
ing are induced through exposure to multiple problems that have
similar solution methods. When a problem is subsequently pre-
sented for which the habitual solution method is not appropriate,
many participants claim that the problem is unsolvable. However,
naive participants can find the solution quickly, thus showing
that the problem is not intrinsically difficult and that the diffi-
culty experienced by solvers reflects the negative impact of prior
experience.
When considered in the context of human expertise, the idea
that prior experience and stimulus familiarity might interfere
with problem solving performance seems at first blush to be
rather counterintuitive. This is because there is a large body of
research demonstrating that stimulus familiarity and domain-
specific knowledge acquired through extensive and deliberate
practice underlie the superior performance of experts relative to
their less skilled counterparts (for a review see Ericsson and Char-
ness, 1994). However, experts are not immune to the negative
impact of prior experience and stimulus familiarity as demon-
strated in studies of expertise in medicine (de Graaff, 1989;
Croskerry, 2003; Gordon and Franklin, 2003) and chess (Saar-
iluoma, 1992; Reingold et al., 2001b; Bilalić et al., 2008a,b, 2010;
Sheridan and Reingold, 2013; Bilalić and McLeod, 2014). For
example, Bilalić et al. (2008a) employed eye movement moni-
toring to study the Einstellung effect in chess experts. Players
were required to find a checkmate with the fewest number of
moves. There were two possible solutions: a familiar five-move
sequence and a less well-known three-move sequence (the optimal
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solution). After identifying the familiar solution, expert chess play-
ers reported that they were searching for the optimal one. However,
the eye movement record revealed that their attention continued
to be directed more often towards chess board regions involved in
the familiar rather than the optimal solution. Thus, it appears that
the Einstellung effect demonstrated in chess experts was due to
the familiar scenario activating a schema in memory that directs
attention towards information relevant to itself, and away from
other information (Bilalić et al., 2008a, 2010; Bilalić and McLeod,
2014).
In the present study, in order to further investigate the neg-
ative influence of stimulus familiarity on problem solving, we
monitored participants’ eye movements while they performed a
modified anagram problem solving task that was introduced by
Ellis et al. (2011). Anagram tasks provide a unique opportunity to
study the Einstellung effect in a domain of expertise possessed
by most adults, that is, their familiarity with words. In addi-
tion, unlike most problem solving tasks that were employed to
study the Einstellung effect, the use of anagrams allows for the
creation of a large number of independent trials in which an
Einstellung effect might occur. Anagrams have long been used
to study insight problem solving (for a review see Ellis et al.,
2011) as well as to demonstrate the negative impact of a men-
tal set on problem solving performance (e.g., Rees and Israel,
1935; Maltzman and Morrisett, 1952; Kaplan and Schoenfeld,
1966; Juola and Hergenhahn, 1967). In particular, it has been
established (e.g., Beilin and Horn, 1962; Ekstrand and Domi-
nowski, 1965, 1968; Tresselt and Mayzner, 1965; Mayzner and
Tresselt, 1966) that solution rates are lower and response times
are slower when the solution word (e.g., HEART) is scram-
bled to create a word anagram (e.g., EARTH) than a nonword
anagram (e.g., THREA). It is likely that the familiar word ana-
gram produces activation (orthographic, phonological, lexical,
and/or semantic) that is irrelevant to the solution and hin-
ders the decomposition and restructuring operations that are
required to produce the solution word (e.g., Hollingworth, 1935;
Devnich, 1937).
The present investigation involved eye movement monitor-
ing during anagram problem solving. As illustrated in Figure 1,
the anagram task we used consisted of six uppercase letters: a
centrally located three-letter string, plus three individual letters
positioned above and to either side of the central letter string.
The central letter string could be arranged either as a familiar
three-letter word, or as a meaningless string of three letters. Par-
ticipants were asked to produce a five-letter solution word, and
were informed that one of the individual letters was a distractor
letter that was not part of the solution word. Using a similar ana-
gram task, Ellis et al. (2011) reported that near the beginning of
trials, viewing times on the distractor and solution letters were
indistinguishable, meaning that participants did not immediately
perceive that the distractor letter was irrelevant to the solution.
Towards the end of trials, viewing times on the distractor letter
decreased relative to the solution letters, indicating that partial
solution knowledge had developed, and this change occurred sev-
eral seconds prior to solution. Importantly, the pattern of viewing
times was the same regardless of whether or not participants
reported a subjective experience of insight upon solution, thereby
FIGURE 1 | Examples of the anagram problem stimulus display, shown
with the central letter string arranged as a word (A) and as a
meaningless letter string (B), and an illustration of the circular interest
areas within which fixations were assigned to the individual letters or
the central letter string, shown here as Xs (C). The solution to the
anagram problems is TOUCH.
demonstrating a dissociation between the subjective experience of
insight and the objective accumulation of solution knowledge. In
the present study we expected to replicate the pattern reported
by Ellis et al. (2011). In addition, based on previous findings
with anagrams (e.g., Beilin and Horn, 1962; Ekstrand and Domi-
nowski, 1965, 1968; Tresselt and Mayzner, 1965; Mayzner and
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Tresselt, 1966) we predicted better problem solving performance
when the central letter string was presented as a nonword than
a word. Finally, we explored differences in the pattern of look-




Sixty undergraduates from the University of Toronto Mississauga
participated in exchange for partial course credit or $10. All partic-
ipants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and were fluent
English speakers.
APPARATUS
An SR Research EyeLink 1000 eye tracking system was used
to record participants’ eye movements with a sampling rate of
1000 Hz. The stimuli were displayed on a 19-inch Viewsonic
monitor with a refresh rate of 75 Hz and a screen resolution of
1024 × 768. Participants were seated 60 cm from the display and
used a chinrest with a head support to minimize head movement.
Following calibration, gaze-position error was less than 0.5◦.
MATERIALS
Anagram problems consisted of six uppercase letters: a cen-
trally located three-letter string, plus three individual letters
positioned above and to either side of the central letter string
(see Figure 1 for examples). All three letters in the central let-
ter string belonged to the solution word, while only two of the
individual letters belonged to the solution word, with the third
being a randomly placed distractor letter. The task was to com-
bine two of the three individual letters with the central letter
string to create a five-letter solution word. Each anagram prob-
lem had only one possible solution, meaning that the distractor
letter did not allow for the formation of any alternative five-letter
words.
Each anagram problem could be presented in either “word” or
“nonword” condition. In the “word” condition, the central letter
string consisted of a three-letter word, while in the “nonword”
condition, the central letter string consisted of a scrambled non-
word version of those same three letters (see Figure 1). For each
anagram problem, the identity and location of the three individ-
ual letters was the same across both conditions, such that the only
difference between a given anagram problem in the two condi-
tions was the configuration of the central letter string as a word or
nonword. In the “word” condition, the central letter string words
had a mean frequency of 435 per million (SD = 1243) according
to Brysbaert and New (2009).
Solution words were made up of five unique letters, always
began with a consonant, and contained either one vowel (33%
of problems) or two vowels (67% of problems). Solution words
had a mean frequency of 175 per million (SD = 396) according
to Brysbaert and New (2009). The central letter string always con-
sisted of two consonants and a vowel, as did the three individual
letters. In order to remind participants that the three letters in
the central letter string must always be included in the solution
word, these letters were displayed in green, in a slightly smaller
and bolder font than the three individual letters, which were
displayed in black. Each anagram problem subtended approx-
imately five visual degrees in height and 14 visual degrees in
width.
The location of the individual distractor letter was counter-
balanced across anagram problems. In an attempt to avoid any
a priori bias away from the distractor letter, we matched the
distractor letter with the other two individual solution letters
in terms of letter frequency (averaged across all five possi-
ble letter positions within the solution word) using tables by
Mayzner and Tresselt (1965). Across all experimental anagrams,
the mean frequency of the distractor letter was no different
from the mean frequency of the individual solution letters (dis-
tractor M = 193, SD = 91, solution M = 199, SD = 115,
t < 1).
PROCEDURE
Participants completed six practice trials followed by 72 experi-
mental trials. Half the anagram problems were presented in the
“word” condition and half were presented in the “nonword” con-
dition, and both anagram order and central letter string type were
randomized for each participant. Across participants, each ana-
gram problem was presented an equal number of times in the
“word” and “nonword” conditions.
Every trial began on a blank screen with a central fixa-
tion cross. After 1000 ms, the anagram problem appeared and
remained on the screen until a response was made, or until
the trial timed out after 45 s. Participants were instructed
that speed of responding was of utmost importance and were
discouraged from verifying their solution prior to response,
even if that might elicit the occasional incorrect solution.
Participants pressed a button on the response pad in order
to respond. The stimulus display then disappeared and par-
ticipants verbalized their answer to the experimenter, who
provided feedback as to whether or not their response was
correct.
After every trial, participants were asked to classify their sub-
jective experience of solving the anagram problem. Participants
selected one of the following options (from Novick and Sherman,
2003) by pressing a corresponding button on the response pad.
1 “The solution came to mind suddenly, seemingly out of
nowhere. I have no awareness of having done anything to try
to get the answer.”
2 “I tried various letter arrangements in order to solve the ana-
gram, but none of them seemed to work. Then the solution
came to mind suddenly.”
3 “I tried various letter arrangements in order to solve the ana-
gram. I was able to build on one of these arrangements to work
out the solution step by step.”
4 “I did not solve the anagram.”
We considered options 1 and 2 to describe subjective experi-
ences of insight, and labeled all trials where participants selected
option 1 or 2 as “popout” trials. Option 3 does not describe
a subjective experience of insight, so trials where participants
selected option 3 were labeled “non-popout” trials. Participants
made another button press to advance to the next trial at their
own pace.
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RESULTS
Our main focus in this experiment involved examining the effect
of central letter string type (word vs. nonword) on mean task per-
formance and eye movement measures. However, we also wanted
to ensure that manipulating central letter string type did not alter
the nature of the problem solving task as compared to prior find-
ings (Ellis et al., 2011). Accordingly, while we primarily focus on
the differences between word and nonword trials, we also exam-
ined any interaction between the familiarity of the central letter
string and participants’ subjective experience of insight (i.e., tri-
als in which the solution was experienced as emerging suddenly
were classified as popout trials, whereas trials in which the solu-
tion was experienced as gradual were classified as non-popout
trials; see Method section for details). Across participants, 52.7%
of trials were correct, 4.2% of trials were incorrect, and 43.1%
of trials timed out with no solution. Mean response time for
correct trials was 14.3 s (SD = 3.3 s), with 69.0% of correct tri-
als classified by participants as popout, and 31.0% classified as
non-popout. The effect of central letter string type on overall
problem solving performance is summarized in Table 1. Impor-
tantly, response times were significantly slower for word trials than
for nonword trials. In addition, there was a numerical trend toward
lower accuracy for word trials than nonword trials, although
this difference did not reach significance. Finally, there was no
impact of stimulus familiarity on the subjective experience of
insight problem solving, as shown by the virtually identical pro-
portion of word trials and nonword trials that were classified as
popout.
Eye movement analyses were performed only on correct trials,
and only included fixations that could be assigned to a particular
item in the stimulus display. Specifically, a fixation was assigned
to an individual letter or to the central letter string if it fell within
a 192 pixel diameter circle around that item (these fixation areas
did not overlap; for an illustration, see Figure 1C). Within cor-
rect trials across participants, 69.9% of fixations were assigned
to the central letter string, 28.3% of fixations were assigned to
one of the three individual letters, and 1.8% of fixations could
not be assigned to either the central letter string or the individual
letters. Assigned fixations were then converted to dwells, where
a dwell is defined as one or more consecutive fixations within
the same area prior to an eye movement to another area. As
shown in Table 1, corresponding to the slower response times
for word than nonword trials, there was a greater number of
dwells per trial on both the central letter string and the individual
letters for word trials as compared to nonword trials, revealing
the classic negative influence of familiarity on problem solving
performance.
However, several fine-grained eye movement measures, shown
in Figure 2, revealed a more complex pattern of the effects of
central letter string type. More specifically, we calculated overall
means for the following eye movement measures: (a) duration of
the initial latency on the central letter string (i.e., the interval from
stimulus onset until the first eye movement that exited the central
letter string area); (b) dwell duration on the central letter string
during subsequent revisits; and (c) dwell duration on the indi-
vidual letters. For each eye movement measure, we carried out a
2 × 2 ANOVA with subjective report (popout vs. non-popout) and
central letter string type (word vs. nonword) as independent vari-
ables. As can be seen in Figure 2, some eye movement measures
revealed facilitation for word trials relative to nonword trials, while
other eye movement measures revealed interference. In addition,
there were no significant interactions between central letter string
type and subjective report for any eye movement measure (all
Fs < 1.45, n.s.), indicating that the differences between word and
nonword trials were the same for both popout and non-popout
trials. Specifically, the initial latency on the central letter string was
much shorter for word trials than for nonword trials (Figure 2A;
F(1,59) = 29.78, p < 0.001), and this processing advantage for
words over nonwords was also present for subsequent dwells on
the central letter string (Figure 2B; F(1,59) = 7.78, p < 0.01).This
processing advantage for word trials is likely due to a working
memory advantage in encoding and maintaining the central letter
string when it is arranged as a word as compared to a nonword.
In marked contrast, dwell duration on individual letters revealed
a processing disadvantage for word trials. Specifically, dwells on
individual letters were longer for word trials than for nonword
trials [Figure 2C; F(1,59) = 25.31, p < 0.001]. This processing
disadvantage might be due to difficulty in integrating the individ-
ual letters into the central letter string when it is in the form of a
unitary gestalt.
In addition, we contrasted viewing times on the distractor and
solution letters during the first half and second half of trials as a
function of both the familiarity of the central letter string (word
vs. nonword) and the reported subjective experience (popout vs.
non-popout). Based on the findings reported by Ellis et al. (2011),
viewing times for the distractor letter and the solution letters were
expected to be the same at the beginning of trials, whereas solu-
tion knowledge towards the end of trials should result in lower
viewing times on the distractor letter as compared to the solution
letters. To examine this prediction, we compared the proportion
Table 1 | Mean problem solving and eye movement measures shown overall for correct trials, and separately for word and nonword trials.
Variable Overall Word Nonword Significance
Accuracy (% correct) 52.7 (2.4) 51.7 (2.4) 53.8 (2.6) t (59) = 1.52, n.s.
Response time (s) 14.3 (0.4) 15.3 (0.6) 13.4 (0.4) t (59) = 3.25, p < 0.01
Number of dwells, central 7.39 (0.37) 8.11 (0.41) 6.76 (0.37) t (59) = 4.69, p < 0.001
Number of dwells, letters 9.40 (0.55) 10.45 (0.63) 8.53 (0.53) t (59) = 4.80, p < 0.001
Percentage of trials classified as popout 69.0 (3.4) 68.9 (3.5) 69.2 (3.6) t < 1, n.s.
SEs are shown in parentheses.
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FIGURE 2 | Mean eye movement measures for word and nonword
conditions within popout and non-popout trials: initial latency on the
central letter string (A); subsequent dwell duration on the central
letter string (B); and dwell duration on individual letters (C).
of time spent on the distractor letter and the mean of the two
solution letters separately for the first and second half of trials.
Accordingly, we conducted 2 × 2 × 2 ANOVAs on the proportion
of viewing time with letter type (distractor vs. solution), sub-
jective report (popout vs. non-popout) and central letter string
type (word vs. nonword) as independent variables. As can be seen
in Figures 3A–D, for all conditions, there was no difference in
the first half of trials between viewing times on the distractor
letter and the solution letters (all ts < 1.50, n.s.). Likewise, the
ANOVA revealed no significant main effects or interactions (all
Fs < 2.74, n.s.). In contrast, in the second half of trials for all
conditions, a significantly greater proportion of viewing time was
spent on the solution letters as compared to the distractor letter
(all ts > 3.83, all ps < 0.001). In this case, the ANOVA revealed a
significant main effect of letter type [F(1,59) = 75.65, p < 0.001]
but no other main effects or interactions approached significance
(all Fs < 0.23, n.s.). The lack of any main effect or interaction
involving central letter string type suggests that the accumulation
of solution knowledge prior to insight is independent of the effects
of the familiarity manipulation. Finally, we also examined the pat-
tern of looking behavior during the first and second half of trials
in which participants failed to provide a solution for the anagram.
As shown in Figures 3E,F, failure to solve anagrams was reflected
by a small but significant tendency for greater viewing time on
the distractor letter relative to the solution letters [F(1,59) = 5.51,
p < 0.05]. No other main effect or interaction was significant
(all Fs < 2.48, n.s.).
DISCUSSION
The main goal of the present study was to explore the negative
influence of familiarity on performance in a simplified anagram
problem solving task. We replicated prior findings from the ana-
gram literature that showed that task performance is poorer
when anagrams are presented in word form than when they
are presented as scrambled letters (e.g., Beilin and Horn, 1962;
Ekstrand and Dominowski, 1965, 1968; Tresselt and Mayzner,
1965; Mayzner and Tresselt, 1966). This effect is thought to
be due to the difficulty in breaking the gestalt of the exist-
ing word in order to rearrange the letter order and form a
new word. However, participants’ eye movements in the present
study revealed a more intricate pattern of the effects of stimulus
familiarity on anagram problem solving, including both interfer-
ence and facilitation. Specifically, the present study documented
shorter viewing times on the central letter string when it was
presented in word form than in nonword form, suggesting that
participants were better able to encode and maintain the cen-
tral letter string in working memory when it was a meaningful
word than when it was a meaningless string of letters. This find-
ing is consistent with the well established perceptual encoding
and working memory advantage for familiar stimuli relative to
unfamiliar stimuli (e.g., Chase and Simon, 1973; Reingold et al.,
2001a).
Of more interest is what the eye movement record revealed
about how familiarity interferes with anagram problem solving.
Our paradigm demonstrated that the interference of stimulus
familiarity was due to longer viewing times on the individual let-
ters when the central letter string was presented as a word than
when it was presented as a nonword. As originally proposed by
Gestalt psychologists, these longer viewing times on the individ-
ual letters might suggest that participants find it more challenging
to integrate the individual letters into the central letter string
when it is a holistic entity. Supporting evidence for this possibil-
ity comes from simple letter-insertion tasks that were introduced
by Reingold (1995). For example, similar to the present task, in a
letter-insertion task participants were presented with a letter string
that was either a word (e.g., CASH) or a nonword (e.g., CRAH)
and were required to insert one of two alternative letters into the
letter string to create a word (e.g., CRASH). Performance was
substantially better for nonword than word letter strings (Rein-
gold, 1995). Thus, consistent with the conceptualization of Gestalt
psychology, it seems intuitive that restructuring and integrating
new elements into a pre-existing holistic representation would be
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FIGURE 3 | Proportion of viewing time on the solution letters and the distractor letter in the first and second half of trials for each combination of
central letter string type (word in A,C,E; nonword in B,D,F) and trial type (popout in A,B; non-popout in C,D; unsolved in E,F).
more difficult than integrating items into an unrelated collection
of problem elements. However, more work is required in order
to specify the mechanisms underlying this theoretical possibil-
ity, and to explain how familiarity interferes with the integration
process.
Finally, a previous eye movement study of the Einstellung effect
in chess experts suggested that the activation of familiar schemas in
memory creates perceptual biases towards information that con-
firms these schemas and away from information that is required
to find a less familiar but more optimal solution (e.g., Bilalić
et al., 2008a). Our eye movement analysis did not reveal a per-
ceptual bias towards the central letter string when it was presented
in word form. This was likely due to the encoding and process-
ing advantages that are associated with the familiar central word.
These advantages might have allowed problem solvers to eas-
ily maintain familiar stimulus information in working memory
while directing their visual attention elsewhere in the stimulus
display. However, participants’ processing resources might have
been captured by the familiar central letter string in ways that
our eye movement methodology could not reveal. Specifically, it
might be that the familiarity of the central letter string causes
an unhelpful bias in the search for solution words based on the
irrelevant orthographic, phonological, lexical, and/or semantic
activation associated with the central word. Unlike previous find-
ings which demonstrated that an exhaustive encoding mental set
could be replaced by a selective encoding strategy which ignores
irrelevant aspects of the stimulus regardless of stimulus familiar-
ity (e.g., Gaschler and Frensch, 2007, 2009; see also Dreisbach
and Haider, 2008, 2009), in the present study, participants were
seemingly unable to ignore the irrelevant but familiar central
word. This is likely due to the fact that the irrelevant activation
caused by the central word was involuntary in nature and required
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processing resources in order to oppose it. Taken together, the
present findings and prior results indicate that while stimulus
familiarity and domain knowledge are clearly fundamental to
establishing expertise, these aspects of skilled performance are not
without their pitfalls when a problem solving scenario requires
flexibility.
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Bilalić, M., McLeod, P., and Gobet, F. (2010). The mechanism of the Einstellung (set)
effect: a pervasive source of cognitive bias. Curr. Dir. Psychol. Sci. 19, 111–115.
doi: 10.1177/0963721410363571
Brysbaert, M., and New, B. (2009). Moving beyond Kučera and Francis: a critical
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As car expertise increases, so does interference between the visual processing of faces and
that of cars; this suggests performance trade-offs across domains of real-world expertise.
Such interference between expert domains has been previously revealed in a relatively
complex design, interleaving 2-back part-judgment task with faces and cars (Gauthier et al.,
2003). However, the basis of this interference is unclear. Experiment 1A replicated the
finding of interference between faces and cars, as a function of car expertise. Experiments
1B and 2 investigated the mechanisms underlying this effect by (1) providing baseline
measures of performance and (2) assessing the specificity of this interference effect.
Our findings support the presence of expertise-dependent interference between face and
non-face domains of expertise. However, surprisingly, it is in the condition where faces
are processed among cars with a disrupted configuration where expertise has a greater
influence on faces. This finding highlights how expertise-related processing changes also
occur for transformed objects of expertise and that such changes can also drive interference
across domains of expertise.
Keywords: perceptual expertise, interference, faces, objects, holistic processing
INTRODUCTION
Face perception is often described as a domain of perceptual exper-
tise. Our skill with faces manifests itself across many different
tasks and is often particularly impressive for familiar faces. For
example, normal adults can recognize familiar faces with accu-
racy >90% despite not having seen some of these faces for over
35 years (Bahrick et al., 1975). Most people are as fast to categorize
an image as a “face” as they are to categorize it at an individual
level (“Bill Clinton’s face”; Tanaka, 2001). In contrast, observers
are much slower to categorize an image of a bird at a similar subor-
dinate level—for example, categorizing an animal as a “cardinal”
is slower than categorizing it at the basic level, “bird” (Tanaka
and Taylor, 1991). But even the processing of unfamiliar faces
outshines our performance with other objects in several respects.
For instance, observers can retain more faces in visual short-term
memory than they can other objects (Curby and Gauthier, 2007;
Curby et al., 2009). Face processing is also more sensitive to subtle
changes in the spatial-relations between features than object pro-
cessing (Haig, 1984; Hosie et al., 1988; Kemp et al., 1990; Bruce
et al., 1991).
Our skill with faces is believed to result, at least in part, from
our extensive experience with them (but see Kanwisher, 2000), and
to be mediated by the acquisition of a holistic processing strategy
(Diamond and Carey, 1977; Richler et al., 2011a). What holistic
means varies to some extent, as it is sometimes described as a
sensitivity to configuration, a global (as opposed to local) infor-
mation sampling strategy, a situation where perceiving the whole
is greater than the sum of its parts, or integrality of processing
for different dimensions (see Richler et al., 2012 for a review).
These different meanings motivate authors to use a number of
tasks to compare face and object recognition. One commonly
used meaning of holistic processing is as a failure of selective
attention. For instance, Young et al. (1987) asked people to name
the identity of part of a face composite, and found they were
unable to do so while ignoring other parts of the composite.
When the composite is inverted or the composite parts are mis-
aligned, people can more easily selectively attend to a face part.
This has been replicated in variations on this original paradigm,
such as in matching tasks with unfamiliar faces (Farah et al., 1998;
Richler et al., 2008; Curby et al., 2013). Like several other hall-
marks of face perception [e.g., the inversion effect; Rossion et al.,
2002; Curby et al., 2009; the sensitivity to spatial frequency con-
tent; McGugin and Gauthier, 2010; recruitment of the fusiform
face area (FFA); Gauthier et al., 2000, 2005; McGugin et al., 2012a],
this kind of holistic processing has also been obtained for non-face
categories when expert observers are tested, for instance for cars
in car experts (Gauthier et al., 2003; Bukach et al., 2010), chess
displays in chess experts (Boggan et al., 2012), and novel objects
after expertise training in the lab (Gauthier and Tarr, 2002; Wong
et al., 2009).
Based on the idea that face processing can be understood as
a kind of expertise, it has been suggested that it may share more
resources with the processing of other objects of expertise than
with typical object perception. The logic is simple: if the per-
ceptual strategies and neural substrates were found to be similar,
this may lead to interference when two categories of expertise are
processed simultaneously. We originally tested this prediction in
an electrophysiological study using the composite paradigm to
measure holistic processing and a neural marker of expertise, the
N170. We recruited participants with a range of car-recognition
skills, from none to extensive, and developed a paradigm in which
participants processed faces and cars concurrently (Gauthier et al.,
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2003). Participants matched the bottom parts of face and car
composites, while faces and cars alternated. In this 2-back part-
matching task, we were able to measure holistic processing of faces
when presented in two different contexts: (1) Among normal cars,
which car experts were found to process more holistically than car
novices, and (2) among cars with inverted tops, which car experts
did not process holistically. Therefore, we expected that holistic
processing of normal cars would compete with that of faces, only
in car experts. Indeed, we found that faces in the context of nor-
mally configured cars were processed less holistically [i.e., there
was less influence from the to-be-ignored (top) part on bottom
judgments] than those presented in the context of cars in a trans-
formed configuration (tops inverted). These results suggested a
functional overlap between face and car processing that is related
to an individual’s level of expertise with cars.
Since our original study, there have been other studies provid-
ing evidence of interference between faces and objects of expertise
using event-related potential (ERP; Rossion et al., 2004, 2007),
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI; McGugin et al.,
2014), or other behavioral paradigms (McKeeff et al., 2010; McGu-
gin et al., 2011). There are also other studies suggesting that the
processing of faces and words may compete during development
and influence their lateralization in the brain (Dehaene and Cohen,
2011; Dundas et al., 2013). However, Gauthier et al. (2003) is the
only study that looked at functional overlap specifically in holis-
tic processing. The goal of the present study was to replicate this
finding (Simons, 2014) and to explore its underlying mechanisms
using baseline conditions that were not used before.
The measurement of holistic processing is relatively complex,
with holistic processing in the composite task quantified using a
difference score between two indices of discriminability (each a d′
measure that depends on a hit-rate and a false-alarm rate). The
design used by Gauthier et al. (2003) not only requires holistic
processing to be measured for both faces and cars concurrently,
but also the calculation of an interference index which is the rel-
ative amount of holistic processing for faces in two different car
contexts. A significant correlation of this interference index with a
measure of car expertise can be obtained for several reasons, and
our goal was to try to understand what led to this correlation.
The interference index is a difference of differences: the congru-
ency effect for faces in the context of normal cars – the congruency
effect for faces in the context of transformed cars, with each con-
gruency effect being a difference score itself. One concern with
correlations with difference scores is that the variance captured in
a correlation can come from the main condition, the control con-
dition, or both (e.g., DeGutis et al., 2013). This is not necessarily
a problem, depending on the construct measured, but it can lead
to misleading interpretations. The difference score that yields the
congruency effects is central to the definition of holistic process-
ing as a failure of selective attention and authors generally do not
consider its components further (DeGutis et al., 2013; Richler and
Gauthier, 2014). In contrast, the difference between holistic pro-
cessing in the two contexts is not a unitary construct. The original
prediction is that interference occurs in one context (when both
faces and cars are shown in their normal configurations) and that
it is not found in the other context (when cars are transformed so
that they do not engage expert processes in car experts).
Here we first replicated the original finding (Experiment 1A),
then unpack the effect in ways that were not explored before. In
particular, we ask whether interference as a function of car exper-
tise is attributable to the condition in which faces are shown in
a normal car context. To preview our results, we find that it is
not, and so we set out to compare the effect to different baseline
conditions, in the hope of clarifying the locus of the effect. In
Experiment 1B, we test our prediction that when comparing to a
baseline with no irrelevant parts, it would be the car experts’ per-
formance that would show interference, and not car novices. The
baseline will also help characterize the interference as facilitation
in congruent trials or interference in incongruent trials. Finally in
Experiment 2, we replace cars with novel objects to assess whether
the interference between two domains can be obtained when per-
formance on the interleaved task is matched, but does not tap into
expert processes.
EXPERIMENT 1A
To assess the robustness of this effect, we first conducted a




Thirty-five individuals with normal or corrected-to-normal vision
volunteered to participate for payment: 17 self-reported as car
experts and 18 as novices (six women, one reporting as a car
expert). The rights of the subjects were protected according to a
protocol approved by Vanderbilt University’s Institutional Review
Board. The data from two novices were later discarded, one
because of poor overall performance in the task (54%) and the
other because he was an outlier (>3 SD) on our interference index
(see design and procedures).
Stimuli
For the car expertise test, 120 pictures of different year and/or
model cars and 120 pictures of different bird species from view-
points varying from profile to three-quarter view were used
(Figure 1). In the interference task, 336 grayscale (256 × 256
pixels) composite images of cars (profile) and faces (front view)
made out of the top and bottom of different original images (64
faces and 64 cars) were used (Figure 2; see Gauthier et al., 2003).
All images had a horizontal red line covering the seam between
the two parts. In half of the car images the top part was inverted.
The stimuli were presented on a 19-inch monitor with a display
resolution of 1280 × 960 pixels. Participants sat ∼70 cm from the
screen. The position of participants’ heads was not fixed.
Design and procedure
Self-report of expertise is not always a good predictor of perfor-
mance (Diamond and Carey, 1986; Rhodes and McLean, 1990;
McGugin et al., 2012b) and thus participants were required to per-
form a car expertise test (Figure 1; see Gauthier et al., 2000) in
addition to the main interference task (Figure 2). This car exper-
tise test yielded a quantitative estimate of their perceptual skill
with cars relative to their skill with a baseline category, birds. Over
224 trials, participants matched sequentially presented, 256 × 256-
pixel, grayscale images of cars and birds on the basis of their model
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FIGURE 1 | Sequential matching paradigm with images of cars and
birds was used to measure car expertise (relative to a baseline of
performance in bird matching; Gauthier et al., 2000, 2005).
FIGURE 2 | 2-back interleaved part-matching task designed to measure
holistic processing for cars and for faces in a situation where the
processing for both categories overlaps in time (Gauthier et al., 2003).
Composite faces were interleaved with composite cars in either (A) an
intact (familiar) or (B) transformed (tops inverted) configuration.
or species (see Figure 1). The first image was presented for 1000 ms
and was followed by a mask for 500 ms. Then the second image
appeared and remained until either the subject made a response
or 5000 ms had passed. Performance on the bird trials provided a
baseline measure for individual differences at subordinate-level
matching for a category of familiar objects in the absence of
expertise. As in Gauthier et al. (2003), a car expertise score was
calculated by subtracting the d′ for birds from the d′ for cars for
each individual.
In the interference task, participants performed 1020 trials (60
practice, 960 experimental) in which an image was presented cen-
trally either for 1500 ms or until they made a response. Images
alternated between car and face composites (see Figure 2). Par-
ticipants pressed a key indicating whether the bottom of the
current image was the same or different from the last image
of the same category, triggering the presentation of the next
image. Thus, participants performed a 2-back part-matching task
in which they were told to always ignore the top of cars and
faces.
Similar to the paradigm used in Gauthier et al. (2003), car con-
figuration was manipulated to influence the extent to which they
should elicit HP in car experts: (i) an upright normal condition
(Figure 2A) and (ii) an inverted-top condition (Figure 2B). The
two interference conditions alternated in 15 blocks of 60 trials
(a break was given every 30 trials). Half of the trials were con-
gruent, where the information from the to-be-ignored top parts
would lead subjects to make the same judgment as the informa-
tion from the attended bottom part (when compared to the 2-back
stimulus from the same category). The other trials were incon-
gruent; information from the to-be-ignored top part would lead
subjects to make the opposite judgment as the attended bottom
part.
Notably, if participants could follow instructions and com-
pletely ignore the top part of composites when making 2-back
judgments on the bottom part, it would make no difference
whether the top part was congruent or incongruent with the cor-
rect response for the bottom part. Thus, the degree to which the
irrelevant top parts influence judgments about the task-relevant
bottom part provides an index of HP (as in Wenger and Ingvalson,
2002, 2003; Gauthier et al., 2003).
ANALYSIS
Face-matching trials performed in the context of cars with inverted
tops and those performed in the context of cars with upright tops
were split into congruent and incongruent trials. The car trials
were also split into congruent and incongruent trials. Sensitiv-
ity (d′) was calculated for the congruent and incongruent trials for
each of the face (upright car-top context, inverted car-top context)
and car (upright tops, inverted tops) conditions. HP was opera-
tionalized as the sensitivity for congruent minus incongruent trials
(HP = d′congruent – d′incongruent).
The Interference index was then calculated by subtracting the
amount of HP for faces in the high interference condition, where
the faces were processed in the context of upright cars, from that in
the low interference condition, where faces were processed in the
context of cars with inverted tops. This index provides a measure
of the change in HP of the faces due to manipulating the configu-
ration of the cars. Because modifying the configuration of objects
of expertise has been shown to impact HP (Young et al., 1987), this
index will allow us to detect any trade-offs in HP between the two
tasks. Crucially the faces and the cars presented in both conditions
were identical except for the orientation of the top (irrelevant) part
of the cars, and therefore any difference in HP of the faces between
the two conditions can be attributed to the context within which
the faces were processed.
RESULTS
Expertise in car recognition varied from none to extensive. There
was little variability in bird-matching performance (none of our
participants reported any special experience with birds and bird-
matching performance was low, ranging from 0.12 to 1.38 d′,
consistent with their self-report) compared to car-matching per-
formance where d′ scores ranged from 0.37 to 3.76. Consistent
with past work, there was a modest, non-significant, correlation
between car and bird scores (r32 = 0.28, p = 0.10).
Even though participants were never asked to make a judgment
about the top, they apparently could not refrain from processing
both faces and cars holistically (see Table 1). This bias was stronger
for faces than cars (t32 = 7.941, p < 0.0001, d = 2.81), this is
likely a result of more extensive expertise with faces (Gauthier and
Tarr, 2002). Normal cars were processed more holistically than
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Table 1 | Sensitivity (d ′ and % accuracy) and the derived measures of holistic processing and interference for subjects in Experiment 1A divided
in a novice and expert group according to a median split on the measure of car expertise.





Inverted car tops 1.57 (77.1) 1.03 (68.8) 0.54
Normal cars 1.39 (74.9) 0.62 (62.0) 0.77
Experts
Inverted car tops 1.90 (81.6) 1.61 (77.6) 0.29
Normal cars 1.93 (82.6) 0.97 (68.0) 0.96
Face sensitivity Interference index (HP new
context–HP old context)
Novices
Transformed car context 1.89 (81.9) 0.76 (64.8) 1.12
Familiar car context 1.80 (80.7) 0.48 (59.5) 1.32
−0.20
Experts
Transformed car context 2.41 (87.3) 0.82 (65.9) 1.58
Familiar car context 2.07 (83.1) 0.63 (62.4) 1.44
0.14
transformed cars, a manipulation check (HP expressed as d′
for normal cars: 0.86 ± 0.07, for transformed cars: 0.42 ± 0.09,
t32 = 3.601, p < 0.002, d = 1.27).
Faces seen in the context of normal vs. transformed cars led to
approximately the same degree of HP when expertise was ignored
(HP for faces seen in the context of normal cars: 1.38 ± 0.08,
for faces seen in the context of transformed cars: 1.35 ± 0.10,
t32 = 0.289, p = 0.77, d = 0.10). Critically however, when car
expertise was taken into account, HP for faces depended on the
configuration of the interleaved cars; as predicted, individuals with
higher levels of car expertise had higher interference indexes (HP
for faces seen in the context of transformed cars minus that for
faces seen in the context of normal cars; r32 = 0.45, F = 7.67,
p = 0.009; Figure 3)1.
Intriguingly, while most experts had a positive interference
index, suggesting that they processed faces more holistically in
the context of cars in a modified, rather than intact, config-
uration, most novices had a negative interference index. This
suggests that car novices actually processed faces more holisti-
cally in the context of cars in an intact, rather than modified,
configuration. We also looked at the correlations between car
expertise and each of the two face conditions separately: car
expertise did not predict HP for faces viewed among normal
1Here we subtracted bird scores from car scores to index car expertise, consistent
with prior work with this paradigm. However, in more recent work with car experts,
we have regressed out performance in a non-car task from a car task to assess
domain-specific effects (McGugin et al., 2014). The partial correlation between the
interference index and car d′, partialing out bird d′, was r31=0.38, p = 0.01).
FIGURE 3 | Relationship between the participants’ car expertise score
(sensitivity for cars minus their sensitivity for birds in the expertise
test) [d ′] and the face interference index defined as the amount of
holistic processing for faces when cars were in a new configuration
compared to the holistic processing of faces when cars were in their
normal configuration.
cars (r32 = −0.01, p = 0.96), whereas it predicted HP for faces
viewed among transformed cars (r32 = 0.45, p = 0.007), a
significant difference (Steiger’s Z = −2.05, p = 0.04). These find-
ings suggest that the interference between faces and cars occurs
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in the transformed car condition, which was not the original
prediction.
DISCUSSION
Consistent with previous findings, Experiment 1A provided evi-
dence of interference between face and car processing as a function
of expertise with cars (Gauthier et al., 2003). These data demon-
strate that interference across different domains of perceptual
expertise, as measured via the impact on an established index
of holistic perception, is a robust and replicable effect. However,
the effect was unexpectedly driven by an interaction between faces
and transformed cars. That is, car novices and car experts differed
more in their face processing in a transformed car context than
in the familiar car context (see Table 1). This is inconsistent with
the original predictions that motivated this task (i.e., that in car
experts, face recognition would compete most with the processing
of whole cars that produce more HP).
One reason why these findings are relatively difficult to inter-
pret is that car experts may differ from novices in the amount
of HP in several ways. For instance, car experts may show more
HP of cars than car novices because they experience more inter-
ference from incongruent to-be-ignored parts, more facilitation
from to-be-ignored parts, or both. Likewise, the difference in HP
of faces by car experts and car novices in the different car con-
texts can also be driven by a difference in facilitation, interference
or both. In addition, while we measured the effect of car exper-
tise as a continuous variable, it may seem reasonable to predict
that relative to a baseline condition where holistic processing is
not implicated, it would be performance for the car experts, and
not for the novices, that would show an interaction with face
processing. But because our initial prediction that faces and nor-
mal cars would be mainly responsible for this interaction was not
supported, we decided to better characterize the effect. While
the theoretical significance of whether facilitation and/or inter-
ference are critical in this interaction across domains is unclear
at the moment, the proposed link between expertise and holistic
processing makes a strong prediction that novices should not be
affected by the presence of the irrelevant part, while car experts
should.
Therefore, in Experiment 1B, we tested new car experts and
novices to provide baseline conditions without to-be-ignored
parts. These baselines will be used to estimate whether car experts
and car novices in Experiment 1A differ most in facilitation from
congruent to-be-ignored parts, or interference from to-be-ignored
parts.
EXPERIMENT 1B
To ask whether the expertise effects observed in Experiment 1A
influence facilitation, interference, or both, we presented partici-
pants with only the bottom half of each image. This experiment
provided baseline measures to which the sensitivity of congruent
and incongruent trials could be compared.
METHOD
Participants
Twenty-two (six females) subjects with normal or corrected-
to-normal vision and varying levels of car expertise who had
not performed in Experiment 1A participated in this study for
payment or course credit. The rights of the subjects were pro-
tected according to a protocol approved by Vanderbilt University’s
Institutional Review Board.
Materials
Stimuli were the same as Experiment 1A except the top half of
each was removed.
Design and procedure
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1A except only the
bottom half of the car and face images were presented (i.e., the
parts above the red line in Figure 2 were omitted).
ANALYSIS
The data were divided into expert and novice groups based on
participants’ car expertise indices (i.e., the difference between car-
and bird-sensitivity in the car expertise test; see Experiment 1A
for details). Consistent with previous studies, we defined experts
as individuals with a d′ for cars >2 and a car expertise index
(car d′–bird d′) >1 (Gauthier et al., 2000). The data from Exper-
iment 1B was also divided into groups of experts and novices.
To facilitate comparison across Experiments 1A and 1B, the aver-
age expertise index for each of the groups was matched across
the two studies. This was done in such a way as to exclude
data from as few participants as possible, based only on their
car expertise scores. The resulting mean d′ and sample sizes
(Experiment 1A/Experiment 1B) for the groups were as follows:
Expert 1.83 (N = 14)/1.81 (N = 9) and Novice 0.37 (N = 14)/0.36
(N = 9).
In general it is more statistically powerful to use car expertise as
a continuous variable than as a dichotomous variable. However,
because Experiments 1A and 1B include different subjects who are
not matched individually but in groups of novices and experts,
we report next a series of ANOVAS on Experiment 1A alone and
relative to the baselines obtained in Experiment 1B in which car
expertise is treated as a dichotomous variable.
RESULTS
ANOVA comparing expert and novice performance in the 2-back
(tops present) task (Experiment 1A)
A 2 (group; novice, expert) × 2 (car top context; upright, inverted)
was performed on the HP measures for the new groups created
from the data reported in Experiment 1A. Consistent with a role
of car expertise in modulating the effect of car context on face
processing, as revealed in the correlation analysis reported above,
a significant interaction emerged between group and car context,
F(1,26) = 5.97, p = 0.022, η2 = 0.064. Car context had a different
effect on face processing depending on car expertise; for novices,
inverting the top of the cars led to a decrease in HP for faces. In con-
trast, for car experts, inverting the top of the cars led to an increase
in HP for faces. There was also a marginally significant effect of
group, F(1,26) = 4.13, p = 0.053, η2 = 0.090, suggesting that car
experts in general processed the faces more holistically. There was
no main effect of car context on HP of faces (F < 1). Planned
t-tests showed that while HP for faces among normal cars failed
to differentiate between car experts and novices, t(26) = 0.30,
p = 0.77, d = 0.12, car experts processed faces shown among
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transformed cars more holistically than car novices, t(26) = 2.76,
p = 0.01, d = 0.48.
Planned comparisons on HP for cars revealed more HP
for upright cars than cars with inverted tops in car experts,
t(26) = 3.58, p = 0.001, d = 1.40, but not in novices, t(26) = 1.03,
p = 0.31, d = 0.40 (see Figures 4A,B). In fact, HP was signif-
icantly different from 0 in all car conditions (all ps ≤ 0.0005)
except for cars with inverted tops in car experts (p = 0.13). This
suggests that inverting car tops made them easier to ignore for car
experts.
ANOVA comparing expert and novice performance in 2-back half
(tops absent) task (Experiment 1B)
A 2 (group; experts, novices) × 2 (category; faces, cars) ANOVA
on the results for the baseline task (no-top) revealed a signifi-
cant interaction between group and category, F(1,16) = 7.34,
p = 016, η2 = 0.041. As expected, car novices and experts did
not differ in their performance matching face bottoms (p > 0.05),
but car experts were better at matching car bottoms than novices
(p < 0.001).
Comparison of Experiment 1A against baselines from
Experiments 1B
Figure 4 illustrates the results in Experiment 1A in each condition,
for car novices and car experts, relative to the baselines obtain in
Experiments 1B where no to-be-ignored parts were present. As we
have seen, these baselines indicate when participants performed
the task with only the to-be-attended parts, car novices and car
experts only differed in their processing of car parts, being better
in car experts. Now we use these baselines to interpret the results
of Experiment 1A and specifically ask in what way car novices and
car experts differ.
The results of planned t-tests comparing sensitivity (d′) in the
top-present congruent and incongruent conditions (from Experi-
ment 1A) with their respective no-top baselines (from Experiment
1B) reveals that HP during the top-present task was mainly due to
interference from incongruent top halves rather than facilitation
from congruent ones (Figure 4). Incongruent conditions led to
lower sensitivity than their respective baselines (all ps < 0.05) in all
cases except for cars with inverted tops in both groups (ps < 0.05).
In contrast, the only condition with significant facilitation was for
FIGURE 4 | Sensitivity for car, (A,B), and face, (C,D), matching judgments
of bottom halves of composites for groups of car novices, (A,C), and
experts, (B,D), in Experiment 1A. In each graph, the results from the two
conditions in Experiment 1A (when the top of cars were upright and when
they were inverted) are plotted with the baseline provided by matched groups
of novices and experts in Experiment 1B, matching the bottom halves of
faces or cars with no top half present. Error bars show the standard error of
the mean.
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faces seen in the context of cars with inverted tops, in car experts
(p < 0.05).
Summary and discussion
Car experts experienced less interference than car novices for
transformed cars (Figures 4A vs. B), while they experiences more
facilitation from congruent face tops processed in this context
(Figures 4C vs. D).
One account of these results is that because car experts pro-
cessed cars in a transformed configuration less holistically than
regular cars, they therefore recruited less HP resources. Therefore,
once the top part of the car is inverted it can be effectively ignored
by car experts.
Because the car context was manipulated, while the face task
was the same in both car contexts, and because car novices and
car experts did not differ in their processing of face parts in a car
context when there was no to–be-ignored part, it is reasonable to
infer that this is what led to facilitation by congruent face parts in
the transformed car context. Exactly why this happened though is
unclear but it is plausible that the transformed car context allowed
car experts to reduce executive control when car tops were easier
to ignore, and as a result also exerted less effort trying to ignore
face tops.
Most experiments using the composite task have not used a
baseline condition to examine facilitation/interference, but when
it has been used, the congruency effect obtained for aligned faces
was generally due to interference from incongruent parts, without
significant facilitation (Richler et al., 2008). This is consistent with
what we observed here in car novices (even if the baseline was
obtained in a different group). This highlights how abnormal the
processing of faces among transformed cars was in our car expert
participants.
It should be noted that the choice of a baseline condition such as
the isolated relevant parts used in Experiment 1B can be difficult.
In the comparison between Experiments 1A and 1B, there are dif-
ferences in stimuli (parts vs. composites) and in task requirements
(requirement to selectively attend or not).
Given the complexity of the 2-back interleaved dual task, it
is possible that other task components unrelated to HP and
affected by car expertise, such as more general effects related to
the executive control and/or short-term memory load demands
of the task, play a role in producing these effects. Experiment
2 investigates an alternative account of the interference between
different expert domains, assessing whether explanations appeal-
ing to contributions from these more general effects can be ruled
out.
EXPERIMENT 2
Our proposed account of why car experts showed more facilita-
tion from to-be-ignored congruent face parts in the context of
transformed cars points to how car experts were better able to
ignore inverted car tops. Experts showed no congruency effects
of inverted car tops while novices did. Non-face objects are not
processed holistically in the composite paradigm, which gener-
ally means that they do not show more of a congruency effect in
a normal than transformed (typically misaligned) configuration.
However, there is sometimes a small but significant congruency
effect for non-face objects that is not modulated by configuration
(e.g., Wong et al., 2009; Richler et al., 2011b). There are situations
where training has a main effect of reducing this congruency effect
for stimuli in a transformed configuration (Chua et al., 2014),
similar to the difference between our car novices and experts in
Experiment 1A.
The absence of holistic processing for cars with inverted
tops among car experts, but not novices, suggests an alterna-
tive account of the interference between face and car processing
that is unrelated to expertise. Because it was the transformed
car context that drove the interference effect, it is possible that
the same interference effect would be observed when faces are
processed in the context of any object category that does not
show a congruency effect, regardless of expertise. This would
suggest that an alternative account, grounded in the more gen-
eral demands of the two concurrently performed tasks, rather
than in participants’ expertise, would better explain this interfer-
ence.
In the original paradigm, the condition where car novices pro-
cess faces in the context of normal cars should had offered a test
of this hypothesis. However, there was a significant congruency
effect for cars in car novices here, perhaps in part because they had
some non-negligible experience with cars (this congruency effect
could also be amplified by cars being processed in the context of
faces, see Richler et al., 2009).
Therefore, to test this hypothesis, we designed simple and unfa-
miliar stimuli in an oval shape with parts defined by colored
gratings (varying in both hue and luminance, see Figure 5A) and
in a pilot experiment, we verified that their processing in the com-
posite task did not produce any congruency effect. Here we ask
whether faces processed in our dual task with these “egg” stimuli
would produce the same facilitation as observed in Experiment
1A. If the increase in the facilitation component of HP for faces
processed in the context of transformed cars is simply due to the
fact that the to-be-ignored parts of these transformed objects are
easy to ignore, then we should observe it here. In contrast, if
facilitation is not observed, this would indicate that the interac-
tion between selective attention to faces and the car context is
specifically dependent on car expertise.
METHOD
Participants
We recruited fourteen volunteer participants (seven females), to
match the size of the car expert group in Experiment 1. The rights
of the subjects were protected according to a protocol approved by
Vanderbilt University’s Institutional Review Board.
Stimuli
Face stimuli were the same as in Experiment 1. Stimuli were con-
structed from 64 oval shapes or “eggs” approximately the same
size as the face stimuli with 15 vertical stripes of two alternat-
ing colors. Twelve different colors were used, selected from the
Adobe Photoshop© palette to be similar but still distinguishable
(all shades of blue, green or purple). The 64 original eggs were
split in half and recombined (in the same manner as the face
stimuli) to create 128 composite eggs used in the experiment (see
Figure 5A).
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FIGURE 5 | Results for Experiment 2. (A) Examples of egg stimuli, this pair has the same bottom but incongruent tops. (B) Sensitivity for egg and face
judgments in Experiment 2. The results of congruent and incongruent trials are plotted against the baseline obtained from the same subjects performing the
same task with no top half present.
Design and procedure
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1, except that
whole faces were processed in only one context, that is the orien-
tation of the top part of the egg was not manipulated (Figure 5A).
The same participants also performed a baseline task with no tops
on faces or eggs (as in Experiment 1B). There were an equal num-
ber of top-present and no-top trials, presented in four blocks of
240 trials. The two conditions alternated and their order was coun-
terbalanced across participants. As in Experiment 1, participants
performed 2-back judgments on the bottom half of all images.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
As expected, the eggs produced a pattern of sensitivity very similar
to that of cars with an inverted top in Experiment 1 (Figure 5B).
There was no significant HP for eggs, t(13) = 1.21, p = 0.25,
d = 0.67. Sensitivity for the egg baseline did not differ from the
baseline for cars among car experts in Experiment 1, t(21) = 0.77,
p = 0.45, d = 0.34. Sensitivity for eggs was also not significantly
different from that for cars with inverted tops among experts in
Experiment 1, both in the congruent, t(26) = 0.68, p = 0.50,
d = 0.27, and incongruent conditions, t(26) = 1.16, p = 0.26,
d = 0.45.
However, unlike in Experiment 1, this context did not lead
to facilitation for congruent face trials. There was no signifi-
cant facilitation (congruent trials relative to no-top baseline) for
faces processed in the context of eggs, t(13) = 1.97, p = 0.07,
d = 1.09. Comparing with Experiment 1, the estimate of facil-
itation from faces among eggs was both indistinguishable from
that obtained from car novices matching faces among transformed
cars, t(26) = 1.27, p = 0.22, d = 0.50, and significantly less than
that obtained from car experts matching faces among cars with
inverted tops, t(26) = 2.39, p = 0.02, d = 0.94.
The results of Experiment 2 suggest that it is not the lack of
HP from the transformed car context per se that led to facilitation
from congruent face trials in Experiment 1 as the egg stimuli were
also not processed holistically, yet did not impact holistic face
perception. Further, the findings of Experiment 1 also demonstrate
that the interferences was not simply a general effect of participants
car expertise (because in the upright car condition there was no
facilitation from the to-be-ignored part for faces) nor because
faces were processed among cars (because facilitation for faces
was not obtained in car novices). Rather, face HP was specifically
influenced by the concurrent processing of transformed objects of
expertise.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
Our results replicated the interference between holistic process-
ing of faces and cars observed in Gauthier et al. (2003). Having
found that the interaction depended on the processing of faces
among transformed cars, we investigated these effects further
by using a dual-task with isolated parts to partition congruency
effects into interference from incongruent parts and facilitation
from congruent parts. We found that car expertise was associ-
ated with less interference from incongruent car parts, and that
in this context, congruent face parts produced more facilitation.
Finally, we showed that this facilitation effect for faces was not
obtained in another dual task with objects that produced no
congruency effect, suggesting that the interaction depends on
expertise.
Our results highlight the fact that transformed objects of exper-
tise can lead to effects that are distinct from control objects. While
there has been much more focus on how the processing of whole
objects of expertise is special (both faces and objects), there is no
question that experts also process parts differently. This is most
clearly shown in our results by the advantage of car experts on
car novices for car part performance. There are other examples
of transformed objects of expertise producing effects that are dis-
tinct from control objects. For example, the ERP response (N170)
to inverted faces is larger than the response for upright faces and
delayed by 10 ms, while other objects elicit a response of much
smaller amplitude and invariant to orientation (Rossion et al.,
2000). This is also found in subjects who have been trained with
non-face objects (Rossion et al., 2002). It is possible that these
responses triggered by transformed objects of expertise index a
mechanism that can interfere with expert processing of objects
from another category.
Recent findings from studies of other domains of expertise,
such as chess, that have also been shown to result in increased HP as
indexed via the composite task, support the suggestion that trans-
formed stimuli of expertise can trigger stronger responses in brain
regions linked with perceptual expertise than their intact versions.
For example, greater FFA activation was found in response to chess
stimuli among chess experts when the structure of the chess stim-
uli was distorted compared to intact (Bilalić et al., 2011). Further,
recent findings suggest that disrupted objects of expertise, such as
the transformed cars used here, may trigger a search for structure
or meaningful chunks by experts that appears to also involve a
frontal-parietal network (Bartlett et al., 2013; Rennig et al., 2013;
see also Bor and Owen, 2007). These existing findings, and the
frequency with which transformed objects of experts (inverted,
scrambled, misaligned etc.) are used as a control or compari-
son stimulus category, highlight the importance of further studies
exploring the processing of such objects among experts.
Another possibility is that the expertise-related interference
between face and car processing primarily reflects an attention-
based effect. For instance, because car experts can more easily
selectively attend to the bottom part and thus ignore the (task-
irrelevant) top part in the transformed car condition, they may
“relax” control of their attention in this task-context, resulting
in more intrusions of congruent face parts. The effect could be
carried by facilitation because interference from incongruent face
parts may already be strong to start with. Our egg control task
suggests that such facilitation is not observed in any situation
where the to-be-ignored part is easily ignored – perhaps a cer-
tain degree of fluency with the relevant parts is also required.
This account is obviously quite speculative and will require further
testing.
Although this study cannot reveal where in the brain inter-
actions between faces and cars may occur, our task is likely to
engage parietal and frontal areas implicated in short-term mem-
ory (Goldman-Rakic, 1987; Belger et al., 1998) as well as the
FFA (Courtney et al., 1997; Grady et al., 1998; Haxby et al., 2000;
Druzgal and D’Esposito, 2001), which is the part of the brain most
associated with the idea of a “face module” (Kanwisher et al., 1997;
McCarthy et al., 1997). Activity in the FFA increases directly with
the short-term memory load for faces (Druzgal and D’Esposito,
2001). This region is a plausible candidate for a locus of inter-
ference obtained in dual experts for a number of reasons. In
particular, it is recruited for both cars and faces in car experts
(Gauthier et al., 2000, 2005; McGugin et al., 2012a); the activity
in this area in response to cars correlates with behavioral mea-
sures of car expertise (Gauthier et al., 2000) and although it is
not the only area to show an effect of expertise for cars, when
the task demands are made more difficult, as was the case here,
effects in these other regions drop whereas the expertise effect
in the FFA remains (McGugin et al., in press). Finally, a recent
fMRI study found that car expertise effects in the FFA survived
manipulations of clutter and of divided attention, but that they
were abolished when cars were presented in the context of faces,
especially when the faces were also task-relevant (McGugin et al.,
2014). Much work remains to be done to relate this example
of competition between faces and cars in the FFA with whole
objects and the present finding of interaction between faces and
transformed objects of expertise during a dual-task that requires
selective attention.
Other findings of expertise-dependent interference between the
concurrent processing of face and non-face objects of expertise
suggest that not only can faces and objects of expertise be pro-
cessed in a similar manner, as well as neurally close in space and
time, but the neural networks responsible for their HP may not
be functionally independent (Gauthier et al., 2003; Rossion et al.,
2004, 2007; McKeeff et al., 2010; McGugin et al., 2011). Impor-
tantly, it is not necessary to postulate that processing of faces and
cars depend on overlapping sets of neurons to account for compe-
tition between the two domains. It is sufficient to assume that face
and object processing are closer together in experts than novices in
“cerebral functional space”(Kinsbourne and Hicks, 1978); cerebral
functional space refers to the physical size of and distance between
brain areas responsible for different functions. This only assumes
that competition is more likely between neural ensembles that are
more densely interconnected, and/or that are separated by fewer
synapses.
In conclusion, our results are consistent with previous findings
of observable interference across different domains of real-world
expertise where the particular domains are proposed to rely on
a common resource. This functional overlap between face and
non-face domains of expertise has implications for the potential
of extensive learning, as in the case of real-world expertise, to lead
to a dynamic reorganization of cognitive resources. Because most
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normal adults possess a certain degree of expertise with faces,
it may be important to consider training and application envi-
ronments for real-world experts and assess the extent to which
competition between different domains can impact learning and
performance.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Kim M. Curby was supported by funding from the Australian
Research Council (DE130100969). This work was also supported
by funding from NSF Award BCS-0091752, National Eye Institute
Grant R01-EY13441, and a grant from the James S. McDonnell
Foundation to Isabel Gauthier.
REFERENCES
Bahrick, H. P., Bahrick, P. O., and Wittlinger, R. P. (1975). Fifty years of memory for
names and faces: a cross-sectional approach. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 104, 54–75. doi:
10.1037/0096-3445.104.1.54
Bartlett, J. C., Boggan, A. L., and Krawczyk, D. C. (2013). Expertise and
processing distorted structure in chess. Front. Hum. Neurosci. 7:825. doi:
10.3389/fnhum.2013.00825
Belger, A., Puce, A., Krystal, J. H., Gore, J. C., Goldman-Rakic, P., and McCarthy,
G. (1998). Dissociation of mnemonic and perceptual processes during spatial
and nonspatial working memory using fMRI. Hum. Brain Mapp. 6, 14–32. doi:
10.1002/(SICI)1097-0193(1998)6:1<14::AID-HBM2>3.0.CO;2-O
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Objects contain rich visual and conceptual information, but do these two types of
information interact? Here, we examine whether visual and conceptual information
interact when observers see novel objects for the first time. We then address how
this interaction influences the acquisition of perceptual expertise. We used two types
of novel objects (Greebles), designed to resemble either animals or tools, and two lists of
words, which described non-visual attributes of people or man-made objects. Participants
first judged if a word was more suitable for describing people or objects while ignoring
a task-irrelevant image, and showed faster responses if the words and the unfamiliar
objects were congruent in terms of animacy (e.g., animal-like objects with words that
described human). Participants then learned to associate objects and words that were
either congruent or not in animacy, before receiving expertise training to rapidly individuate
the objects. Congruent pairing of visual and conceptual information facilitated observers’
ability to become a perceptual expert, as revealed in a matching task that required visual
identification at the basic or subordinate levels. Taken together, these findings show that
visual and conceptual information interact at multiple levels in object recognition.
Keywords: object learning, semantics, visual features, perceptual expertise
INTRODUCTION
A chocolate bunny is more visually similar to a stuffed animal but
more conceptually similar to a baking chocolate bar, and the com-
bination is such that a child may not allow her parent to melt it
to bake a cake, nor would the parent allow the child to bring it in
bed. Our interactions with objects must take both visual and con-
ceptual information into account but little research addresses how
object recognition mechanisms are constrained by the interactions
between these two sources of information.
Object perception involves more than processing visual fea-
tures. For familiar objects, visual knowledge, such as color of
a fruit, modulates perception of salient features of an object
(Hansen et al., 2006; Witzel et al., 2011). Conceptual knowl-
edge about familiar object categories is also represented in the
visual system (e.g., animals, tools, Chao et al., 1999; Mahon and
Caramazza, 2009; Huth et al., 2012). While is often assumed
that visual features of novel objects engage minimal concep-
tual processing (Tarr and Pinker, 1989; Bülthoff and Edelman,
1992; Gauthier and Tarr, 1997; Hayward and Williams, 2000;
Schwoebel and Srinivas, 2000; Curby et al., 2004; Bar and Neta,
2006; Op de Beeck et al., 2006), shape dimensions of novel objects
(e.g., sharpness, symmetry, contrast, complexity) can impact
observers’ subjective preferences (Reber et al., 2004; Bar and Neta,
2006, 2007). Moreover, intuitions may also be formulated about
the similarity of novel objects to familiar objects (e.g., smooth
novel objects resembling “women wearing hats,” Op de Beeck
et al., 2006, p.13031), and such meaningful interpretations of
ambiguous shapes appear to be robust and stable within indi-
vidual observers (Voss et al., 2012). However, how meanings
evoked by visual features may influence object processing remains
a question that has not been explored systematically.
Some information on how object representations are con-
strained by both visual and conceptual factors comes from exper-
iments where new conceptual associations are created for visual
stimuli. Conceptual associations can facilitate perceptual catego-
rization (Wisniewski and Medin, 1994; Lin and Murphy, 1997),
bias perceptual interpretation of neutral stimuli (Bentin and
Golland, 2002; Hillar and Kemp, 2008), and improve visual dis-
crimination (Dux and Coltheart, 2005; Lupyan and Spivey, 2008).
The discriminability of shapes or faces increases after having been
paired with words from different categories, compare with hav-
ing been paired with words from similar categories (Dixon et al.,
1997, 1998; Gauthier et al., 2003). Observers also activate recent
conceptual associations during visual judgments, even when the
information is task irrelevant (James and Gauthier, 2003, 2004).
However, in these studies (e.g., Dixon et al., 1997, 1998; Gauthier
et al., 2003; James and Gauthier, 2003, 2004), the conceptual and
visual information are arbitrarily associated, leaving entirely open
whether some of these associations are created more easily than
others, such as when the visual and conceptual features convey
congruent, compared to contradictory, information.
We start with the assumption that the animate/inanimate dis-
tinction exists in the visual arena (objects can look like an animal
or not) as well as in the non-visual conceptual arena (we can list
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attributes of objects that are animate or not). In this study, we
manipulated both visual and conceptual features to study their
interaction, more specifically the alignment of an animate vs.
inanimate dimension in the visual and conceptual domains. We
used words that described non-visual attributes that would nor-
mally apply to either people or man-made objects (e.g., cheerful,
affordable), and created novel objects that resembled either liv-
ing or non-living things. For visual features, we attempted to
convey the animate vs. inanimate character of novel objects by
manipulating shape, texture and color. These dimensions were
chosen because bilateral shape symmetry is a powerful indica-
tor of animacy (Concar, 1995; Rhodes et al., 1998), whereas the
shape of man-made objects is more variable depending on their
function. Also, the objects were rendered in colors and textures
generally associated with animals or tools (e.g., skin color/organic
vs. non-skin color/metallic). Experimental manipulation of both
conceptual and visual information afforded us more control to
investigate their interaction.
INITIAL VISUAL-CONCEPTUAL BIASES
We first examined to what extent the visual appearance of novel
objects from unfamiliar categories evokes conceptual processing,
when observers see the objects for the first time. We asked whether
visual features of the “animal-like” and “tool-like” object sets
are sufficient to evoke the conceptual biases of animacy. Instead
of asking participants directly to categorize the novel objects as
animate or inanimate entities, we tested if the visual appear-
ance of the objects evoked the concepts related to animate vs.
inanimate categories by testing whether their (task-irrelevant)
presence interfered with judgments of non-visual attributes as
being more relevant to people or to man-made objects (e.g.,
“excited,” “grateful” vs. “durable,” “useful”).
VISUAL-CONCEPTUAL INTERACTION ON EXPERT RECOGNITION
Beyond any early conceptual biases evoked by visual appear-
ance, it is also possible that visual-conceptual interactions become
more important with experience with a category. If visual features
of novel objects activate abstract biases, anchoring the objects into
existing conceptual networks appropriately (e.g., calling animate-
like objects “animals” vs. calling tool-like objects “animals”) may
constrain their representations during expertise training. There
may be differences in the acquisition of expertise between objects
that look like animals or not (i.e., the effect of visual appear-
ance), or between objects that are introduced as having animate
or inanimate conceptual properties (i.e., the effect of concep-
tual associations). But more importantly, we asked whether it is
easier to acquire expertise with a category that is assigned concep-
tual features congruent with its appearance (i.e., the interaction
between visual and conceptual information), as we conjectured
that learning objects with congruent visual and conceptual infor-
mation might enhance the ability to locate diagnostic visual
features for fine-level discrimination.
TRAINING PROCEDURES
Here we combined training procedures used in previous con-
ceptual association studies (James and Gauthier, 2003, 2004)
and expertise studies (Gauthier and Tarr, 1997, 2002; Wong
et al., 2009). During the two-stage training, participants first
learned to associate particular concepts with individual objects,
and then learned to rapidly recognize objects at the subordinate
level. Critically, participants were divided into two groups dur-
ing the first training stage: Both groups were shown identical
words and objects, but the Congruent pairing group learned to
associate animate attributes with animal-like objects and inan-
imate attributes with tool-like objects, while the Incongruent
pairing group learned the opposite pairings. In the second train-
ing stage, both groups practiced individuating objects from both
animal-like and tool-like categories, without further mention of
conceptual information.
DEPENDENT MEASURES
We used two dependent measures to reveal potential visual-
conceptual interactions. First, in a word judgment task, partici-
pants categorized words as appropriate for describing people or
man-made objects presented on task-irrelevant objects. This task
was first completed prior to any training, and then completed
after each training stage. This task uses an opposition logic simi-
lar to the Stroop task (1935) and several tasks since (e.g., see Bub
et al., 2008), to test whether the visual appearance of the animal-
like and tool-like objects would be sufficient to evoke concepts
relevant to animacy/non-animacy. If our manipulation of visual
appearance does not evoke animate vs. inanimate concepts, word
judgment performance should not be affected by whether con-
gruent or incongruent objects are present. While the actual locus
of any interference may be at the response level, such responses
would have to be evoked by visual appearance (note that at pre-
test, no response had ever been associated with these or similar
objects).
Second, in an object matching task, participants judged if two
objects were from the same category (basic-level trials), or showed
the same individual (subordinate-level trials). The reduction of
the “basic-level advantage” is a hallmark of real-world expertise
(Tanaka and Taylor, 1991), which is also sensitive to short-term
expertise training (Bukach et al., 2012). Expert observers recog-
nize individual objects in their expert categories at the subordinate
level (e.g., “eastern screech owl,” or “Tom Hanks”) as quickly as
at the basic level (e.g., “bird,” or “man”), whereas novices recog-
nize the objects faster at the basic than the subordinate levels (i.e.,
the “basic-level advantage,” Rosch et al., 1976). The basic-level
advantage is reduced in experts for both animate and inani-
mate object categories (e.g., faces: Tanaka, 2001; birds: Tanaka
et al., 2005; Scott et al., 2006, 2008; novel 3D objects: Gauthier
et al., 1998; Wong et al., 2009; Wong et al., 2012). With novel
objects, explicit conceptual information is often absent during
training (e.g., Wong et al., 2009; Wong et al., 2012). Although
faster subordinate-level processing in experts might depend pre-
dominantly on experience with perceptual information of similar
exemplars in a category, it is possible that conceptual information
also impose processing constraints. For instance, brief learning of
a diverse set of semantic associations with novel objects can facil-
itate subordinate-level judgment compared to that of a restricted
set (Gauthier et al., 2003). The question of interest here is whether
observers apply conceptual knowledge about familiar categories
to novel objects, based on the visual resemblance between the
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familiar and novel categories. If this is the case, conceptual infor-
mation expected based on past experience with visual features
may facilitate fine-level discrimination of similar exemplars, as
both visual and conceptual information interact to constrain
object representations.
Here, we assessed whether having associated concepts that
are congruent with the visual appearance of a category may
facilitate the recognition of the objects at the subordinate-level
compared to the basic-level, even though the object matching
task can be accomplished based on visual features alone. We mea-
sured any differences in the “basic-level advantage” after semantic
training and after individuation training. If visual processing
is facilitated by visual-conceptual pairings, then the basic-level
advantage should be more reduced in participants who associated




Twenty-four adults (normal/corrected-to-normal vision) from
Vanderbilt University participated for payment ($12/h). The
study was approved by the Vanderbilt University IRB. Participants
were randomly assigned to the Congruent pairing group (6
females and 6 males, age M = 22.58, SD = 4.32) or the
Incongruent pairing group (4 females and 8 males, age M =
23.67, SD = 4.29). Twelve additional adults (5 females and
7 males, age M = 22.67, SD = 3.08) participated only in the
object-matching task once as a Control group.
STIMULI
Objects
Each participant was shown 48 novel objects called “Greebles”
(see examples in Figure 1A) created using 3D Studio Max. Half
of the objects (24) were Symmetric-organic Greebles with smooth-
edged parts and organic textures. The rest (24) were Asymmetric-
metallic Greebles with sharp-edge parts and metallic textures. Note
that symmetry refers to object, and not image, symmetry. Each
Greeble had a unique set of four peripheral parts. To minimize
object-specific effects, we generated two versions of Symmetric-
organic and Asymmetric-metallic Greebles that differed in color
(i.e., yellow/pink, blue/green), central and peripheral part assign-
ment to the objects. Each version was shown to half of the
participants in each of the two training groups. There were 18
Greebles from each of the Symmetric-organic and Asymmetric-
metallic categories in the trained subsets, and 6 in the untrained
subsets (which were used as foils in the basic-level recognition
task). The two subsets (trained or untrained) within each cate-
gory had different central and peripheral parts. From each trained
subset, six Greebles were used in semantic training. An additional
six Greebles from each trained subset were also used in individ-
uation training. All objects were shown during the testing tasks.
The objects used for training and testing were counterbalanced
across participants within each group and matched between
groups. All Greebles were rendered on a white background at four
viewpoints (0/6/12/18◦: The 0◦ view was an arbitrarily defined
orientation with the symmetric axis rotated 40◦ to the right). The
image size was approximately 6 × 3.6◦ of visual angle. To avoid
FIGURE 1 | (A) Examples of the two categories of objects and two
categories of words, including Symmetric-organic objects,
Asymmetric-metallic objects, animate attributes and inanimate attributes.
(B) Schematic of the two-stage training. In semantic training (stage 1),
participants were divided into two groups to learn to associate three words
to each trained object. The two training groups differed only in terms of the
pairing of the objects and words. In individuation training (stage 2), all
participants learned to name and identify objects at the subordinate level
quickly and accurately.
image-based effects, objects used during training were shown at 0
and 18◦. During testing, the objects were presented at 6 and 12◦.
Additionally, phase-scrambled images of the Greebles were also
created as control stimuli in one of the tasks.
Words
Eighty-four words were used; each described a non-visual
attribute appropriate for describing either people (“animate
attributes”) or man-made objects (“inanimate attributes”;
Figure 1A and Appendix A in Supplementary Material ), gener-
ated in a pilot study (N = 20). Word length was controlled across
the animate (M = 7.17 letters, SD = 2.05) vs. inanimate (M =
7.5 letters, SD = 1.86) features. According to the SUBTLEXus
word frequency database (Brysbaert and New, 2009), the mean
frequency was higher for the animate (M = 38.06, SD = 63.53)
than inanimate (M = 4.16, SD = 6.29) attributes. But since
the critical manipulation here was the object-word pairing and
identical words were used for both training groups, word fre-
quency alone could not account for differences between groups.
Twenty-four animate and 24 inanimate attributes were used in
the word judgment task. Eighteen animate and 18 inanimate
attributes were used during semantic training. The words used
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were also counterbalanced across participants within each group
and matched between groups.
PROCEDURE
The study was conducted on Mac mini computers with 19′′
CRT monitors using Matlab. Below are the details on the two-
stage training (which lasted approximately 9 h across 6 days),
the word judgment and object matching tasks (which lasted 15
and 45 min respectively). The entire study consisted of a pre-test
(word judgment task), followed by two sessions of semantic train-
ing, followed by a session with two post-test tasks (word judgment
and object matching), followed by four sessions of individuation
training, then another session with the two post-test tasks.
Training
Training stage 1: semantic training. During semantic train-
ing (two 90-min sessions; Figure 1B, Table 1), each group
learned three randomly selected words each for 12 Greebles
(6 Symmetric-organic Greebles and 6 Asymmetric-metallic
Greebles). The Congruent pairing group learned animate
attributes with Symmetric-organic Greebles and inanimate
attributes with Asymmetric-metallic Greebles, whereas the
Incongruent pairing group learned the opposite pairing. Identical
sets of word triplets were assigned to one participant in the
Congruent pairing group and another in the Incongruent pairing
group. The two categories of Greebles were shown in interleaved
blocks.
Training stage 2: individuation training. During individua-
tion training (four 90-min sessions; Figure 1B, Table 1), all
participants learned to individuate 24 Greebles (12 Symmetric-
organic and 12 Asymmetric-metallic Greebles; in which 6 from
each category were previously shown during semantic training).
Additional objects were used in this phase to increase the
Table 1 | Task details of the two-stage training paradigms.
SEMANTIC TRAINING
Session and number of objects involved No. of trials Task
Session 1 (4 Symmetric-organic Greebles
and 4 Asymmetric-metallic Greebles),
Session 2 (6 Symmetric-organic Greebles
and 6 Asymmetric-metallic Greebles)
16 in session 1,
24 in session 2
Passive viewing: To initiate learning, this task allowed participants to study
each Greeble with the three associated attributes, twice for as long as
needed
576 Three-attribute matching: To promote associations between each Greeble
and each unique set of attributes, this task required participants to judge if a
set of three attributes matched a concurrently presented Greeble
576 Single-attribute matching: To ensure participants learned all three attributes
independently, instead of any one from each set, this task required
participants to judge if a single attribute matched a subsequently presented
Greeble
16 in session 1,
24 in session 2
Recall: To examine if participants were able to generate the associated
attributes without verbal hints, participants were asked to input the three
attributes associated with each Greeble, twice
INDIVIDUATION TRAINING
Session and number of objects involved No. of trials Task
Session 1 (6 Symmetric-organic Greebles
and 6 Asymmetric-metallic Greebles),
Session 2 (12 Symmetric-organic Greebles
and 12 Asymmetric-metallic Greebles)
720 Naming: To promote learning of each Greeble with its name, participants
were asked to input the first letter of the name associated with a Greeble.
The names were shown during the first 3 presentations of a Greeble
480 Name matching: To ensure participants learn to individuate the Greebles
quickly and accurately, participants were asked to judge if a name matched
with a concurrently presented Greeble as quickly and accurately as possible
384 Name verification: A variation of the Name matching task to encourage
task-general learning, participants judged if a name matched with a
subsequently presented Greeble
We used a variety of tasks in every session to promote task-general learning. These tasks were previously used in several studies (semantic training: James and
Gauthier, 2003, 2004; individuation training: e.g., Gauthier and Tarr, 2002; Wong et al., 2009). The semantic training (stage 1) consisted of four tasks promoting
associations between a set of three words to a trained object. The trained objects were introduced across the first two training sessions: 8 Greebles (4 Symmetric-
organic and 4 Asymmetric-metallic Greebles) were introduced in session 1 and all 12 Greebles (6 of each category) were introduced in session 2. The individuation
training (stage 2) consisted of three tasks that aimed to enhance the speed and accuracy of identification for individual objects at the subordinate level. The trained
objects were introduced across the first two training sessions: 12 Greebles were used in session 1 and all 24 Greebles were used in sessions 2–4.
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difficulty of rapid identification. During this training, each
Greeble was named with a 2-syllable nonsense word (e.g., Pila,
Aklo, see Appendix B in Supplementary Material for the full list).
Name assignment was randomized within group but matched
between groups. Both speed and accuracy were emphasized in
all training tasks. To motivate participants, the mean speed
and accuracy for each block were shown at the end of each
block. Symmetric-organic and Asymmetric-metallic Greebles
were shown in interleaved blocks.
Testing
Word judgment. Participants first completed the 15-min task
(Figure 2A) prior to training, and again after semantic train-
ing and after individuation training. In this 2-alternative forced
choice task, participants judged if a word was more appro-
priate for describing people or objects, while told to ignore
an image presented behind each word. In a total of 432 tri-
als, each of the 24 animate and 24 inanimate attributes was
presented nine times. Each word appeared twice with each of
the 48 Symmetric-organic Greebles and 48 Asymmetric-metallic
Greebles at each of two slightly different viewpoints (difference
= 6◦), and four times with each of 12 phase-scrambled Greeble
images (6 Symmetric-organic and 6 Asymmetric-metallic). The
phase-scrambled images were included to evaluate whether par-
ticipants paid additional attention to the task-irrelevant Greebles
during the word judgment task. All stimuli were shown until a
response, with a 1-s interval in between trials. All conditions were
randomized.
FIGURE 2 | Example trials of (A) the word judgment task and (B) the
object matching task at the basic level (top: a basic-level trial with two
individuals from different categories) and at the subordinate level
(bottom: a subordinate-level trial with two individuals from the same
category).
Matching at basic- and subordinate-levels
Participants completed this 45-min task (768 trials) after semantic
training and after individuation training (Figure 2B). In different
blocks, participants judged if two sequentially presented objects
were identical or different, at either the basic or subordinate level.
In basic-level blocks, object pairs could be Greebles from the same
category (the same central body part) or different categories (dif-
ferent central body parts). In subordinate-level blocks, the object
pairs could be identical or different individuals from the same cat-
egory (the same central body parts but different peripheral parts).
All object pairs were shown across 6◦ rotation. The following con-
ditions were blocked: Categorization level (basic/subordinate),
Visual appearance (Symmetric/Asymmetric), and training status
(trained/untrained objects). On each trial, a 300 ms-fixation was
followed by a study image (800 ms), a mask (500 ms), and by a
test image (1 s).
RESULTS
TRAINING RESULTS
The training was meant to form conceptual associations and
improve individuation performance, and the training results
(Figure 3) were not a focus of the study. Both groups showed
accuracy near ceiling throughout training (i.e., well above 90% in
all tasks across all sessions), with the expected significant increases
in all individuation training tasks. Responses became faster with
time in all semantic training and individual training tasks but
the single-attribute matching task. Note that responses were also
faster for Symmetric-organic Greebles than Asymmetric-metallic
Greebles, but there was no statistical significant difference in
performance between the groups in all but the passive viewing
task during semantic training. We do not report statistical analy-
ses here, but Figure 3 shows confidence intervals relevant to the
significant training effects across sessions.
TESTING RESULTS
Word judgment
We focused on RT in correct trials because accuracy in this task
was high (>95%)1.
There was no effect of the Pairing group on this task at any
stage of the study (pre-test, after semantic training or individua-
tion training) ANOVAs (all p > 0.35). There results are therefore
presented in Figure 4 collapsing over this factor.
It was entirely expected that there would be no difference
between the two pairing groups at pre-test because no pairings
had actually been done. At this stage, the question was whether
the visual appearance of novel objects imply conceptual informa-
tion about animacy. We also measured performance in the word
judgment in a baseline condition where task-irrelevant scrambled
images were shown behind the words (Table 2).
As mentioned above, we observed no effect of Pairing groups
after pairings were learned in semantic training. Like any null
result, this is difficult to interpret, but given we found other
effects of pairing group in the study (described later), this suggests
that the word judgment is simply not sensitive to these effects.
1Trials that involved the word “curvy” were discarded because of chance
performance across participants.
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FIGURE 3 | Mean response times in the various tasks of (A)
semantic training and (B) individuation training. Note that RT was
in seconds in the Passive viewing task and in milliseconds in all
other tasks. Error bars represent the 95% confidence intervals of the
training effects across sessions within each group for each object
type.
FIGURE 4 | Mean response times (ms) in the word judgment task as a
function of Word type (animate attributes vs. inanimate attributes) and
Object type (Symmetric-organic Greebles vs. Asymmetric-metallic
Greebles) (A) in the first session (pre-training), (B) in the second session
(post-semantic training), and (C) in the third session (post-individuation
training). Error bars represent the 95% confidence intervals of the Word
type and Object type interaction. The lines were added to the figures despite
the conditions being categorical, to highlight the interactions.
This could be because it is an explicit conceptual task in which
participants can as easily retrieve all the explicitly learned asso-
ciations, whether congruent or incongruent. In contrast, in a
more perceptual task where no explicit conceptual search is acti-
vated, congruent visual-conceptual pairings may show more of an
advantage.
Interaction between visual appearance and conceptual infor-
mation. After collapsing over the non-significant factor of
pairing group, we focus here on the effect of Visual appear-
ance on word categorization across sessions (Figure 4). A
Session (pre-training/post-semantic training/post-individuation
training) × Word type (animate/inanimate) × Object type
(Symmetric-organic/Asymmetric-metallic) ANOVA was con-
ducted. Responses became faster with time, F(2, 46) = 13.53,
η̃2p = 0.37, p < 0.0001. Responses were also faster for judging
animate than inanimate attributes, F(1, 23) = 10.60, η̃2p = 0.32,
p = 0.0035, possibly because of the higher word frequency for
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Table 2 | Mean response times (ms) in the word judgment task for
each image type (Symmetric-organic Greebles, Asymmetric-metallic
Greebles, and scrambled images) across the three testing sessions.
Symmetric-organic Asymmetric-metallic Scrambled
Greebles Greebles images
Session 1 798.9 (25.2) 805.7 (24.5) 830.9 (28.7)
Session 2 758.0 (29.0) 759.3 (28.4) 768.2 (27.3)
Session 3 707.5 (21.4) 709.5 (21.2) 723.2 (19.5)
Standard errors of the mean are reported within the parentheses.
animate than inanimate attributes. There was no significant effect
of Object type, F(1, 23) = 0.86, η̃2p = 0.04, p = 0.36, nor signifi-
cant interactions between Session and Word type, F(2, 46) = 0.48,
η̃2p = 0.02, p = 0.62, or between Session and Visual appearance,
F(2, 46) = 0.35, η̃2p = 0.015, p = 0.71. Critically, however, Word
type and Object type interacted, F(1, 23) = 6.68, η̃2p = 0.25, p =
0.017, although the 3-way interaction of Session, Word type and
Object type did not reach significance, F(2, 46) = 2.31, η̃2p = 0.09,
p = 0.11.
One of our main goals was to investigate whether Word type
and Visual appearance might interact when participants were first
presented with the objects during the pre-training sessions, and
how a putative interaction would be affected by further training.
Therefore, we conducted a Word type (animate/inanimate) ×
Object type (Symmetric-organic/Asymmetric-metallic) ANOVA
separately for each session to examine if the effect was already
significant at pre-test (Figures 4A–C). Critically, we found a
significant interaction between Word type and Object type in
pre-training [F(1, 23) = 7.18, η̃2p = 0.24, p = 0.013]. Scheffé’s
post-hoc tests revealed faster judgment for animate attributes
with the presence of Symmetric-organic Greebles compared with
Asymmetric-metallic Greebles (p = 0.0045), and a significant
effect of the opposite result for judging inanimate attributes
(p = 0.015).
The Word type and Object type interaction was also signifi-
cant after individuation training [F(1, 23) = 6.16, η̃2p = 0.21, p =
0.02], but interestingly, it was not immediately after semantic
training [F(1, 23) = 0.033, η̃2p = 0.0015, p = 0.86]. We observe a
bias for relating novel animal-like (or tool-like) objects to human
(or object) attributes at pre-test, and it seems that introducing
explicit semantic associations can temporarily alter this bias. This
is also consistent with the idea, suggested above to explain the
lack of a Pairing group effect, that this explicit word judgment
task may be most sensitive to implicit influences. During seman-
tic training, participants in all groups had to learn associations
with the objects, and the training ensured that all associations
were learned. These explicit associations would have been more
salient to the minds of participants in Session 2 than later on.
We would therefore speculate that these associations blocked the
effects of visual appearance that we observe in Sessions 1 and 3,
and the reappearance of the interaction effect in Session 3 demon-
strates that the faster RTs or practice with the word judgment task
cannot account for the lack of effect in Session 2.
Manipulation check: objects vs. scrambled objects as task-
irrelevant images. To test whether participants paid less attention
to the words during the word judgment task due to the presence
of task-irrelevant objects, we compared performance to that for
the same task with words shown on scrambled images. The pres-
ence of an object was apparently not more distracting than the
presence of a scrambled image, in fact if anything the objects were
easier to ignore than the scrambled images (perhaps due to low-
level image properties). Indeed, RTs for the word judgment were
consistently faster when objects were present relative to scram-
bled images (Table 2). A Session (pre-training/post-semantic
training/post-individuation training) × Image type (Symmetric-
organic/Asymmetric-metallic/Scrambled) ANOVA showed an
effect of Image type, F(2, 46) = 8.26, η̃2p = 0.26, p < 0.001, with
faster RT with the presence of either type of objects compared
to the scrambled images (ps < 0.01), and no difference between
object types (p = 0.80). There was also an effect of Session,
F(2, 46) = 15.53, η̃2p = 0.40, p < 0.0001, with faster RT as the ses-
sions progressed, and no interaction between Session and Image
type, F(4, 92) = 1.11, η̃2p = 0.05, p = 0.37.
Matching at the basic- and subordinate-levels
After finding that the visual appearance of novel objects can acti-
vate conceptual information in a word judgment task on the first
encounter with these objects, we then examined the influence
of acquired conceptual associations with animate vs. inanimate
objects, in a matching task at the basic- and subordinate-levels.
As in prior work (e.g., Gauthier and Tarr, 1997; Wong et al., 2009;
Wong et al., 2011), we focus only on trials with unfamiliar objects
from the trained categories that were not used during training
(i.e., “transfer” objects)2, as a critical aspect of expertise is general-
ization of the skills to unfamiliar exemplars in the expert domain
(e.g., car experts viewing cars, Bukach et al., 2010, face experts
viewing faces, Tanaka, 2001). Here, we measured both response
times (RT) and sensitivity (d′: z(hit rate)-z(false alarm rate)).
We first compared the performance of the two training groups
after semantic training to an untrained control group. We then
compared the effects in the two training groups after both stages
(semantic and individuation) of training.
Effects of semantic training (comparison between a Control
group and the training groups). Semantic training with a
few exemplars was sufficient to reduce basic-level advantage,
even for untrained exemplars in the training groups com-
pared to a Control group that did not receive any train-
ing (Figures 5A,B). A Group (Control/Congruent/Incongruent)
× Object type (Symmetric-organic/Asymmetric-metallic) ×
Categorization level (Basic/Subordinate) ANOVA revealed a sig-
nificant interaction of Group and Categorization level in RT,
F(1, 33) = 9.00, η̃2p = 0.40, p < 0.001: the basic-level advantage
was smaller in the training groups compared to the control group
(ps < 0.05), and also smaller in the Congruent than Incongruent
pairing group (p = 0.04). The Group and Categorization level
2For the trained objects, the two training groups showed comparable
improvement in this task after individuation training, with comparable mag-
nitude of reduction in basic-level advantage. These results were consistent
with the results from the individuation training procedures whereby both
groups successfully learned to quickly and accurately identify this subset of
the exemplars at the subordinate-level
www.frontiersin.org July 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 793 | 59
Cheung and Gauthier Visual-conceptual interaction in object recognition
FIGURE 5 | Results of the object matching task. Left panel: Performance
of the Control group who did not receive any training. Right panel:
Performance of the two Training groups. Panel (A) shows response times
(ms) and Panel (B) shows sensitivity (d′) as a function of Group/Pairing
(Control vs. Congruent pairing vs. Incongruent pairing), Session (no training
vs. post-semantic vs. post-individuation training), Visual appearance
(Symmetric-organic Greebles vs. Asymmetric-metallic Greebles) and
Categorization level (Basic vs. Subordinate). The dots represent mean
response times or mean sensitivity, and the bars represent the mean
basic-level advantage. Error bars represent the standard errors of the mean.
interaction did not reach significance d′, F(1, 33) = 2.72, η̃2p =
0.12, p = 0.08.
Effects of both semantic and individuation training (com-
parison between the training groups). We then assessed how
pairing during semantic training influenced the acquisition of
perceptual expertise in the two training groups. RT and d′
were analyzed in a Pairing (Congruent/Incongruent) × Session
(post-semantic/post-individuation) × Object type (Symmetric-
organic/Asymmetric-metallic: each category was paired with
either animate or inanimate attributes) × Categorization level
(Basic/Subordinate) ANOVA, respectively. RT and d′ results
(Figures 5A,B) revealed different aspects of conceptual influ-
ences: RT showed a long-lasting pairing effect throughout the
tests, whereas d′ showed an effect of conceptual association type
only after semantic training.
In RT, object matching was faster after individuation train-
ing than after semantic training, F(1, 22) = 41.17, η̃2p = 0.65,
p < 0.0001. The basic-level advantage was present, F(1, 22) =
109.6, η̃2p = 0.83, p < 0.0001, with faster recognition at the
basic level compared to the subordinate level. The basic-
level advantage was smaller for Symmetric-organic Greebles
than Asymmetric-metallic Greebles, F(1, 22) = 12.82, η̃2p = 0.37,
p = 0.002. Critically, the Congruent pairing group showed a
reduced basic-level advantage compared to the Reversed pair-
ing group, as revealed by an interaction between Pairing
and Categorization level, F(1, 22) = 7.12, η̃2p = 0.24, p = 0.014.
The interaction of Pairing, Category level, and Session was
not significant, F(1, 22) = 0.11, η̃2p = 0.005, p = 0.74, nor was
any other effect (ps > 0.31). Thus, visual-conceptual pair-
ing impacted both matching performance and a marker
of perceptual expertise: associations with congruent concep-
tual facilitated perceptual judgments, relative to incongruent
associations.
The basic-level advantage was also present in d′, F(1, 22) =
75.35, η̃2p = 0.77, p < 0.0001. All other results were not signif-
icant (all p > 0.09) except for an unexpected result regarding
the type of conceptual associations. This was a 4-way interac-
tion of Group, Session, Object type and Categorization level,
F(1, 22) = 6.69, η̃2p = 0.23, p = 0.017. Although a 4-way interac-
tion could be difficult to interpret, the result essentially revealed
that immediately after semantic training, both groups showed
a smaller basic-level advantage for Greeble categories associated
with inanimate attributes compared with the categories associ-
ated with animate attributes (ps < 0.006). However, following
individuation training the basic-level advantage no longer dif-
fered depending on animate or inanimate associations (ps >
0.32). Unlike the effect of visual-conceptual pairing in RT that
was observed both after semantic and individuation training, the
type of conceptual associations had an initial impact on matching,
but the effect was absent once the conceptual associations were no
longer emphasized.
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DISCUSSION
We found an implicit bias to relate animate concepts to unfa-
miliar symmetric, animal-like objects, and to relate inanimate
concepts to unfamiliar asymmetric, tool-like objects. This is a rare
and important experimental demonstration that the processing of
novel objects is far from neutral conceptually. Moreover, whether
visual and conceptual information are associated in a congruent
or incongruent manner influences visual processing of untrained
objects from the category. These effects last long after associations
are no longer task-relevant.
Consistent with previous work, we found that concepts can be
quickly associated with novel objects (Dixon et al., 1997; Gauthier
et al., 2003; James and Gauthier, 2003, 2004), and that learning
distinctive semantic associations can facilitate subordinate-level
processing (Gauthier et al., 2003). Our results also led us to
speculate that such conceptual associations, especially right after
they were freshly learned, may in some tasks block the auto-
matic activation of semantic information evoked by the visual
features themselves. This conjecture is based on the absence of an
interaction between semantics and visual appearance in the word
judgment task only in Session 2.
For the first time we considered the effect of different kinds of
pairings of conceptual information with novel objects, informa-
tion that was either congruent or incongruent with the animacy
of the visual appearance. We found that both congruent and
incongruent pairings of objects and concepts can be learned.
Moreover, these associations generalize to an object category, as
they influenced performance for untrained objects during a visual
matching task.
Specifically, congruent visual-conceptual pairings facilitated
the acquisition of subordinate-level perceptual expertise, result-
ing in a smaller basic-level advantage in the Congruent than
Incongruent pairing group. When learning to individuate objects,
observers not only utilize visual information, they are affected
by conceptual cues implied from visual features. The new asso-
ciations introduced during semantic training interacted with
the initial conceptual biases for the objects, such that con-
gruent cues from different sources facilitate forming precise
representations for visually similar exemplars in the trained
categories.
On the other hand, the fact that even relatively unexpected
conceptual associations (e.g., inanimate attributes to animal-like
objects) generalized to objects that shared only some of the visual
properties of the trained objects suggests a mechanism to explain
the implicit bias observed in the word judgment task for novel
objects prior to any training. We showed that unfamiliar objects
from a novel category (e.g., symmetric-organic objects) appear to
derive conceptual meaning on the basis of visual similarity with
familiar categories (e.g., animals or people). Likewise, unfamiliar
objects from recently familiarized categories (i.e., the untrained
objects in the trained categories in the current study) derive con-
ceptual meaning on the basis of visual similarity to objects from a
recently learned category. If relatively novel and arbitrary associa-
tions that run contrary to much of our experience can generalize
in this manner, a lifetime’s history of conceptual learning likely
has a very powerful influence on how we represent any object we
encounter.
Additionally, while the main focus of the study is on the
interaction between visual and conceptual properties, we found
transient effects regarding the type of conceptual information
on object processing immediately after associations were learned.
For instance, objects associated with inanimate attributes showed
less of a basic-level advantage compared to objects associ-
ated with animate attributes. One possibility is that inanimate
concepts possess lower feature overlap than animate concepts
(Mechelli et al., 2006). Two objects that are “elastic, shiny
and antique” vs. “eco-friendly, plastic and durable” may seem
to be quite different and likely to belong to different basic-
level categories. Conversely, two objects that are “adorable,
funny and sensitive” and “cheerful, talented and forgiving” are
more likely two individuals within the same basic-level cate-
gory. Therefore, inanimate associations may be more distinc-
tive than animate associations, facilitating visual discrimination
(Gauthier et al., 2003). Note, however, this difference cannot
account for the pairing effect, because identical sets of asso-
ciations were used for both training groups. Also, this effect
regarding the type of associations faded once the associations
were no longer emphasized, even though the visual-conceptual
pairing effects remained. Further research should aim to repli-
cate and explore the different temporal dynamics of the more
short-lived effect of distinctive conceptual associations, and the
congruency of the visual-conceptual associations, which were
longer-lasting.
Several influential object recognition theories focus almost
entirely on visual attributes of objects (e.g., Marr, 1982;
Biederman, 1987; Perrett and Oram, 1993; Riesenhuber and
Poggio, 1999; Jiang et al., 2007), assuming that conceptual
associations should have no influence on object recognition
(e.g., Pylyshyn, 1999; but see Goldstone and Barsalou, 1998).
Additionally, researchers interested in the role of shape in object
processing have often used novel objects to prevent influences
from non-visual information, such as object names, familiar-
ity and conceptual content (e.g., Op de Beeck et al., 2008).
Our findings suggest that novel objects are not necessarily con-
ceptually neutral, and that both visual and conceptual factors,
and their interaction are important in the formation of object
representations.
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According to event segmentation theory, action perception depends on sensory cues and
prior knowledge, and the segmentation of observed actions is crucial for understanding
and memorizing these actions. While most activities in everyday life are characterized by
external goals and interaction with objects or persons, this does not necessarily apply
to dance-like actions. We investigated to what extent visual familiarity of the observed
movement and accompanying music influence the segmentation of a dance phrase in
dancers of different skill level and non-dancers. In Experiment 1, dancers and non-dancers
repeatedly watched a video clip showing a dancer performing a choreographed dance
phrase and indicated segment boundaries by key press. Dancers generally defined less
segment boundaries than non-dancers, specifically in the first trials in which visual
familiarity with the phrase was low. Music increased the number of segment boundaries in
the non-dancers and decreased it in the dancers. The results suggest that dance expertise
reduces the number of perceived segment boundaries in an observed dance phrase, and
that the ways visual familiarity and music affect movement segmentation are modulated
by dance expertise. In a second experiment, motor experience was added as factor, based
on empirical evidence suggesting that action perception is modified by visual and motor
expertise in different ways. In Experiment 2, the same task as in Experiment 1 was
performed by dance amateurs, and was repeated by the same participants after they had
learned to dance the presented dance phrase. Less segment boundaries were defined in
the middle trials after participants had learned to dance the phrase, and music reduced
the number of segment boundaries before learning. The results suggest that specific
motor experience of the observed movement influences its perception and anticipation
and makes segmentation broader, but not to the same degree as dance expertise on a
professional level.
Keywords: expertise, event segmentation, dance, movement learning, motor experience, music
INTRODUCTION
Despite its continuous nature, human motor action is func-
tionally based on task- and event related perception. Research
suggests that ongoing processing resources are devoted to this
perceptual process, and that the online perception of events deter-
mines how episodes are understood and encoded in memory
(Zacks and Tversky, 2001; Kurby and Zacks, 2008). According to
Event Segmentation Theory (Zacks et al., 2007), the perception
of events depends on both sensory cues and knowledge structures
that represent previously learned information about event parts
and inferences about actors’ goals and plans. Related studies have
revealed that the segmentation of observed actions is crucial for
the understanding and memorizing of these actions (e.g., Swallow
et al., 2009; Zacks et al., 2009; Sargent et al., 2013). Furthermore,
the theory states that any observed activity is spontaneously seg-
mented into events during perceptual processing, which enables
the system to anticipate upcoming information and react appro-
priately. As long as anticipation is successful, representations in
working memory (named “event models” in this context, see
Zacks et al., 2007; Kurby and Zacks, 2008) are maintained in
a stable state, guiding further prediction and saving process-
ing costs. When the frequency of anticipation errors increases
as prediction becomes more difficult, event models are updated
based on incoming information; these instances of increasing
insecurity are subjectively experienced as boundaries between
events. Perception of common goal-directed activities has been
found to be hierarchical, with coarse-grained and fine-grained
segmentation layers, corresponding to the hierarchical structure
of action organization with goals and sub-goals. Furthermore,
perception has been described as cyclical, with ongoing compar-
ison of predictions to the perceived feeding back into processing.
Event segmentation thereby results from the ongoing anticipa-
tion of what will happen next, which serves action understanding,
prediction and learning.
Studies using event segmentation paradigms have shown that
segmentation characteristics can be related to the understanding
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and memory of the observed actions. In these studies, actions
from everyday life, such as assembling objects, setting a table or
folding laundry, were presented to participants with no speci-
fied expertise (e.g., Zacks et al., 2009; Sargent et al., 2013). The
presented actions typically involve the manipulation of objects
and/or interactions between people, and are defined by clear
action goals and a clear semantic context. In the context of dance
or sports, the same characteristics do not necessarily apply. Even
though many skilled actions in a sports context are object- and
person-related and have clearly defined goals (e.g., passing the ball
to a team member), there are also many other examples of move-
ments that do not share these features. As such motor actions
occur particularly in dance, the term “dance-like actions” has
been used to describe motor actions that lack common features
ascribed to actions from everyday contexts, such as interactions
with objects and persons and obvious external action goals.
It has been stated that the goal of such dance-like actions is “the
movement itself,” which certainly is often the case in a dance con-
text. Schachner and Carey (2013) showed that observers tended to
interpret actions as being intentionally movement-related if they
were not able to infer external goals from observing the action,
or if the action seemed to be inefficient or inappropriate with
regards to any recognizable external goal. The authors state that
a dance-like action is also (in the eye of the observer) primar-
ily characterized by its goal, which is movement-based, whereas
other “rational” actions have external goals. This is particularly
true for dance movements, the goal of which is commonly not
only movement-based but also related to communicating to part-
ners or an audience via the body. It can therefore be assumed
that segmentation of dance-like actions or dance movements
follows different “rules” and cognitive strategies compared to
segmentation of typical everyday activities with external goals.
Specifically in modern and contemporary dance, movement
performance often requires a fluent quality that does not afford
obvious partitioning or segmenting. The ability to perform long
movement phrases with this obvious fluency is an important skill
in these dance disciplines. This fluent quality of the movement
can be supported and enhanced by the accompanying music or
sound. Choreographers might choose music that does not have
a clear beat or rhythm but that rather provides an associated
sound layer, allowing the dancer and the spectator to integrate
more freedom in integrating sound and movement. This means
that the dance movement, when accompanied by music at all,
does not necessarily follow a musical beat or rhythm, and might
even contravene the music in order to create a more exciting
impression for the audience. The interrelation between the dance
movement and the accompanying music deliberately influences
the spectator’s perception and should therefore be taken into
account when investigating the segmentation of dance move-
ment; in this respect, dance differs from dance-like actions that
are not commonly associated with music.
Numerous studies have provided evidence that the percep-
tion of skilled actions is modulated by expertise (see Cheung and
Bar, 2012) and is specifically facilitated by motor experience of
the observed action type (e.g., Abernethy and Zawi, 2007; Aglioti
et al., 2008; Güldenpenning et al., 2011; Steggemann et al., 2011).
Even though empirical approaches to expertise often differentiate
between perception, cognition (e.g., decision making) and action
(motor control), this distinction can hardly be maintained in
the context of athletes’ practice-dependent task-specific skills (see
Yarrow et al., 2009). Evidence for the interdependency of per-
ception, action and cognition in movement expertise has been
found in many studies with athletes and other movement experts
(e.g., Aglioti et al., 2008 see also Yarrow et al., 2009 for review).
Dance expertise in particular has been shown to comprise a mul-
titude of perceptual-motor and cognitive skills, including motor
control, timing, learning, memorizing, imagery, entrainment, as
well as multimodal communication and artistic expression (see
Sevdalis and Keller, 2011; Bläsing et al., 2012; Waterhouse et al.,
2014). Studies with expert dancers have shown that movement-
related memory is more functionally structured in dancers than in
non-dancers (Bläsing et al., 2009; Bläsing and Schack, 2012), and
that dancers show shorter fixation times while watching dance
movements than non-dancers, which points toward perception
facilitation (Stevens et al., 2010). Furthermore, dance provides a
highly adequate framework for studying expertise effects related
to action-perception coupling, because dance, more than most
types of sports, is performed with the primary goal of being
observed by an audience. In dancers, increased activity has been
found in specific brain areas commonly referred to as action
observation network (AON) while watching familiar dance move-
ments (Calvo-Merino et al., 2005). This network of brain regions
(comprising the ventral and dorsal premotor cortices and parts
of the parietal cortex, including the inferior parietal lobe, the
superior parietal lobe, and the superior parietal sulcus, as well
as the superior temporal sulcus) is typically involved in the exe-
cution, observation and imagery of actions. Studies showed that
the activation of these regions is modulated differently by visual
and motor expertise (Calvo-Merino et al., 2006). Dancers showed
increased activity in areas belonging to the AON while watching
movements from their own dance discipline compared to simi-
lar movements from other dance disciplines (Calvo-Merino et al.,
2005; Cross et al., 2006). Activation of AON regions was further
increased when dancers watched movements they had previously
performed themselves, compared to movements they had fre-
quently watched but not physically performed (Calvo-Merino
et al., 2006). Learning to dance a specific movement phrase affects
AON activation while watching the same phrase already early dur-
ing the learning process (Cross et al., 2006). Different types of
learning have been found to activate the AON in specific ways,
with the right ventral premotor cortex responding specifically to
the experience of having performed an observed movement, and
the bilateral superior temporal cortex responding to the pres-
ence of a human model (Cross et al., 2009). These findings reflect
that dance expertise affects both the production and the percep-
tion of dance-like movements. Dance expertise should therefore
not only enable dancers to perform movement phrases fluently,
but should also influence their perception of observed movement
material in favor of fluency and greater over-all connectedness.
Only few studies have investigated the segmentation of dance-
like actions (e.g., Pollick et al., 2012; Noble et al., 2014), and so
far none has focused on effects of dance expertise on segmenta-
tion. Evidence from preliminary studies suggests that observers’
dance expertise affects the segmentation of dance-like actions,
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but not of other actions that have an obvious external goal
(Bläsing et al., 2010).
The aim of the present study was to investigate how different
factors, namely dance expertise, visual familiarity (via repeated
presentations), motor experience (via learning to dance the pre-
sented phrase) and music would influence the segmentation of
observed dance movement. Specifically, we presented a chore-
ographed contemporary dance phrase of fluent character that did
not contain interactions with objects or persons, communicative
signals or semantic content. The dance phrase was choreographed
on the basis of modern/contemporary dance technique, and was
initially novel to all participants. This means that participants
who regularly trained modern contemporary dance were likely
to be familiar with the type of movement in general, but not
with the presented movement material as such (note that mod-
ern/contemporary dance choreography commonly involves the
exploration and creation of new movement material rather than
re-combination and variation of defined partial movements, as
this is often the case in classical dance). During the experimental
procedure, the participants watched the sequence repeatedly and
became thereby increasingly familiar with it. Their visual familiar-
ity, in terms of knowing the exact dance phrase (rather than sim-
ilar movement material from the same disciplinary background)
was addressed here as a factor potentially affecting segmentation.
It was expected that segmentation would become less variable
with increasing visual familiarity over consecutive trials.
The issue of dance expertise was addressed in the current study
by comparing groups of participants differing in their specific skill
level in dance. In Experiment 1, professional dancers who had
undergone professional dance training for many years and were
currently all members of a professional dance theater company
or free-lancing professional dancers performing with different
companies as well as teaching dance on different levels (these
participants are in the following referred to as “dancers”) were
compared to sports students (in the following referred to as “non-
dancers”) who had no particular experience in dance training
apart from few very basic mandatory courses in their study pro-
gram. It has to be pointed out that the non-dancer participants
were “novices” only with respect to dance, but not to movement
skills in general; most of them performed their preferred sports on
an advanced to high level. For the purpose of the study, this group
was preferred to a group of participants without any movement
expertise (i.e., persons who did not perform sports or physical
exercise on a regular basis) because of the specific segmentation
task. Expertise has been shown to be task-specific and does not
generalize well over domains (e.g., Ericsson and Charness, 1994).
It was assumed that athletes without dance expertise would show
similar responses to observed human body movement in general
compared to dancers, including corresponding levels of motor
activation and simulation, and that any differences in the results
could be related to expertise in dance rather than a high level
of physical training and motor skill in general. It was expected
that dancers’ segmentation behavior would differ from that of
the non-dancers, with dancers defining less segment boundaries
based on their training-based ability to anticipate dance move-
ment more successfully despite its novelty, and their preference
for viewing the observed dance movement as more connected.
As a third group, dance amateurs who trained mod-
ern/contemporary dance on intermediate level participated in
Experiment 2 of the presented study. These participants (referred
to as “amateurs” in the following) were chosen for two reasons.
First, they represented a viable intermediate step between the
non-dancers and the dancers, offering the opportunity to monitor
expertise effects on different levels. Second, the amateur par-
ticipants all belonged to the same dance class that was trained
by the choreographer of the stimulus dance phrase. Crucially,
this class was taught the dance phrase as part of their training
schedule, which provided the opportunity to add the aspect of
learning to that of expertise and relate the two aspects to each
other. In Experiment 2, the participants thereby gained specific
motor experience of the presented movement material (referred
to as “motor experience” in the following, applied as factor in
Experiment 2). The term “motor experience” is in this case related
to the experience of having danced the exact phrase presented as
stimulus, not more generally to experience with similar move-
ment material from the same disciplinary background. It was
expected that specific motor experience would increase the par-
ticipants’ expertise for the dance phrase and thereby make their
segmentation behavior more “expert-like,” potentially even more
than the dancers’ in Experiment 1 who had greater dance exper-
tise in general but no motor experience of the presented dance
phrase.
As a fourth factor, the presence of music was added. The
music chosen by the choreographer to accompany the dance
phrase did not have a clear metric rhythm but rather con-
sisted of an underlying sound layer of chords with slowly
increasing and decreasing pitch and volume. It was hypothe-
sized that the added music, because of its specific character,
would influence the segmentation of the movement by reduc-
ing the number of segment boundaries, thereby binding move-
ments together and reducing the over-all number of segment
boundaries.
EXPERIMENT 1: SEGMENTATION OF A DANCE PHRASE BY
DANCERS AND NON-DANCERS: EFFECTS OF VISUAL
FAMILIARITY AND MUSIC
In Experiment 1, professional dancers and sport students without
dance expertise repeatedly watched a video clip showing a dancer
performing a phrase from a contemporary dance choreography.
Each participant watched the sequence 20 times on a computer
screen, 15 times without music followed by 5 times with music,
and indicated segment boundaries by key press. This experiment
was conducted in order to gain information about the effects of




Twenty-two participants voluntarily took part in Experiment 1
without any exchange for course credit or money. Twelve students
of sport science (six females, one left-handed; age 25.91 ± 3.29
years, range 22–30 years) without any particular dance training
experience (except for basic courses as part of their study pro-
gram) were assigned to the non-dancers’ group. All non-dancers
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were physically active; their most regularly performed sports
included soccer, handball, rugby, and fitness training.
Ten professional dancers (six females, two left-handed; age
30.1 ± 6.59, range 23–40 years) participated as experts; all
were trained in classical, modern and contemporary dance
on professional level and were currently active as company
dancers. Six of the dancers were current members of Tanztheater
Bielefeld; four of the dancers were freelancing dancers and dance
teachers.
All participants reported having normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, and were naive with regard to the purpose of the
experiment. All participants provided written informed consent
before testing started. The experiment was performed in accor-
dance with the ethical standards of the sixth revision (WMA,
2008) of the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki.
Apparatus and Stimuli
The stimulus material consisted of a video clip (92 s, 2.290
frames, 25 Hz, recorded with a Sony camcorder) showing a dance
phrase created and performed by dancer and choreographer Ilona
Pászthy. The dance phrase was choreographed on the basis of
modern/ contemporary dance technique, and was novel to all par-
ticipants. For stimulus presentation and data collection, Interact®
(Mangold) software running on a Notebook (Acer) with a 15
inch VGA-Display (vertical retraces 60 Hz) was used. The soft-
ware recorded key presses during the presentation of the video
clip, linked them to the adequate runtime and frame number and
provided a protocol of these data.
Design and Procedure
The data collection took place in a quiet lab or office room or in
a free rehearsal space at the theater. Each participant was tested
individually. During the experiment, the participant sat in front
of the notebook computer and watched the presented video clip.
The following instructions were given verbally by the experi-
menter: “You will now see a video clip of a dancer dancing a
part of a dance piece. The clip will be repeated 20 times. While
watching, please keep your finger on the space bar and press the
space bar each time a part of the dance phrase ends and a new
one begins. Apply your own criteria; you do not need to mark the
same moments in each repetition.” This instruction was phrased
in a similar way as instructions in previous segmentation studies
(e.g., “to press a button... whenever... one natural and meaning-
ful unit of activity ended and another began,” Zacks et al., 2009).
No instruction was given regarding the resolution of segmenting
(fine or coarse), as had been done in other segmentation studies
(e.g., Swallow et al., 2009; Zacks et al., 2009). The sequence was
presented 20 times, the first 15 trials without sound, followed by
five trials accompanied by the music that had been chosen by the
choreographer.
After completing all 20 trials, the participant was verbally
asked two questions by the experimenter:
1. Which criteria or strategies did you use for segmenting the
dance phrase?
2. Did the music in the last five trials affect your decisions?
The answers were written down by the experimenter in the form
of key notes. This explorative interview was not carried out
according to any established qualitative method, but was added to
the data collection only to gain an impression of the participants’
use of criteria and strategies. It was not expected that participants
would be able to give a complete and objective account of their
segmenting behavior, but the experimenter was rather interested
in the criteria and strategies the participants applied explicitly
or even deliberately. The complete experimental session for each
participant lasted 60–90 min.
Data analyses
For every participant, the number of segment boundaries was
recorded for each of the 20 trials. Mean group results of dancers
and non-dancers were calculated for each trial number (1–20)
separately, for all trials together, and for four groups of trials
(trials 1–5: early trials; these trials were regarded as familiar-
ization phase during which visual familiarity with the dance
phrase was still low; trials 6–10: middle trials, with increas-
ing visual familiarity; trials 11–15: late trials; for these tri-
als, visual familiarity with the dance phrase was regarded as
high; and trials 16–20: music trials, presented with sound).
Non-parametric tests were applied to compare dancers and non-
dancers regarding their defined numbers of segment bound-
aries for each trial separately, for all trials, and for each group
of five trials (early trials, middle trials, late trials and music
trials). Within each group of participants, mean numbers of
segment boundaries of the four trial groups (early, middle,
late, and music) were compared to each other using non-




Comparisons between dancers and non-dancers (Mann-Whitney
U-test) revealed that dancers generally defined less segment
boundaries than non-dancers for all trials together (z = −2.853,
p = 0.005), for each individual trial (trials 1–5: p < 0.01; tri-
als 6–13: p < 0.05; trials 14–20: p < 0.01), and for all groups
of trials (early trials: z = −3.269, p = 0.001; middle trials:
z = −2.474, p = 0.013; late trials: z = −2.440, p = 0.015; music
trials: z = −2.969, p < 0.003). Comparisons between groups of
trials (Wilcoxon signed-rank test) in the non-dancers revealed
differences between middle trials and music trials (z = −2.296,
p = 0.022) and between late trials and music trials (z = −2.173,
p = 0.030), with more segment boundaries occurring in the
music trials than in the other groups. In the dancers, less segment
boundaries were defined in the early trials than in the middle
trials (z = −2.018, p = 0.044). In contrast to the non-dancers’
results, less segment boundaries were defined in the music tri-
als than in the late trials (z = −2.092, p = 0.036). Results for
the four groups of trials are displayed in Figure 1, results for all
individual trials are shown in Figure 3. The distribution of seg-
ment boundaries (calculated as average over all trials for 92 bins
of 1 s) as defined by the experimental groups is illustrated in
Figure 4.
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FIGURE 1 | Results of Experiment 1. Mean numbers of segment
boundaries defined for the four groups of trials [1: trials 1–5 (early); 2: trials
6–10 (middle); 3: trials 10–15 (late); 4: trials 16–20 (music)]; blue columns:
dancers, red columns: non-dancers; asterisks mark significant differences:
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Post-hoc interviews
After finishing the experimental procedure, each participant was
asked two questions:
1. Which criteria or strategies did you use for segmenting the
dance phrase?
2. Did the music in the last five trials affect your decisions?
The experimenter asked the participant verbally and wrote down
the answers in key points (note that this informal procedure did
not follow any established qualitative approach but only aimed at
gaining additional information in an explorative way).
From the informal answers to Question 1, the most common
criteria were extracted, and naming frequencies of these criteria
were counted. The most common criteria and their frequencies
of naming are displayed in Table 1. Remarks made by individ-
ual participants in response to Questions 1 and 2 are listed in
Supplementary Table 1.
DISCUSSION
In Experiment 1, dancers and non-dancers segmented a dance
phrase repeatedly presented in a video clip by key press.
Segmentation grain (i.e., numbers of segment boundaries) was
expected to be influenced by expertise (comparison between the
two groups), by visual familiarity of the movement phrase (com-
parison between early, middle and late trials), and by music
(comparing the last group of trials presented with music to the
previous groups of trials).
The results showed that in all trials, in each individual trial
and in the four groups of trials, dancers generally defined less
segment boundaries than non-dancers. The effect of expertise
on movement segmentation was thereby very clearly reflected
by the results, with dancers defining less segment boundaries
and thereby segmenting the whole movement phrase into fewer
Table 1 | Segmentation criteria named by the three groups of
participants in the post-hoc interviews (numbers indicate absolute
frequencies of naming in both experiments).
Segmentation criteria Non-dancers Amateurs Dancers
Change of movement type 7 8 4
Change of height level 3 3 6
Stops, pauses 5 2 3
Change of direction in space 4 2 3
Change of main active body part 4 1 3
Change of tempo, dynamics – 8 5
Feeling, imagery – 5 4
Movement impulse, accents – 3 2
Cues for learning or teaching – 5 –
Change of energy or force – – 4
and longer sections than non-dancers. This finding is supported
by the comment of one dancer, who reported perceiving the
entire phrase as a whole, “in a flow,” therefore segmenting did
not feel natural. Perceiving a longer dance phrase as a whole
despite the occurrence of various movement characteristics that
could be used (and were typically named) as segmentation cri-
teria is also in accordance with the claim often made in modern
and contemporary dance to dance longer phrases fluently with-
out obvious breaks or partitions, without “losing the energy.”
The finding that this principle commonly applied to the dancers’
action performance is transferred to perception when observing
a dance phrase accords with the principle of perceptual resonance
(Schütz-Bosbach and Prinz, 2007) described in various areas of
expertise (e.g., Kiesel et al., 2009; Güldenpenning et al., 2011;
Steggemann et al., 2011). Dancers defined less segment bound-
aries in early trials than in the middle and late trials, whereas
no difference between early, middle and late trials was found in
the non-dancers. An effect of visual familiarity was thereby only
found in the dancers, but not in the non-dancers.
Interestingly, music affected segmentation differently in
dancers and non-dancers: In the music trials, dancers defined
less segment boundaries than in late trials, whereas non-dancers
defined more segment boundaries in music trials than in mid-
dle and late trials. Apparently, music had a binding effect on the
perceived movement in the dancers’ group. (Comments given
by individual dancers in response to Question 2 supported this
interpretation: music was experienced as binding the movement
together, slowing down the movement, adding a harmonic feel-
ing). In the non-dancers, in contrast, music seemed to confuse
and thereby cause more segment boundaries to occur, possibly
based on the perceived lack of segmentation cues in the music that
might have interfered with previously defined movement cues.
Expertise in sport or dance typically involves visual as well
as motor experience of specific actions, and differences found
between experts and novices can be based on any of the two, or
both. To gain further understanding of expertise effects in action
perception, it is necessary to differentiate visual and motor exper-
tise either by studying observation experts (e.g., Calvo-Merino
et al., 2006; Aglioti et al., 2008) or by applying a learning interven-
tion (e.g., Cross et al., 2006, 2009). In order to gain information
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about potential effects of motor experience on segmentation,
a second experiment was conducted with dance amateurs who
solved the same experimental task as applied in Experiment 1
before and after learning the presented dance phrase.
EXPERIMENT 2: SEGMENTATION OF A DANCE PHRASE
BEFORE AND AFTER LEARNING: EFFECTS OF MOTOR
EXPERIENCE, VISUAL FAMILIARITY AND MUSIC
In Experiment 2, the same segmentation task as in Experiment
1 was applied to dance amateurs who regularly trained modern
dance in the same group. After learning the phrase in their train-
ing as part of a performance program, all participants repeated
the experimental task. The main goal of the experiment, apart
from adding a third (intermediate) group of participants, was to
gain information regarding the effect of specific motor expertise
on segmenting a dance phrase.
METHOD
Participants
Eight participants (all female, one left-handed; age 18.5 ± 6.55
years, range 14–30 years) voluntarily took part in Experiment 2
without any exchange for course credit or money. All participants
trained regularly in classical and contemporary dance on average
to advanced amateur level (years of training in classical dance:
9.13 ± 1.45 years, range: 8–12 years; years of training in mod-
ern dance: 3.38 ± 1.51 years, range: 1–6 years; dance training:
3.38 ± 2.20 h per week, range: 2–6 h) and were currently mem-
bers of the same modern dance class (Theater Bielefeld ballet
school). All eight participants named classical and modern dance
as their primary types of training, single participants also trained
in one of the following disciplines: capoeira, hip-hop, karate and
acrobatics. All participants reported having normal or corrected-
to-normal vision, and were naive with regard to the purpose of
the experiment. All participants provided written informed con-
sent before testing started. The experiment was performed in
accordance with the ethical standards of the sixth revision (WMA,
2008) of the 1964 Declaration of Helsinki.
Apparatus and Stimuli
The same stimulus material and experimental set-up was used as
in Experiment 1.
Design and Procedure
Two data collections were applied, one before and one after
the participants learned the dance phrase in their training.
Data collections took place in a quiet lab or office room or
in a free dress room at the ballet school. Each participant was
tested individually, the experimental procedure was exactly the
same as in Experiment 1. The single experimental session lasted
60–90 min.
After all participants had completed the experiment once (data
collection 1, pre-learning), they learned the presented dance
phrase as part of their regular training. After approximately 6
weeks in which the dance phrase had been trained regularly, the
experiment was repeated in exactly the same way as before (data
collection 2, post-learning). Crucially, at the time of data collec-
tion 1, participants were neither informed that they would learn
the dance phrase nor that they would be asked to participate in a
second data collection, and participants were not informed about
data collection 2 when learning the dance phrase. The data collec-
tions were separated by a time interval of approximately 6 weeks
during which the dance phrase was learned and trained as part of
a choreography for later stage performance.
Data Analyses
Mean numbers of segment boundaries were analyzed in the same
way as for Experiment 1. Non-parametric tests were applied to
compare the two experimental conditions, pre- and post-learning
(i.e., without and with motor experience of dancing the phrase,
respectively), regarding the defined numbers of segment bound-
aries for each trial separately, for all trials, and for each group of
five trials (early trials, middle trials, late trials, and music trials).
For each data collection (pre- and post-learning), mean numbers
of segment boundaries of the four trial groups (early, middle, late,
and music) were compared to each other using non-parametric
tests (Wilcoxon signed-rank test).
RESULTS
Segment boundaries
Comparisons of trial groups between the pre- and post-learning
conditions (Wilcoxon signed-rank test) revealed a difference in
the middle trials (z = −2.240, p = 0.025), in which less segment
boundaries were defined in the post-learning condition than
in the pre-learning condition. Comparisons of individual trials
revealed differences in trials 8, 9, 10, 12, and 15 (all p < 0.05). No
difference between pre- and post-learning was found, however,
when comparing segment boundaries over all trials. Comparisons
between groups of trials within each condition revealed that
only in the pre-learning condition, less segment boundaries were
defined in the music trials than in the late trials (z = −2.371, p =
0.018), whereas trial groups did not differ in the post-learning
condition. Results for the four groups of trials are displayed in
Figure 2, results for all individual trials (Experiments 1 and 2) are
shown in Figure 3. The distribution of segment boundaries (cal-
culated as average over all trials for 92 bins of 1 s) as defined by the
amateurs before and after learning the dance phrase is illustrated
in Figure 4.
Comparing the group of amateurs to the groups of dancers
and non-dancers from Experiment 1 showed differences between
the non-dancers and the amateurs in the pre-learning con-
dition for the early trials (z = −2.013, p = 0.044) and the
music trials (z = −2.394, p = 0.017), and differences between
the non-dancers and the amateurs in the post-learning condi-
tion in all groups of trials (early: z = −2.355, p = 0.019; mid-
dle: z = −2.431, p = 0.015, late: z = −2.546, p = 0.011, music:
z = −3.009, p = 0.003), as well as over all trails (z = −2.508,
p = 0.012). No differences were found between the dancers’ and
the amateurs’ results. Results for all individual trials are displayed
in Figure 3.
Post-hoc interviews
As in Experiment 1, each participant was verbally asked two
explorative questions after each data collection (again, no estab-
lished qualitative approach was applied but the two questions
were asked informally and key points of the answers were written
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FIGURE 2 | Results of Experiment 2. Mean numbers of segment
boundaries defined for the four groups of trials (1, early trials; 2, middle
trials; 3, late trials; 4, music trials); blue columns: before learning, red
columns: after learning; asterisks mark significant differences: ∗p < 0.05.
FIGURE 3 | Results of Experiment 1 (full lines) and Experiment 2
(dashed lines) combined, mean numbers of segment boundaries
defined for individual trials. Red, non-dancers; green, dancers; light blue,
amateurs before learning; dark blue, amateurs after learning.
down by the experimenter). The most common criteria and their
frequencies of naming (in response to Question 1: “Which crite-
ria or strategies did you use for segmenting the dance phrase?”)
are displayed in Table 1. Remarks made by individual participants
in response to Questions 1 and 2 (“Did the music in the last five
trials affect your decisions?”) are listed in Supplementary Table 1.
DISCUSSION
In Experiment 2, dance amateurs segmented a dance phrase
repeatedly presented in a video clip by key press. The experi-
ment was repeated after the participants had learned to dance
the presented dance phrase. Segmentation grain (i.e., numbers
of segment boundaries) was expected to be influenced by motor
experience (comparison between pre- and post-learning), by
visual familiarity of the movement phrase (comparison between
early, middle and late trials), and by music (comparing the last
group of trials presented with music to the previous groups of
trials).
Results showed that less segment boundaries were defined in
the post-learning condition compared to the pre-learning condi-
tion in the middle and late trials. No difference between pre- and
post-learning was found in the early trials and in trials with music,
and when comparing mean numbers of segment boundaries over
all trials. Consequently, the motor experience of dancing the pre-
sented movement phrase was found to affect segmentation grain
slightly, with less segment boundaries being defined by the par-
ticipants after they had learned to dance the phrase, however,
this difference only reached significance in the middle and late
trials. This finding was reflected by the participants’ comments:
segments were perceived as longer, “larger shapes” were recog-
nized, longer segments were “more fun.” Participants’ comments
also reflected that watching the dance phrase was experienced as
more embodied and more competent after learning.
Music was found to affect segmentation in the pre-learning
condition, but not in the post-learning condition. Before learn-
ing the dance phrase, less segment boundaries were defined in
the music trials than in the late trials, showing an effect of music
on segmentation comparable to the one observed in the dancers.
It can be assumed that the effect was caused by a binding effect
of music (as assumed in the dancers). The finding that the dif-
ference between late trials and music trials was not significant
anymore after learning the movement phrase might be explained
by the fact that the participants danced the phrase in their training
in combination with the same music as used in the experiment,
therefore music and movement might have been coupled during
the learning and training process. When watching the movement
without the music in the post-learning condition, participants
did not really experience the movement “without the music,” as
music and movement had become parts of the same integrated
representation in their long-term memory (see Land et al., 2013),
and segmentation (even when no music was played) related not
only to the presented movement, but to the representation of
“movement-with-music.”
In contrast to Experiment 1, no differences were found
between early, middle and late trials within each condition, show-
ing that no effect of visual familiarity was found in the amateurs
(or that the potential effect of visual familiarity was too weak
to produce significant results). The finding that visual familiar-
ity did not significantly affect segmentation is contrasted by the
impression of several participants that, with repeated observa-
tions of the dance phrase in consecutive trials, the dance phrase
was more strongly perceived as a whole (the movement was
“growing together”). Similar to the dancers, several amateurs had
expressed before learning that they found it difficult to segment
the phrase because of the perceived fluency and connectedness of
the movement.
Comparing the results of the amateurs’ group in Experiment 2
to the results of the two groups of participants from Experiment
1 revealed that the amateurs did not differ from the dancers,
whereas differences found between the amateurs and the non-
dancers were found and increased from the pre-learning to
the post-learning condition. These findings indicate that the
amateurs might have become more “expertly” in perception and
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FIGURE 4 | Results of Experiments 1 and 2. Distribution of segment
boundaries over the phrase: average number of segment boundaries for each
bin (1 s), calculated over all trials; panels from top to bottom: dancers,
non-dancers, amateurs before learning the phrase, amateurs after learning
the phrase. The most frequently set segmentation boundaries marked the
following instances in the dance phrase: 13 change of speed and direction
during a floor sequence; 29 slowing down and raising to the knees from floor
sequence; 53 slowing down floor movement, raising into shoulder stand; 76
transition from walking to dynamic swinging movement initiated by an
impulse of the right shoulder; 86 going down to the floor from standing.
segmentation by learning to dance the presented movement,
which corroborates findings on effects of motor expertise on
action perception (e.g., Aglioti et al., 2008; Güldenpenning et al.,
2011).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Expertise in dance and various sports disciplines has been found
to modulate the perception of actions on different levels, specif-
ically of those actions belonging to the specific area of expertise
(Calvo-Merino et al., 2005, 2006; Aglioti et al., 2008; Cheung and
Bar, 2012). Evidence exists that these effects specifically relate to
motor experience and learning of the observed actions (Cross
et al., 2006, 2009). Furthermore, Event Segmentation Theory
(Zacks et al., 2007) and related empirical studies (e.g., Zacks
et al., 2009; Sargent et al., 2013) provide evidence for the assump-
tion that the segmentation of observed actions is influenced by
relevant visual and motor expertise. In the present study, this
assumption was tested using segmentation of a dance phrase as
experimental task performed by three groups of participants dif-
fering in dance expertise. Results of two consecutive experiments
revealed broader segmentation applied by professional dancers,
but also by dance amateurs, compared to non-dancers. The effect
was increased in the amateurs after learning the presented dance
phrase, pointing toward a specific effect of motor experience. It
has to be emphasized that in this study participants were not
instructed to segment with fine or coarse segmentation grain,
whereas this was commonly done in studies on event segmen-
tation. When participants were instructed to segment observed
actions into coarse units, this typically resulted in segment lengths
of 30–60 s, whereas the instruction to apply fine-grained segmen-
tation resulted in units of 10–20 s. Zacks et al. (2009) showed
that fine-grained segmentation generally correlated with move-
ment parameters whereas coarse-grained segmentation rather
correlated with external goals and context information. In the
current study, average segment lengths defined by the partici-
pants ranged between 6 and 13 s. As the context of the presented
movement in this study was dance and the dancer’s intention
was clearly movement-related, it can be assumed that segmenta-
tion was predominantly fine-grained, and the results support this
assumption.
Visual familiarity was induced in the current study by repeated
presentation of the same stimulus dance phrase. This approach
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clearly differs from the approaches taken in other segmentation
studies in which observes typically watched the same action twice,
in part with different instructions (e.g., coarse vs. fine segmenta-
tion, Zacks et al., 2009; Sargent et al., 2013; or just watching vs.
segmenting, Noble et al., 2014). Under natural conditions, actions
are not repeated in exactly the same way, and segmentation occurs
spontaneously as part of perceptual processing. The same com-
monly applies to watching dance: most audience members watch
the performance of a dance piece once, from a naive perspec-
tive. “Expert observers” like dancers, choreographers, teachers,
and dance enthusiasts watch the same movement phrases repeat-
edly, however, performances naturally differ. Watching different
versions of the same movement material performed with nat-
ural variation may increase the observers’ sensitivity for subtle
differences. Watching the identical performance 10 or 20 times
(e.g., from a video clip) certainly increases the observer’s sensi-
tivity for details, but might also become boring. In the current
study, the phrase was presented repeatedly to create high visual
familiarity with the previously unknown phrase, thereby facili-
tating prediction and increasing anticipation success. Following
Event Segmentation Theory (Zacks et al., 2007), this should result
in a decrease of the number of segment boundaries. Results
of this study confirm this assumption, and individual partici-
pants’ comments reflect this (see Supplementary Table 1). Other
participants’ comments suggest that certain segment boundaries
became fixed over trials, as participants felt more confident to
be “right” in their decisions. This aspect of experiencing com-
petence might play a crucial role for the esthetic evaluation of
dance, which has been related to prediction success and moments
of surprise (e.g., Hagendoorn, 2004). Studying segmentation in
relation to the novelty and esthetic evaluation of dance movement
would be highly relevant in this context, addressing for instance
observers’ subjective experiences of boredom and competence. In
the present study, several participants reported that they delib-
erately varied their strategies, playfully trying out different ways
of segmenting (see Supplementary Table 1). This creative atti-
tude toward the experimental task might have been an attempt to
counteract boredom, but might also have been elicited by the type
of stimulus (dance) and the general appreciation of watching it.
Music added during the last five trials had contradictory effects
in the different experimental groups. While music decreased
the number of segment boundaries in the dancers and in the
amateurs (before learning), it increased the number of segment
boundaries in the non-dancers. This finding has been interpreted
in terms of a binding effect in the dancers and amateurs and
irritation in the non-dancers.
Empirical evidence exists that event segmentation not only
occurs while observing actions, but also while listening to music
(Sridharan et al., 2007). Based on the proposed multimodality
of event models (see Zacks et al., 2007), it can be assumed that
music modifies the perception (and performance) of the dance
movement it accompanies, by potentially increasing the experi-
ence of uncertainty in movement prediction at musical transition
points (Sridharan et al., 2007) and decreasing it within musi-
cal phrases. The effect of this interrelation between perceived
movement and sound on segmentation is likely to depend on the
specific characteristics of both and their temporal relation to each
other. As listening to music alone has been shown to be sensitive
to event segmentation (Sridharan et al., 2007), it can be assumed
that music would affect the segmentation of movement in differ-
ent ways, depending on its characteristics (i.e., its metrics, pitch,
rhythm, pulse, etc.). In the current study, the music that accompa-
nied the movement did not have any metric rhythm or pulse, but
consisted of slowly rising and falling chords, and might therefore
have had a binding rather than a dividing influence. It can fur-
thermore be hypothesized that segmentation of dance movement
accompanied by music would be sensitive to the way both are
integrated, and to what extent the dancer entrains with the music,
reacts to musical cues or deliberately counterpoints them. This
aspect and the more general question to what extent music influ-
ences the segmentation of observed dance movement warrants
further study. It would be particularly interesting to systemati-
cally combine movement and sound in different ways to shed
light on the roles of visual and auditive information and their
interrelation for the perception and segmentation of dance-like
actions. Research responding to these questions would not only
be of interest for scientists investigating action perception, but
also for dancers and choreographers interested in audience reac-
tions. Promising manipulations could include the presentation
of a movement phrase combined with different types of music
and sound, or with the same music or sound varying in temporal
relation (i.e., music systematically shifted relative to the move-
ment). In such studies, the different combinations of music and
movement would have to be presented in a counterbalanced way
to control for order effects. In the current study, this was not
the case; music was added only to the last five trials to prevent
interference with the factor visual familiarity. Confounding of the
factor music with visual familiarity can therefore not be excluded,
which represents a clear limitation of the current study with
regards to the influence of music on movement segmentation.
Furthermore, as previously mentioned, the typical situation of a
dance spectator is to watch a dance performance once, without
knowing it. Therefore, potential effects of music on the percep-
tion of novel, unfamiliar and potentially surprising movement
material would be relevant to study in the context of dance.
The task of parsing movement phrases has also been applied
as artistic tool in choreography, as it is assumed to have the
potential to change the dancers’ perception of the movement
and thereby their artistic expression. In a “parsing and view-
ing” task performed by Wayne McGregor | Random Dance as
part of a choreographic process, dancers segmented movement
phrases and subsequently commented their decisions, which
revealed different cognitive frameworks underlying dance parsing
(deLahunta and Barnard, 2005). To attend to the latter aspect in
our study, the participants of the current study were asked infor-
mally about their personal segmentation criteria and strategies.
Participants of all groups named changes in movement character-
istics (movement type, active body part, height level, direction,
speed). Criteria related to learning the movement were only
named by the amateurs (e.g., “how the teacher would teach it”),
whereas only the dancers named dynamic features (e.g., “where
force would be needed”). It can be assumed that the latter crite-
rion requires efficient on-line motor simulation of the observed
movement, which might be a skill that is specific to dancers on a
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high level of expertise (see Bläsing and Schack, 2012). To address
this issue, further research would be needed relating experts’ seg-
mentation with movement analysis. Similar approaches have been
used by Zacks et al. (2009) for actions from a non-dance con-
text and by Noble et al. (2014) for Indian dance with a narrative
character, but these studies did not include an expertise-related
paradigm. It would be of particular interest to know to what
extent dancers, compared to non-dancers, are able to specify and
predict dynamical measures (i.e., forces) from motor simulation
while watching dance movement, and how this influences the way
they segment a dance phrase.
An aspect of this study that has been rarely addressed is
the combination of comparing expertise with a learning task.
Learning, however, was investigated only in the amateur group
with intermediate skill level, but not on different levels of exper-
tise, which could be a topic for further study. A related question
of interest that could not be addressed here is to which extent the
way movement material is learned or taught affects the perception
and segmentation of the same material later on. In other words,
would the way the teacher has structured the dance phrase be
reflected by the segment boundaries defined by the students after
learning the phrase? In dance training, teachers commonly break
movement phrases down into sub-phrases and partial movements
in order to facilitate learning, and students imitate and practice
these parts and subsequently combine them again to a whole
phrase. This procedure naturally affords breakpoints in the men-
tal representation of the phrase in the dancer’s memory that can
become undesired breakpoints in the fluent quality of movement
performance. To cure this problem, different measures are taken
during further training of the phrase, such as varying the lengths
of partial phrases and paying special attention to the transitions.
Studies using segmentation paradigms could help to shed light on
the effects and the efficiency of such practice.
Taken together, it can be concluded that segmentation of
dance movement is clearly influenced by expertise, with broader
segmentation grain being applied by professional and amateur
dancers than non-dancers. Effects of visual familiarity and music
on movement segmentation seem to be modulated by expertise,
and motor experience had a slight effect in the amateur dancers.
These findings contribute to the literature on dance expertise
and segmentation of dance-like actions, and raise future research
questions particularly addressing effects of the novelty or famil-
iarity of the observed movement material, interrelations between
movement and music or sound, learning in different ways and
on different levels of expertise, and the esthetic evaluation of the
observed dance movement.
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In indoor rock climbing, the perception of object properties and the adequate execution
of grasping actions highly determine climbers’ performance. In two consecutive
experiments, effects of climbing expertise on the cognitive activation of grasping actions
following the presentation of climbing holds was investigated. Experiment 1 evaluated the
representation of climbing holds in the long-term memory of climbers and non-climbers
with the help of a psychometric measurement method. Within a hierarchical splitting
procedure subjects had to decide about the similarity of required grasping postures.
For the group of climbers, representation structures corresponded clearly to four grip
types. In the group of non-climbers, representation structures differed more strongly
than in climbers and did not clearly refer to grip types. To learn about categorical
knowledge activation in Experiment 2, a priming paradigm was applied. Images of hands
in grasping postures were presented as targets and images of congruent, neutral, or
incongruent climbing holds were used as primes. Only in climbers, reaction times were
shorter and error rates were smaller for the congruent condition than for the incongruent
condition. The neutral condition resulted in intermediate performance. The findings
suggest that perception of climbing holds activates the commonly associated grasping
postures in climbers but not in non-climbers. The findings of this study give evidence
that the categorization of visually perceived objects is fundamentally influenced by the
cognitive-motor potential for interaction, which depends on the observer’s experience and
expertise. Thus, motor expertise not only facilitates precise action perception, but also
benefits the perception of action-relevant objects.
Keywords: expertise, mental representation, action activation, categorical knowledge, grasping
INTRODUCTION
Rock climbing requires a multitude of physical and cognitive abil-
ities, as well as their well concerted interaction. One of them is
the ability to perceive properties of climbing holds and to execute
adequate grasping actions. In indoor climbing, the athlete’s goal
is to reach the top of a climbing wall by using specific climbing
holds that are arranged as routes of different skill requirements.
The shape, orientation and relative position as well as the combi-
nation of holds thereby determines the adequate grasp and step
techniques. Apprehending climbing holds correctly is crucial for
planning corresponding actions, and thereby for optimizing the
climber’s performance (Boschker et al., 2002). Thus, the ability to
assign optimal grasps to the reachable holds is a relevant part of a
climber’s specific cognitive expertise (Pezzulo et al., 2010).
The cognitive aspects of expertise in the domain of rock or
indoor climbing have hardly been investigated. One of the rare
experimental studies on cognitive issues of climbing expertise has
been conducted by Pezzulo et al. (2010), who investigated the
ability of novice and expert climbers to memorize climbing routes
from presented photographs. Cognitive performance was mea-
sured as number of recalled grips in the correct sequence of a
route. The main finding was that expert climbers outperformed
novices in recalling the sequence of climbing holds of a difficult
climbing route that could only be climbed by experts, but not in
recalling an easy route that could be climbed both by experts and
novices. The authors argued that having the motor competence
to climb a visually perceived route enables climbers to mentally
simulate mastering it, and that this motor simulation improves
the climbers’ recall of the grip sequence. Moreover, as partic-
ipants were not explicitly instructed to mentally simulate the
required climbing actions, it was suggested that visually perceiv-
ing a climbing route automatically activates the corresponding
action sequence in skilled climbers.
Automatic activation of motor components of grasping
actions has also been found in other contexts, for example, when
participants had to classify kitchen objects or tools (Labeye et al.,
2008), or manufactured and natural objects (Tucker and Ellis,
2001, 2004; Grèzes et al., 2003). Labeye et al. (2008) investigated
the processing of object features (kitchen tools vs. do-it-yourself
(DIY) tools) and action features (implied actions performed with
each tool). Participants had to categorize target pictures as kitchen
tools or DIY tools. The targets were preceded by a prime picture
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either depicting a kitchen tool or a DIY tool. Both the object
(same vs. different category) and the action features (similar
vs. dissimilar implied action) were independently manipulated
between the prime and the target pictures. Object and action fea-
tures independently led to faster processing if they were from the
same category or implied similar actions, respectively, compared
to different categories or dissimilar actions. Labeye et al. (2008)
argued that perceiving the prime picture automatically activates
the motor components of the action that may potentially be per-
formed with regard to the object (see also Ellis and Tucker, 2000;
Tucker and Ellis, 2001; Bub and Masson, 2010; Masson et al.,
2011).
Studies investigating well-known everyday objects (e.g.,
kitchen tools) suggest that such object representations are asso-
ciated with certain grasping actions (e.g., Tucker and Ellis, 2004;
Labeye et al., 2008). These associations may emerge as a con-
sequence of associated action experience. To further investigate
the role of motor experience for object-based action activations,
laboratory training studies have been conducted (Creem-Regehr
et al., 2007; Kiefer et al., 2007; Weisberg et al., 2007; Cross et al.,
2012; Bellebaum et al., 2013). After a training period in which
participants explicitly learnt to use objects in a tool-like man-
ner, the manipulation experience became a part of participants’
object representations and were automatically activated when the
objects were perceived (e.g., Weisberg et al., 2007).
A sports context provides a suitable scenario for investigat-
ing expertise effects in object-related action knowledge. Climbing
holds have been artificially designed to be used in indoor climb-
ing and are encountered exclusively in this context. Accordingly,
people who do not practice indoor climbing have no manipula-
tion experience with climbing holds, whereas sport climbers who
frequently train on indoor climbing walls have a large amount of
specific manipulation experience. Yet, climbing holds are objects
from which particular manipulation potential might be inferred
even by non-climbers based on the perceivable shape-properties
of the object. Comparing non-climbers’ and climbers’ processing
of climbing holds therefore provides a suitable scenario to dissoci-
ate the role of grasping experience and physical object properties
in the representation and processing of grasping actions.
Climbing is not a sport performed under time pressure (except
speed climbing; Florine and Wright, 2004). However, automatic
activations of single grasping actions are an important aspect of
a climber’s performance. The immediate activation of a grasp-
ing action to a perceived climbing hold might decrease cognitive
effort in short-term memory and thus save cognitive resources
necessary for further action planning (Spiegel et al., 2013).
Besides, the direct activation of a grasping action also allows
a quick action execution and may thus prevent high energy
costs arising when a climber has to remain in a static position
evaluating the next action possibility. Based on these considera-
tions, the present study examines object-related action knowledge
(Experiment 1) and automatic action activation (Experiment 2)
based on perceived climbing holds.
To investigate knowledge representations of climbing-specific
grasping actions, Experiment 1 evaluated the relevant cogni-
tive structures of grasping actions related to typical climbing
holds in the long-term memory of climbers and non-climbers
via Structure Dimensional Analysis (Schack, 2004; SDA; Schack,
2012). It was expected that climbers, but not non-climbers,
would categorize climbing holds according to appropriate grip
types (functional features) used in indoor climbing rather than
according to other object properties.
Experiment 2 was conducted to clarify whether or not the rep-
resentational clusters are actually associated with motor compo-
nents that fit the holds in climbers. A priming paradigm was used
with pictures of climbing holds as primes and grasping postures
as targets (e.g., Güldenpenning et al., 2011, 2013). Climbers were
expected to show different effects than non-climbers. Specifically,
climbers but not non-climbers should show a congruency effect,
i.e., facilitation by congruent primes and inhibition by incongru-
ent primes (Dehaene et al., 1998).
EXPERIMENT 1: CATEGORIZATION OF CLIMBING HOLDS
In indoor climbing, climbers have to manage routes of different
difficulty level, which requires a multitude of physical and cog-
nitive skills. Applying adequate grasp techniques to the available
climbing holds is one of the crucial tasks in this challenge, as it
enables the climber to master the route in a safe and efficient
way. Experiment 1 investigated if climbing holds are categorically
organized depending on their associated manual actions (i.e.,
adequate grip types) in the long-term memory of experienced
indoor climbers. Structure dimensional analysis (SDA; Schack,
2004, 2012) was applied to reveal the relevant representational
structures related in the long-term memory of climbers and non-
climbers. It was expected that climbers, but not non-climbers,
categorized climbing holds according to the appropriate grip
types. Previous studies using SDA showed that experts’ cluster
solutions referred to functionally structured mental representa-
tions of complex movements (Bläsing et al., 2009; Land et al.,
2013) or to objects affording similar actions (e.g., Stöckel et al.,




Twenty-one participants voluntarily took part in Experiment 1
without any exchange or in exchange for course credit. Ten
students of sport science without any experience in indoor or
outdoor rock climbing, all from Bielefeld University, Germany,
were assigned to the non-climbers’ group (two females, all right-
handed, mean age 24.0 years, range 23–25). All non-climbers
were physically active (eight out of ten participants performed
individual sports, four performed team sports). The sports most
regularly performed by the participants of the non-athlete group
included soccer, basketball, fitness training, and running.
Eleven climbers (two females, all right-handed, mean age 27;
range 22–34) were recruited from an indoor climbing area, due
to their experiences in climbing (mean climbing experience: 5.3
years of training, 3.4 training sessions per week). Referring to
the Union Internationale des Associationes d’Alpinisme’s (UIAA)
grading system describing the difficulty of the climbing route,
participants’ indoor climbing skills ranged from 6 to 8 (two par-
ticipants climbed routes graded up to 8, five participants climbed
routes graded 7). Five of the climbers also regularly climbed
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outdoors, with skills corresponding to routes ranging from 5 to 7.
Additionally, five out of the ten climbers regularly performed
other sports (mostly mountain sports or running).
All participants reported having normal or corrected-to-
normal vision, and were naive with regard to the purpose of
the experiment. All participants provided written informed con-
sent before testing started. The single experimental session lasted
about 30 min. The experiment was performed in accordance with
the ethical standards of the sixth revision of the 1964 Declaration
of Helsinki (World Medical Assocition, 2008).
Apparatus and stimuli
Stimuli consisted of 16 colored photographs of climbing holds of
different shapes and sizes, as commonly used in indoor climbing
(see Figure 1). The holds were presented to match the climber’s
perspective, in adequate size relative to each other. All holds were
chosen to elicit specific grip types rather than being ambiguous or
non-specific. Six out of sixteen holds typically required a crimp
grip, four a sideways pull toward the body, four a pocket grip, and
two an open grip. This a priori attribution of climbing holds to
grip types was informed by climbing experts who did not partic-
ipate in the study and was used as reference for the results of the
experiment.
Design and procedure
The participants were tested individually while sitting in front of
a computer screen. An experimental paradigm named Structure
Dimensional Analysis (SDA; Schack, 2004, 2012) was applied to
investigate the categorization of climbing holds on the basis of
mental representations of specialist grip types in the long-term
memory of climbers and non-climbers. SDA was applied via
custom-made software (NetSplit). The stimuli were presented in
such a way that in each trial, the reference stimulus (or anchor)
occurred in the top position marked by a green frame, and the
stimulus directly below the reference, marked by a blue frame, had
to be assigned by key press to a positive (left) or negative (right)
list relative to the reference (see Figure 2). The anchor and the
active stimulus picture were presented on the screen with a size of
approximately 6 × 6 cm. The participants were instructed to indi-
cate by pressing one of two marked keys if the adequate grasping
action directed toward the currently active hold (marked blue)
would be of the same type as the one directed toward the climbing
hold in the reference position (marked green). Once the response
was given, the next trial began, in which the same anchor was pre-
sented with another of the remaining items, until all 15 items had
been judged as affording a similar or dissimilar grip compared to
the anchor; this procedure composed one block. In the next block,
a different hold was presented as anchor, in combination with all
remaining 15 holds. The whole experiment comprised 16 blocks
applied in randomized order, each block with a different item as
anchor, resulting in a total of 240 trials.
Data analyses
A hierarchical cluster analysis according to SDA (Lander and
Lange, 1996; Schack, 2004, 2012) was carried out on the data col-
lected via the previously described splitting procedure in order to
obtain mean cluster solutions for the two experimental groups. To
achieve this, the sorting task described as part of the experimental
FIGURE 1 | Stimulus pictures showing climbing holds commonly used in indoor climbing; this grouping of climbing holds according to grip types
was used as reference for the participants’ results.
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FIGURE 2 | Presentation of stimuli during the experiment. The
stimulus item in the top position, marked by a green frame, is the
current anchor (reference) relative to which the active stimulus
below, marked by a blue frame, has to be categorized as affording
a similar grip or affording a dissimilar grip. Items appearing in
smaller size left and right of the active item have already been
assigned to the positive list (similar grips) or to the negative list
(dissimilar grips), respectively.
procedure was applied to deliver a distance scaling between the
items (climbing holds). By this procedure, 16 decision trees were
established, as each item occupied once the reference position,
resulting in a 16 × 15 matrix of partial quantities in which val-
ues took either a negative or positive sign depending on whether
the item was judged as belonging to the positive or the neg-
ative list relative to the anchor (e.g., if 4 out of the 15 items
were assigned to the positive list, these items were each given the
value +4, whereas the remaining 11 features assigned to the nega-
tive list were each given the value −11). The resulting matrix was
then z-transformed for standardization and subsequently trans-
formed into a Euclidian distance matrix as basis for a hierarchical
cluster analysis (in accordance with the average-linkage-method).
Cluster solutions were determined using a critical Euclidian dis-
tance (dcrit), with all junctures lying below this value forming the
apical pole of an underlying concept cluster (for more details on
the method, see Schack, 2012). As reference structure, an a pri-
ori classification of stimulus climbing holds according to specific
grip types had been achieved based on interviews with climb-
ing experts who did not participate in the study (see Figure 1).
To calculate the similarity between mean group results with the
reference structure and to compare each individual participant’s
cluster solution with the averaged cluster solution of the group
and the reference structure (holds 1–6: crimp grip; holds 7–10:
sideways pull; holds 11–14: pocket grip; holds 15 and 16: open
grip; see also Figure 1), we used the adjusted rand index (ARI;
Rand, 1971; Santos and Embrechts, 2009). The ARI provides a
measure of similarity on a range between 0 and 1; a score of
0 indicates that two cluster solutions are independent, whereas
a score of 1 indicates that two cluster solutions are identical.
Scores between these two values indicate the degree of similar-
ity between cluster solutions; the higher the ARI score, the greater
is the similarity between the variables.
Results
The hierarchical cluster analysis revealed four clusters corre-
sponding to four grip types for the group of climbers, and three
smaller clusters for the non-climbers. The four clusters of the
climber group included all 16 holds into clusters that reflected
the correct assignment of holds to grip types (cluster 1: items 1–6,
cluster 2: 7–10, cluster 3: 11–14, cluster 4: 15 and 16). Euclidean
distances between the items of all clusters were all below 1.5 (criti-
cal value: 3.4, alpha value: 5%), which reflected a high consistency
of the climbers’ decisions. The non-climbers’ cluster solution con-
tained three clusters, consisting of items 2 to 6, 7 and 8, and 13 and
14. Euclidean distances were all larger than 1.5, and the remaining
seven items were singled out (i.e., were not significantly assigned
to any cluster). The mean group dendrograms for climbers and
non-climbers are presented in Figure 3.
To compare individual participants’ cluster solutions to the
groups’ mean cluster solutions, adjusted rand index (ARI, Santos
and Embrechts, 2009) was calculated, which expresses the extent
to which the individual cluster solutions differ from the respec-
tive averaged group dendrogram. Comparison of the mean group
cluster solutions with the reference structure resulted in an ARI
score of 1.0 for the climbers (i.e., both cluster solutions were
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FIGURE 3 | Results of Experiment 1: mean cluster solutions of groups;
top: climbers (N = 11); bottom: non-climbers (N = 10). Left: dendrograms;
alpha: 5%, dcrit (marked by a horizontal line): 3.4. Numbers on the x-axis refer to
the item numbers; numbers on the y-axis indicate Euclidean distance between
items according to the cluster analysis via SDA. Right: Stimulus pictures
representing cluster solutions.
identical) and of 0.535 for the non-climbers. Individual ARI
scores of the climbers ranged from 0.685 to 1.0, with a mean
of 0.952 ± 0.195 (SD). For the non-climbers, ARI scores were
smaller than the climbers’ (Mann-Whitney U-test; Z = −3.887,
p < 0.001), they ranged from 0.0 to 0.643, with a mean of
0.311 ± 0.206. When non-climbers’ ARI scores were calculated
with reference to the reference structure, they were also smaller
than the climbers’ (Z = −4.033, p < 0.001), ranging from 0.0
to 0.638, with a mean of 0.268 ± 0.194. The non-climbers’ ARI
scores calculated relative to the group average and the reference
structure did not differ (Wilcoxon signed-rank test; Z = −1.836,
p = 0.066).
Discussion experiment 1
The hierarchical cluster analysis via SDA revealed four clusters for
the group of climbers, and three clusters for the group of non-
climbers. For the group of climbers, the mean cluster solution
was identical with the functional assignment of grasping holds
to grip types (see Figure 1), and individual participants’ cluster
solutions differed only little from each other; nine out of eleven
participants produced a result that was identical with the mean
cluster solution. Euclidean distances between items within each
cluster were all below 1.5, and thereby small compared to the
critical value (dcrit = 3.4). These results point toward a high con-
sistency of decisions made by participants during the experiment,
within as well as between participants. These findings suggests
that climbers, on the basis of their experience in indoor climb-
ing, could easily associate the presented climbing holds to the
corresponding grip types, thereby producing consistent clusters
representing functional task-related categories.
In contrast, the non-climbers’ mean cluster solution included
only nine out of 16 items into clusters, whereas the remaining
seven items remained as singletons (that is, these seven items
were not categorized by the non-climbers, reflecting a partly non-
categorical representation). The three clusters each contained
items that belonged to the same grip category. This finding could
be explained by two mechanisms: despite their lack of climbing
experience, non-climbers might have been able to assign certain
climbing holds to appropriate grip types, potentially based on
their experience with manipulable objects from a non-climbing
context. Non-climbers thereby might have applied the same (or
similar) criteria as climbers, but succeeded in doing so only for
a subset of the presented items. In this case, the results reflect
that attribution to a specific grip type was more difficult for cer-
tain climbing holds than for others (e.g., the appropriate grip that
required inserting one or more fingers into openings in the hold
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was apparently easier to recognize for items 13 and 14 than for
items 11 and 12).
Alternatively, non-climbers might have grouped items on the
basis of other feature-based object similarities related to shape or
even color. The latter explanation is supported by the observa-
tion that items grouped into the same cluster by the non-climbers
looked similar (this is particularly obvious for items 7 and 8 and
for items 13 and 14, respectively). Previous studies have shown
that novice participants often tend to combine items that show
similarity regarding superficial characteristics, rather than task-
related functional dependence, into the same cluster (see Schack,
2004). In studies that use partial movements (or basic action con-
cepts, see e.g., Schack and Mechsner, 2006; Schack and Ritter,
2009) in order to investigate mental representations of complex
movements, such characteristics often regard the use of body
parts (e.g., movement concepts referring to the arms might be
combined into one separate cluster, even though this might have
no relevance for the functional structure of the movement, as
arm movements might have different and even opposed functions
during different movement phases). The results suggest that the
non-climbers, due to their lack of task-related experience, were
less able than the climbers to decide consistently which specific
grips were required for the presented climbing holds.
These findings corroborate the notion that the categorization
of visually perceived objects is fundamentally influenced by their
potential for interaction (i.e., their affordances; Gibson, 1977),
the evaluation of which strongly depends on the observer’s task-
specific experience and expertise. For task-specific objects such
as climbing holds, certain features determine their potential use
and are, therefore, relevant for functional categorization, whereas
other features play a minor role. Climbers, compared to non-
climbers, choose more purposefully which of the characteristics
of a climbing hold are relevant for the task in question. (In the
current study, shape and orientation were task-relevant features,
whereas in a different context, the color of climbing holds could
be a task-relevant object feature, as it would allow the climber to
view the hold as part of a color-coded route).
Taken together, the results of Experiment 1 show that the
cognitive representation of objects (i.e., climbing holds) strongly
depends on their functional relation to action-based experi-
ences. Based on this finding, we investigated in the subsequent
experiment with similar stimuli and two similar groups of partic-
ipants if and to what extent the perception of task-related objects
influences (short-term) processing and the (pre-)activation of
object-related actions.
EXPERIMENT 2: COGNITIVE ACTIVATION OF GRASPING
POSTURES
Experiment 2 investigated whether visually perceiving a climb-
ing hold activates the grasping posture commonly associated with
this climbing hold. Moreover, it was asked whether the activation
of the grasping postures depends on the manipulation experi-
ences with the climbing holds. In a priming experiment, climbers
and non-climbers were asked to decide whether a presented target
picture reflected a crimp grip or a sideways pull. The preced-
ing prime picture either depicted a climbing hold requiring the
grip shown in the target picture (congruent condition; e.g., a
hold requiring a sideways pull followed by a sideways pull) or the
alternative grip (incongruent condition; e.g., a hold requiring a
sideways pull followed by a crimp grip). Moreover, two unspe-
cific conditions were applied. In the positive unspecific condition,
the target picture was preceded by a climbing hold which could
both be grasped with a crimp grip as well as a sideways pull. In
the negative unspecific condition, the preceding climbing hold
could neither be grasped with a crimp grip nor with a sideways
pull.
It was expected that in experienced climbers a climbing hold
would activate the grasping posture commonly associated with
the climbing hold, and thus influence responses to the tar-
get picture depicting a particular grasping posture (i.e., crimp
grip vs. sideways pull). No such activation was expected in par-
ticipants without manipulation experience with the climbing
holds. Moreover, for both groups it was expected that unspecific
climbing holds would not activate any grasping posture.
The following three predictions were made: first, a congruency
effect was expected for participants with climbing experience; that
is, faster response times under conditions in which a climbing
hold shown in the prime picture would require the same grasp-
ing posture as depicted in the following target picture, and slower
response times under conditions in which a climbing hold would
require the alternative grasping posture as shown in the target
picture. Second, no congruency effect was expected for partici-
pants without specific climbing experience. Third, for climbers,
response latencies in the unspecific condition were predicted to be
in between the congruent and the incongruent condition, whereas
for non-climbers, response times should not vary between con-
ditions. The described differences between groups related to the
factor congruency are expected to be statistically indicated by an
interaction between group and congruency.
METHODS
Participants
Thirty two participants voluntarily took part without any
exchange or in exchange for course credit. Eighteen students or
employees from Bielefeld University, Germany, were assigned to
the non-climber group (three female, one left-handed, mean age
29.6; range 23–43). Participants of the non-climber group had no
experience in climbing. All non-climbers were physically active,
performing at least one type of sport (11 participants performed
individual sports, 12 performed team sports, 2 performed com-
petitive sports, 2 performed racket sport). Participants of the
non-climber group played, for example, soccer, handball, bas-
ketball, or regularly performed swimming, running, or fitness
training.
Fourteen climbers (one female, two left-handed, mean age
30.0; range 16–43) were recruited from an indoor climbing
area for their experiences in climbing (mean training expe-
rience: 8.7 years; mean training frequency per week: 4.0 ses-
sions). All recruited climbers were members of the Deutscher
Alpenverein (German Alpine Association). Referring to the UIAA
grading system describing the difficulty of climbing routes, par-
ticipants’ climbing skills ranged between 6 and 10 (two par-
ticipants were able to climb routes graded 6, two participants
climbed routes graded 7, six participants climbed routes graded
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition September 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1008 | 80
Bläsing et al. Cognitive expertise in climbing
8, three participants climbed routes graded 9, and one participant
climbed routes graded 10).
All participants reported to have normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and were naive with regard to the purpose of
the experiment. All participants provided written informed con-
sent before testing started. The single experimental session lasted
about 20 min. The experiment was performed in accordance with
the ethical standards of the sixth revision of the 1964 Declaration
of Helsinki (World Medical Assocition, 2008).
Apparatus and stimuli
For stimulus presentation and data collection, a Toshiba
Notebook with a 17 inch VGA-Display (vertical retraces 60 Hz)
and the software Presentation® (version 14.8) was used. The soft-
ware controlled the presentation of the stimuli and measured
reaction times. Responses had to be given by pressing one of two
external response buttons connected via a parallel port with the
notebook.
The target pictures were 16 photographs of hands in grasping
postures. Eight pictures reflected a crimp grip and eight pictures
reflected a sideways pull. Half of the grasping postures reflected a
right hand and half of the postures reflected a left hand (images
were mirrored) which were used equally often.
As prime pictures, 32 photographs of climbing holds were
presented. All climbing holds were red. Four of the climbing
holds would require a crimp grip, and four climbing holds would
require a sideways pull. Moreover, four climbing holds could be
grasped with a crimp grip or a sideways pull (positive unspecific
climbing holds). Last, four climbing holds would require a grip
that was different from a crimp grip or a sideways pull (negative
unspecific climbing hold). The 16 pictures of the climbing holds
were mirrored vertically to extend the spectrum of the stimulus
material to 32 prime pictures in total. An exemplary illustration
of the stimulus material is given in Figure 4.
The background of the climbing holds and of the grasping
postures was an indoor climbing wall (see Figure 4). The stim-
uli had a size of 9.2 × 9.2 cm (346 × 346 pixels). All stimuli were
presented centrally on a black background and subtended a visual
angle of 8.9◦ horizontally and vertically from the viewing distance
of 60 cm.
Design and procedure
The present study used a 4 × 2 mixed factorial design with the
within-subject factor congruency (congruent condition, incon-
gruent condition, positive and negative unspecific condition)
and participants’ expertise as between-subject factor (climbers vs.
non-climbers). The impact of these factors was analyzed with
reaction time (RT) and error rate (ER) measures as the dependent
variables.
Participants sat in front of a computer screen (60 cm) and
were instructed in written form to classify the presented tar-
get picture as a crimp grip or as a sideways pull as quickly as
possible by pressing one of the two response buttons with the
index finger. Moreover, participants were instructed to respond
as accurately as possible. The response button assignment was
counterbalanced across participants within each group. Before
starting the experimental session, each participant performed ten
randomized practice trials. Data from this practice block were
not analyzed. The following test block consisted of 128 pseudo-
randomized prime-target pairs. Each prime picture appeared four
times and was either combined with a left hand or right hand
crimp grip or with a left hand or right hand sideways pull. The
presentation of the order of the prime-target pairs was completely
randomized.
Each trial started with the presentation of a central fixa-
tion cross (400 ms), followed by a blank screen (100 ms), the
prime (100 ms), a second blank screen (100 ms), and the tar-
get (which remained visible on the screen until a response was
FIGURE 4 | Examples of the stimulus material used in Experiment 2. On the left side examples for each type of climbing hold are given. On the right side
examples for each type of grasping posture are presented.
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given). Incorrect responses elicited the word “Fehler” (German
for “error”). An inter-trial interval of 1500 ms elapsed before




Reaction times (RTs) were screened for outliers using a total cut
off. RTs below 200 ms and above 1000 ms were excluded (2.0%).
Trials with wrong answers (3.4%) were not used in the analy-
sis of the RTs. The mean RTs from the factorial combinations of
the within-subjects factor congruency and the between-subjects
factor expertise were computed for further analysis. A prelimi-
nary comparison of the RTs for positive unspecific primes and
negative unspecific primes was performed. Separate paired t-
tests revealed neither a significant difference between positive
(547 ms, s.e.m. = 21 ms) and negative unspecific primes (552 ms,
s.e.m. = 22 ms) for climbers, t(13) = 0.56, p = 0.59, nor for pos-
itive (529 ms, s.e.m. = 14 ms) and negative unspecific primes
(535 ms, s.e.m. = 14 ms) for non-climbers, t(17) = 0.98, p =
0.34. This result indicates that positive unspecific primes and neg-
ative unspecific primes did not evoke differential priming effects.
Thus, further analyses were computed with the mean value of
positive unspecific and negative unspecific primes. This param-
eter value of the factor congruency was simply termed neutral
condition.
Mixed ANOVAs with the within-subjects factor congruency
(congruent, incongruent, neutral) and the between-subjects fac-
tor expertise (climbers vs. non-climbers) were performed with
RT and ER as dependent variables. A violation of the sphericity-
assumption resulted in a correction of the p-values according to
Greenhouse-Geisser1.
Reaction times
The within subjects factor congruency reached significance,
F(1, 60) = 4.86, p = 0.01, ε = 0.84, η2p = 0.14, as well as the
1A violation of the sphericity-assumption requires modifications of the
degrees of freedom (df s) to reduce the Type I error. The estimates for this
modification is denoted by epsilon (ε) providing a measure of deviation from
sphericity. An epsilon of 1 indicates that sphericity is exactly met, smaller
epsilon values indicate increasing deviation. Due to better reading, the uncor-
rected df s are given for the F-value, but the corrected df s can be easily
calculated by multiplying the original df s with ε.
interaction between congruency and expertise, F(2, 60) = 3.88, p =
0.03, ε = 0.84, η2p = 0.12. The between subjects factor expertise
did not reach significance (p = 0.75).
To illuminate the source of the interaction, paired t-tests were
performed separately for climbers (one-tailed) and non-climbers
(two-tailed). Climbers responded significantly faster to congru-
ent compared to incongruent prime-target pairs, t(13) = 2.52,
p = 0.01. Responses to grasping postures preceded by a neu-
tral prime were significantly slower than responses to congruent
prime-target pairs, t(13) = 2.02, p = 0.03, and significantly faster
than responses to incongruent prime-target pairs, t(13) = 1.89,
p = 0.04.
Non-climbers in contrast responded not differently fast (p =
0.72) to grasping postures preceded by a congruent climbing hold
and by an incongruent climbing hold. Interestingly, responses
to grasping postures preceded by a neutral climbing hold
were significantly faster than congruent, t(17) = 2.18, p = 0.04,
and also faster than incongruent climbing holds, t(17) = 2.78,
p = 0.01.
Mean values of the RTs and ERs and corresponding confidence
intervals are illustrated in Figure 6 and additionally displayed in
Data Sheet 1 in the Supplementary Material.
Response errors
A mixed ANOVA on the mean ERs neither revealed a significant
effect for the within subjects factor congruency (p = 0.23) nor for
the between subjects factor expertise (p = 0.60). The interaction
between congruency and expertise reached statistical significance,
F(2, 60) = 4.30, p = 0.01, ε = 0.82, η2p = 0.17. To compare the
results of the analysis of the RTs with the ERs, paired t-tests were
computed separately for climbers (one-tailed) and non-climbers
(two-tailed).
For climbers, responding was less error-prone with congruent
compared to incongruent trials, t(13) = 2.80, p = 0.01. The com-
parison between the incongruent and the neutral condition also
reached statistical significance, t(13) = 2.8, p = 0.01, indicating
a higher ER for incongruent compared to neutral prime-target
pairs. The comparison between the congruent and the neutral
condition did not reach significance (p = 0.27).
For non-climbers, none of the comparisons revealed a signif-
icant effect (all ps > 0.30), but the error rate was slightly smaller
for incongruent primes compared to congruent and neutral
primes.
FIGURE 5 | Stimulus presentation in Experiment 2. This figure reflects the within-trial procedure for an example of the incongruent condition: a climbing
hold requiring a crimp grip is followed by a target picture depicting a sideways pull.
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FIGURE 6 | Results of Experiment 2: Reaction times (RTs) in milliseconds
with corresponding 95% confidence intervals (CIs) and error rates (ERs)
in percent with corresponding 95% CIs for climbers (left panel) and
non-climbers (right panel). The dashed lines display RTs scaled on the left
vertical axis. The bars illustrate ERs scaled on the right vertical axis. The
prime-target conditions are labeled on the x-axis.
Discussion experiment 2
Experiment 2 aimed to investigate the activation of grasping
postures by visually presenting climbing holds and how such acti-
vation is influenced by skill level. In accordance with the hypothe-
ses, a congruency effect was found for climbers, that is, faster
responses were found for congruent trials compared to incongru-
ent trials. The inclusion of an unspecific condition revealed that
the found congruency effect is based both on speeded responses
in the congruent condition and on slowed responses in the incon-
gruent condition compared to the neutral baseline. It would be
interesting to determine whether this priming effect arises at
the perceptual level (perceptual priming, e.g., Biederman and
Cooper, 1992), the cognitive level (e.g., Labeye et al., 2008), or
at a motor stage of processing (response priming; e.g., Kunde
et al., 2003). Regarding a perceptual locus of the priming effects,
there is no visual relation or similarity between the climbing
holds and the grasping postures that is larger for the congruent
prime target pairs (hold-posture) compared to the incongruent
pairs. Hence, we consider it implausible that our priming effects
are due to perceptual (dis)similarity of the stimuli. Regarding a
potential motor locus, the priming effect is unlikely to reflect a
response activation or a response competition effect because the
task instruction to classify a grasping posture as a crimp grip or
as a sideways pull cannot directly be applied to the climbing hold
pictures (primes). That is, the holds themselves should not acti-
vate or elicit a response per se (i.e., pressing a left or right response
button). Therefore, we would argue that the priming effects do
not arise during perceptual or motor stages but during cognitive
processing stages.
More precisely, the result pattern of speeded responses in con-
gruent trials and slowed responses in incongruent trials, both
relative to a neutral baseline, points toward two cognitive pro-
cessing mechanisms. First, the perception of a given hold leads
to an activation of the representation of that hold including the
corresponding grasping action. Second, the perception of a given
hold seems to lead to a reduced availability of non-corresponding
grasping actions. These mechanisms of action activation and
action inhibition might help to explain the efficient selection of
grasping actions in climbing.
The results found in the non-climbers are also in accordance
with the interpretation of a cognitive locus of the priming effects.
Participants with no climbing experience are expected to pos-
sess no representations of climbing-specific grasping actions.
Accordingly, non-climbers did not show any congruency effect.
Unexpectedly, however, non-climbers had shorter reaction times
for unspecific prime-target pairs compared to congruent und
incongruent ones. Besides the possibility that this finding might
be a random finding in principle, a possible post-hoc explana-
tion for this result could be the following. Round objects similar
to the unspecific climbing holds are also common in daily life,
for example, as round rotatable button on a washing machine
or as knob-like hold of a drawer. It is thus possible that non-
climbers applied their general knowledge, that round objects
can be grasped either with a crimp grip or with a sideways
pull (without knowing these climbing specific concepts), to the
predominantly round shapes of climbing holds in the neutral
condition. In contrast, non-climbers could not infer any associ-
ated grasping action from the unfamiliar climbing holds requiring
a crimp grip or a sideways pull. The faster responses to targets
following a prime picture with a round hold thus may reflect
unspecific activations of grasping representations. Further studies
are needed to confirm this suggestion.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This study explored the relationship between the action-based
cognitive representations of climbing holds and the object-based
activation of the corresponding grasping actions. Experiment 1
investigated the structure of skill representations. (Note that we
use the term climbing skill in this context specifically for the
skilled manual use of climbing holds, i.e., the knowledge of cor-
rect grip application for individual climbing holds.) The results
of Experiment 1 suggest that climbers organize visually perceived
climbing holds categorically according to functional features (i.e.,
how to grasp in an indoor climbing context). Non-climbers, in
www.frontiersin.org September 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1008 | 83
Bläsing et al. Cognitive expertise in climbing
contrast, showed an organizational structure that was not cate-
gorical in terms of skill-based (climbing) knowledge but rather
based on unspecific world knowledge or superficial object fea-
tures (e.g., form or color). Experiment 2 investigated the access
of grasping knowledge, in particular whether and how functional
features (i.e., grasping postures) are activated by object features
(i.e., shapes of climbing holds). Here, we found evidence for
activation of matching grasping postures and inhibition of non-
matching grasping postures by the perception of grip-specific
holds.
We argue that in climbers, but not in non-climbers, the cat-
egorical memory structure reflects the functional features of
climbing holds in the context of indoor climbing. This struc-
ture appears to follow functional distinctions of the associated
actions and reflects climbers’ manifold experiences of task-related
action-effect coupling (Hoffmann, 2003). The qualitative changes
in memory structures might also change perceptual information
processing (cf. Ericsson and Kintsch, 1995). Having command
over, for example, a grip category related to sideways pull would
facilitate the recognition and processing of potentially distinct
holds regarding their applicability and functional relevance for
the adequate motor action. The present findings thus provide
insights as to how skilled climbers may achieve a better climbing
performance: automatic activation of adequate grasping actions
in response to the perception of a specific climbing hold can be
regarded as crucial mechanism to reduce the cognitive demands
involved in decision making and the planning of selected motor
actions. This mechanism thereby serves to reduce cognitive pro-
cessing time, which, importantly in the climbing context, leads to
reduced physical energy costs (i.e., muscle force needed to remain
in a static posture while evaluating the next move). Climbing
thereby represents a relevant example of how skill-based knowl-
edge that can be accessed explicitly for cognitive control also
supports evaluative, strategic action planning under resource
constrained conditions.
Our results are in accordance with findings by Pezzulo et al.
(2010) who reported better recall performance for difficult climb-
ing routes in climbers compared with non-climbers. Pezzulo et al.
(2010, p. 72) speculate that experts are better able to form motor
chunks that are necessary for mastering perceived climbing routes
by means of simulation and hence are better in memorizing the
routes, but these authors also consider alternative explanations
such as better visual imagery in experts. Whereas Pezzulo et al.
(2010) used an offline measure of memorization, Experiment
2 in our study investigated online processing (i.e., short-term
activation) of skill representations which are suggested to be
categorically structured according to our Experiment 1.
The assumption of categorical skill representations raises the
question of how specific actions are selected. Generally, it is con-
ceivable that some holds have multiple grasping possibilities and
should, thus, activate more than one category of climbing holds.
Here, Experiment 2 yielded evidence for processes of activation
and inhibition. The results of Experiment 2 are also in accordance
with Labeye et al. (2008) who also found that the perception of
(manipulable) objects activates associated actions, even though
we used considerably longer stimulus onset asynchronies com-
pared to Labeye et al. (2008). Moreover, Experiment 2 suggests
that such action feature activations depend on previous learning
or experience with the object and not on the pure physical object
properties as the non-climbers’ data pattern showed the fastest
responses in the unspecific conditions.
Our results corroborate findings from studies of complex
movement representations (Bläsing et al., 2009; Güldenpenning
et al., 2011, 2013; Weigelt et al., 2011; Land et al., 2013) and
skill acquisition (Frank et al., 2013). They emphasize the role of
cognitive representations and processes in action control and sup-
port the view that skill representations are based on categorical
knowledge. In this regard, our study confirms the role of cognitive
processes in the control of complex human actions as proposed
in frameworks such as the ideomotor approach (Koch et al., 2004;
for a histoical overview of the ideo-motor principle, see Stock and
Stock, 2004), the theory of event coding (TEC; Hommel et al.,
2001), or the cognitive action architecture approach (CAA-A;
Schack and Ritter, 2009; Land et al., 2013).
Taken together, the present studies investigated the cognitive
representations of indoor climbing holds and the perceptual pro-
cessing of such holds and associated grasping postures in climbers
and non-climbers. Experienced climbers represent holds accord-
ing to their functions (i.e., grip types) whereas non-climbers show
less structure in their representations and organize these accord-
ing to unspecific action knowledge or superficial features. It was
also found that the perception of climbing holds activates the
matching grasping posture and inhibits non-matching postures
in climbers but not in non-climbers. These findings suggest a
processing advantage and mechanism of categorical action repre-
sentations. Furthermore, the findings show that action experience
modifies the relevant object representations by associating action
features to the representations of corresponding objects.
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Introduction: Movement-based expertise relies on precise timing of movements and the
capacity to predict the timing of events. Music performance involves discrete rhythmic
actions that adhere to regular cycles of timed events, whereas many sports involve
continuous movements that are not timed in a cyclical manner. It has been proposed
that the precision of discrete movements relies on event timing (clock mechanism),
whereas continuous movements are controlled by emergent timing. We examined
whether movement-based expertise influences the timing mode adopted to maintain
precise rhythmic actions.
Materials and Method: Timing precision was evaluated in musicians, athletes and control
participants. Discrete and continuous movements were assessed using finger-tapping and
circle-drawing tasks, respectively, based on the synchronization-continuation paradigm. In
Experiment 1, no auditory feedback was provided in the continuation phase of the trials,
whereas in Experiment 2 every action triggered a feedback tone.
Results: Analysis of precision in the continuation phase indicated that athletes performed
significantly better than musicians and controls in the circle-drawing task, whereas
musicians were more precise than controls in the finger tapping task. Interestingly,
musicians were also more precise than controls in the circle-drawing task. Results also
showed that the timing mode adopted was dependent on expertise and the presence of
auditory feedback.
Discussion: Results showed that movement-based expertise is associated with enhanced
timing, but these effects depend on the nature of the training. Expertise was found
to influence the timing strategy adopted to maintain precise rhythmic movements,
suggesting that event and emergent timing mechanisms are not strictly tied to specific
tasks, but can both be adopted to achieve precise timing.
Keywords: emergent timing, event timing, expertise, training, music, sports
INTRODUCTION
Experts such as musicians and athletes rely on precise timing of
bodily movements. However, whereas musicians are especially
skilled at discrete rhythmic actions that adhere to regular cycles
of timed events (meter and pulse) (Repp and Doggett, 2007; Baer
et al., 2013; Albrecht et al., 2014), athletic sports often involve
fluid and continuous movements that are not timed in a cycli-
cal manner (Sternad et al., 2000; Jaitner et al., 2001; Jantzen et al.,
2008; Balague et al., 2013). Research suggests that the timing of
discrete movements (i.e., those preceded and followed by a period
without motion) and continuous movements depend on differ-
ent strategies or processes (Robertson et al., 1999; Zelaznik et al.,
2002; Huys et al., 2008; Zelaznik and Rosenbaum, 2010; Studenka
et al., 2012). Specifically, the timing of discrete movements is
thought to involve a clock-like mechanism that incorporates an
explicit representation of the time interval delineated by each
discrete movement. In contrast, activities that involve smooth
and continuous rhythmic movements are thought to be based
on emergent timing, whereby timing regularity emerges in the
absence of a representation of time interval from the control of
parameters such as movement trajectory and velocity.
The hypothesis that event and emergent timing are distinct
and dissociable systems is supported by a substantial body of evi-
dence. Behavioral studies have shown that temporal variability in
finger tapping is usually uncorrelated with variability in continu-
ous circle drawing (Robertson et al., 1999; Zelaznik et al., 2005),
and that event-timed movements, such as tapping, are signifi-
cantly more precise and adjust faster to timing perturbations than
continuous movements such as circle drawing (Elliot et al., 2009;
Repp and Steinman, 2010; Studenka and Zelaznik, 2011). There is
also neurological (Ivry et al., 2002; Spencer et al., 2003, 2005) and
neuroimaging (Schaal et al., 2004; Spencer et al., 2007) evidence
that event and emergent timing processes recruit different brain
areas.
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However, recent results have raised doubts that discrete and
continuous movements always engage event and emergent tim-
ing mechanisms, respectively (Jantzen et al., 2002, 2004; Repp
and Steinman, 2010; Studenka et al., 2012; Studenka, 2014).
For example, evidence suggests that the presence of perceptual
events marking the completion of time intervals can induce
event timing even for tasks performed with continuous move-
ments (Zelaznik and Rosenbaum, 2010; Studenka et al., 2012).
Computational simulations and behavioral studies also suggest
that task tempo and movement speed constraints (Huys et al.,
2008; Zelaznik and Rosenbaum, 2010), as well as task order and
practice (Jantzen et al., 2002, 2004), are important influences
on the timing mechanism adopted for a certain task. Based on
the suggestion that the timing mechanisms recruited to perform
rhythmic movements are significantly influenced by several fac-
tors, the present investigation tested whether two distinct forms of
expertise and training (music and sport) differentially influence
the strategy that is engaged to perform movement-based timing
tasks.
Practice is generally regarded in the motor learning literature
as one of the most essential predictors of motor skill acquisition
(Schmidt and Lee, 1988; Smith, 2003; Tenenbaum and Eklund,
2007; but see Mosing et al., 2014) and researchers have suggested
that the amount of deliberate practice is directly associated with
the level of expertise acquired by athletes and musicians (Ericsson
et al., 1993; Ericsson, 1996; Howe et al., 1998). It is well known
that highly trained musicians are exceptionally precise in discrete-
timing tasks, such as finger tapping with an auditory metronome
(Repp, 2005, 2010; Repp and Doggett, 2007; Baer et al., 2013).
Musicians tend to show smaller asynchronies and lower tapping
variability when tapping to a metronome compared with non-
musician counterparts (Aschersleben, 2002; Repp, 2010). Musical
expertise also seems to enhance the internal representation of
time as suggested by perceptual studies showing that training can
improve interval discrimination and perceptual sensitivity to tim-
ing perturbations (Buonomano and Karmakar, 2002; Ivry and
Schlerf, 2008; Repp, 2010). Research also demonstrates that musi-
cianship specifically interacts with tasks associated with discrete
movements, and not continuous movements (Baer et al., 2013),
which is consistent with the view that emergent and event timing
are distinct mechanisms (Zelaznik et al., 2000, 2005) and suggests
that music expertise is predominantly an event-based skill (Repp,
2005; Baer et al., 2013).
On the other hand, we know very little about how expertise
and training might influence the operation of emergent timing
mechanisms, and whether the effect of training in one movement-
based expertise might transfer to other timing skills. The timing
of continuous rhythmic movements, such as leg movement dur-
ing cycling, walking and running, or arm movements during
swimming or rowing, is thought to rely on emergent timing
mechanisms (Kelso et al., 1981; Sternad et al., 2000; Jaitner et al.,
2001; Jantzen et al., 2008; Elliot et al., 2009; Balague et al., 2013).
This class of rhythmic movements is typically observed in sport
activities such as rowing, swimming, running, and cycling, and
could therefore be used as a model to study the effect of training
in the production of precise continuous rhythmic movements.
The purpose of the present study was to compare the ability of
movement-based experts from different domains to engage in
discrete and continuous movement tasks. Based on the hypothesis
that musical performance involves predominantly discrete rhyth-
mic actions that rely on event timing, and that athletic sports gen-
erally recruit fluid and continuous rhythmic movements based
on emergent timing, we examined whether movement-based
expertise is associated with specific or general timing skills. If
the event and emergent timing processes are dependent on the
nature of expertise and training, then athletes should be more
precise in a timing task that involves continuous movements
whereas musicians should be more precise in a timing task that
involves discrete movements. In contrast, if musicians and ath-
letes do not differ in their performance in both tasks, then this
would suggest that timed movements are accomplished similarly
in these two groups of movement-based experts and, therefore,
that event and emergent timing mechanisms are not strictly tied
to specific tasks, but may both be adopted to achieve precise
timing.
Experiment 1 compared the performance of elite athletes,
highly trained musicians, and controls on finger-tapping and
circle-drawing tasks. The variability of inter-response inter-
vals was measured in a synchronization-continuation paradigm.
Participants were instructed to synchronize their movements with
a metronome and continue the action at the same rate estab-
lished by the metronome even when the pacing signal stopped
(continuation phase). In Experiment 2, auditory feedback was
presented in the continuation phase in order to assess the effect
of the presence of salient perceptual events on the timing mech-
anism adopted to complete the tasks. Based on past research
(Zelaznik and Rosenbaum, 2010; Studenka et al., 2012; Baer et al.,
2013), we predicted that the presence of auditory feedback would
induce an event-timing strategy in the continuous movement




Fifteen athletes were recruited through the Macquarie University
Elite Athlete Scholarship Program. Athletes (8 females, 7 males)
were on average 21.31 years old (SD = 2.33, range 18–26 years)
and had been involved in athletic training for an average of
7.31 years (SD = 3.45). All athletes involved in the project
were actively engaged in training and competing at State and/or
National level in athletic sports, such as swimming, rowing, mar-
tial arts, rugby and others. None of the athletes had completed
more than 2 years of musical training or were involved in any
musical activities. Musicians (n = 13, 4 females) were recruited
through the Departments of Music and Psychology at Macquarie
University and local conservatories and universities. The aver-
age age of musicians was 21.38 years (SD = 3.20, range 18–28
years) and all participants had been involved in formal music
training for at least 10 consecutive years (M = 10.85, SD = 2.38).
Musicians played a range of instruments, including piano, gui-
tar, and violin. Control participants (n = 17, 10 females) were
on average 21.76 years old (SD = 3.31, range 18–31 years). None
of the participants in the control group reported any formal
athletic or music training. Groups did not differ significantly
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in mean age, F(2, 42) = 0.07, p = 0.93. All participants reported
that they were right-handed and had no hearing or motor
impairment. Psychology undergraduate students were compen-
sated with course credit, and all other participants received
financial compensation for their participation. All participants
provided informed consent and were debriefed about the goals
of the experiment.
Materials, stimuli, and procedure
Stimulus presentation and data collection were done using a
Macbook Pro 9.2 laptop running custom software written in
Python and tasks were completed using an Apple single-button
mouse. The task widely used to induce event timing is finger
tapping, whereas circle drawing is thought to typify emergent
timing (Repp and Steinman, 2010). The paradigm adopted for
both tasks was synchronization-continuation (Stevens, 1886). For
each trial, participants first synchronized their movements (cir-
cle drawing or finger tapping) with an isochronous metronome
click for 18 clicks. The signal tones were 40 ms square waves clicks
of 480 Hz presented at 74 dB. After the synchronization phase,
the metronome stopped and participants were instructed to con-
tinue to produce 36 more movements at the tempo set by the
metronome. Within each trial, one of two metronome tempi was
used: slow (800 ms IOI) or fast (600 ms IOI).
In the finger-tapping task, participants repeatedly tapped on
the mouse with their right index finger at the tempo set by the
metronome pacing signals and continued to tap at the same
rate when the signal was removed. Participants heard the pacing
signals through Sennheiser HD 515 headphones with noise can-
celing and reduction, which prevented participants from hearing
any sound produced by the finger tap. No auditory feedback was
provided.
In the circle-drawing task, participants repeatedly moved the
computer mouse with the right hand in a circle in time with
the metronome and in a clockwise direction, and continued this
motion in the absence of the external timing cue. Participants
traced an unfilled circle template of 5 cm in diameter displayed
on the screen with the mouse cursor, and were instructed to syn-
chronize every time the path of the cursor crossed an intersection
at 270◦ of the circle with the metronome. Participants were told
that timing precision was more relevant than drawing accuracy,
and they were free to draw a circle at their preferred size.
Participants had 5 practice trials at 600 ms IOI before each
experimental block. Trials were blocked by task, with tapping per-
formed before circle drawing (Zelaznik and Rosenbaum, 2010;
Studenka et al., 2012). For each task, trials were blocked by tempo,
with the order of the two tempo conditions and the 10 trials
within each tempo condition randomized independently for each
participant. Participants were permitted to take breaks in between
trials at any time. The experiment took approximately 50 min.
Data analysis
Only responses in the continuation phase were analyzed as the
synchronization phase was used only to establish the pacing. In
order to allow for acceleration commonly observed in the tran-
sition from the synchronization to continuation phase (Flach,
2005), only the final 30 movements were analyzed. For the
finger-tapping task, inter-response interval (IRI) was defined as
the elapsed time between sequential taps (in milliseconds) and
for the circle-drawing task, IRI was defined as the elapsed time
between successive passes through the intersection. Outlier IRIs
were identified as those 60% longer or shorter than the target IRI
for a given trial (4% of all IRIs analyzed in Experiment 1; 2% in
Experiment 2), and were deleted.
Several timing measures were used. First, mean IRI within a
trial served as a measure of timing accuracy. Second, to measure
timing precision we analyzed participants coefficient of varia-
tion (CV), which was defined as the standard deviation of IRIs
within a trial divided by its mean IRI (SD/Mean). Lower CV
scores indicate greater precision. CV can be considered a measure
of total IRI variability, including slow drift in IRI over the course
of a trial, timing error, and motor implementation error. Third,
dependencies between successive IRIs in each trial were measured
using lag-one autocorrelation. Data were first linearly detrended
to remove the impact of slower drift over the course of a trial
on dependencies between successive IRIs. In general, discrete-
timing tasks are associated with negative lag-one autocorrelation.
This has been proposed to arise from random delays in motor
implementation (Wing and Kristofferson, 1973) that occur inde-
pendently of a central clock mechanism. One such delay should
both lengthen the IRI that it completes and shorten the one that
it initiates; the accumulation of these delays over the course of
a trial should be reflected in negative lag-one autocorrelation.
Continuous-timing tasks, on the other hand, which are thought
not to involve a central clock mechanism, have been shown
to result in non-negative lag-one autocorrelation (Zelaznik and
Rosenbaum, 2010; Baer et al., 2013). Thus, lag-one autocorrela-
tion can serve as an index of event and emergent timing strategies.
CV and lag-one autocorrelation values were averaged by task and
tempo for each participant.
Finally, we sought to estimate clock and motor contributions
to timing variance (Wing and Kristofferson, 1973) using slope
analysis (Ivry and Hazeltine, 1995). Slope analysis takes advantage
of the well-established finding that timing variance increases lin-
early as a function of squared target duration. Under the assump-
tion that motor production is invariant across target durations,
a positive slope (i.e., an increase in variance with target dura-
tion) is thought to be influenced entirely by duration-dependent
variability (Studenka and Zelaznik, 2008). The intercept of this
regression line, on the other hand, is thought to be duration-
independent, i.e., reflecting variability in the motor aspect of the
task (Studenka and Zelaznik, 2008). Different event-like tasks
have been shown to exhibit equal slope values (Ivry and Hazeltine,
1995; Green et al., 1999), suggesting a common underlying central
clock mechanism. On the other hand, (emergent) circle-drawing
and (event) finger-tapping tasks have been shown to exhibit sig-
nificantly different slopes (Robertson et al., 1999), suggesting
different timing mechanisms. Individual differences in slope are
also observed within tasks (Spencer et al., 2005; Baer et al., 2013),
with lower slope values indicating less duration-dependent vari-
ability. In the current study, for each participant and for each task,
slope and intercept values were obtained from a linear regres-
sion of detrended variance (averaged across trials) against squared
target durations (600 and 800 ms2).
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RESULTS
Preliminary analysis of mean IRI during the continuation phase
revealed that participants were accurate in maintaining the target
tempi [fast tempo (600 ms IOI): M = 606; SD = 35; slow tempo
(800 ms IOI): M = 818; SD = 55]. There were no significant
differences between groups or group interactions.
Coefficient of variation (CV) scores were entered into a mixed
design ANOVA with Task (circle drawing, finger tapping) and
Tempo (fast, slow) as within-subject factors and Group (athletes,
musicians, controls) as between-subject factors. There was a sig-
nificant main effect of Task, F(1, 42) = 251.01, p < 0.001, demon-
strating that participants were more precise in the finger-tapping
task (M = 0.07) than the circle-drawing task (M = 0.23). It was
also verified that there was no statistical difference in CV between
the fast and slow tempi conditions, F(1, 42) = 1.16, p = 0.28, and
no significant interaction between Task and Tempo, F(1, 42) =
2.25, p = 0.14.
Between-subjects analysis revealed a significant main effect
of Group, F(2, 42) = 18.42, p < 0.001, and a significant inter-
action between Group and Task, F(2, 42) = 16.48, p < 0.001.
Independent sample t-tests revealed that on the circle-drawing
task athletes were significantly more precise than musicians,
t(26) = 2.19, p = 0.03, and controls, t(30) = 7.00, p < 0.001.
Musicians were significantly more precise than controls on
the circle-drawing task, t(28) = 3.37, p = 0.002. On the finger-
tapping task, musicians were significantly more precise than con-
trols, t(28) = 2.23, p = 0.03, while athletes were not significantly
more precise than controls, t(30) = 1.87, p = 0.07 (Figure 1). The
performance of musicians and athletes was not significantly dif-
ferent, t(26) = 0.61, p = 0.54. We also analyzed the correlation in
CV between tasks for each of the groups tested. Results indicated
that the variability in the finger-tapping task was not significantly
correlated with the variability in the circle-drawing task for any
group: musicians (p = 0.55), athletes (p = 0.08), and controls
(p = 0.11).
Slope analysis was next performed to determine whether group
differences could be attributed to duration-dependent and/or
FIGURE 1 | Coefficient of Variation (CV) for the circle-drawing and
finger-tapping tasks per group in Experiment 1. Standard error bars are
shown. Significant pairwise differences are marked with an asterisk
(∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.001).
duration-independent sources. Although the slope analysis was
performed with just two target tempi, slope values were almost
entirely positive (44 of 46 participants in circle drawing; 45 of
46 participants in finger tapping), indicating greater variance for
longer durations (slower tempo), which is consistent with the
model’s assumptions. An ANOVA on slope values revealed main
effects of Task, F(1, 42) = 21.01, p < 0.001, and Group, F(2, 42) =
8.70, p < 0.001, as well as a marginal Group × Task interac-
tion, F(2, 42) = 2.96, p = 0.06. As shown in Figure 2, slope values
closely mirrored those for CV. On the circle-drawing task, slope
values for athletes (M = 0.009) and musicians (0.008) were sig-
nificantly lower than for controls (M = 0.02, p = 0.02). However,
although the trend was in the same direction, unlike the CV val-
ues, athletes’ and musicians’ slope values did not differ from each
other, p = 0.88. On the finger-tapping task, slope values were
significantly lower for musicians (M = 0.002) than for athletes
(M = 0.004, p = 0.03) or controls (M = 0.006, p = 0.006); as
with the CV values, slope values for athletes and controls did not
differ from each other (p = 0.33). Results of the correlation anal-
ysis on the slope values indicated no significant intra-individual
correlations for any group. An ANOVA on the intercept values
revealed no significant between-subjects effects or interactions.
Taken together, the slope analysis indicates that group differences
were duration-dependent, suggesting that they can be attributed
to the functioning of a timing mechanism rather than to the
motor constraints of the tasks.
One generally accepted indicator of the timing strategy
adopted in a given task is found through the analysis of lag-
one autocorrelation. Tasks that involve an event timing strat-
egy exhibit lag-one autocorrelation values between −0.5 and 0,
whereas tasks that involve emergent timing strategies are associ-
ated with a non-negative lag-one autocorrelation (Zelaznik and
Rosenbaum, 2010; Delignieres and Torres, 2011). Our data were
only partially consistent with expectations. One sample t-tests
[with p-value set at 0.01 to control for Type I error (Zelaznik
FIGURE 2 | Slope for the circle-drawing and finger-tapping tasks per
group in Experiment 1. For each participant and for each task, slope values
were obtained from a linear regression of detrended variance (averaged
across trials) against squared target durations (600 and 800 ms2). Lower
slope values indicate lower duration-dependent variability. Standard error
bars are shown. Significant pairwise differences are marked with an
asterisk (∗p < 0.05).
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and Rosenbaum, 2010; Baer et al., 2013)] showed that group
values were significantly negative in all conditions, which con-
trasts with the expectation of non-negative lag-one autocorrela-
tions in the (emergent) circle-drawing task. A repeated measures
ANOVA revealed that, as expected, lag-one autocorrelation values
were significantly more negative in the finger tapping condition
(M = −0.14) than the circle-drawing condition (M = −0.11),
F(1, 42) = 8.43, p < 0.001. Lag-one autocorrelation values, how-
ever, did not significantly differ between fast and slow tempo
conditions, F(1, 42) = 0.19, p = 0.66, and the interaction between
Task and Tempo also did not reach statistical significance
(p = 0.24).
Comparing lag-one autocorrelation scores between the dif-
ferent groups, the analysis indicated that there was a sig-
nificant Group × Task interaction, F(2, 42) = 6.81, p < 0.001.
Examination of the percentage of individuals in each group
and condition with significantly negative lag-one correlations, as
assessed by one sample t-tests on each individual’s data, revealed
that 60% of athletes and 59% of controls adopted an event-timing
strategy to perform the circle-drawing task, whereas 93% of
athletes and 88% of the controls used event timing in the finger-
tapping task. That is, the percentage of athletes and controls that
tended to rely on an event-timing strategy was significantly larger
(p < 0.001) for the finger-tapping task than for the circle-drawing
task. Interestingly, lag-one autocorrelation values for musicians
were not significantly different between tasks (p = 0.37), and
musicians tended to adopt an event-timing strategy to perform
both finger-tapping (63%) and circle-drawing tasks (85%).
DISCUSSION
The results of Experiment 1 demonstrated that movement-based
experts were significantly more precise than controls on both
timing tasks. Athletes were significantly more precise than con-
trols in the circle-drawing task, and musicians were more precise
than controls in the finger-tapping task (Repp, 2005; Repp and
Doggett, 2007; Baer et al., 2013). This result suggests that exper-
tise leads to enhanced timing precision in domain-related timing
tasks and reinforces a dominant timing skill. This suggestion is
supported by results showing that, whereas musicians were sig-
nificantly more precise than controls in the finger-tapping task,
the performance of elite athletes did not differ significantly from
controls. This result indicates that the group differences observed
in this study can be attributed specifically to the functioning of a
timing mechanism rather than motor control in general.
A novel finding of this research is that music training was
associated with enhanced precision on a continuous-movement
task. Past research has suggested that formal music training only
enhances precision of discrete movements but not continuous
movements (Baer et al., 2013). It should be acknowledged that
the use of a computer mouse to perform the tasks might have
influenced the results. However, task constraints cannot read-
ily account for the discrepancy between our results and those
reported by Baer et al. (2013). The slope analysis suggests that our
results are best explained by the functioning of a timing mech-
anism rather than by the constraints of the tasks. Hence, it can
be speculated that group differences may contribute to the dis-
crepancy of results in these studies, such as number of years of
formal music training, instrument of expertise, amount of cur-
rent involvement in musical activities, or age of commencement
of training. Research is needed to assess the extent to which these
factors contribute to the development of timing skills.
The finding that music training was associated with enhanced
precision on the continuous-movement task is compatible with
the hypothesis that the distinction between event and emergent
timing is not as rigid as initially proposed, and that these mech-
anisms are not strictly tied to specific tasks such as tapping and
circle drawing (Jantzen et al., 2002, 2004; Repp and Steinman,
2010; Studenka et al., 2012; Studenka, 2014). The hypothesis
that the dissociation between event and emergent timing is not
an all-or-nothing process (Repp and Steinman, 2010; Studenka
et al., 2012) implies that the circumstances in which the differ-
ent timing modes are employed are open for investigation. In
Experiment 1, lag-one autocorrelation values were significantly
negative in all conditions, suggesting that participants tended to
adopt an event-timing strategy for both discrete and continu-
ous tasks. More specifically, approximately 60% of participants
in each group tended to adopt event-timing strategies to perform
the circle-drawing task. Interestingly, whereas the percentage of
athletes and controls that adopted event timing was higher for
finger tapping than for circle drawing, the percentage of musi-
cians that relied on event timing was not statistically different
between tasks. One interpretation of this result is that years of for-
mal music training prompted participants to rely on event-timing
mechanisms to perform any timed movement, even when those
movements are continuous (Studenka et al., 2012; Baer et al.,
2013).
In Experiment 2, we further explored the hypothesis that
movement-based expertise is associated with enhanced skill in
discrete and continuous movement, while reinforcing one pre-
dominant timing mode. We also reexamined recent evidence that
when participants are engaged in a timing task, the presence of
salient feedback that defines the completion of cyclical time inter-
vals elicits timing behavior consistent with event timing, even
for continuous-movement tasks (Zelaznik and Rosenbaum, 2010;
Studenka et al., 2012). Studenka et al. (2012) showed that the
introduction of discrete tactile events presented at the comple-
tion of each cycle of movement induced event timing in a typically
emergent timing task. This finding corroborated a previous study
that suggested that event timing can be elicited by the insertion
of regular cycles of auditory feedback (Zelaznik and Rosenbaum,
2010). To examine these issues, in Experiment 2 we tested whether
the presence of auditory feedback elicits an event-timing strategy





Thirty-one elite athletes (10 females) were recruited from
Macquarie University through the Elite Athlete Scholarship
Program. Athletes’ average age was 21.06 years old (SD = 3.69,
range 18–32 years) and they had been involved in athletic train-
ing for an average of 8.31 years (SD = 5.55). Athletic training
included sports that require discrete interactions with a ball or
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other projectile (e.g., kicking, catching, or repelling a ball in
soccer, rugby, or volleyball) and sports that primarily involve con-
tinuous movements (e.g., strokes in swimming, cycling, rowing).
None of the athletes were involved in the first experiment and
none had had more than 2 years of musical training. Musicians
(n = 17, 15 females) were recruited through the Departments of
Music and Psychology at Macquarie University and local conser-
vatories and universities. The average age of musicians was 20.72
years (SD = 3.52, range 18–29 years). Musicians were all cur-
rently involved in music activities for a minimum of 2 h/week
and all had been involved in formal music training for at least
10 consecutive years (M = 11.94, SD = 2.68). None of the par-
ticipants were involved in the previous study. Musicians played a
range of instruments, including piano, guitar, and violin. Control
participants (n = 10, 10 males) were postgraduate or profes-
sional computer programmers recruited through the Computer
Science Department at Macquarie University. Participants were
on average 31.58 years old (SD = 7.21, range 22–49 years), and
had an average of 10 years of training in their area of exper-
tise (SD = 6.07), and reported that they had no previous formal
athletic training and no significant past or current involvement
in music. Because the control group consisted of professionals
and postgraduate students, there was a significant group differ-
ence in mean age [F(2, 55) = 26.09, p < 0.001]. All participants
provided informed consent and were debriefed about the goals
of the experiment. Fifty-six participants were right-handed and
two were left-handed, and all participants reported that they had
no hearing or motor impairment. Participants received financial
compensation for their participation.
Materials, stimuli, procedure, and data analysis
Stimulus presentation and data collection involved the same
equipment as in Experiment 1, with the exception that partici-
pants completed the tasks using the laptop’s touch pad in order
to facilitate performance on the circle-drawing task. Procedures
and data analysis followed the protocol established in Experiment
1. The main change was the introduction of auditory feedback
at the continuation phase of the task. For each trial, after par-
ticipants synchronized their movements (circle drawing or finger
tapping) with an isochronous metronome for 18 pacing signals,
the metronome stopped and participants were instructed to con-
tinue to produce 36 more movements at the tempo established by
the metronome.
For the finger-tapping task, participants repeatedly tapped on
the touch pad with their right index finger at the tempo set
by the metronome. In the continuation phase, every tap trig-
gered a feedback tone of 40 ms duration with a fundamental
frequency of 480 Hz and at an intensity of 74 dB SPL. In the
circle-drawing task, participants repeatedly traced an unfilled cir-
cle template of 5 cm in diameter displayed on the screen with
the mouse cursor using their right index finger in time with the
metronome and continued the task in the absence of the exter-
nal timing cue. Participants were told to pass the cursor over
a crossing intersection at 270◦ of the circle in synchrony with
the metronome. In the continuation phase, every time the cur-
sor trajectory crossed the intersection the auditory feedback was
provided.
RESULTS
Participants were accurate in maintaining the target tempo during
the continuation phases of trials [fast tempo (600 ms IOI): M =
613 (SD = 25); slow tempo (800 ms IOI): M = 791 (SD = 39)].
An analysis of mean IRI across the two tasks showed no significant
group differences or group interactions. That is, all three groups
maintained a similar overall tempo in the continuation phase of
the timing tasks.
To measure timing precision, CV scores were averaged by task
and tempo for each participant and entered into a mixed design
ANOVA with Task (circle drawing, finger tapping) and Tempo
(slow, fast) as within factors and Group (athletes, musicians,
controls) as the between-subjects factor. The analysis revealed
a significant main effect of Task, F(1, 55) = 4.60, p = 0.03, and
a paired sample t-test confirmed that across the three groups
performance on the finger-tapping task (M = 0.05) was signifi-
cantly more precise than on the circle-drawing task (M = 0.10),
t(57) = 6.87, p < 0.001. There was also a main effect of Tempo,
F(1, 55) = 35.61, p < 0.001, and a significant interaction between
Task and Tempo, F = 17.69, p < 0.001. Results indicated that
precision was significantly better for fast tempo (M = 0.05, p <
0.001) than slow tempo (M = 0.11) in the finger-tapping task.
Participants were also significantly more precise in fast tempo
(M = 0.06) than slow tempo (M = 0.09, p < 0.001) in the circle-
drawing task.
Between-subjects analysis indicated that there was a significant
main effect of Group, F(2, 55) = 3.23, p = 0.04, and a marginally
statistical interaction between Task, Tempo and Group, F(2, 55) =
2.81, p = 0.06. Analysis of the circle-drawing task showed that
musicians were significantly more precise than controls on the
circle-drawing task (p = 0.01), but there was no statistical dif-
ference between the performance of athletes and musicians (p =
0.24), or between athletes and controls (p = 0.07). A similar
pattern was observed for the finger-tapping task, which also
corroborated the results of Experiment 1: musicians were sig-
nificantly more precise than controls (p = 0.04), but no other
significant group differences were observed (athletes and controls,
p = 0.14; musicians and athletes, p = 0.33; see Figure 3).
Different subgroups of athletes were included in the study
(e.g., swimming, rowing, rugby, volleyball, squash, triathlon, ice
hockey, martial arts, and others). We also examined whether per-
formance differed between athletes specializing in sports that
require discrete interactions with a ball or other projectile (e.g.,
kicking, catching, or repelling a ball in soccer, rugby, or volleyball)
and athletes trained in continuous movements (e.g., strokes in
swimming, cycling, rowing). An independent sample t-test indi-
cated that there was no statistical difference between athletes of
sports based on different movement class on either the circle-
drawing task, t(29) = 1.40, p = 0.17, or the finger-tapping task,
t(29) = 0.31, p = 0.75.
Slope analysis was next conducted to determine whether, as
in Experiment 1, the group differences in CV could be isolated
to duration-dependent variability. As shown in Figure 4, a close
correspondence was again observed. As with the CV values,
only a main effect of Group was significant, F(2, 55) = 3.79,
p = 0.03. Slope values, like CV values, were lower for musi-
cians (M = 0.002) than athletes (M = 0.005; p = 0.03) and
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FIGURE 3 | Coefficient of Variation (CV) per group in Experiment 2.
Standard error bars are shown.
FIGURE 4 | Slope for the circle-drawing and finger-tapping tasks per
group in Experiment 2. Standard error bars are shown.
controls (M = 0.005; p = 0.02), but did not differ between
athletes and controls (p = 0.96). In contrast, an ANOVA on
the intercept values revealed no significant between-subjects
effects or interactions, and intraindividual correlations on the
slope values were also not significant for any group. Thus, as in
Experiment 1, group differences in total variability (as indexed
by CV) could be isolated to duration-dependent variability (e.g.,
arising from noise in a central timekeeping mechanism) rather
than duration-independent differences associated with the motor
implementation of these tasks.
Previous research has suggested that the introduction of
a perceptual event, such as tactile or auditory feedback, can
strongly induce event-timing strategies (as indexed by negative
lag-one autocorrelations) even for tasks performed with continu-
ous, smoothly-produced movements (Zelaznik and Rosenbaum,
2010; Studenka et al., 2012). Our data were generally con-
sistent with these findings. One sample t-tests showed that
group means were significantly negative in all conditions (see
Figure 5). A mixed-design ANOVA with Task (circle drawing,
finger tapping) and Tempo (slow, fast) as within-subject fac-
tors, and Group (athletes, musicians, controls) as the between-
subjects factor, revealed that lag-one autocorrelations values were
FIGURE 5 | Lag-one autocorrelation values averaged across tempi by
Group and Experiment on the circle-drawing and finger-tapping tasks.
Auditory feedback was provided in Experiment 2 only. Note: Groups of
participants in Experiment 2 are different from those in Experiment 1.
not significantly different between tasks [F(1, 55) = 0.21, p =
0.64]. Lag-one autocorrelation values were significantly different
between fast and slow conditions in Experiment 2, F(1, 55) = 6.23,
p = 0.01, and there was also a significant interaction between
Task and Tempo (p = 0.002). Pairwise comparisons indicated
that there was a significant difference between lag-one auto-
correlation scores in the slow (M = −0.11) and fast conditions
(M = −0.17) for the finger-tapping task (p = 0.001), but lag-
one autocorrelation values did not significantly differ between
the slow (M = −0.13) and fast conditions (M = −0.12) for the
circle-drawing task (p = 0.70).
An examination of the percentage of individuals in each group
and condition with significantly negative lag-one autocorrela-
tions, as assessed by one sample t-tests on each individual’s data,
revealed that 90% of participants in the control group adopted
an event-timing strategy to perform the circle-drawing task in
Experiment 2, and 60% of participants in this group used event
timing to perform the finger-tapping task. Among movement-
based experts, the percentage of individuals that adopted an
event-timing strategy to perform the circle-drawing and finger-
tapping tasks was similar for musicians (76%) and athletes (68%).
ANOVA confirmed that there was no interaction between Group
(musicians, athletes, controls) and Task (finger tapping, circle
drawing), F(2, 55) = 0.98, p = 0.38. Taken together, these results
suggest that the majority of participants adopted an event-timing
strategy to perform both tasks in Experiment 2 (Table 1).
To test whether the presence of auditory feedback defining
the completion of cyclical time intervals influenced the timing
strategy adopted, we examined the percentage of individuals in
each group and condition that had significantly negative lag-
one autocorrelations between Experiments 1 and 2 (see Table 1).
Examination of Table 1 suggests that the use of event timing
depended on the condition and expertise of the participant. First,
for the circle-drawing task, a smaller percentage of control (non-
expert) participants used an event-timing strategy when there
was no auditory feedback (59%) than when there was auditory
feedback (90%). Second, when there was no auditory feedback,
musicians were more likely to use an event-timing strategy (85%)
than control participants (59%).
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Table 1 | Percentage of individuals with significantly negative lag-one
autocorrelation values for each group and condition in Experiment 1
(no auditory feedback) and Experiment 2 (with auditory feedback),
and Event Timing Index (ETI: the percentage of individuals with
negative lag-one autocorrelation/meanCV).
Measures of event timing
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Circle drawing Circle drawing
Percentage (ETI) Percentage (ETI)
Musicians 85% (8.3) 76% (8.1)
Athletes 60% (5.8) 68% (6.8)
Controls 59% (3.3) 90% (8.6)
All 67% (5.2) 74% (7.5)
Finger tapping Finger tapping
Musicians 62% (13.1) 76% (16.6)
Athletes 93% (14.0) 68% (12.5)
Controls 88% (11.8) 60% (10.1)
All 82% (13.1) 70% (13.0)
However, interpreting the raw percentage of negative autocor-
relation values is complicated by the fact that these values not
only reflect a tendency to adopt an event timing strategy; they also
reflect timing variability (van Beers et al., 2013). Thus, changes in
the percentage of negative (lag one) autocorrelation values may
reflect a change in the strategies adopted by participants; a change
in the average variability of timing; or both. For this reason, it is
useful to consider the percentage of negative autocorrelation val-
ues relative to the average CV of participants in each condition.
Thus, we defined the Event Timing Index (ETI) as the percent-
age of participants with negative lag-one autocorrelations divided
by the CV averaged across these same participants. This normal-
ized measure of event timing permits a meaningful comparison
between conditions.
Table 1 displays ETI values in parentheses. These values sug-
gest that across groups and experiments, an event-timing strategy
was used significantly less for circle drawing (mean ETI = 6.6)
than for finger tapping (mean ETI = 13.0). For circle drawing,
there was a greater tendency for control participants to adopt an
event timing strategy when there was auditory feedback (ETI =
8.6) than when there was no auditory feedback (ETI = 3.3). This
finding suggests that, for circle drawing, the presence of a salient
perceptual event defining the completion of cyclical time intervals
influenced the timing strategy adopted by non-experts.
Musicians, however, exhibited a comparatively strong ten-
dency to employ event timing when performing the circle-
drawing task regardless of whether there was or was not auditory
feedback (ETI = 8.3 and 8.1, respectively). For finger tapping,
the tendency to adopt an event-timing strategy was similar in the
two Experiments (mean ETI in Exp 1 = 13.1; mean ETI in Exp 2
= 13.0). In short, introducing a salient perceptual event demar-
cating the completion of each movement cycle encouraged an
event-timing strategy for circle drawing, but not finger tapping.
One interpretation of this finding is that there was already a strong
tendency to employ an event-timing strategy for finger tapping,
so the inclusion of auditory feedback had no additional impact
on this tendency.
DISCUSSION
The findings of Experiment 2 confirmed that participants per-
formed significantly more precisely in the finger-tapping task
than in the circle-drawing task. The results also indicated that
precision was significantly better for the fast-tempo condi-
tion than the slow-tempo condition in both finger-tapping and
circle-drawing tasks. Previous studies have also reported signif-
icant interactions between task precision and tempo, suggesting
that the timing mechanism adopted is affected by the rate of
timed movements (Huys et al., 2008; Repp, 2008; Zelaznik and
Rosenbaum, 2010). The slope analysis also suggests that the dif-
ferences in total variability cannot be attributed to differences
associated with the motor implementation of the tasks, but to
duration-dependent variability (e.g., in event timing, a central
clock mechanism accumulates error as the interval duration
increases).
The results of Experiment 2 also confirmed that musicians
were significantly more precise than controls at both finger tap-
ping and circle drawing. It can be suggested that music training
may engage and refine both discrete and continuous movements.
One explanation for this result is that both event and emergent
timing are implicated in the accurate timing achieved by elite
performers, and that music training leads to the enhanced oper-
ation of both timing modes (Jantzen et al., 2002, 2004; Repp and
Steinman, 2010; Studenka et al., 2012; Studenka, 2014). However,
it is also possible that the superior performance by musicians on
both discrete and continuous tasks could be largely attributable
to an enhanced central clock mechanism, as the results of the lag-
one autocorrelation analysis suggested that the vast majority of
musicians tended to employ an event-timing strategy to perform
both discrete and continuous tasks.
In Experiment 2, the performance of athletes in the circle-
drawing task did not differ significantly from that of controls,
in contrast to the results of Experiment 1. This discrepancy
could be related to the fact that 90% of controls and 68%
of athletes adopted an event-timing strategy to perform the
continuous-movement task when auditory feedback was avail-
able (Experiment 2), whereas 59% of controls and 60% of athletes
used event timing to perform the circle-drawing task when audi-
tory feedback was not available (Experiment 1). In other words, in
the presence of auditory feedback there was a greater tendency to
adopt an event timing strategy to perform the circle-drawing task,
especially for participants without movement-based expertise.
This finding corroborates previous evidence that the introduction
of a perceptual event, such as tactile or auditory feedback, induces
an event-timing strategy even for tasks performed with continu-
ous movements (Zelaznik and Rosenbaum, 2010; Studenka et al.,
2012). This tendency may explain why the precision of contin-
uous movements increases when auditory feedback is available
(Zelaznik and Rosenbaum, 2010). More generally, it is known
that the presence of feedback significantly enhances timing pre-
cision Aschersleben et al., 2001; Aschersleben, 2002; Stenneken
et al., 2006; Goebl and Palmer, 2009, and event timing is preferred
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in synchronization tasks, given that discrete actions are less vari-
able and quicker to adjust after perturbations in the sensory input
(Elliot et al., 2009).
Taken together, the results of Experiment 2 corroborate find-
ings obtained in Experiment 1 that movement-based expertise
significantly improves timing skills, and that extensive training in
music leads to enhanced precision for both discrete and contin-
uous movements. The findings also support the hypothesis that
event and emergent timing are not uniquely tied to specific types
of movements but can be influenced by expertise (Jantzen et al.,
2002, 2004; Zelaznik and Rosenbaum, 2010), the presence of feed-
back (Studenka and Zelaznik, 2011), and movement speed (Huys
et al., 2008).
GENERAL DISCUSSION
This investigation sought to examine the effects of expertise and
training on the precision of timed movements. The results are
compatible with the view that movement-based training signif-
icantly enhances the precision of timing skills, and that this effect
depends on the nature of the training. It was also observed that
expertise is an important predictor of the timing mechanism that
is engaged during timed actions. These findings help to clarify
the distinction between event and emergent timing mechanisms
by showing that expertise and training can influence the timing
mode that is employed in a particular movement-based task.
Experiment 1 demonstrated that athletes were significantly
more precise in the production of continuous rhythmic move-
ments, whereas musicians were significantly more precise in
discrete rhythmic movements in the absence of auditory feed-
back. These results indicate that intense training and expertise
can help to improve timing precision, and corroborate the initial
hypothesis that music performance relies predominantly on event
timing (Repp and Doggett, 2007; Baer et al., 2013; Albrecht et al.,
2014), whereas athletic activities tend to employ more predom-
inantly smooth and continuous movements based on emergent
timing (Kelso et al., 1981; Sternad et al., 2000; Jaitner et al., 2001;
Jantzen et al., 2008; Balague et al., 2013). Thus, hours of daily
practice involving a predominant type of movement (i.e., dis-
crete or continuous) may reinforce one dominant timing mode.
This finding is particularly relevant to the development of educa-
tional and rehabilitation programs that could greatly benefit from
activities targeting specific classes of movements.
It is important to state, however, that actions can be imple-
mented in different ways (e.g., walking vs. marching) and may
often engage multiple mechanisms simultaneously. For exam-
ple, playing the piano not only requires precise timing of the
pianist’ keystrokes but also a fluid transition of the hand across
the piano keys. Rowing or swinging a badminton racquet, on
the other hand, are continuous actions in the sense that the
movement is not smooth and interrupted; however they are dis-
crete insofar as movements are segmented by perceptual events
(e.g., contact of the oar with the water, and the racquet with
the shuttlecock). Therefore, whereas it is possible to isolate dis-
crete and continuous movements in laboratory for experimental
purposes, performances often require both classes of rhythmic
actions (Sternad et al., 2000; Hogan and Sternad, 2007; Sternad,
2008; Repp and Steinman, 2010; Studenka, 2014). The results of
the present study do not support the idea that musical and ath-
letic skill are associated with event-timing and emergent timing,
respectively. On the contrary, our findings suggest that to accu-
rately perform timing tasks at high skill level, experts may rely
on both timing modes, although one timing mechanism is often
dominant. Therefore, an essential skill in movement-based exper-
tise is to smoothly transition between movements of different
classes.
Our findings are consistent with the idea that event and emer-
gent timing mechanisms are not strictly tied to specific tasks
(Jantzen et al., 2002, 2004; Repp and Steinman, 2010; Studenka
et al., 2012; Studenka, 2014). First, musicians were not only sig-
nificantly more precise than controls in the finger-tapping task
but also in the circle-drawing task, suggesting that music train-
ing refines both discrete and continuous rhythmic movements.
Second, lag-one autocorrelation values were significantly nega-
tive in all conditions in Experiment 1, suggesting that participants
tended to adopt an event-timing strategy to perform both discrete
and continuous tasks, even when no salient perceptual event was
present.
The analysis of the Event Timing Index (ETI) allowed us to
further investigate the effect of auditory feedback on the tim-
ing strategy adopted to perform continuous movements. These
results suggested that the percentage of musicians that used an
event-timing strategy to complete the circle-drawing task did not
change significantly when auditory feedback was provided at the
end of each movement cycle. Years of formal music training might
have prompted participants to rely on event-timing mechanisms
to complete a continuous-movement task (Studenka et al., 2012;
Baer et al., 2013; van Beers et al., 2013). These findings support
the suggestion that expertise and training are important predic-
tors of the timing mechanism engaged in maintaining precise
timed actions. On the other hand, the percentage of partici-
pants who adopted event timing to complete the circle-drawing
task significantly increased when auditory feedback was present,
especially for control participants. For this task, 59% of partici-
pants tended to use an event-timing strategy when no auditory
feedback was provided (Experiment 1), but 90% of the control
group adopted an event-timing strategy when auditory feed-
back was provided (Experiment 2). This finding indicates that
salient events (e.g., auditory, tactile) signaling the completion of
a movement cycle can be used to generate an internal represen-
tation of the time intervals to be produced based on clock-like
mechanisms (Zelaznik and Rosenbaum, 2010; Studenka et al.,
2012). It is known that sensory feedback enhances timing accu-
racy (Aschersleben et al., 2001; Rabin and Gordon, 2004; Repp,
2005; Goebl and Palmer, 2009; Gray, 2009). However, it is impor-
tant to note that the manipulation of auditory feedback is possible
in experimental conditions, but in real life circumstances mul-
tiple sources of feedback may be used to monitor and refine
the accuracy and precision of timed actions (Aschersleben et al.,
2001). Future studies are needed to examine the role of event
and emergent timing mechanisms in the control of discrete and
continuous rhythmic movements in ecologically valid conditions.
Such research would shed light on the relative importance of
these two timing strategies for the production of accurately timed
movements in real-life circumstances.
www.frontiersin.org December 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1482 | 94
Braun Janzen et al. Timing skills and expertise
It should be acknowledged that certain methodological fea-
tures of our investigation limit the conclusions that can be drawn.
First, we observed that lag-one autocorrelation values were sig-
nificantly negative in all conditions in both experiments. This
finding suggests that participants tended to adopt an event-timing
strategy to perform both discrete and continuous tasks, even
when no salient perceptual event was present. One explanation
for this finding is that participants took part in the tapping task
before the circle-drawing task, as in previous studies (Zelaznik
and Rosenbaum, 2010; Studenka et al., 2012), and task order
may have significantly influenced the timing strategy adopted
by some participants. Previous research has suggested that prac-
ticing one timing task reinforces a particular timing strategy,
which may then persist over time and over tasks (Jantzen et al.,
2002, 2004; Studenka et al., 2012). Interestingly, this carry-over
effect may have been stronger for some participants than others.
Nonetheless, this possibility also corroborates a central conclu-
sion of the study: that timing strategies are not strictly tied to
specific tasks but may be influenced by factors such as task order,
expertise and training, and the presence of salient perceptual
events.
Second, it is important to acknowledge that different groups
of participants were used in the two experiments, preventing a
within-subject comparison between the results of these experi-
ments. For this reason, it is difficult to estimate that the precise
effect of auditory feedback on the timing strategy adopted. To
overcome this limitation, we developed the “Event Timing Index
(ETI).” This index is essentially the relationship between the per-
centage of participants with negative lag-one autocorrelations
divided by CV averaged across these same participants. The
results of this analysis strongly suggest that auditory feedback
influenced the timing strategy adopted for circle drawing but
not finger tapping. Further research is required to validate this
conclusion.
In summary, expertise in sports and music is significantly
associated with enhanced precision of timing skills, but this
effect depends on the nature of the expertise and the pres-
ence of auditory feedback. It should be emphasized that one
interpretation of these findings is that individuals with supe-
rior timing precision gravitated to these pursuits. However, it
is likely that expertise and training further helped to engage
and refine mechanisms associated with skilled timing. Expertise
was also an important predictor of the type of timing mech-
anism that individuals employed for both discrete and con-
tinuous movements, which casts further doubt on the long-
standing assumption that event and emergent timing mecha-
nisms are strictly tied to discrete and continuous movement tasks,
respectively.
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The primary aim of this study was to examine the role of cue utilization in the initial
acquisition of psycho-motor skills. Two experiments were undertaken, the first of which
examined the relationship between cue utilization typologies and levels of accuracy
following four simulated, power-off landing trials in a light aircraft simulator. The results
indicated that higher levels of cue utilization were associated with a greater level of
landing accuracy following training exposure. In the second study, participants’ levels of
cue utilization were assessed prior to two 15 min periods during which they practiced
take-offs and landings using a simulated unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). Consistent with
Study 1, the outcomes of Study 2 revealed a statistically significant relationship among
levels of cue utilization and the number of trials to criterion on the take-off task, and the
proportion of successful trials during both take-off and landing. In combination, the results
suggest that the capacity for the acquisition and the subsequent utilization of cues is an
important predictor of skill acquisition, particularly during the initial stages of the process.
The implications for theory and applied practice are discussed.
Keywords: skill acquisition, cue utilization, expertise, training
INTRODUCTION
Expert performance across a range of environments, including
sport, medical diagnosis, and financial decision making, is char-
acterized by rapid, accurate responses, even in highly complex
situations (Farrington-Darby and Wilson, 2006; Müller et al.,
2006; Sherbino et al., 2012). Since this level of performance is
generally acquired over extensive periods of exposure, there is an
assumption that the capacity for sustained, high-levels of perfor-
mance derives from the gradual development of highly specialized
associations or routines that are subsequently retained in mem-
ory (Ericsson and Lehmann, 1996; Ericsson and Towne, 2010).
Where these routines are available, they are activated rapidly and,
in some cases, in the absence of conscious processing (Salthouse,
1991; Finkbeiner and Forster, 2007).
One of the advantages associated with the availability of highly
specialized routines is that their activation imposes relatively fewer
demands on working memory resources (Chung and Byrne, 2008).
This enables experts to undertake multiple tasks simultaneously
and with relatively consistent levels of accuracy (Houmourtzoglou
et al., 1998; Boot et al., 2008). However, it also ensures that cog-
nitive resources are available to enable both the acquisition of
additional skills, and the refinement of those skills that have
already been acquired.
The necessity for cognitive resources to facilitate the acquisition
of cognitive skills reflects the theoretically important role of work-
ing memory in enabling the association between environmental
features and objects or events. For example, in the case of produc-
tion systems, Anderson et al. (2004) proposed that a production
can only emerge when the condition and action statements are resi-
dent simultaneously in working memory. In the early stages of skill
acquisition, the process of problem resolution involves the recall
of declarative knowledge from long term into working memory,
thereby occupying what is a finite resource. The development of
a production or condition-action statement obviates this demand
for declarative knowledge and the faster that this process occurs,
the greater the capacity to allocate the residual resources to other
tasks, thereby potentially improving the rate of skill acquisition.
The proposition that efficiencies in information processing
can be gained through a parsimonious association between envi-
ronmental features and events or objects is a consistent theme
in various models of skill acquisition, as well as explanations
of the superior performance of experts (Ericsson and Kintsch,
1995). Notions of bounded rationality, automated processing, and
instance processing all presuppose tightly arranged associations to
explain the rapid recognition and response to situations that are
characteristic of expertise (Logan, 2002; Campitelli et al., 2007;
Pachur and Marinello, 2013).
Klein (2011) suggests that the value of the associations in mem-
ory lies in their capacity to enable an operator to quickly classify or
diagnose a situation. This process triggers an associated response
from memory, and thereby facilitates a relatively rapid response.
Where Anderson et al. (2004) would refer to this process as the
activation of a condition–action statement in the form of a pro-
duction, Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier (2011), Klein et al. (2010),
and Brunswik (1955) suggest the application of cue-based asso-
ciations. Cues constitute relationships among features and events
or objects that are resident in the environment (Wiggins, 2006).
They are highly specialized and targeted, and they enable the rapid
recognition and response to particular situations.
The difficulty associated with the acquisition of associations
between phenomena is that their coexistence does not neces-
sarily infer a causal relationship (Holyoak and Cheng, 2011).
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A “storming” process is necessary during the acquisition of skilled
performance whereby associations are quickly tested, discarded,
or revised to ensure that they are both as accurate and as parsimo-
nious as possible (Wiggins, 2012). However, an inevitable part of
this process of storming is the commission of errors, whereby inap-
propriate cues may be triggered, or the cue associations themselves
may be overly general or incorrect, thereby leading to inefficiencies
or delays in the acquisition of skilled performance (Bridger and
Mecklinger, 2014).
At a fundamental level, the capacity to acquire and subsequently
revise cue-based relationships requires a cognitive strategy involv-
ing the identification of salient features in the environment, the
perception of associations between features and events/objects,
the retention of these associations in memory and, finally, the
recognition of those situations during which the application of
cues applies (Wiggins, 2014). The efficiency with which this pro-
cess occurs will determine the rate of skill acquisition. However,
what remains unclear is whether the capacity for the development
and application of cues is determined by a particular context, or
whether it constitutes an underlying trait so that the rate of cue
acquisition within one context predicts performance in a related
domain.
The aim of the present study was to consider the relation-
ship between the cue utilization in the context of motor vehicle
hazard detection and way finding, and skill acquisition in learn-
ing to land a simulated aircraft and learning to take-off and
land a line-of-sight umanned aerial vehicle (UAV). If skilled
psycho-motor performance is dependent upon the availability of
feature–event/objects in memory in the form of cues, the rate
at which cues are acquired within a given period should pre-
dict the rate of skill acquisition. Moreover, if cue acquisition is
a trait, then the rate of cue utilization evident in one task should
reflect the rate of skill acquisition in tasks that demand similar
capabilities.
Although the relationship between cue acquisition and skill
acquisition has yet to be examined empirically, some evidence for
a relationship can be drawn from Small et al. (2014) who were
investigating the relationship between cue utilization and perfor-
mance during a novel, short vigilance task. Of particular interest
in the context of the present study was the observation that par-
ticipants’ performance differed in the rate at which they became
familiar with a novel representation of a domain-related task. This
difference in the rate of skill acquisition was not explained by years
of industry-related experience, suggesting that the acquisition of
cues may constitute an underlying trait.
STUDY 1
Study 1 was designed to examine the relationship between a com-
posite measure of cue utilization in the context of motor vehicle
hazard and way-finding, and performance in learning to land a
simulated aircraft as close as possible to a runway target. Since cue
utilization represents the outcome of the process of cue acquisi-
tion, it was important to control for domain-related experience.
To that extent, drivers’ years of experience were recorded, and
these data were employed as a covariate to control statistically for
exposure to the domain. It was hypothesized that, controlling for
driving experience, participants who recorded greater levels of cue




A total of 51 university students (25 male and 26 female) were
recruited for the study. These participants comprised first- and
second-year psychology students who each received 0.5% course
credit for their participation. Their ages ranged from 18 to 22 years
(M = 20.27, SD = 1.601). The inclusion criteria comprised
licensed drivers who had never previously flown a flight simulator.
Instruments
A demographic questionnaire required participants to indicate
their age, sex, years of driving experience, weekly driving fre-
quency, weekly frequency of video-game play, and their experience
operating a flight simulator. Cue utilization was assessed using the
EXPERT Intensive Skills Evaluation (EXPERTise; Wiggins et al.,
2010) situation judgement test (SJT). Designed to measure per-
formance on several cue-based processing and problem solving
tasks, it provides a composite assessment of domain-related cue
utilization.
EXPERTise incorporates experimental tasks that have sepa-
rately and collectively been associated with differences in oper-
ational performance. They include a paired association task,
designed to establish the availability of feature–event/object rela-
tionships in the form of cues, a feature identification task, designed
to assess feature priming, and a feature discrimination task,
designed to test the precision of cue-based associations in memory.
Each task yields a distinct but complementary assessment of cue
utilization that, in combination, provides an overall assessment of
the utilization of cues in memory.
In the paired association task, participants were presented with
two different terms (feature–event/object) that appeared adjacent
to one another for 1800 ms. Using a six-point Likert scale, partic-
ipants were asked to indicate the extent to which they considered
the two words related. Examples included related terms such as
“journey time” (event) with “car speed” (feature) and relatively
less related terms such as “red traffic light” (feature) and “freeway”
(object). Higher levels of cue utilization were associated with a
greater variance in the perceived relatedness of terms (Ackerman
and Rathburn, 1984; Morrison et al., 2013). The use of variance as
a measure of cue utilization in this context is based on the assump-
tion that, through experience, the associations between cues are
better refined and thereby lead to a greater level of dichotomy in
perceptions of the association between features and events/objects.
The measure of performance has been used successfully to differ-
entiate experts from non-experts in a range of context (Witteman
et al., 2012)
For the feature identification task, participants were tasked with
locating, as quickly as possible, a ball displayed at different loca-
tions within a static, complex driving scene; a process similar to
measures of field dependence (Goodenough, 1976). In this case,
lower response latencies reflect a greater capacity to extract key
features from a complex array (Wiggins, 2014).
In the feature discrimination task, participants were provided
with a hypothetical scenario (“After driving for some time, you
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become aware that you have lost your bearings... Surveying your
surrounds, you see several cars driving with surfboards on their
roofs. There are also several beachgoers and shoppers walking
nearby. . .. In the distance, you can see high-rise apartment blocks
as well as palm trees. There are also several street signs visible. . .”).
After making a decision as to their most likely response under
the circumstances, participants rated the importance of different
features in the formulation of their response. In the driving ver-
sion of EXPERTise, 14 features were presented during the feature
discrimination task, to which participants responded using a 10-
point Likert Scale, with higher ratings equating to a greater level
of importance in the decision process. In this task, higher levels
of cue utilization were reflected in higher variance in the ratings
of the perceived relevance of features (Weiss and Shanteau, 2003;
Witteman et al., 2012).
The construct validity of EXPERTise has been demonstrated
in a number of different domains, whereby typologies that were
formed on the basis of performance across the EXPERTise tasks
differentiated both simulated and actual performance in the work-
place (Loveday et al., 2013b,c; Loveday and Wiggins, 2014; Wiggins
et al., 2014). The test–retest reliability of the typologies has been
demonstrated in the context of power control operators at six
monthly intervals, κ = 0.59 (Loveday et al., 2013a).
Flight simulator
A Redbird FMX-1000 flight simulator incorporating three degrees
of freedom was used to position a simulated Cessna 172 at an
altitude of 1000 feet and a distance of 1.5 km from the runway.
Two large white bars positioned on the runway represented the
target landing point. After landing, the aircraft was repositioned
and this process was repeated for four trials.
Procedure
The participants completed the tasks individually, and all measures
were presented sequentially in the same sitting. Having completed
the demographic questionnaire, participants were directed to the
on-line version of EXPERTise and they were asked to follow the
instructions that were displayed on the computer screen. Once
completed, participants entered the flight simulator and were
briefed on the basic controls and the aim of the exercise. They
then completed four trials, attempting to guide the aircraft to a
landing on the runway.
RESULTS
Cue utilization typologies
Prior to detailed analysis, it was necessary to identify the cue uti-
lization typologies that corresponded to relatively higher and lower
levels of cue utilization. These typologies were based on the out-
comes of the EXPERTise tasks and were employed in this case due
to the correspondence with previous methodological approaches
to the application of EXPERTise-related outcomes (Loveday et al.,
2013b,c; Loveday and Wiggins, 2014; Wiggins et al., 2014). The cal-
culation of typologies began with the aggregation of the responses
within the tasks, the calculation of z-scores, and a cluster analysis
to identify whether two, meaningful typologies could be estab-
lished. In the present study, two typologies were identified with
centroids that corresponded to: (a) a lower response latency in the
feature identification task, and higher variance in the paired asso-
ciation and feature discrimination tasks (higher cue utilization),
and (b) a greater response latency in the feature identification
task, and lower variance in the paired association and feature
discrimination tasks (lower cue utilization). The cluster analysis
classified 15 participants in the higher cue utilization typology
and 33 participants in the lower cue utilization typology (see
Table 1). The data for three participants were excluded due to
missing data.
Landing performance
Flight performance data comprised the primary dependent vari-
able in the current study. Specifically, the flight task required
participants to land the aircraft at a specific target located on the
runway. The difference between a participant’s landing position
(longitude and latitude) and the ideal landing location (longi-
tude and latitude) formed the “flight performance” variable in
the current study. This was measured in kilometers and calcu-
lated using a distance calculator for compass coordinates. Lower
scores in flight performance represent a shorter distance from
the landing target, and thus, greater accuracy during the flight
task.
Five landing trials were conducted by each participant.
The Shapiro–Wilks normality statistic for each landing trial
was non-significant (p < 0.05) and inspection of the P–P
plots indicated normal distributions. The landing trials were
analyzed via repeated measures and post hoc pairwise com-
parisons. A significant main effect for landing performance,
F(4,144) = 12.83, p = 0.000, suggested that landing accu-
racy differed over trials. Post hoc comparisons and inspection
of means revealed a pattern of steady and statistically signif-
icant improvement in landing accuracy, until the final trial
(fifth landing). Landing accuracy in the first trial (M = 0.66,
SD = 0.18, SE = 0.030) significantly improved in the sec-
ond (M = 0.58, SD = 0.19, SE = 0.032, p = 0.011), and
performance in the second trial significantly improved in the
third trial (M = 0.51, SD = 0.21, SE = 0.034, p = 0.000).
Compared to the third trial, the fourth showed continued
improvement, with a reduced mean distance from the tar-
get (M = 0.48, SD = 0.20, SE = 0.033). However, the
fourth trial was not significantly different from the preced-
ing trial (p = 1.00). The final trial indicated a decrease in
performance and increased error (M = 0.49, SD = 0.26,
SE = 0.043). Trial five was also not significantly different
from trials two, three, or four. Taken together, this pattern
suggests that learning occurred, and that performance in the
final trial may have been affected by fatigue. For this reason,
Table 1 | Cluster centroids for the EXPERTise task scores for Study 1.
Cluster 1 (n = 15) Cluster 2 (n = 33)
Feature identification –1.01 0.47
Feature discrimination 0.99 –0.45
Paired association 1.24 –0.54
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the landing performance for trial four was selected as the
dependent variable in subsequent analyses, since it was at this
point that optimal performance, following learning, had been
achieved.
Cue utilization and landing performance
A univariate analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was used to test
the relationship between cue utilization and landing performance,
and comprised the cue utilization typology as the independent
variable (higher and lower), landing performance (as measured
by the distance from the target on the fourth trial) as the depen-
dent variable, and years of driving experience as a covariate. The
results revealed a statistically significant main effect for cue uti-
lization typology, F(1,45) = 4.18, p = 0.047. An inspection of
the mean landing performance of the clusters indicates that par-
ticipants with higher levels of cue utilization (controlling for
driving experience) landed the aircraft closer to target (Mean
distance = 0.37, SD = 0.23) than participants with lower lev-
els of cue utilization (Mean distance = 0.53, SD = 0.19). This
suggests that a relationship exists between cue acquisition and
the acquisition of skilled performance in related, psycho-motor
task.
Using hierarchical regression with change statistics, the vari-
ance in landing performance attributable to cluster was 11.5%
and when driving experience was included in the model,
the total proportion of the variance explained increased to
27%. This change represents an increase of 24%, and was
statistically significant, F(1,45) = 9.49, p = 0.005. Partial
correlations for driving experience and cluster revealed that
the variance uniquely attributed to cluster was 8.5% and
the variance uniquely attributed to driving experience was
17.4%.
STUDY 2
Study 2 was designed to extend the outcomes of Study 1 by
examining the relationship between driving-related cue acquisi-
tion and the development of skilled performance in the operation
of a simulated UAV. If cue acquisition represents a precursor
to skilled performance, then measures of cue utilization (con-
trolling for driving experience) were expected to predict the
number of trials required to reach a predetermined level of take-
off and landing performance, together with the proportion of
successful take-off and landing trials. Since the acquisition of
cues is also likely to dependent upon the capacity to exclude
extraneous information and thereby identify predictive feature–
event/object associations, it was also anticipated that measures
of sensory processing sensitivity (SPS) and attentional control
would account for a proportion of the variance associated with
the acquisition of skilled performance in operating the UAV.
Higher levels of SPS and lower levels of attentional control
are normally associated with clinical conditions and heightened
arousal (Aron and Aron, 1997; Derryberry and Reed, 2002).
Therefore, lower levels of SPS in combination with higher lev-
els of attentional control and greater levels of cue acquisition
were expected to account for a greater proportion of success-




A total of 50 university students participated in the study of
whom 21 were male and 29 were female. They were recruited
from the Psychology Research Pool, and each received 1% course
credit for their participation. They were aged between 18 and
26 (M = 18.87, SD = 1.58), possessed a current motor vehicle
driver’s license, and had no experience in remote control aircraft
operation.
Instruments
As in Study 1, the participants completed a demographic
questionnaire, including questions related to video game and
driving experience, and then progressed to complete the on-line
version of EXPERTise. They were subsequently asked to com-
plete Aron and Aron’s (1997) Highly Sensitive Person Scale and
Derryberry and Reed’s (2002) Attentional Control Scale. The 27-
item Highly Sensitive Person Scale requires participants to indicate
their response on a seven-point Likert scale. An example item is
“Are you easily overwhelmed by things like bright lights, strong
smells, coarse fabrics, or sirens close by?” Levels of sensitivity
are calculated by summing the responses to the questions with
higher scores associated with higher levels of SPS. The scale has
adequate discriminant, convergent, and overall construct validity,
and Cronbach’s alphas have been obtained in the range of 0.81–
0.84, demonstrating adequate reliability (Jagiellowicz et al., 2010).
An alpha of 0.77 was achieved in the present study.
The Attentional Control Scale is designed to measure an indi-
vidual’s general capacity to focus attention on a task, to filter out
distractions, shift attention between tasks, and to flexibly control
thought (Derryberry and Reed, 2002). The 20-item scale required
participants to indicate their response on a four-point Likert scale.
An example item is “When concentrating, I can focus my atten-
tion so that I become unaware of what’s going on in the room
around me?” Scores are calculated by summing the responses to
the questions with higher scores associated with greater levels of
Attentional Control. The scale has adequate discriminant, con-
vergent, and overall construct validity in different populations
(Fajkowska and Derryberry, 2010). A Cronbach’s alpha of 0.83
was achieved in the present study.
UAV simulator
Real Flight 6.0TM was used to simulate the operation of a UAV.
The simulator was displayed on a 40-inch monitor with con-
trol exercised using a standard remote control aircraft transmitter,
incorporating two joysticks, one to control the pitch and roll of
the aircraft and the other to control power.
For the take-off task, the UAV was located at the end of the
runway, and participants were asked to accelerate the aircraft using
the joystick and fly the aircraft down the extended center line of
the runway through two virtual parallel lines. In the case of this
computer program, the failure to position the aircraft within the
parallel lines would result in the destruction of the aircraft, wherein
the aircraft was repositioned at the take-off in preparation for the
next trial. Similarly, in the case of the landing, the aircraft was
positioned at altitude, a short distance from the runway along
the extended center line. Participants were asked to advance or
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retard the throttle while maintaining directional control of the
aircraft, and descend between two parallel lines. Similar to the
take-off task, the failure to maintain the position of the aircraft
within the two parallel lines would result in the destruction of
the aircraft and a return to the landing approach position. The
number of trials was recorded and criterion performance was set
at three consecutive successful take-offs or landings to reduce the
influence of accidental and sporadic successes.
Procedure
Once the initial questionnaires had been completed, participants
were asked to stand in front of the UAV display and the task was
described, together with instructions concerning the control of
the simulated aircraft. Participants were advised that they were
to try and ensure that the aircraft departed or landed within the
parallel lines and that flight outside the parallel lines would result
in the destruction of the aircraft with the requirement to restart
the trial. Similarly, if the participant succeeded in completing a
trial successfully, the aircraft trial would be restarted. Participants
were advised that they would be given 15 min to complete as many
successful trials as possible. The take-off trials always preceded the
landing trials.
RESULTS
The aim of Study 2 was to examine the differential effects of cue
utilization, sensory processing sensitivity, and attentional control
on trials to criterion in learning to operate a UAV simulator. Similar
to Study 1, data arising from the EXPERTise SJT were aggregated
and converted into z scores. However, unlike Study 1, typologies
were not established. Instead, a grand mean was employed as an
overall, standardized measure of cue utilization and to allow for
regression analyses.
UAV performance
Four measures of UAV skill acquisition were used as dependant
variables in the present study. The number of trials to achieve cri-
terion performance (three consecutive successful trials) was used
to establish the rate of skill acquisition. A descriptive analysis of the
data revealed that skewness was outside normal limits. A square-
root transformation was undertaken subsequently, which reduced
the skewness to an acceptable level (<1).
The number of trials to reach criterion performance could not
be used as a measure of the rate of skill acquisition, as only 31 of
the 50 participants were able to complete three consecutive land-
ings successfully. Consequently, a new categorical variable was
calculated with two levels: those who were able to achieve land-
ing criterion performance and those who were unable to achieve
criterion performance.
The proportion of successful trials was included as a broader
measure of skill acquisition that was influenced by both the rate
of skill acquisition and the consistency of performance beyond
the initial achievement of the criterion. Proportions were derived
for both the take-off and landing tasks by calculating the number
of successful trials as a proportion of the total number of trials
completed by each participant. The mean number of total trials
across all participants was 70.82 for the take-off task (SD = 10.312)
and 76.46 for the landing task (SD = 11.38).
Modeling UAV performance
A measure of SPS was obtained by summing the responses to all 27
items of the Highly Sensitive Person Scale. The Attentional Con-
trol score was obtained by summing the responses for the reverse
scored items (1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 15, 16, and 20) from the
Attentional Control Scale. A hierarchical multiple linear regres-
sion was used initially to determine the relationship among cue
utilization scores, weekly videogame use, SPS, Attentional Con-
trol, driving experience, and the proportion of successful take-off
trials. Entering the cue utilization score explained 19.7% of the
variance in the proportion of take-off trials and was statistically
significant, F(1,47) = 11.81, p < 0.01. This increased to 30.3%
of the explained variance with the addition of Sensory Process-
ing Sensitivity scores, a change that was statistically significant,
F(1,46) = 7.15, p < 0.01. The addition of the remaining variables
failed to increase the amount of variance explained, indicating that
the proportion of successful take-off trials during skill acquisition
of the UAV was best predicted by a combination of a higher level
of cue utilization (β = 0.38) and lower level of sensory processing
sensitivity (β = –0.33).
Consistent with the results associated with the proportion
of successful take-off trials, levels of cue utilization and sen-
sory processing sensitivity also provided the model of best
fit for the proportion of successful landing trials using the
UAV, F(2,47) = 8.33, p < 0.01. Specifically, 26.2% of the
variance in the proportion of successful landing trials was
predicted by higher levels of cue utilization (β = 0.37) and
lower levels of sensory processing sensitivity (β = –0.29).
Although this is slightly lower than the variance explained
for take-off performance, it is of particular note that nei-
ther driving experience, videogame experience nor attentional
control contributed significantly to the final model. As might
be expected a strong correlation was evidence between take-
off and landing performance using the UAV [r(50) = 0.69,
p < 0.001].
In relation to the number of trials required to satisfy the take-
off criterion, the regression model of best fit was restricted to the
level of cue utilization, β = –0.41, F(1,42) = 8.58, p < 0.01, which
explained 17% of the variance in performance. No other vari-
ables contributed significantly to the model, including sensory
processing sensitivity. This suggests that, while sensory processing
sensitivity may explain some of the variance associated with sus-
tained performance beyond the achievement of a criterion level of
performance, it is not predictive of the initial achievement of this
criterion.
Since the nature of the data arising from the landing per-
formance task precluded the use of linear regression, a logistic
regression was employed in which the dependent variable com-
prised whether or not the participant achieved the landing crite-
rion. Consistent with the data for the linear regression concerning
the achievement of the take-off criterion, only cue utilization
was retained as in the model of best fit, β = 1.68, SE = 0.584,
Wald’s X2 = 8.27, Exp(B) = 5.35, p = 0.004. The results sug-
gest that the odds of achieving landing criterion increased by a
factor of 5.35 for each unit increased in the log concentration
of cue utilization (Hosmer–Lemeshow X2 = 8.78, Cox and Snell
R2 = 0.20).
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
The overall aim of this research was to examine the role of cue
utilization in the early development of skilled performance in
two related domains. Cue utilization has been established pre-
viously as a characteristic of expertise (Loveday et al., 2013c), and
this suggests that the capacity to identify, acquire, and retain
feature–event/object relationships in memory may be a necessary
precursor for the acquisition of expertise. Understanding the role
of cue acquisition at the initial stages of skill development poten-
tially gives rise to a more complete model of the mechanisms that
will facilitate the transition from novice through competence to
expertise.
Study 1 sought to establish the relationship between cue
utilization and performance in learning to land a simulated
aircraft. Cue utilization was assessed using the driving-related
version of EXPERTise, and this enabled the formation of
typologies reflecting relatively higher or lower levels of cue
utilization. The results revealed a statistically significant rela-
tionship between cue utilization typology and the proximity to
the runway target following the fourth landing trial. Specifi-
cally, higher levels of cue utilization, controlling for driving
exposure, were associated with a closer proximity to the land-
ing target. This suggests an association between a measure of
cue utilization and performance on a novel skill acquisition
task.
To establish the generalizability of the outcomes of Study
1 and to explore additional explanations of the mechanisms
of skill acquisition, Study 2 was designed to employ the
same measure of cue utilization (driving-related) but consid-
ered the acquisition of skilled performance in the operation
of a UAV. While conceptually similar to the operation of a
flight simulator, the operator of a Line-of-Sight UAV con-
trols the aircraft from the ground using a remote control
device.
In addition to cue utilization, additional variables were incor-
porated into the analysis, including video-game use, SPS, and
attentional control. It was surmised that, in combination with
the capacity to associate feature–event/object relationships in the
form of cues, the capacity to identify prospective features and
events would depend upon the capacity to direct attention to
particularly salient features and avoid being distracted by those
features that are likely to embody little predictive capacity. The
results revealed a strong model in which a combination of cue
utilization scores and sensory processing sensitivity was most pre-
dictive of both the number of trials to reach criterion on the
landing and take-off tasks, together with the proportion of suc-
cessful trials. Specifically, greater levels of cue utilization and lower
sensory processing sensitivity predicted 31.7% of the variance
associated with the acquisition of take-off performance on the
UAV simulator.
In combination, the results of the two studies suggest that cue
utilization in one context may play a significant role in the initial
acquisition of skilled performance in other, related tasks. The fact
that cue utilization is also characteristic of expert performance
suggests that cues may constitute a key cognitive mechanism by
which skill acquisition occurs, even at the earliest stages of the
process.
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS
Although there have been a number of different theoretical propo-
sitions concerning the cognitive mechanisms that facilitate the
progression to expertise, including cases, instances, and produc-
tions, the present study targeted behavior that was most closely
associated with the utilization of cues. EXPERTise is designed to
target a number of aspects of cue utilization, including the capabil-
ity to discern key features from a complex visual background, the
capacity to differentiate the strength of the relationship between
different feature–event/object pairs, and the relative importance
of features in the context of diagnosis.
On the basis of the relatively consistent relationship between
the driving-related version of EXPERTise and performance on
the skill acquisition tasks, it might be concluded that the capac-
ity to identify features and discern the strength of relationships
between features and events/objects, constitutes a capability that
informs the acquisition of skilled performance on both a three-
dimensional tracking task in the context of flight simulation,
and take-offs and landings in the context of operating a UAV.
Moreover, in cases involving the acquisition of novel skills, the
rate of progression toward expertise may be dependent upon:
(a) the extent to which key features can be identified; (b) their
association with events/objects established and retained in mem-
ory; and (c) their accurate application during the process of skill
acquisition.
Although the outcomes of present research do not necessarily
discount the role of productions as an explanation of skill acquisi-
tion, given the conceptual similarities between the two constructs,
the role of cases and instances as an explanation of the process
is less clear. In particular, the predictive capacity of a process that
deconstructs tasks into distinct feature–event/object relationships,
coupled with the lack of domain-related knowledge on the part of
participants gives rise to a cue-based explanation of psycho-motor
skill acquisition, particularly at the initial stages of the process.
This explanation is consistent with previous research establishing
the role of cue-based training in developing the skills of novices
in other domains (Abernethy, 1990; Wiggins and O’Hare, 2003;
Markovits, 2013; Momm et al., 2013).
As a context-dependent measure of cue utilization, EXPER-
Tise has differentiated performance among pediatricians, power
controllers, and software engineers. It has also identified differ-
ences in the acquisition of skilled performance in the context of
power control. In combination with the results of the present
study, cue utilization, as measured by EXPERTise, appears
to both differentiate the performance of different operators,
and predict the rate and the achievement of skilled perfor-
mance. However, despite the relative consistency of the outcomes
achieved, a number of key questions remain that are rele-
vant to those models of cognitive skill acquisition that posit
that the progression to expertise is based on the acquisition
and utilization of cues. First, and most important, EXPER-
Tise is purported to measure cue utilization but, in the absence
of neurological evidence, that argument will remain specula-
tive. Second, longitudinal studies have yet to be completed
that include competent practitioners. Much of the work thus
far has focused on the performance of novices, the transi-
tion from competence to expertise, or on retrospective accounts
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of skill acquisition and experience from skilled performers
(e.g., Young and Salmela, 2010). Little research has been under-
taken that considers the key transition from novice to competence
that, potentially, is the stage at which mental models are acquired
and tested.
APPLIED IMPLICATIONS
The practical implications of the present study include the identi-
fication of those practitioners who are relatively more likely to
achieve criterion performance on a three-dimensional psycho-
motor tracking task, together with the rate at which this progres-
sion is likely to occur. The associated benefits include a potential
reduction in the costs of training and attrition due to the selection
of candidates who are capable of acquiring particular skills more
accurately and at a rate that reduces the investment in both time
and access to expensive simulation technologies.
In addition to the selection of candidates, the results of the
present study also enabled the development of interventions for
those candidates who, having been selected, experience plateaus
in their acquisition of skilled performance. The apparent key role
of cue utilization during the initial stages of skill acquisition sug-
gests that learning plateaus may be explained by the inability of
the learner either to identify predictive features, and/or establish a
relationship between predictive features and associated events or
objects. Therefore, learning plateaus may be considerably short-
ened if learners can be directed toward those features that are most
appropriate in the context of the problem being confronted. Evi-
dence for the potential utility of this type of approach to initial
learning can be drawn from Lagnado et al. (2006) who observed
that learning environments that are directed toward the identifica-
tion of feature-outcome relationships can facilitate the acquisition
of cue-based associations that, in turn, lead to improvements in
performance. Similarly, Wulf et al. (2000) observed that improve-
ments in tennis could be achieved by directing learners’ attention
toward what they referred to as the “antecedents” and “effects”
of particular types of strokes from opponents. In identifying and
remediating “gaps” in cue-based processing, it becomes possible
to augment existing training initiatives, thereby maintaining an
optimal rate of skill acquisition, irrespective of the nature of the
learner.
CONCLUSION
The aim of this paper was to establish whether a measure of cue
utilization predicts the rate and the achievement of initial perfor-
mance in the acquisition of two, three-dimensional tracking tasks.
In Study 1, participants learnt to maneuver a simulated light air-
craft to land nearest to a target on a runway. Study 2 involved
learning to take-off and land a UAV using a remote control device.
In both studies, a relationship was established between cue utiliza-
tion and task-related performance, whereby relatively higher levels
of cue utilization were associated with both a greater rate of skill
acquisition and a greater proportion of successful trials in learning
to operate the UAV. Given that cue utilization also differentiates
greater from lesser performance among experienced operators, the
results suggest that the acquisition and subsequent utilization of
cues may play a significant role in facilitating the rate and the
achievement of expertise.
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As a novice in a particular domain, the
cognitive feats that experts are capable of
performing seem impressive, even extraor-
dinary. According to the well-established
exemplar theory of categorization (e.g.,
Brooks, 1987; Medin and Ross, 1989), a
new category member in everyday clas-
sification (e.g., a bird, a table, or a car)
or expert classification (e.g., an abnor-
mal chest x-ray, a patient with myocardial
ischaemia, or a poor chess move) is cat-
egorized on the basis of its similarity to
individual prior cases. Often this sensitiv-
ity develops effortlessly and without any
intention to learn similarities or differ-
ences among the exemplars.
Experts can do a lot with a little. Across
various domains of expertise, it seems that
experts can perform quickly and accu-
rately when given only a small amount
of information, as in chess (Gobet and
Charness, 2006); fireground command
(Klein, 1998); radiology (Myles-Worsley
et al., 1988; Evans et al., 2013), and der-
matology (Norman et al., 1989). The expe-
riential knowledge based on the hundreds
of thousands of prior instances serves as a
rich source of analogies to permit efficient
problem solving.
A fruitful approach to understand-
ing these cognitive feats has been to
understand where expertise lies in var-
ious domains. Expertise in ball sports,
for example, seems to lie in anticipating
where the ball will be (Abernethy, 1991);
expertise in wine seems to lie in apply-
ing verbal labels (Hughson and Boakes,
2001); expertise in radiology seems to lie
in rapid discrimination of normal and
abnormal radiographs (Evans et al., 2013);
and expertise in chess seems lie in rapid
retrieval of board configurations from
memory (Chase and Simon, 1973).
Over the last several years, we have
been working with a fascinating group
of experts who spend several hours a
day examining a highly structured set of
impressions. When a fingerprint is found
at a crime scene it is a human exam-
iner, not a machine, who is faced with
the task of identifying the person who
left it. Professional fingerprint examin-
ers are usually sworn police officers who
use image enhancement tools, such as
Photoshop or a physical magnifying glass,
and database tools to provide a list of
possible matching candidates. They place
a crime scene print and a suspect print
side-by-side—physically or on a computer
screen—and visually compare the prints to
judge whether the prints came from the
same person or two different people.
These fingerprint examiners have tes-
tified in court for over one hundred
years, but there have been few experi-
ments directly investigating the extent to
which experts can correctly match fin-
gerprints to one another, how competent
and proficient fingerprint experts are, how
examiners make their decisions, or the fac-
tors that affect performance (Loftus and
Cole, 2004; Saks and Koehler, 2005; Vokey
et al., 2009; Spinney, 2010b; Thompson
et al., 2013a). Indeed, many examiners
have even claimed that fingerprint iden-
tification is infallible (Federal Bureau of
Investigation, 1984). Academics, judges,
scientists, and US Senators have reported
on the absence of solid scientific prac-
tices in the forensic sciences. They high-
light the absence of experiments on human
expertise in forensic pattern matching,
suggesting that faulty analyses may be
contributing to wrongful convictions of
innocent people (Edwards, 2009; National
Research Council, 2009; Campbell, 2011;
Carle, 2011; Expert Working Group on
Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis,
2012; Maxmen, 2012), and they lament
the lack of a research culture in the foren-
sic sciences (Mnookin et al., 2011). The
field of forensics is, however, beginning to
acknowledge the central role that fallible
humans play in the identification process
(Tangen, 2013).
Our first point of inquiry was to see
whether qualified, court practicing finger-
print examiners are any more accurate
than the person on the street, and to get a
feel for the kinds of errors examiners make.
In our first experiment (Tangen et al.,
2011), we tested the matching accuracy
of fingerprint examiners from Australian
state and federal law enforcement agencies.
In a signal detection paradigm, we cre-
ated ground-truth matching prints for use
as targets, and highly-similar, nonmatch-
ing prints from a national database search
for use as distractors. We found that qual-
ified, court-practicing fingerprint experts
were exceedingly accurate compared with
novices. Experts tended to err on the side
of caution by making more errors of the
sort that could allow a guilty person to
escape detection than errors of the sort
that could falsely incriminate an inno-
cent person. A similar experiment, with
participants from the US Federal Bureau
of Investigation, produced similar results
(Ulery et al., 2011), and a follow-up exper-
iment found variability in the consistency
within and between examiners’ decisions
(Ulery et al., 2012). An examiner’s exper-
tise seems to lie, not in matching prints
per se, but in discriminating highly similar
but nonmatching prints (Thompson et al.,
2013a).
In a follow-up experiment (Thompson
et al., 2013b), we replicated (Tangen
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et al., 2011) but with genuine crime scene
matching prints from casework (where the
ground truth is uncertain), and with the
addition of two trainee participant groups.
Intermediate trainees—despite their lack
of qualification and average 3.5 years’
experience—performed about as accu-
rately as qualified experts who had an
average 17.5 year’s experience. It appears
that people can learn to distinguish match-
ing from similar nonmatching prints to
roughly the same level of accuracy as
experts after a few years of experience
and training. New trainees—despite their
5-week, full-time training course or their
6 months experience—were not any bet-
ter than novices at discriminating match-
ing and similar nonmatching prints, they
were just more conservative. It appears
that early training and/or experience may
not necessarily result in more accurate
judgments, but may simply result in a
more conservative response bias. Again we
concluded that the superior performance
of experts was a result of their ability to
identify the highly similar, but nonmatch-
ing fingerprints as such.
What the findings mean for reason-
ing about expert performance in the wild
is an open question (e.g., Koehler, 2008,
2012; Mnookin, 2008; Thompson et al.,
2013a), but these findings do contradict
the notion that fingerprint identification is
infallible, and that the fingerprint identifi-
cation “methodology” can be disembodied
from a judgment about whether two fin-
gerprints match or not.
Our second point of inquiry was to
understand the nature of expertise in fin-
gerprint matching—to understand where
a fingerprint examiner’s expertise lies.
Through experience and feedback, an
expert can rapidly retrieve, from memory,
previous instances and decisions relevant
to the current situation, whereas novices
rely more on formal rules and proce-
dures (Brooks, 2005; Norman et al., 2007).
Fingerprint examiners claim that careful,
deliberate analysis is the basis of the work
that they do (Busey and Parada, 2010),
but a hallmark of genuine expertise is the
ability to accurately perform a domain rel-
evant task quickly (Kahneman and Klein,
2009). Do fingerprint examiners rely on
the same non-analytic cognitive processes
as experts in other domains of expertise?
Busey et al. (2011) found that experts
move their eyes differently from novices,
and Busey and Vanderkolk (2005) found
that experts performed better than novices
at identifying the matching fragments of
fingerprints in noise after a short delay.
They also found that inverted fingerprints
produced a delayed N170 event-related
potential response in experts but not in
novices, suggesting that experts process
upright fingerprints configurally (Busey
and Parada, 2010).
In a series of experiments, we further
examined the nature of fingerprint exper-
tise (Thompson, 2014). We added artificial
noise to all the print pairs, and inverted
half and kept the other half upright,
and found that experts could discriminate
prints even when the prints were highly
noisy. Unexpectedly, fingerprint experts
did not show the classic inversion effect
seen in face recognition. We tested the
short term memory of experts and novices
by separating fingerprint pairs in time by
a few seconds, and found that experts were
better than novices at discriminating print,
and that experts were far better at discrim-
inating similar, nonmatching prints. We
tested the long term memory of experts
and novices by asking them to learn a set
of fingerprints to be recognized a few min-
utes later, but found no difference in long
term memory accuracy between experts
and novices, and both groups performed
around the level of chance. We tested the
ability of experts and novices to discrimi-
nate prints by presenting them briefly on
screen, and found that experts could accu-
rately discriminate prints when presented
for just 2000 ms, and the largest differ-
ence between experts and novices was on
similar, nonmatching prints. We then fur-
ther reduced the stimuli presentation time,
and found that experts were more accurate
than novices overall, and that experts had
a much better idea about whether a pair
of prints match or not in a rapid period of
time. With such short presentation times
(i.e., from 250 to 2000 ms), there is little
time to engage in careful, deliberate anal-
ysis of the minutiae in a fingerprint image
in order to make accurate decisions.
These findings suggest that fingerprint
experts are capable of making accurate
decisions when the amount of visual
information in the prints is dramatically
decreased. It is clear that, through expe-
rience, experts can learn the regularities
of matching and nonmatching prints, and
rapidly compare new prints to memory
in order to make accurate judgments. The
findings above are in stark contrast to the
common and consistent claims in formal
training, textbooks, and courtroom testi-
mony: that fingerprint identification is a
“scientific process” that requires careful,
thorough analysis in order for judgments
to be accurate.
Fingerprint expertise is particularly
interesting because of the sheer amount
of experience that examiners have with
the stimuli. Their full-time job, often in
departments that run 24 hours a day, is
to visually compare crime scene prints to
suspect and database candidates. It’s dif-
ficult to imagine any other domain in
which there is so much attention and
exposure to a highly constrained stimu-
lus, where the task is to definitively report
that two images come from the same, sin-
gle source or not. And the stakes are high:
innocent people could be wrongly con-
victed, and guilty people could be wrongly
acquitted.
This vast experience allows experts to
resolve information in a print: to cor-
rectly regard ambiguous information that
is more consistent with within-source vari-
ability as a “match,” and correctly regard
ambiguous information that is more con-
sistent with between-source variability as
a “non-match.” An ambiguous mark on a
fingerprint, for example, can be regarded
as signal (i.e., as evidence of a “match”), or
it can be disregarded as noise (i.e., as evi-
dence of a “non-match”). This kind of pro-
cess is undoubtedly operating in novices
too, but the ambiguity cannot be suffi-
ciently resolved unless the examiner has
accumulated enough matching and non-
matching exemplars in memory to point
to one direction or the other. One clear
result of this vast experience is the experts’
capacity to disregard, to “see through” the
ambiguity and surface structure of similar
prints and discriminate them accurately.
We think that further study of the nature
of fingerprint expertise will inform general
theories for the development of expertise,
while also providing an empirical basis for
claims made by expert witnesses in the
courtroom.
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The use of analogy is an important component of human cognition. The type of analogy
we produce and communicate depends heavily on a number of factors, such as the
setting, the level of domain expertise present, and the speaker’s goal or intent. In this
observational study, we recorded economics experts during scientific discussion and
examined the categorical distance and structural depth of the analogies they produced.
We also sought to characterize the purpose of the analogies that were generated. Our
results supported previous conclusions about the infrequency of superficial similarity in
subject-generated analogs, but also showed that distance and depth characteristics were
more evenly balanced than in previous observational studies. This finding was likely due
to the nature of the goals of the participants, as well as the broader nature of their
expertise. An analysis of analogical purpose indicated that the generation of concrete
source examples of more general target concepts was most prevalent. We also noted
frequent instances of analogies intended to form visual images of source concepts. Other
common purposes for analogies were the addition of colorful speech, inclusion (i.e.,
subsumption) of a target into a source concept, or differentiation between source and
target concepts. We found no association between depth and either of the other two
characteristics, but our findings suggest a relationship between purpose and distance; i.e.,
that visual imagery typically entailed an outside-domain source whereas exemplification
was most frequently accomplished using within-domain analogies. Overall, we observed a
rich and diverse set of spontaneously produced analogical comparisons. The high degree
of expertise within the observed group along with the richly comparative nature of the
economics discipline likely contributed to this analogical abundance.
Keywords: analogy, expertise, naturalistic, reasoning, problem-solving
INTRODUCTION
The importance of analogy has been described in many ways by
notable researchers. Polya (1957) wrote that analogy “pervades
all our thinking,” Holyoak et al. (2001) called it “a central com-
ponent of human cognition,” and Hofstadter (2001) referred to
it as “the lifeblood . . . of human thinking.” Because of its per-
ceived importance in cognitive functioning, the use of analogy in
thought and language has been studied extensively in cognitive
psychology, cognitive development, and cognitive science since
the early 1980s. Research examining analogical production and
retrieval under experimental conditions has provided a wealth of
valuable data. Far fewer studies of these important phenomena
have been conducted in naturalistic settings.
The importance of studying analogical production “in the
wild” was emphasized by one of its most prominent researchers.
Just as it is necessary to conduct both in vivo and in vitro stud-
ies to fully understand biological phenomena, Dunbar (1995,
2001) argued that it is likewise necessary to conduct both
naturalistic and experimental studies in cognitive research to
fully understand the cognitive processes involved in reason-
ing and analysis. He modeled his approach after techniques
applied in biological research, referring to this paradigm as
“in vivo/in vitro.” Observing behavior in naturalistic settings
provides several advantages: (a) behaviors are unconstrained by
laboratory conditions and are not instigated by artificial or exper-
imental stimuli, (b) the setting emphasizes processes rather than
outcomes, and (c) there is a clear relationship between observed
behaviors and the domain of interest (Dunbar, 1995; Crano
and Brewer, 2002). These conditions are particularly important
when investigating analogical thinking which involves linking
one’s current context with prior knowledge in a spontaneous
fashion. It is important to note, however, that the observational
approach lacks the superior structure and clarity of laboratory-
based experiments.
Because there are many commonly used definitions of the term
analogy, we felt it necessary to offer a clear definition that captures
the essential characteristics applied by researchers in this field.
A frequently used means of conveying an understanding of an
unfamiliar concept is by drawing a comparison to similar, more
familiar concepts. An analogy conveys more than literal similarity
between two objects or concepts (Gentner, 1983). As a process,
analogy involves the search for and selection of a well-understood
source from long-term memory, followed by the transfer of mean-
ing from that source to a less familiar target (Spellman and
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Holyoak, 1996). The set of correspondences between a source and
target are referred to as a source-target mapping. In contrast to
other forms of likeness or similarity, analogy is based on a com-
parison of structural relations, or systems of relations, rather than
a mere resemblance of surface properties or attributes (Gentner
and Markman, 1997). A system of relations can be quite complex,
and all of its mappings may not be apparent. Some evidence sug-
gests, however, that analogical mapping is not entirely relational
(Ball et al., 2004; Bearman et al., 2007).
In the current study, we applied Dunbar’s in vivo approach
to observe and analyze some of the characteristics of source
analogs produced during live, open discussion involving prob-
lems in economics and discuss some of the factors influencing
their production. We chose a behavioral economics group to
observe, as economists seek to broadly explain complex real-
world human behavior in the context of models, games, and
examples. All of these techniques rely heavily upon comparisons
between different states of the world, different types of behav-
ior, and combinations of models and situations. Many of these
comparisons are potentially analogical, drawing heavily upon
the expertise of the individual and the broader group. Data
were collected from the weekly sessions of an economics read-
ing group, which consisted of participants whose expertise in the
broad field of economics varied in terms of depth and academic
specialization.
ANALOGICAL DEPTH
One of the factors that has been shown to influence source
retrieval is the level, or depth, of similarity between a target and
the chosen source. Past research has shown that source-to-target
mapping is primarily driven by the comparison of structural
relations between source and target concepts but retrieval may
be facilitated by superficial characteristics (Gick and Holyoak,
1980, 1983; Gentner et al., 1993; Forbus et al., 1997). In other
words, people will rely on structural details to find appropriate
sources when mapping an analogy, but perhaps find it easier to
rely on overlapping surface features in addition to underlying
structure when retrieving a correspondence (Holyoak and Koh,
1987; Holyoak and Thagard, 1995; Dunbar, 2001). The use of
superficial characteristics for comparison is particularly apparent
when source and target analogs are generated a priori and pro-
vided to an individual, who must then consider the nature of the
relationship or relationships.
When people generate their own analogies by drawing upon
their own knowledge, research has shown that fewer super-
ficial similarities between analogs are observed. Studies by
Dunbar (1995, 1997) and Blanchette and Dunbar (1997, 2000,
2001) revealed that more than half of the analogies pro-
duced during biology laboratory meetings and political dis-
course, respectively, showed no apparent surface similarity.
The Bearman et al. (2007) management study showed that
73% of analogies were only structural in nature. With this
in mind, the first goal of this study was to examine the
depth of analogies produced by economics experts during sci-
entific discourse. Results were expected to show infrequent sur-
face feature overlap and provide additional support for earlier
findings.
ANALOGICAL DISTANCE
A second important feature in analogy use concerns the range, or
distance, between the domains of the source and target analogs.
Dunbar (1995) defined three categories of analogy in terms of
their degree of domain separation: (a) long-distance describes a
source drawn from a very different domain (also referred to as
outside-domain, or out-of-category), (b) regional refers to a source
mapped from a similar domain (e.g., economics to finance or
public administration), and (c) local maps a target to a source
in the same domain. Both local and regional classes are collec-
tively referred to as within-domain, or within-category. Because of
the subjective nature of judging domain distance between similar
domains, many observational studies simply categorize analo-
gies using a binary choice of within-category or outside-category.
Analogies formed within the same category might compare bio-
logical organisms or investment strategies, while commonly refer-
enced domains for outside-category analogies include sports (e.g.,
one might fail and “strike out at the plate” or succeed and “push
the ball over the goal line”) and the supernatural (e.g., “it works
so well that it’s like magic”).
Research on the domain separation of analogies has pro-
vided contrasting results. Dunbar’s studies of scientific reasoning
set in microbiology laboratories showed heavy use of within-
category analogies—98% of the analogies generated were clas-
sified as either local or regional (Dunbar, 1995, 1997). A study
by Saner and Schunn (1999) produced a similar but narrower
finding—researchers in psychology laboratory meetings and col-
loquia made frequent use of analogies, and more than 75% of
them were within the same domain. In contrast, Blanchette and
Dunbar found that 77% of the analogies that appeared in political
articles aimed at more general audiences were outside-category
(2001). Christensen and Schunn’s, 2007 engineering design group
study showed a more balanced mix of analogies—55% were
within-category while 45% were outside-category.
One explanation for the difference in domain distance is that
the collective expertise of the audience may influence the selection
of analogy. When addressing other domain experts with special-
ized knowledge, within-category analogs may prove more effec-
tive whereas an outside-domain analogy might be more attractive
choice for a general audience. The type of task or function per-
formed by the analogizer is another possible constraint. Our
second goal was to observe the use of within- and outside-domain
analogies produced by the economics experts. We expected to
find a fairly balanced use of both styles, which differs somewhat
from earlier findings. Our expectation was motivated by the dif-
ferent subdomains and varying levels of subject expertise within
the reading group. Furthermore, in light of the stated belief that
within-domain analogies tend to involve a higher degree of super-
ficial similarity than outside-domain analogies, we investigated
whether such a relationship emerged.
ANALOGICAL PURPOSE
Thirdly, past research has shown that the goal of the individ-
ual producing the analogy is likely to influence the process of
selection and transfer (Spellman and Holyoak, 1996). Prior obser-
vational studies have examined the types of goals that emerge
from the production of analogies, and the goals themselves
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tend to be highly domain-specific and task-specific. For exam-
ple, the four goals derived from the microbiology laboratories
by Dunbar (1995, 1997) were: forming hypotheses, designing
experiments, modifying experiments, and explaining issues and
concepts to other scientists. The management decision-making
study by Bearman et al. (2002) identified only two goals: problem-
solving and illustration. Similarly, the Christensen and Schunn
(2007) study of analogizing during engineering design meetings
reported three functions: identifying problems, solving problems,
and explaining concepts. Our economics reading group differed
in its function from the settings of the studies mentioned above.
The purpose of the group was limited to explaining and under-
standing experiments performed by other researchers; i.e., the
experts in our observational study critiqued experimental designs
and analyzed results.
Blanchette and Dunbar (2001) provided evidence that goals
influenced the choice of analogy. When supporting a favor-
able position, emotionally positive analogies were more com-
monly chosen over those displaying negative emotional ideas.
Conversely, when criticizing an unfavorable position, emotion-
ally negative analogies were more frequent. Because analogical
retrieval appears subject to the influence of the purpose for which
it was produced, our third goal was to analyze the range of goals
that emerge from the use of analogies by the economics group and
their potential effect on analogical distance and depth.
METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
The setting for this study was the School of Economic, Political,
and Policy Sciences (EPPS) weekly reading group at The
University of Texas at Dallas during the Spring semester of 2011.
Participants included male and female reading group attendees.
The average weekly attendance was approximately 20 partici-
pants, which included both faculty members (∼25%) and gradu-
ate students (∼75%). The group was largely the same from week
to week, but attendance did fluctuate and not all participants
attended regularly. Participants’ academic expertise was mixed,
and included sub-disciplines such as econometrics, experimen-
tal economics, and game theory. A few of the attendees had no
exposure to experimental methods.
The sessions were conducted in typical reading group fash-
ion. One of the senior faculty members acted as the group’s
moderator, and one student participant was assigned each week
to lead the following week’s discussion of one or more chosen
research papers. Following a brief presentation of the paper by the
assigned student, a free and open discussion followed in which the
members of the group examined and dissected the experimental
methods and results described in the paper.
PROCEDURE
Session recordings
The investigator attended and made audio recordings at each of
five group meetings, but did not participate in the discussions and
appeared to have minimal impact on group interaction. Group
members understood that their discussions would be evaluated
(the moderator referred to it as “the science behind the science”).
The research goal of examining the spontaneous use of analogies
was not revealed, however. Although each session was scheduled
to last for 90 min, actual discussion times ranged from 65 to
110 min. In all, approximately 7 h of discourse were recorded.
Transcription procedure
Four transcribers participated in the initial processing of
the discourse—the primary author and three undergraduate
Psychology students. Only the primary author and one of the
undergraduates had any significant transcription experience prior
to the task. None of the undergraduate transcribers had expo-
sure to Economics beyond introductory coursework. Transcribers
were given instruction by the primary author on what consti-
tutes an analogy based on the definitions presented earlier in this
paper, then solved practice problems on recognizing analogies
from non-analogies by identifying sources and targets. The period
of instruction lasted approximately 30 min.
For purposes of indoctrination, each undergraduate tran-
scriber was given one of the sessions for practice and directed to
process at least 30 min of the recording. They were instructed to
transcribe passages in which a possible analogy was made, taking
care to include all of the important source and target informa-
tion. Their instruction was: “when in doubt, include it.” The
primary author evaluated their performance and made individual
adjustments until the results were satisfactory and consistent.
To address the possibility of subtle, easily-overlooked analo-
gies, every audio recording was processed by two transcribers.
To be included for analysis, a passage needed only to appear on
either transcriber’s log, not both. In order to be missed, a pas-
sage would have to have been heard by both transcribers and
rejected.
Coding procedure
The two authors performed the coding duties. Both were expe-
rienced coders with strong knowledge of analogy literature and
considerable research experience. Each of the transcribed seg-
ments was first evaluated for the presence of one or more analo-
gies based on the definition stated earlier. Comparisons based
only on literal similarities were considered non-analogies. If a seg-
ment was judged to contain no analogy, no further evaluation was
performed. If an analogy was deemed present, the source, target,
source domain, and target domain of the analogy were recorded.
Each analogy was then coded along the three dimensions of
distance, depth, and purpose.
Both coders rated the entire set and reliability was calculated
for each dimension. Distance was rated using the commonly
applied within-domain and outside-domain categories. Following
the example of Saner and Schunn (1999) in which the authors
collapsed all psychology-related categories into “within-domain,”
we likewise considered all analogies related to economics, finance,
statistics, probabilities, and game theory to be in the same
domain. Depth was rated as superficial if the source and target
shared surface characteristics; if not, it was rated as structural.
Two passes were made by each coder to rate the purpose. The
first pass was used to generate and agree on a list of functions
represented by the set of analogies. Then, the coders used the list
from the first pass as set of categories for rating analogies in the
second pass.
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RESULTS
SEGMENT TRANSCRIPTION AND ANALOGY EXTRACTION
Transcription of the five recorded sessions yielded 114 unique
passages with possible analogies (M = 16.29 analogy segments
per hour). See Appendix A for a sampling of extracted pas-
sages. When judging whether a passage contained an analogy,
the coders agreed on 96% (n = 109) of the 114 passages. Of
these, most were rated as containing an analogy (n = 91, 83%).
Passages lacking the basic ingredients of an analogy (i.e., source-
target mapping and knowledge transfer) or showing evidence of
a literal comparison (n = 18, 17%) were eliminated. Five pas-
sages were inconclusive and were likewise eliminated. The inter-
rater reliability for identifying analogies was strong (κ = 0.85).
Some of the passages were found to contain multiple analo-
gies. In all, 97 analogies were extracted for the remainder of this
analysis.
ANALOGICAL DEPTH
In coding for analogical depth, the coders agreed on 91%
(n = 88) of the 97 analogies. Of these, analogies showing no
obvious overlap in surface characteristics (n = 69, 78%) far
outnumbered those where superficial similarities were present
(n = 19, 22%). The inter-rater reliability was found to be
substantial (κ = 0.75).
ANALOGICAL DISTANCE
In coding for analogical distance, the coders agreed on 86%
(n = 83) of the 97 analogies. Of these, within-domain (n = 44,
53%) and outside-domain (n = 39, 47%) analogies were almost
evenly distributed. The inter-rater reliability was again found to
be substantial (κ = 0.71).
ANALOGICAL PURPOSE
At stated above, we did not impose a priori categorical restric-
tions on coding for analogical purpose. Rather, the coders were
free to make subjective judgments as to the intent of the speaker
on the first pass through the data. From these impressions, we
grouped similar items and derived a set of categories for coding
the analogies on the second pass. The derived taxonomy of rating
categories was as follows: Differentiation (highlighting differences
between source and target), Inclusion (indicating that the target
was a type or component of the source), Example (indicating that
the target was an instance of the source concept), Visualization
(intended to create a picture or image in the mind of the audi-
ence), Emotion (appealing to feelings of the audience, or drawing
on the emotion of the expert), Critique (using the source to point
out shortcomings in the target), Exaggeration (gratuitous use of
colorful phrasing), and Abstraction (broaden the target concept
using a more general source concept). Where an analogy plausibly
served multiple purposes, the raters chose the strongest.
In coding for analogical purpose, the coders agreed on 79%
(n = 77) of the 97 analogies. Examples were the most prevalent
(n = 27, 35%), followed by visualizations (n = 19, 25%). A fair
number of exaggerations (n = 11, 14%), inclusions (n = 9, 12%),
and differentiations (n = 8, 10%) were observed, but abstrac-
tions (n = 2, 3%) and critiques (n = 1, 1%) were uncommon.
The inter-rater reliability for analogical purpose was substantial
(κ = 0.74).
ASSOCIATION BETWEEN DEPTH AND DISTANCE
As reported above, most of the analogies were rated as struc-
tural analogies. Of those, there was an even distribution of
outside-domain (n = 31, 50%) and within-domain (n = 31,
50%) analogies. The superficial analogies were likewise split
between outside-domain (n = 7, 54%) and within-domain (n =
6, 46%). It was determined that there was no significant distance-
depth association [χ2(1,N = 75) = 0.06, p = 0.80], suggesting that
the two variables are independent.
ASSOCIATION BETWEEN DEPTH AND PURPOSE
Almost half of the analogies were rated as either structural-
example (n = 18, 25%) or structural-visualization analogies (n =
16, 23%). Though the distribution of purpose ratings was highly
skewed, it was skewed similarly over both categories of analogi-
cal depth and no significant depth-purpose association was found
[χ2(7,N = 71) = 8.74, p = 0.27]. This finding suggests that these
two variables are also independent.
ASSOCIATION BETWEEN DISTANCE AND PURPOSE
In contrast to the two findings above, an examination of analog-
ical distance as a function of the speaker’s purpose did reveal a
significant association [χ2(7,N = 66) = 34.94, p < 0.005]. When a
speaker sought to produce an analogy that created a visual image,
an out-of-domain source was typically selected (n = 16, 24%).
On the other hand, when an analogizing by example, a source-
target transfer from within the same domain was most commonly
observed (n = 18, 27%).
DISCUSSION
The most prominent observation to come from this study was
that the use of analogy for exploration and explanation among
economics experts and students was rich and abundant. In
427 min of discourse, 97 analogies were extracted, suggesting that
analogies are both commonly used and serve as an important
component in human reasoning and in understanding prob-
lems. The reading group setting enabled the observation of actual
experts spontaneously forming analogies using their semantic
knowledge applied to economics, a domain likely to entail more
freedom to move between and among domains of knowledge than
the previously investigated biology and political domains. The
selection and fluid assembly of analogies during discourse may
help to reveal the core principles involved in analogical think-
ing among experts. This study’s findings will be discussed in the
context of prior evidence.
EXPERTS IN THE FIELD OF ECONOMICS
We chose to study behavioral economics experts in this study.
Economists seek to broadly explain complex real-world human
behavior in the context of equations, models, games, and hypo-
thetical examples. All of these techniques rely heavily upon com-
parisons between different states of the world, different types of
behavior, and combinations of models and situations. While some
feature or object-based similarity occurs in comparisons between
economic models and real-world behavior, it can be argued that
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the majority of the comparisons are about relations and sys-
tems of relations. For example, in the economic Ultimatum Game
(Guth et al., 1982), two individuals each make monetary deci-
sions that will be reviewed and reacted to by the other. The
Ultimatum Game can be compared to many situations in life
in which banks, individuals, or nations either choose to coop-
erate or not with regard to money, goods, or military action.
Thus, many of the comparisons used in behavioral economics are
likely to be analogical and may occur with greater frequency than
observed in laboratory settings. The expertise of the individuals
involved in behavioral economics discussions and expertise levels
of the broader group are likely to encourage potentially rich and
relationally deep analogies.
Expertise was a critical element to this study, as the role
of domain knowledge in analogy production is not yet well
understood. The level of expertise among reading group partic-
ipants varied, but all had sufficient knowledge to be considered
experts in the field. In some observational studies, expertise was
narrowly concentrated [Dunbar’s (1995, 1997) molecular biol-
ogy group], whereas in others, general audiences possessed little
to no domain knowledge [e.g., Blanchette and Dunbar (2001)
political news study]. In our economics reading group, the exper-
tise was both deep and broad, covering a range of specializa-
tions such as experimental economics, econometrics, and game
theory.
There is growing evidence that the depth of expertise of the
audience may influence analogical selection. It is reasonable to
hypothesize that the breadth of expertise may contribute, as well.
Blanchette and Dunbar (2001) showed more frequent use of
outside-domain analogies when the intended audience consisted
of non-experts and correspondingly more prevalent within-
domain analogies among fellow experts. Additionally, experts
appear more likely to exploit the complex relational nature of
analogies while avoiding the tendency to rely on superficial fea-
tures for comparison. The findings of Bearman et al. (2007)
suggested that experts tend to compare structural relationships
in all activities but novices show differences; i.e., when engaged
in problem solving activities, novices rely on structural analogies
but incorporate superficial features in their comparisons when
illustrating or explaining.
We based our depth and distance expectations for this study
largely on these findings. We did, as expected, observe a more even
distribution of distance in analogies and infrequent use of super-
ficial features in making comparisons. Relative to novices, experts
can draw on a great deal of accumulated knowledge when think-
ing and reasoning (Bearman et al., 2007). It stands to reason that
they are better able to exploit the deep, structural nature of source
information as a result. Non-experts, on the other hand, lack the
same deep encoding of domain information and may need to rely
more heavily on superficial characteristics. The evidence is incon-
sistent, however; the Blanchette and Dunbar (2000) study points
to novice use of structure as well.
ANALOGICAL DEPTH—SUPERFICIAL VS. STRUCTURAL
Structural correspondences in the underlying system of relations
between source and target elements represent an important com-
ponent of analogies. Past experimental research demonstrated
that superficial features influence the selection of source analogs
(Gick and Holyoak, 1980, 1983; Gentner et al., 1993; Forbus
et al., 1997), and studies in naturalistic settings suggest that other
factors may contribute, as well (Blanchette and Dunbar, 2001;
Bearman et al., 2007). The ratings from this study showed that
the economics experts relied primarily on structural components
of analogies (78%) with infrequent use of superficial feature
comparisons (22%).
The data collected from the reading group sessions contained a
dense set of complex comparisons rich in structure. Because of the
unconstrained, yet guided, nature of the discussion, participants
experienced a great deal of freedom to explore, compare, and
explain complex target concepts. The reading group setting had
certain features of prior story-based analogical reminding studies
(Gentner et al., 1993; Wharton et al., 1994; Catrambone, 1997),
as participants compared the contents of journal papers and the
various experimental methods they described. The setting also
had characteristics of the Blanchette and Dunbar “production
paradigm” studies (2001) in which participants generated source
analogs from their own knowledge and experiences. Perhaps not
all settings are completely retrieval-based or production-based;
rather, the degree to which the activity combines retrieval tasks
with production tasks may determine the balance of analogical
depth applied. Additionally, the occasional use of superficial com-
parisons likely reflects a tendency to spark heightened interest by
making a link to a distant analogous domain during their descrip-
tions of economic processes. Indeed, some of the surface-level
analogies tabulated could be considered to be turns of phrase or
metaphorical comparisons. The use of such comparisons can be
helpful in making speech more interesting to the listener and to
add points of common reference periodically.
ANALOGICAL DISTANCE—WITHIN DOMAIN VS. OUTSIDE DOMAIN
One possible explanation for the observed balance between
within-category and out-of-category analogies was that subject
matter expertise shared among a speaker and audience influenced
source selection. Observational data offer support to this hypoth-
esis. In Dunbar’s (1995, 1997) biology laboratory study, scientists
overwhelmingly produced within-domain analogies (98%). Saner
and Schunn (1999) also observed high rates of within-domain
analogies in their study of psychology laboratory meetings (81%
within-domain) and colloquia (77% within-domain). In con-
trast, Blanchette and Dunbar (2001) studied opinion articles in
the mainstream press, where the audience was the population at
large. Here, they found that most analogies (77%) were from out-
side the target domain. Based on these findings, it appears that
experts produce more within-domain analogies when commu-
nicating knowledge to their fellow subject matter experts, but
generate analogies from sources from other domains when the
audience consists of non-experts.
A second, but related, explanation stated that the goals of
the participants were an influencing factor on source distance
(Dunbar, 1995; Holyoak and Thagard, 1997; Blanchette and
Dunbar, 2001). In Dunbar’s biology lab study, the scientists were
heavily focused on examining unexpected experimental results
and resolving methodological problems. However, in the Dunbar
and Blanchette studies involving both experts and non-experts,
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the experts’ goals were to educate and/or persuade. In our study,
there was no “discovery task”—i.e., there were no new hypotheses
being generated, no new designs being developed, and no prob-
lems being solved. Rather, the discussion involved a great deal of
comparison, both integrating and differentiating details of exper-
imental methods and results. It may be that tasks involving a
greater amount of creativity or innovation lead to more frequent
use of same-domain analogies.
The results from the current study were more balanced. Out-
of-category analogies were observed most frequently (53%), but
within-category analogies accounted for a sizeable portion of the
total as well (47%). These results fall squarely between the pre-
vious findings, but a plausible explanation can be made. If the
number of within- and outside-domain analogies is a function
of expertise, then the balance between them might be expected
to vary with the range and depth of expertise. In the EPPS
reading group, the participants all had some degree of expertise
in economics, but their domain experience varied in terms of
sub-discipline (e.g., econometrics, game theory, behavioral eco-
nomics) and academic career longevity (i.e., faculty or graduate
student). Hence, common expertise is likely to be an influenc-
ing factor, as Dunbar suggested, but the amount of influence it
has on source distance may moderated by the variability in such
factors as range and depth. Additionally, the goals of the partici-
pants differed from those in earlier studies. Here, the participants
sought to comprehend papers describing experimental methods
and results, often by comparing unfamiliar methods to known,
more familiar ones. To accomplish these goals, perhaps a more
balanced and diverse set of analogies is most effective.
Another possibility for explaining the balance between within-
and outside-domain analogies that we observed is concerns the
economics discipline itself. In Dunbar’s (1995, 1997) biology
lab observations, the overwhelming number of within-domain
analogies may have stemmed from the fact that a majority of situ-
ations in molecular biology are likely to have clear relational cor-
respondences to closely related areas within biological research,
rather than remote domains comprised of non-molecular ele-
ments. Meanwhile, the Blanchette and Dunbar (2001) study of
political commentary suggested that politicians and journalists
appeared to draw intentionally from remote domains that would
be familiar to readers in ways intended to highlight certain aspects
of relational comparisons. In the present study, discussions across
the relatively broad domain of economic inquiry highlighted
the technical overlap between its various subdomains. Unlike
molecular biology, economics has a high potential for relational
alignment to more remote domains within public policy, banking,
and corporate practice, domains in which human behavior, mon-
etary valuations, and world affairs converge. Thus, the complexity
of economics, which plays out both in academic analytic settings
and in real-world financial markets, appears to provide a rich
field optimal for both within-domain and out-of-domain ana-
logical comparisons. Given the complicated nature of economic
systems, economic analogies are rarely complete, so both superfi-
cial and structural correspondences appear to be drawn upon in
order to explain and describe various aspects of complex systems.
The validity or appropriateness of analogies in economics may
also be subject to greater interpretation than other domains given
our limitations in fully explaining human behavior and market
dynamics.
In terms of a possible relationship between distance and
depth, it has been suggested that within-domain analogies
present more superficial similarity than distant analogies; in
other words, the greater the distance, the less superficial the
comparison (Christensen and Schunn, 2007). However, we
found no evidence of that constraint in our observation of
economists.
ANALOGICAL PURPOSE
It is fairly well established that goals influence the production
of analogies (Dunbar, 1995, 1997; Spellman and Holyoak, 1996;
Blanchette and Dunbar, 2001). Prior studies examined the goals
of experts in scientific laboratories in both discovery (e.g., prob-
lem solving, hypothesis generation, experimental design) and
non-discovery (e.g., explanation, illustration, or visualization)
activities. The primary difference in purpose between the eco-
nomics reading group and groups observed in the cited studies
was the absence of discovery goals in the reading group. Since we
determined that the discussions we observed were largely non-
discovery in nature, we focused on categorizing the extracted
analogies into groupings based on the perceived reason for select-
ing the particular analogy; e.g., to differentiate a concept from
other concepts, to inject emotion or colorful language into a com-
parison, to give a concrete example of a more abstract idea, etc.
The list we derived can be found in the Results section above.
Blanchette and Dunbar (2001) provided evidence that goals
influence analogical production, but the goals of the individuals
in their study appeared to have no effect on analogical distance.
Saner and Schunn (1999), on the other hand, found that goals did
impact the domain distance. In particular, they found that indi-
viduals used within-domain analogies when working to identify
problems but used outside-domain analogies when explaining
issues or concepts to their lab mates. In our study, too, the
purpose-distance effect was significant. Exemplification was asso-
ciated with within-domain analogizing, while visualization was
strongly related to out-of-domain analogy use. It may be that the
functions that result in within-domain analogies (i.e., problem
identification, generation of concrete examples) share some of
the same underlying cognitive operations, as do those that pro-
duce outside-domain analogies (i.e., explaining issues, visualizing
concepts), in ways that influence the generation and retrieval of
analogies.
In interpreting our results, we should mention that the cate-
gories we developed were not mutually exclusive; e.g., an analogy
intended to differentiate between concepts might do so using
visual elements. In cases where an analogy plausibly served multi-
ple purposes, the raters chose the category they felt best described
its purpose.
GENERAL DISCUSSION ON THE RICHNESS OF OBSERVED ANALOGIES
We have already emphasized that the collected passages con-
tained a wealth of analogies rich in depth and structure, many of
which involved implied systems of complex relations that could
not be fully identified and analyzed. Furthermore, some of the
more complex comparisons actually involved multiple analogies
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at different distances and depths. The challenges we faced in
terms of analyzing the passages were made more difficult due to
the complexities of the structural and superficial analogies used.
Unlike laboratory tasks, in which comparisons between explicit
statements are made (Gentner and Landers, 1985; Gentner et al.,
1993; Krawczyk et al., 2004, 2005), the comparisons made by our
economics experts were not always made fully explicit. Indeed,
we frequently encountered instances in which a source or a target
were implied, or not even articulated in the flow of discussion.
This interpretive challenge may have been exacerbated by the
high degree of expertise in our sample group, as some analo-
gies involved inside knowledge that the speaker did not feel was
necessary to clearly articulate in order to meaningfully draw the
comparison to the group.
These observations are offered for several reasons. First, there
are additional questions that can be investigated from these data,
aside from the boundaries of this paper (e.g., Do the within-
category/outside-category comparisons correspond to particular
types of source-target pairs? Does a taxonomy of source categories
emerge from the outside-category analogies in this setting? How
effective did the analogies seem to be in conveying the intended
information?). Second, the rating process involved some inherent
subjectivity; even though inter-rater reliability was rather high,
there were disagreements on specific passages. This is a chal-
lenge inherent in real-world analogical analyses, as the dynamic
and unscripted nature of the interactions can produce text that
is very difficult to interpret outside of the context in which it
was spoken and by an individual who does not have access to
the speaker’s intent. Third, the rating process was further com-
plicated when analogies were embedded in familiar language
constructs—well-known clichés, common metaphors, etc.—and
were not immediately identified as analogies by the raters, as such
phrases have become so conventionalized that their figurative
qualities can be simply overlooked.
We were able to ascertain some of the major purposes
for which analogies are used in economics discussions among
experts. The leading purpose for analogical comparisons was to
provide examples. Good examples from other domains or famil-
iar sources can provide clarity to a target and make the concept
more concrete. In many of the analogies, we observed that experts
tended to either relate an abstracted theoretical model to a more
common situation that occurs in human interactions, or they
did the reverse and described a particular situation as being an
example of what is known to occur within a particular theoreti-
cal game. Experts also made common use of analogies to create
a visual image of a particular concept. Visualization is important
for providing a common ground for the audience and for making
a target domain richer and easier to comprehend. Experts also
used analogies in order to add color or interest to their contri-
butions and to mark a topic as being included within a more
familiar source domain. Given that we conducted this observation
process in an academic setting, our experts may have developed
tendencies to use analogy due to their experiences with teaching,
in which good examples and visual comparisons can be use-
ful for conveying concepts (Richland et al., 2007; Glynn, 2008).
These goals for analogical comparison fit with prior observations
about analogy as being diverse in function (Holyoak and Thagard,
1995), but contrary to several prior scholarly works describing
analogical purpose (Holyoak and Thagard, 1997; Hummel and
Holyoak, 1997) we did not find substantial evidence of new infer-
ences being generated. Rather, the most prevalent use of analogy
in the economics experts was to describe concepts to the group or
to point out similarities between relational systems in either the
real world, or in theoretical constructs.
In addition to these questions, several limitations with regard
to the method and analysis of this study should be noted. The
transcribers were non-experts in economics, but they were cho-
sen to avoid domain bias and reduce the tendency to add their
own interpretation to the passages. Additionally, three of the four
transcribers lacked prior transcription experience in recognizing
analogies, which opened the door for subtle analogies to be over-
looked. We addressed this limitation using a two-phased training
process and a two-person extraction strategy and believe that we
reduced - but may not have eliminated - the likelihood of missed
analogies. While it is possible that some subtle analogies may have
been overlooked, we believe the number to be small enough to not
alter our findings.
Their lack of domain expertise, however, may have con-
tributed to the subjectivity and inconsistency mentioned above.
Furthermore, we did not code the analogies according to any
sort of standard domain taxonomy, as Dunbar (1995) did in his
microbiology laboratory study. Finally, we did not account for
individual differences by examining patterns of analogy use by
specific individuals in the group.
CONCLUSIONS
In summary, this study reinforces the strong reliance humans
place on analogies for developing understanding and communi-
cating in natural settings. It contributes valuable evidence that
humans are quite agile in their selection of analogies, drawing
on a mix of shallow and deep comparisons and determining an
effective distance strategy based on the constraints of the domain
and the level of perceived group expertise. Economics faculty and
graduate student experts engaged in scientific discussion were
observed to apply analogies that were more balanced in terms
of categorical distance and structural depth than those observed
in other natural settings. The domain context, problem-solving
goals, and participant expertise of this particular group setting
all appear to be important factors that led to differences in the
magnitudes of depth and distance observed in the earlier stud-
ies. No evidence of an association between the distance and depth
characteristics was found, but distance and purpose appeared to
be related. A number of other questions remain to be answered
about the ways in which analogies are applied in different types of
settings. Future naturalistic analogy research could help to clar-
ify the role on analogical comparisons in real-world settings and
the social sciences appear to provide particularly rich domains for
additional studies.
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Analogical reasoning is a landmark of
human cognition. Based on the realiza-
tion that the elements of two situations are
organized by similar systems of relations,
analogical inferences allow the transfer of
knowledge structures from a better-known
situation (the base analog) to a target situ-
ation that is relatively less understood (the
target analog).
Experimental research has demon-
strated that the retrieval of base analogs
from long term memory in response
to the proceesing of a target analog is
infrequent in the lack of semantic simi-
larities between both situations (Gick and
Holyoak, 1980; Keane, 1987; Gentner et al.,
1993; Trench and Minervino, 2014). With
the turn of the century, several natural-
istic observations of experts working in
their domains of expertise yielded a more
complex picture. While molecular biolo-
gists (Dunbar, 1997) and psychologists
(Saner and Schunn, 1999) still exhib-
ited mostly within-domain analogizing,
the observation of journalists and politi-
cians (Blanchette and Dunbar, 2001),
teachers (Richland et al., 2004), man-
agers (Bearman et al., 2007) and design
engineers (Christensen and Schunn,
2007) showed a more frequent use of
long-distance analogies. The naturalis-
tic study by Kretz and Krawczyk (2014)
on the use of analogies by economists also
demonstrates an abundance of distant
analogies in the sevice of an impres-
sive variety of communicative purposes,
most of which were not evident in prior
research. These goals included the gen-
eration of concrete source examples of
more general target concepts, the forma-
tion of visual images of source concepts,
the addition of colorful speech, the inclu-
sion of a target into a source concept, or
the differentiation between source and tar-
get concepts. With these results in mind,
the time is ripe to assert that the nat-
uralistic observation of experts shows a
more flexible use of analogical sources
than is predicted by experimental stud-
ies on analogical transfer, and simulated
by dominant computer models of ana-
logical retrieval (e.g., MAC/FAC, Forbus
et al., 1995; LISA, Hummel and Holyoak,
1997). How, then, to explain this analog-
ical abundance? In trying to account for
the contrasting results of the experimental
and the naturalistic traditions, the default
explanations revolve around the expertise
of the analogizers and the psychological
constraints of the target tasks. I will argue
that although both factors are likely to
bear some responsibility for this empirical
inconsistency, there are reasons to expect a
heavier weight of the latter.
THE EXPERTISE OF THE ANALOGIZERS
Shortly after having documented that
journalists and politicians generated
mostly distant analogies when argu-
ing for (or against) the referendum on
the independence of Quebec, Blanchette
and Dunbar (2000) obtained an in vitro
replication of this result with novice par-
ticipants generating their own analogies
for another realistic political topic: the
zero-deficit strategy for controlling pub-
lic debt. The authors concluded that their
prior results were due to the fact that
the analogizers were generating their
own analogies for a realistic situation,
rather than to their expertise in the target
issue. Trench et al. (2009a) provided sup-
port for this interpretation by replicating
Blanchette and Dunbar’s results with 10
different target topics. In the same vein,
Bearman et al. (2007) failed to observe
differences in the analogies proposed by
novices and experts solving management
problems. Rather than based on broad
expertise differences across-participants,
it seems that the ease of generating dis-
tant analogies depends on the goals of
the analogizer and on the extent to which
she understands the target analog at stake.
When the analogizer comprehends the
target analog better than her intended
audience, as in communicative situations
such as explaining a procedure to students
(Richland et al., 2004) or selling politi-
cal ideas to the population (Blanchette
and Dunbar, 2000, 2001; Trench et al.,
2009a), both experts and novices easily
generate distant analogies. But when the
target analog is insufficiently understood,
as when Dunbar’s (1997) expert molecular
biologists or Gick and Holyoak’s (1980)
novice participants are attempting to solve




Another explanation for the frequent
use of distant analogies in naturalis-
tic studies might arise from comparing
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the psychological constraints of natural-
istic analogy generation against those of
classical experimental studies. The stan-
dard experimental procedure comprises
an encoding phase, during which partici-
pants learn the base analogs, and a transfer
phase, where experimenters present par-
ticipants with either a semantically close
or a semanically distant target situation,
and assess whether its processing elic-
its the spontaneous retrieval of the base
analog. Based on this procedure, differ-
ences accross conditions were typically
taken to demonstrate the centrality of sur-
face similarities during analogical trans-
fer. In contrast with this highly controlled
environment—in which transfer can only
originate in the retrieval of the criti-
cal base analog from memory—in nat-
uralistic settings participants are free to
generate analogies by means of retriev-
ing their own base analogs (Blanchette
and Dunbar, 2000; Hofstadter and Sander,
2013), identifying conceptual metaphors
(Minervino et al., 2009), stumbling across
suitable analogs in the external environ-
ment (Christensen and Schunn, 2005)
or fabricating novel base analogs either
by generating extreme cases out of the
target analog (Clement, 1988), or by
reinstantiating the relational structure of
the target with a new set of elements
(Olguín et al., 2013). Upon generating
candidate analogies via any combination
of such mechanisms, the proportion of
close vs. distant analogies that people
produce in naturalistic settings can also
reflect a conscious editing of one type
of analogies in favor of the other type,
depending on the purpose of the reasoner
(Trench et al., 2009b).
The fact that the core components
of our retrieval mechanisms are invari-
ably set to favor semantically close base
analogs (Gentner et al., 1993; Trench and
Minervino, 2014) suggests that the above-
mentioned generative mechanisms could
possibly account for the frequency and
the diversity of the analogies generated
by experts. Future studies, both natural-
istic and experimental, are required to
understand how these overlooked anal-
ogy generation methods interact with
the variety of goals that realistic anal-
ogy generation can pursue, as eloquently
revealed by Kretz and Krawczyk’s (2014)
detailed analysis of the analogies produced
by expert economists.
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In several previously reported studies, participants increased their normative correctness
after being instructed to think hypothetically, specifically taking the perspective of an
expert or researcher (Beatty and Thompson, 2012; Morsanyi and Handley, 2012). The
goal of this paper was to investigate how this manipulation affects risky or delayed
payoffs. In two studies, participants (n = 193) were tested online (in exchange for money)
using the adjusting procedure. Individuals produced certain/immediate equivalents for
risky/delayed gains. Participants in the control group were solving the problem from their
own perspective, while participants in the experimental group were asked to imagine
“what would a reliable and honest advisor advise them to do.” Study 1 showed that
when taking the perspective of an expert, participants in experimental group became
more risk aversive compared to participants in the control group. Additionally, their certain
equivalents diverged from the expected value to a greater extent.The results obtained from
the experimental group in Study 2 suggest that participants became less impulsive, which
means they tried to inhibit their preferences. This favors the explanation, which suggests
that the perspective shift forced individuals to override their intuitions with the social norms.
Individuals expect to be blamed for impatience or risk taking thus expected an expert to
advise them to be more patient and risk aversive.
Keywords: risk, intertemporal choices, expert, dual-process theory, decision-making
INTRODUCTION
Human life presents continuous choices. In this text, we will focus
on choices made in risk conditions (sticking to a permanent post
vs. starting your own business) and intertemporal ones (buying
an iPad vs. saving money). Studies have shown that people make
mistakes in both areas, which can lead to serious social problems,
such as gambling or obesity.
Overwhelming media advertisements and marketing strengthen
impulsive behaviors in the modern society. This results for
an example in obesity and financial debts. Nowadays, people
are often facing artificial risky problems (stock market, infla-
tion) for which they are not prepared (for extended review, see
Todd and Gigerenzer, 2012). This suggests a need to provide sup-
port to people so they can make more rational decisions, especially
those that are intertemporal and risky.
One of the recently introduced methods to support thinking,
specifically reasoning, is hypothetical thinking. People are asked
to assess a problem from the perspective of an expert or researcher
(Beatty and Thompson, 2012; Morsanyi and Handley, 2012). This
usually results in increased normative correctness of their mental
processing. Our aim is to test this method in a new field of cog-
nition, that is, decision-making under risk and delay. We hope to
validate the method of taking the perspective of an expert as an
efficient debiasing method.
DECISIONS UNDER RISK
Uncertainty about the future is an inherent part of human exis-
tence. While there are events we can be sure of and others that
are impossible to predict, most of us have to deal with probabilis-
tic situations. Studies on choices in risky conditions show that
people have difficulty understanding information about probabil-
ities. In a classic study, Tversky and Kahneman (1971) showed
that when people assess the probability of events, they tend
to ignore base rate information and instead rely on the social
stereotype.
One of the main assumptions of prospect theory is that in
risky situations, people underestimate moderate and large proba-
bilities but overrate rare events (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
Failure to understand the rules of probability theory as well
as the fact that people overrate small probabilities are possi-
ble causes for the high percentage of people participating in
different types of gambling. Despite the unfavorable profit-to-
risk ratio, studies have shown that 82% of adult Americans
(Welte et al., 2002), 72% of Canadians (Azmier and Clements,
2001), and 68% of adult British citizens (Wardle, 2007) admit
to gambling. Even part of the stock market investors treat
investing as a substitute of gambling. (Markiewicz and Weber,
2013).
Biased perception of randomness is a challenge in the health-
care domain. For example, in the medical context, there is the
question of informing patients about the probability of various
diseases. Much empirical evidence has shown that people have
serious problems estimating small probabilities. In particular,
people are insensitive to changes in the magnitude of these prob-
abilities (Kunreuther et al., 2001; Siegrist et al., 2008; Tyszka and
Sawicki, 2011).
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INTERTEMPORAL CHOICES
Intertemporal choices present people with different challenges. In
everyday life and in politics or economic affairs, some decisions
are based on choosing between payments that occur at a time
different from the time when the decision is made. For example,
deciding whether to eat fast food immediately or wait for a bal-
anced meal is based on the same psychological mechanisms as
deciding whether to spend your profit immediately or invest it.
The issue of intertemporal choices is also examined in terms of
self-control, for example, not succumbing to temptation. In the
classic research commonly known as the marshmallow test, Walter
Mischel offered a four-year-old child a sweet and said if the child
decided not to eat it, he or she would soon get two marshmallows.
The experimenter then left the room, leaving the child alone with
the temptation. If the child did not wait, he or she got only one
marshmallow instead of two. The results showed that people who
had greater self-control when they were children, scored higher on
the SAT test several years later, exhibited fewer behavioral prob-
lems, coped better with stress, and were more focused and attentive
(Mischel et al., 1989).
The inability to defer gratification may also lead to serious social
problems, such as obesity. Obesity is estimated to be the seventh
leading cause of mortality in the world (Ezzati et al., 2002). In
2007–2008, 68% of adults in the US were overweight, and 33.8%
of them were obese (Flegal et al., 2010).
SOCIAL NORMS AND NORMATIVE MODELS
For many cognitive processes there is a normative model, which
states what is correct (e.g., logic for reasoning). For risk taking,
multiplication of gain and probability of its occurrence expected
value (EV) is used as a normative model. Those who expect more
for a lottery than its EV are overly risk seeking, and those who
expect less thank the EV are risk averse. The intertemporal choices
do not have a normative model, but because of changes in our
societies and extended lifespan, patience (to some degree) is seen
as rational.
Social norms also regulate the behavior. Typically, patience
and the ability to avoid acting impulsively are virtues (Haidt and
Joseph, 2004). Children are rewarded when they show the ability
to postpone reward.
Rational, according to the normative model of risk taking,
would be to take a well calculated risk. It is unknown whether
there are any consistent social norms regarding risk-taking, but
experiencing a loss because of risk-taking (action) is blamed more
than missing a chance to profit (omission, Ritov and Baron, 1990,
1995). This happens because people expect to be blamed when tak-
ing the risk, and risk avoidance can be seen as a socially accepted
behavior.
METHODS IMPROVING DECISION MAKING
Some studies have focused on debiasing individuals in their con-
clusions and decisions. These studies introduced different types
of instruction or additional information to help people override
their initial, biased intuitions. There are two, usually implicit,
assumptions behind these manipulations.
First group of researchers tries to inform people about the
normative models and procedures (presenting people with the
concept of validity, EV or base rates). They assume that people
are making mistakes because they lack the appropriate knowledge
or intuitions regarding the field of probability or logic (or mind-
ware, as called by Stanovich, 2009b). In this view, an efficient
method of debiasing would be a request to rely on a specific, for-
mal procedure, e.g., “being presented with the concept of logical
validity, please try to assess following conclusions according to
their validity” (Evans et al., 1993).
The other group of researchers believes that biased thinking is
not a result of the lack of appropriate knowledge but of cognitive
miserliness (Fiske and Taylor, 1991), which means that individuals
are making biased decision because of lack of available cognitive
resources and/or motivation to use reflexive processing. When
motivated and having enough time, individuals show less biased
decision-making. In this view, an efficient method of debiasing is
an instruction that relates to the procedure, supporting a deeper
and reflexive thinking. An example of such instruction would be,
“please try to override your initial beliefs and focus on the logi-
cal structure of presented problems,” like used by Moutier et al.
(2002).
Both approaches did not produce any satisfying and consis-
tent increase in normative correctness of decisions. Despite the
consensus in the literature that debiasing requires decoupling of
the intuitions with effortful processing (Croskerry et al., 2013),
it seems that people are having troubles willingly override their
initial beliefs, even when instructed to do so and when they are
motivated and have appropriate knowledge.
In contemporary literature, we can also find other meth-
ods of improving individual’s cognitive processing. Hypothetical
thinking can increase the normative correctness of decisions by
increasing chances of using effortful, rule based processing (called
Type 2, Evans and Over, 1996; Evans, 2007) but also inhibit-
ing intuitive and heuristic responses (Type 1 processing). For
example, Loewenstein et al. (2001) instructed participants to imag-
ine the consequences of both presented alternatives, and thus
debiased people from the vividness effect. Lord et al. (1984)
instructed their participants to imagine the opposite when con-
sidering social dilemmas (e.g., capital punishment). Thanks
to this strategy, they improved the objectivity of their judg-
ments. Baron (2008) proposed open-minded thinking to help
override simple heuristic-cued intuitions. Trippas (unpublished
doctoral dissertation) showed that cognitive style, understood as
willingness to engage in Type 2 processing rather than cogni-
tive ability, influences accuracy of reasoning. This suggests that
human cognition can be improved by encouraging people to think
hypothetically (Type 2 processing).
Considering a problem from an expert’s perspective is quite
a natural instruction. People typically perceive experts as unbi-
ased and reliable sources of information. When taking an expert’s
perspective, intuitions and emotions should play a minor role,
and thanks to this manipulation, reflexive processing (1) should
be used more often compared to standard cases and (2) should
override the internal conflict with intuitions.
In some studies, the instructing participants to take the
experts perspective effectively encouraged the use of Type 2
processing, leading to less biased human performance (see
Greenhoot et al., 2004; Thompson et al., 2005; Ferreira et al., 2006;
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Beatty and Thompson, 2012). However, when testing children, the
effect of the instruction was ambiguous. The instruction, “please
answer the questions taking the perspective of a perfectly logical
and rational person (pp. 328),” as used in the study of Chiesi et al.
(2011), seemed to work only for high cognitive ability individuals.
This is possibly a result of the lack of learned rules and procedures,
which could be applied to the task in the reported study or lack of
cognitive resources. We can assume that the rules of thinking, just
like driving a car, require much more cognitive resources when
they are just learned while requiring fewer resources with greater
practice (Stanovich, 2009a).
QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESIS
As stated in the introduction section, people make many mistakes
when dealing with risk and delay, what results in many social prob-
lems, like debts, gambling, obesity, and many more. The presented
literature suggests that instructing people to reflect on a problem
from the perspective of an expert can significantly improve the
performance. We expect our participants to produce less biased
decisions in the field of risk and delay management.
The performance in risky condition is expected to be more
consistent with the behavior predicted by EV normative model.
This would provide an evidence of less biased risk assessment.
The performance in intertemporal choices is expected to change
direction toward bigger patience. The ability to focus on bigger
but more delayed goals seems to be more adaptive in mod-
ern society than is impulsivity; thus, our manipulation should
boost patience. This assumption does not follow from any nor-
mative model, as in the case of risk; instead, the general social
norm supports patient behavior rather than short-term oriented
behavior (Haidt and Joseph, 2004). Hence, we expect partici-
pants to follow the social norm of impulsivity avoidance and
produce lower discounting strength in the experimental condi-
tion in which participants are instructed to take the perspective of
an expert.
STUDY 1
We investigated the effect of forced hypothetical thinking on
choices under risk. Situations, such as considering how much
one is willing to invest to get a higher but uncertain return,
are everyday problems, but the form of presenting the problem
is relatively artificial, and people are evolutionally not prepared
to deal with such problems. In other words, people can intu-
itively deal with risk, but the way they are presented increases
the chance of making a biased decision (Gigerenzer and Selten,
2002).
By improving these types of judgment, we could enhance peo-
ple’s entrepreneurship abilities as well as prevent risky, maladaptive
behaviors, such as gambling or smoking. The hypothetical think-
ing can possibly increase the use of other competing intuitions or
rule-based processing. Both should change the risk taking decision
in a more normative manner and help people accurately estimate
the EV of potential gains.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The certain equivalent of a potential gain of $5000 with a prob-
ability of 90, 70 and 30% was computed for every participant.
The experimental manipulation was an instruction, asking par-
ticipants to consider the problem from one of two perspectives,
experts‘ or own. Our manipulation should increase abstract hypo-
thetical thinking by taking the perspective of an expert1. Through
this manipulation, we expected to debias human reasoning and
discover the mindware responsible for risk management. The
following is an example of tasks used:
Imagine you have received a $5000 reward, which will be paid to you with
a 70% chance. An investment fund is willing to rebuy your reward with
a certain payment. Imagine what an honest and rational expert would
advise you to do – accept or refuse the given offer.
ADJUSTING PROCEDURE
The research scheme used in all experiments was based on the
adjusting method, which is most popular in the discounting
research (Yi et al., 2006; Benzion et al., 2011; Odum, 2011).
This procedure enables one to determine balance points, i.e.,
payment methods where the person being tested was indiffer-
ent to two given alternatives, for example, between receiving a
sum x immediately and a sum y after a period of time t (in
research on risky choices, between receiving a sum x for cer-
tain, and a sum y with a determined probability). Thanks to
the adjusting method, the overestimation of expected gains can
be prevented, which is common if individuals are asked directly,
e.g., how much they would expect for having to wait for their
gain.
The research was conducted using a specially developed com-
puter program, which enabled us to determine the balance points.
The characteristic feature of the adjusting method is that one
choice alternative adjusts its value depending on previous deci-
sions made by the person being tested. For example, during the
test on risky payments, two cards depicting sums were displayed
on the screen, one was bigger but uncertain (the card on the
right side of the screen), and the other was smaller and certain
(the card on the left side of the screen). The sum on the card
on the right was fixed, while the card on the left changed its
value depending on the subsequent choices of the person being
tested.
The participant’s task was to choose between the two alterna-
tives. With every question, the person being tested was to choose
one of the values (certain or uncertain). In the first step, the par-
ticipant was given a choice of $2500 for sure (information on
the card on the left side) or $5000 with a 70% chance of win-
ning (information on the card on the right side). After choosing
the risky option, in the following step, the certain sum increased
by half of its previous value. Hence, this time, the person being
tested could choose $3750 for sure or $5000 with a 70% chance
of winning. When the participant chose the risky option once
more, the certain value increased by half of the previous value
and amounted to $4375 ($3750 + $625) in the subsequent step.
However, if in the next step ($4375 for sure or $5000 with a
70% chance of winning), the person being tested chose the cer-
tain sum, its value decreased by half of the previous change (by
1We have also manipulated the ownership of the gain (deciding for myself or for
somebody else’s gains), but it produced neither main effect nor interaction; thus,
we do not report this manipulation in more details.
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$312). To sum up, the certain value was adjusted to reflect pre-
vious choices of the person being tested. After making the sixth
choice, the program calculated the equivalent point for the risky
alternative.
PARTICIPANTS
Participants (n = 105) were citizens of the United States recruited
by specialized company in exchange for payment. They were ran-
domly assigned to one of four experimental conditions. From this
group, 27 participants who answered illogically (e.g., they wanted
to receive more for a 30% chance of winning compared to 70%
chance) were removed from the database prior to any further anal-
ysis. Mean age, gender distribution, and number of individuals in
each experimental condition are presented in Table 1.
RESULTS
When a person is risk averse his subjective value of a lottery is
lower. Figure 1 presents a line that connects mean subjective val-
ues of each lottery computed for the own/expert perspective and
compared to the EV model. We can see that individuals who took
the perspective of an expert were more risk averse. Additionally,
their result is further from the normative EV line compared to the
control group individuals who solved the problem from their own
perspective.
To measure the attitude towards risk, the area under the curve
was analyzed2 (Myerson et al., 2001). The surface of the area
under the curve is the sum of all trapezes set by the next balance
point values in relation to the ordinate and abscissa (Figure 2).
By using this measure, one should first assign the values in the
range (0, 1) to a scale of delay and the subjective value of the
discounted values. In the case of the scale of delay, values are
subsequently divided by the highest delays used. The scale of
subjective values of the discounted sums is converted in a sim-
ilar way. Next, we calculate the sum of the fields of the created
trapezes using the formula (a2–a1) [(b1 + b2)/2], where a1 and
a2 are consecutive delays while b1 and b2 represent consecutive
subjective values of gains. The area under the empirical dis-
counting curve is therefore the sum of all trapezes. The smaller
the area under the curve the bigger is the risk aversion of an
individual.
Attitude toward risk was computed for each participant. Later,
the parameters were compared across experimental groups. The
2This measure has two significant advantages compared to an alternative analysis,
which is based on comparing discounting parameters. First, it reduces the level of
skewness compared to the analysis of the distribution of discounting parameters
(k); second, it is neutral, i.e., it does not refer directly to any specific mathematical
formula.
Table 1 | Information about participants in Study 1.
Experimental condition N Ratio of females Mean age (SD)
Expert perspective 39 38.5 34.077 (9.94)
Control group 39 43.6 33.58 (8.58)
Overall 78 41.0 33.8 (9.24)
general linear model showed the main effect of perspective
[F(1,78) = 7.634; p < 0.01; η2 = 0.091]3, and the participants
in the experimental group showed bigger risk aversion. The mean
areas under the curve are shown in Figure 3. The bars represent
the mean field under the curve, with higher value indicating more
positive attitude toward risk (lower risk aversion).
DISCUSSION
We found that taking the perspective of an expert significantly
influenced the risky choices. Individuals in the experimental con-
dition were more risk aversive. By comparing the choices in the
study to the line representing the EV, we can conclude that the deci-
sions made in the experimental condition were less normatively
correct.
This result is contrary to our expectations because previously
reported studies in other domains suggested that the perspective
manipulation increases the normative correctness of decisions.
There are two possible explanations. First, the concept of EV is
not known to participants or the social norm for risky decisions
(risk avoidance) was made less salient thanks to the perspective
shift. The first explanation seems less probable, as already children
intuitively compare lotteries by multiplying gains and probabilities
(Schlottmann, 2001). But if individuals would follow the social
norm would expect to be blamed for unsuccessful risk taking and
thus avoid doing so to greater extent.
Morsanyi and Handley (2012) showed that the use of Type 2
processing does not guarantee the correctness of thinking. Par-
ticipants instructed to think from the perspective of a rational
person focused even more on stereotypes instead of base rates
when solving a lawyer’s task (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973).
In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there
were 5 engineers and 995 lawyers. Jack is a randomly chosen par-
ticipant of this study. Jack is 36 years old. He is not married and is
somewhat introverted. He likes to spend his free time reading science
fiction and writing computer programs.
Most of individuals endorsed the conclusion that Jack is an
engineer. They showed more interest in social stereotype than
in the probability of occurrence of a specific event and answered
against the odds. This case is especially interesting for understand-
ing the naïve probabilities that humans calculate. Here, taking a
rational perspective (Type 2 processing) exacerbated the neglect
of base rates.
In other study, Pennycook et al. (2014) showed that the base
rates are available at an intuitive level, so the increase of biased
responses in referred Morsanyi and Handley study is a cor-
rupted mindware case, where a social stereotype was judged
as a more reliable source of information compared to the base
rates. Additionally, in the field of risky decision, the instruc-
tion manipulation or enhancement of hypothetical thinking did
not consistently improve the performance (Weinstein and Klein,
1995). The manipulation of instructions (hypothetical thinking)
could possibly increase efficiency when one has the appropriate
mindware: knows how to calculate the probability and how to
3The analysis on full population of participants showed also a significant main effect
of the perspective manipulation [F(1,104) = 5.187; p < 0.05; η2 = 0.077]. By the
elimination of irrational responses, we wanted to reduce a possible noise and report
most reliable effect of the study.
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FIGURE 1 | Mean certain equivalents for own/expert perspective compared to expected value model.
FIGURE 2 |The diagram shows four trapezes created as a result of
connecting equivalent points, with the risk axis by line segments. Both
the risk and subjective value of the sum are standardized from the range
from 0 to 1. Value 1 on the risk axis corresponds to a certain value, and on
the subjective value axis the non-discounted sum. Own elaboration based
on: Myerson et al. (2001).
use it in real-life social problems. If the mindware is missing, the
performance can be even worse (Chiesi et al., 2011).
STUDY 2
The aim of the second study was to investigate the effect of forced
hypothetical thinking on intertemporal choices. Such situations
are everyday problems, where one has to think about how much
he/she is willing to invest now to get a higher but delayed return.
By improving that type of judgment, we could persuade peo-
ple to improve health or prevent such maladaptive behavior as
overeating.
This assumption does not follow from any normative model, as
in the case of risk, but the general social norm supports patience
FIGURE 3 | Mean area under the curve for uncertain gains.
rather than short-term oriented actions (Haidt and Joseph, 2004).
Thus, we expected participants to follow the social norm of impul-
sivity avoidance and produce lower discounting strength in the
experimental condition of taking the perspective of an expert.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
We repeated the procedure of Study 1. The only difference was that
individuals had to evaluate three delayed gains. The delay was set
for 1 month, 6 months, and 24 months. Once again, participants
were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions,
own perspective or the perspective of an expert. Additionally, in
Study 2, we manipulated the ownership of the money (own money
or someone else’s money), but this manipulation produced no
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main effect and did not interact with the perspective manipulation;
thus, it will not be reported in following analysis.
PARTICIPANTS
Participants (n = 130) were citizens of the United States recruited
by external services in exchange for payment. They were randomly
assigned to one of two experimental conditions. Details of the
group are presented in Table 2. A small group of participants
(n = 15) was excluded because of irrational responses (the same
criterion as in Study 1 was used).
RESULTS
The discounting curves that connect balance points for delayed
gain of $5000 are presented in Figure 4, from which we can see
that when taking the perspective of an expert, people show less
impulsivity compared to the control condition (own perspective).
General linear model analysis was used to test the influence of
possession and perspective on discounting strength. Once again,
a main effect of perspective has been found [F(1,114) = 4.168;
p < 0.05; η2 = 0.036]4. The mean discounting strength is
presented in Figure 5.
DISCUSSION
Taking the perspective of an expert improves thinking by helping
individuals overcome impulsivity. Participants taking an expert’s
perspective were less likely to lose some of their money by receiv-
ing it sooner and not having to wait compared to considering a
problem from their own perspective. We can conclude that indi-
viduals’ mindware related to delay management is governed by
a rule, where impulsivity is assessed as wrong, and the correct
behavior is patience. This belief is then in conflict with the intu-
itive willingness to receive immediate rewards. This is consistent
with common observations that people are sometimes consciously
aware of the internal conflict between their intuitions (impulsivity,
Type 1 processing) and beliefs about correct response (patience,
Type 2 processing).
Despite the lack of normative model, we can conclude that
the patience in this specific task presented here is adaptive; thus,
it should be evaluated positively. This internal conflict should
emerge when the mindware response is made salient by taking
the perspective of an expert. De Neys (2014) stated that when the
emotional arousal emerges after the conflict detection and an indi-
vidual notices it, the heuristic response could be questioned. This
can decrease the impulsivity, as it is a heuristic response.
4As requested by reviewer, we tested gender as a factor in the GLM analysis and
found no main effect or interaction (both p > 0.5).
Table 2 | Information about participants in Study 2.
Experimental condition N Ratio of females Mean age (SD)
Experts perspective 62 35 34.4 (10.31)
Own perspective 53 57.9 37.5 (11.46)
Overall 115 46.15 35.91 (10.92)
FIGURE 4 | Discounting curves for delayed gains.
FIGURE 5 | Discounting strength for delayed gains.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The perspective shift changed human decisions. Participants
showed bigger patience and risk aversion. The results in the area
of risk are not consistent with our expectations. The decisions
made cannot be seen as more correct or rational. The intertempo-
ral choices have shown an improvement, as the discounting rate
shown by individuals decreased. This can help individuals over-
come temptations and help them make long-term financial plans
(savings, investments).
Possible explanation of observed behavior is that individu-
als focused on social norms rather than on normative models.
This would be consistent with findings of Chiesi et al. (2011)
and Morsanyi and Handley (2012) who reported no consistent
improvement or even decrease in correctness of decisions under
the forced perspective shift. We discuss, that the experimen-
tal manipulation made the social norm salient and people who
took experts’ perspective focused on the social norm to big-
ger extent, than in typical, everyday decision. Because patience
and cautiousness are socially perceived as virtues we see a
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change of decisions to match those. This assumption is consis-
tent with the reported findings on the improvement of thinking
and reasoning presented in the introduction section. The social
norm related to thinking promotes reflexive and logical think-
ing, that is, the Type 2 processing. The mindware responsible
for dealing with risk is still a main topic for research on risk
and delay management, but social norms related to this topic
have to be investigated more and incorporated in the design of
studies.
Our data did not fully support presented conclusion, as we have
not tested the social norms of participants. We assume that the
cultural norm should have some effect on most individuals. The
proverb “A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush,” is a good
example of socially accepted risk avoidance. The hypothesis of
social norms made salient could be tested by comparing cultures
with big differences in the delay management or in the attitude
toward risk.
Despite possible difficulties, the idea of improving individu-
als’ decision-making in the area of risk and delay seems to be
worth effort. Individuals perform sub-optimally even in advanta-
geous conditions (with all required information provided and no
time pressure) and require to be supported. Modern society cre-
ated an artificial environment (e.g., by marketing, commercials)
in which people are misinformed or put under time pressure; thus,
human decision-making needs to be supported to greater extent,
particularly by hypothetical thinking with the focus on a specific
instruction.
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Theories of expertise based on the acquisition of chunk and templates suggest a
differential geometric organization of perception between experts and novices. It is implied
that expert representation is less anchored by spatial (Euclidean) proximity and may
instead be dictated by the intrinsic relation in the structure and grammar of the specific
domain of expertise. Here we set out to examine this hypothesis. We used the domain of
chess which has been widely used as a tool to study human expertise. We reasoned that
the movement of an opponent piece to a specific square constitutes an external cue and
the reaction of the player to this “perturbation” should reveal his internal representation
of proximity. We hypothesized that novice players will tend to respond by moving a piece
in closer squares than experts. Similarly, but now in terms of object representations,
we hypothesized weak players will more likely focus on a specific piece and hence
produce sequence of actions repeating movements of the same piece. We capitalized
on a large corpus of data obtained from internet chess servers. Results showed that,
relative to experts, weaker players tend to (1) produce consecutive moves in proximal
board locations, (2) move more often the same piece and (3) reduce the number of
remaining pieces more rapidly, most likely to decrease cognitive load and mental effort.
These three principles might reflect the effect of expertise on human actions in complex
setups.
Keywords: chess expertise, object representation, chunks, spatial proximity, attentional control
INTRODUCTION
The focus of attention can be directed by exogenous (bottom-
up) and endogenous (top-down) cues (Pylyshyn, 2007; Richard
et al., 2008). The region of visual space to which attention is
directed changes according to specific goals and tasks (Gilbert and
Sigman, 2007; Vinckier et al., 2007). A classic example is Yarbus
gaze experiment (where subjects had to view a complex image
several times, each with a different instruction), he demonstrated
that the sequence of eye fixations changed drastically according
to the question the observer was trying to respond about the
image (Yarbus, 1967; Tatler et al., 2010). Top-down control of
attention can act over a wide range of categories, including loca-
tion but also objects, goals, features, context, time . . . (Duncan,
1984; Chun and Jiang, 1998; Maunsell and Treue, 2006; New
et al., 2007). The ability to direct attention to specific objects and
categories changes with experience (Gilbert and Sigman, 2007)
and, similarly, the ability to ignore salient cues requires inhibition
mechanisms which are trainable (Cepeda et al., 1998).
Chess has been one of the most widely studied models
of expertise (de Groot, 1978; Schultetus and Charness, 1999;
Reingold et al., 2001a,b; Campitelli and Gobet, 2008; Connors
et al., 2011; Bilalic et al., 2012). Chess experts recognize and
recall chess positions accurately [chunk and templates theories
(Chase and Simon, 1973; Gobet and Simon, 1996)], and develop
heuristics that allow them to focus and explore only a few “good
enough” moves (de Groot, 1978), substantially alleviating the
search process.
As in other domains of perceptual expertise, chunk and tem-
plates acquisition theories reflect geometrical differences in the
organization of perception between chess experts and novices:
strong players recognize groups of pieces connected by functional
relations as units (Gobet and Simon, 1996) and they also explore
chess positions differently than novices [eye fixations are more
centered in relationships between pieces (Reingold et al., 2001a)].
An implication of this theory is that expert representation is not
anchored to the proximity between two pieces (Euclidean dis-
tance) and may instead be dictated by the intrinsic relation in the
structure and grammar of the board. For instance, a bishop in one
corner of the board which works in concert with a knight on the
other side of the board to jointly attack an opponent square may
be “functionally proximal” pieces in the mind of an expert, but
“functionally distal” in the mind of a novice who does not recog-
nize this relation. The same argument is true for other domains
of expertise, for instance an expert soccer goalkeeper may bind
together (spatially) distant properties of the field (where is the
ball, where are the defenders and the attackers) which jointly may
build an important cluster of features. Here we set out to examine
explicitly this conjecture. We focus on chess which has three prin-
cipal advantages to solve our goal: (1) The degree of proficiency
can be quantified precisely with international systems of ratings
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(Elo, 1978), (2) The spatial layout in chess is well delimited by a
square discrete grid of 64 locations, and (3) Capitalizing on chess
internet servers we can base our conclusions on massive sets of
data.
We reasoned that the movement of an opponent piece to a
specific square constitutes an external attentional cue. The reac-
tion of the player to this “perturbation” should reveal his internal
representation of proximity. Specifically, we hypothesized that a
naive player will tend to respond in proximal squares. Instead,
we hypothesized that expert player responses are less likely to
be governed by the spatial position of the opponent last move.
Additionally, when this argument is expressed in terms of object
oriented attention, we hypothesized that a novice player will more
likely direct attention (concentrate) to a specific piece and hence
produce repeated sequence of moves with the same piece. Instead,
expert representation is directed to a more sophisticated pattern
of pieces (chains of pawns, coordinated set of pieces working in
concert. . . ) and hence the sequence of moves should show fewer
repetitions. If weak players focus more on individual pieces, we
hypothesized they should tend to reduce the number of objects to
be attended to avoid cognitive load. Finally, we examined some
core aspects of chess strategy hypothesizing the experts would
play more in-line with them than novices.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
DATA ACQUISITION
All games were downloaded from FICS (Free Internet Chess Server,
http://www.freechess.org/), a free ICS-compatible server for play-
ing chess games through Internet, with more than 300,000 reg-
istered users. This constitutes a quite unique experimental setup
providing virtually infinite data (thousands of millions of moves).
Each registered user may be human or a computer player,
and has associated a rating (Glicko rating, http://www.glicko.net/
glicko.html) that indicates the chess skills strength of the player,
represented by a number typically between 1000 and 3000 points.
We defined two expertise levels: (a) strong players with rating
higher than 1900 points and (b) weak players with rating between
1000 and 1400 points.
A regular game of chess contains about 40 moves from each
player. A ply (plural plies) refers to one turn taken by a player.
Hence, a chess game of 40 moves corresponds to 80 plies. We use
the term “next move” to refer to two consecutive actions by the
same player (white move 1: e4, white move 2: Nf3) and the term
“next ply” to refer to consecutive actions by each player (ply 1:
e4—white movement; ply 2: e5—black movement).
For each expertise group, we selected games from the FICS
database (played from 2005 to 2013) with at least 80 plies, played
between human players (of the same expertise group), with a total
time budget of 180 s for each player and no increment. In order to
make further comparisons, we generated 35 sets for each expertise
group (each with 5000 games). These sets were built by date (i.e.,
set 1 contained mostly games from 2005 and set 35, from 2013).
For each analysis we compared 35 values (one for each set) from
the high rated expertise group with the 35 values from the low
rated group.
In order to extend the results to longer time budgets, we repli-
cated the analysis with games of 300 and 900 s per player. Because
of the lower number of available games for these time budgets,
we generated 35 datasets of 1500 games each (for each expertise
group) for each of them. All other conditions were maintained.
MOVEMENT DISTANCE MEASURE
Piece location coordinates were organized in an 8∗8 matrix (rep-
resenting the 64 squares of the chess board). For each movement,
we calculated two different measures (D1 and D2) to examine the
proximity between successive actions in a game of chess. To do
this, we define the initial square of a movement as the location of
the moving piece before the movement and the final square of a
movement as the location of the moving piece after this action.
D1 corresponds to the difference between the initial square of
a piece movement and the final square of the previous move-
ment by the opponent. In other words, this corresponds to the
difference in location between two consecutive plies of the game.
This is the observable which can be more easily mapped to classic
attentional cues experiments. We make the analogy that the loca-
tion where the opponent drops a piece is an attentional cue and
observe the player’s onset of his response relative to this cue.
D2 corresponds to the difference between the final squares of
two successive moves from the same player. This is measured as
the difference between the end-locations of ply(n + 2) and ply(n).
For each measure we calculated the signed difference in
squares in the x and y axis. Positive values of the y-axis indicate
that the difference is shifted toward the upper side of the board.
To do so we assumed the normal row conventions of chess (1
indicating white’s first row and 8 black’s first row). A positive dif-
ference in x-axis indicates a shift toward the left side and negative
values a movement toward the right side of the board. Note that
the differences in both axis take a range in the [−7, −6, . . . , 0,
1, . . . , 7] values. A value of zero indicates that there was not shift
in that axis. For each measure (D1 and D2), we obtained a dis-
tance matrix for white moves and other for black moves, and we
added them.
For each independent set (35 per expertise group) we cal-
culated the 15∗15 matrices D1mat(i,R) and D2mat(i,R), where i
ranges from 1 to 35 and R can be high or low rated group.
Probabilities for each entry of the matrices were calculated as
follow: (a)- for each movement (at least 40∗5000 –number of
moves∗number of games-, white or black) we calculated the dis-
tance measure, (b) we counted the amount of movements which
matched with each matrix entry, (c) we divided the number of
movements on each entry by the total number of movements
on the distance matrix. For each matrix, the entries indicate the
probability to find successive plies (for D1) or moves (for D2) at
the corresponding distance (see Figure 1) where indices 1 . . . 15,
respectively, code distances [−7 . . . 7].
Our main experimental question is to investigate whether
certain transitions (spatial differences between successive move-
ments) differ between high and low rated players. To examine
this we performed two-sample t-tests comparing high vs. low
groups. We performed an independent t-test for each entry of the
matrix (a total of 225 tests), each comparing the 35 values mea-
sured for the high and low expertise groups. From this analysis
we generated a matrix oft-values which encodes the difference in
probabilities for each entry between high and low rated players.
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FIGURE 1 | Expertise level defines spatial effects on successive
movements. (A) Distance measurements. Distances between two
squares over an 8∗8 checkerboard can be measured subtracting the
coordinates of one location (white circle) to the coordinates of other
location (represented by the end of each arrow) on both x and y
axis. The square where the white circle is located corresponds to
x = 6 and y = 6, and four alternative locations are illustrated with
color arrows. All possible distances between two squares of this
8 × 8 board are constrained to a 15∗15 square, where now the
coordinates of the white circle are (0, 0) and distance measures
range from −7 to 7. The x axis shows the direction movement on
number of columns (x < 0, left direction; x > 0, right direction) and
the y axis represents movements on number of the rows (y < 0,
down direction; y > 0, up direction). For example, the distance
between the end of the yellow arrow (which is at x = 5 and y = 7
on the 8∗8 board) and the white circle is calculated as the
difference between the corresponding squares coordinates (x = −1
and y = 1). (B) Probability distributions of movement distances. We
use two observables to assess locality effects on chess playing: D1
and D2 (see Methods). Probabilities to make a movement close to
the previous one is higher at short distances, for both High and
Low expertise levels. (C) Weak players made their movements closer
to the previous one. We contrasted probability distributions for both
High and Low rated players on each entry of the 15∗15 distance
square independently. t-value of each independent two-sample t-test
(with p-value < 0.001, Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons)
is color-coded. Positive (red) t-values indicate significantly higher
probabilities for high rated players and negative (blue) values, for
weaker players. (D) Radial or Euclidean distances. Distances were
one-dimension collapsed and the difference between probabilities of
making movements corresponding to a distance square [P(High) –
P(Low)] was plotted vs. each radial distance. High and low rated
groups distributions were independently compared in each radial
distance [two-sample t-test on each variable (D1 and D2)]. Red
asterisks (t > 5.3 for D1 and t > 5.6 for D2) indicates distances were
P(High) is significantly higher than P(Low); blue asterisks (t < −12.3 for
D1 and t < −11 for D2), distances were P(Low) > P(High); in both
p < 0.001, Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons. Dotted lines
indicate distance values where the significances changes from weak
to strong players.
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Positive t-values indicate that this transition is more likely for
high than for low rated players. p-values were corrected with a
strict Bonferroni criterion for multiple comparisons, considering
a difference as significant only if p < 0.001/225. For visualization
purposes, t-values in comparisons that did not reach significance
were set to t = 0.
We then collapsed the matrices D1mat(i,R) to their radial dis-
tance by the conventional formula r = (x2 + y2)1/2. This
resulted on independent vectors of 34 dimensions for each i and
R. Note that the possible differences in distance over the board
is less than 15∗15 since there is a lot of redundancy (for instance
moving the king one square to the left, to the right, up or down,
all correspond to a radial distance of 1). As before, we converted
these distributions in a vector of t-values which encode the differ-
ence in probabilities for each index between high and low rated
players. Positive t-values indicate that this transition is more likely
for high than for low rated players. p-values were corrected with a
strict Bonferroni criterion for multiple comparisons, considering
a difference as significant only if p < 0.001/34.
PIECE REPETITION
This analysis is shown only for white moves (analyzing black
moves yielded identical results). We encoded for each white move
whether the piece moved was the same (1) or different (0) than
the piece moved in the previous turn. The probability of moving
the same piece twice depends on the number of pieces remaining
of the board. Thus, we calculated the repetition probability as a
function of the pieces remaining in the board independently for
the 35 sets of each expertise level. This yielded vectors PR(i,R,np)
where i indicates the group (1–35), R the expertise level (high or
low) and np the number of pieces remaining on the board from 3
to 16 (there were not sufficient positions with one or two pieces
remaining on the board when considering the first 40 moves). To
quantify the main effects of expertise level and number of pieces
on the repetition probability we made a Two-Way ANOVA test
with number of pieces and expertise level as independent factors
and their interactions. Then, we compared the distributions of
high and low rating independently for each number of pieces with
independent two-sample t-tests comparing high and low rated
players. p-values were corrected with a strict Bonferroni criterion
for multiple comparisons, considering a difference as significant
only if p < 0.001/16.
NUMBER OF PIECES REMAINING ON THE BOARD
This analysis is shown only for white moves (analyzing black
moves yielded identical results). We calculated for each white
move number (1–40) the number of white pieces remaining on
the board (1–16). We then averaged this value for each move
number (1–40) across all the games in each set. This yielded
vectors NP(i,R,n) where i indicates the set (1–35), R the exper-
tise level (high or low), and n the move number from 1 to 40.
Note that this distribution as function of move number has to be
monotonous decreasing. This would not be true in bughouse or
crazy house variants of the games where a player can introduce a
captured piece back to the board. We assessed the main effects
of move number and expertise level with a Two-Way ANOVA
test with move number and expertise level as independent factors
and their interactions. Then, we compared the distributions of
high and low rating independently for each move number with
independent two-sample t-tests. p-values were corrected with a
strict Bonferroni criterion for multiple comparisons, considering
a difference as significant only if p < 0.001/40.
BOARD DISTRIBUTION
This analysis is shown only for white moves (analyzing black
moves yielded identical results). We calculated for white moves
5, 10, 20, 30, and 40 and for each piece the frequency of dis-
tribution along all squares of the board. Since the remaining
amount of pieces between varies with expertise levels and the
number of types of pieces is not the same (8 pawns, 2 bishops, one
king,. . . ) we normalized the occurrences by the average number
of the piece type at each move number on each set. For exam-
ple, the probability to have a knight on b1 in the move number
1 (in a set of an expertise level) is 0.98 and for g1 is 0.93, but
at that moment there were 2 knights over the board (on average
in that set), then the values for b1 and g1 were 0.49 and 0.465,
respectively.
This results (for each piece type, move number, set and exper-
tise level) in an 8∗8 matrix which encodes the normalized average
occupation of the corresponding piece along the board. Then,
for each piece and move number, we compared the distribu-
tions along the board for high and low rating, with indepen-
dent two-sample t-tests for each entry of the matrix. Positive
t-values indicate that the occupation probability in a given entry
is more likely for high than for low rated players. p-values were
corrected with a strict Bonferroni criterion for multiple compar-
isons, considering a difference as significant only if p < 0.001/64.
We reported results from knights, rooks and queen in the full
matrix.
Data is represented as mean ± SD (n = 35) for Figures 1C,
2A,B. Asterisks indicate significant differences at p < 0.001
(Bonferroni corrected). The same color code is maintained along
the whole work: red indicates higher probabilities for strong
players and blue for weaker players.
RESULTS
HYPOTHESIS 1
Low rated players make moves which are more proximal to their
own last move and to the opponent precedent move.
D1 considers the difference between the initial location of a
piece movement and the final location of the previous movement
by the opponent. D2 corresponds to the difference between the
final locations of two successive moves from the same player (see
Materials and Methods and Figure 1A for a full description of
how D1 and D2 are calculated).
For both expertise groups, we found a similar distribution of
distances probabilities: all players tended to make their move-
ments in squares close to the final location of their opponent
last movement (D1) and to their own last movement (D2)
(Figure 1B). However, and in accordance with our first hypothe-
sis, lower rated players tend to make more movements in board
locations which are proximal to the opponent’s last movement
(D1) and their own antecedent movement (D2). Instead, strong
players showed higher densities of successive movements which
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FIGURE 2 | Object-based mechanisms depend on expertise level. (A)
Weak players repeat the same piece on consecutive movements more
frequently than strong players. Probabilities to repeat the same piece on
two consecutive moves depends on the remaining number of pieces on
the board. We plotted this probability vs. the number of pieces for both
expertise levels. Independent two-sample t-tests (high vs. low expertise
probabilities) for each number of pieces left (ranging from 1 to 16) evidence
a higher probability to move the same piece on consecutive movements for
low rated players, almost independently of the number of remaining pieces
(∗p < 0.001 Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons). Dashed black
line shows the random threshold. (B) Low-rated players reduce the number
of pieces more rapidly than high-rated players. The number of remaining
pieces over the board, which change throughout the game (starting in 16
pieces for each player), is significantly higher for high rated players along
the whole game (moves 3–40, independent two-sample t-tests on each
move number, ∗p < 0.001 Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons),
evidencing than low rated players exchange (or loss) their pieces more
rapidly than stronger players.
were more scattered in space (Figure 1C) 1. To quantify this
observation we aggregated the distribution of spatial differences
to a single scalar estimating the radial distance between the two
successive movements (Figure 1D).
1Note that D2 has a non-zero probability in the origin which corresponds to
two consecutive moves by one player which have the same end-location. This
can only happen when a player captures twice in the same location. Instead D1
has a strict zero probability in the origin since a player cannot make a move
starting in the square where the opponent has moved a piece.
Results of D1 indicated that movements starting within a
radius of 3.5 squares from the position where the opponent
moved his piece were more likely in low rated players (p < 0.001
Bonferroni corrected) while movements outside of this radius
where more likely for high rated players (p < 0.001 Bonferroni
corrected). Similarly, results of D2 indicated that low rated play-
ers were more likely (p < 0.001 Bonferroni corrected) to make
two consecutive moves with end-locations within a radius of
2.5 squares, while higher rated players made more likely moves
beyond this radius.
Both of these results are extremely reliable through distances
(Figure 1D). This indicates that while the specific geometry of
the board may be subtle and specific to chess (the patterns of
Figure 1C are complex) they organize on a synthetic rule by
which low rated players tend to overplay more proximal and high
rated players more distal moves.
Previous results were obtained using games with a short time
budget (180 s). To avoid any confound related with the use of very
short games, we repeated the exact analysis for games with longer
time budgets (300 and 900 s per player) and we found the same
results (Figures S1, S2).
HYPOTHESIS 2
Low rated players are more likely to move the same piece in
consecutive turns.
The previous results suggest that low rated players have a nar-
rower (or more focal) spatial window of attention. Attention can
also be directed to objects (Richard et al., 2008). We examine the
hypothesis that throughout a game, low rated players are more
focused in a specific piece than high rated players, who may drive
attention to schemas assembling sets of pieces (pawn chains, sev-
eral pieces converging in a square or a plan . . . ). To this aim,
we simply measured the probability of repeating a piece in two
consecutive moves. A repetition is counted only when the exact
same piece (not the same type of piece) is moved twice. If a player
moves a pawn and in the next turn moves another pawn, this is
considered as a different piece movement.
The probability of moving the same piece twice depends on the
number of pieces remaining of the board. Thus, we calculated the
repetition probability as a function of the pieces remaining in the
board (Figure 2A). The repetition probability decreased with the
number of pieces for both groups but remained above chance lev-
els. This is expected since: (1) some pieces actually cannot move
and (2) players rarely consider all pieces in the board as candidates
to move. As we had hypothesized, lower rated players produced
more repetitions reflecting that attention (or their strategies or
conception of plans) is more likely to be constrained to a single
piece. To quantify this observation we first submitted the data to
a Two-Way ANOVA test with number of pieces and expertise level
as independent factors and their interactions. Results showed
a main effect of both factors (Expertise, p < 0.0001, F = 91.8,
df = 1; Number of Pieces: p < 0.0001, F = 181.6, df = 15 and
Interaction, p < 0.0001, F = 7.5, df = 15). We followed this test
with independent two sample t-tests (corrected with a strict
Bonferroni criterion for multiple comparisons) for each num-
ber of pieces left, comparing the distributions for high and low
rated players. Each value of the distribution is obtained from one
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of the 35 different sets of each expertise level. All comparisons
consistently showed greater repetition probability for lower than
higher rated player. This effect was significant when 6, 8–14, and
16 pieces remaining on the board [t(34) < −5.2, p < 0.001].
As for the first hypothesis, we repeated the piece repetition
analysis using games with longer time budgets (Figures S3A,B)
and we replicated the results found for 180 s games.
HYPOTHESIS 3
Since weak players focus more on individual pieces it is expected
that it is effortful for them to work on boards with many pieces.
We expect that weaker players will tend to simplify the position to
avoid mental effort (Koechlin and Summerfield, 2007).
We compared the amount of pieces as a function of move
number for both expertise levels. As expected the number
of pieces started in 16 (initial configuration) and smoothly
decreased to an average of about 7 pieces by move 40. Beyond this
main trend we observed that after the first five moves, the distri-
butions of remaining pieces for high and low rated players bifur-
cate. This analysis shows that, as we had hypothesized, weaker
players exchange pieces more rapidly than stronger players. To
quantify this observation we first made a Two-Way ANOVA test
with number of pieces and expertise level as independent factors
and their interactions. Results showed a main effect of both fac-
tors (Expertise, p < 0.0001, F = 4.5∗104, df = 1; Move number:
p < 0.0001, F = 2.2∗105, df = 39 and Interaction, p < 0.0001,
F = 296, df = 39). We followed this test with independent two-
sample t-tests (corrected with a strict Bonferroni criterion for
multiple comparisons) for each move number, comparing the
distributions for high and low rated players. All comparisons con-
sistently showed significant greater number of pieces along the
whole game (move numbers 3–40) for high rated players [t(34) >
15 for move numbers 4–6, t(34) > 27 for move numbers 3 and
7–40, p < 0.001]. Once again, we repeated the previous analysis
for 300 and 900 s games (Figures S3C,D) replicating the results
found for 180 s time budget.
The results described above show that weaker players tend to
produce consecutive moves in proximal board locations, more
often moving the same piece and exchanging pieces more rapidly
to reduce the number of remaining pieces. These three principles
reflect consistent general findings which might reflect the effect of
expertise on human actions in complex setups.
Beyond these three principles there are idiosyncratic aspects of
the game of chess which relate to piece value, with the way the
move on the board and where they are more effective, which dic-
tate a specific strategy in the board. Expert play is expected to
be more in-line with certain strategic themes. Here we examined
three core aspects of chess strategy: (1) Knights are more effective
when they are centralized, (2) Rooks play first along the 1st row
to find an optimal centralized column where they are effective,
(3) The queen should not risk going for long travels early in the
game.
At different stages of the game (moves 5, 10, 20, 30, and 40)
we calculated the average density of white pieces (N: knights,
R: Rooks, Q: Queen) along the board. For each square we per-
formed a two-sample t-test comparing the distribution of densi-
ties for the high and low rated players and corrected for multiple
comparisons with a strict Bonferroni criterion. Results showed
that, as expected, knights were significantly more centralized
(over the whole board) for higher rated players and were more
likely to be found in their initial square (b1 or g1) or advanced
in the enemy camp for weaker players (Figure 3A). Rook move-
ment revealed that by move 5 higher rated players are more likely
to have castled and by move 10 a higher probability of central-
izing the rooks on the 1st row (Figure 3B). Rooks position in
weaker players instead was much more likely to be in the ini-
tial squares (a1 and h1). Also, as with knights, weaker players
are more likely to advance the rook in the enemy camp. Another
consistent finding is that stronger players place their rooks in the
queen-side (left side of the board for white). Instead weaker play-
ers more rapidly attack on the king-side: for instance by move
30, white rooks are more likely to be found in squares close to
the opponent-king location. This reflects a more positional play
and a less direct tendency of directly going to mate the enemy
king for high rated players. Finally, as expected, stronger play-
ers tend to postpone queen development (by move 5 and 10 the
queen is more likely to be in the initial square d1) and through-
out the game develop the queen on the first rows (Figure 3C). We
emphasize that these results do not convey information about the
absolute distribution of occupation of a piece. Instead they reflect
differential distributions, i.e., indicating whether a given pieces
is more likely to be occupied by stronger or weaker players. To
avoid confusion Figure S4 shows the average degree of occupancy
of these pieces throughout the game for each expertise level. As
for previous hypotheses, we replicated and found similar results
for games with longer time budgets (see Figure S5).
DISCUSSION
Here we showed differences in general and domain-specific pat-
terns of actions depending on expertise level. We found that
weaker players play more locally, tend to focus sequences of
actions in the same piece and more rapidly exchange pieces to
reduce the total number of pieces on the board. Our working
hypothesis is that these observations reflect a different focus of
attention to space and objects with expertise.
Our first working hypothesis was that the end location of a
movement (the place where a piece is located) functions like a
spatial cue in the board space. Our conjecture is that the ten-
dency to continue playing close to that cue is a reflection of the
persistence of attention to this location.
Attention involves a sequence of operations: 1- attentional
shifting to the target location, 2-attentional engagement, 3-
attentional disengagement (Posner and Petersen, 1990; Fox et al.,
2002; Koster et al., 2006). The persistence of play in a given
location has three likely and related explanations: a first possi-
bility is that novices have difficulties disengaging attention from
the cued place in the last movement (Sheridan and Reingold,
2013). Another possibility is that expert players have more effec-
tive preattentive mechanisms to encode saliency mechanisms in
peripheral locations of the board (Sigman and Gilbert, 2000;
Intriligator and Cavanagh, 2001; Pylyshyn, 2007; Vinckier et al.,
2007). Chess masters have an advantage for the recognition of
chess pieces (Saariluoma, 1995; Kiesel et al., 2009; Bilalic et al.,
2010) and chess themes (Reingold et al., 2001a,b), which may
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition February 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 47 | 131
Leone et al. Expertise geometry
FIGURE 3 | Piece distribution over the board reveals domain-specific and
expertise-dependent strategies. Probabilities to find a type of piece
(normalized by the number of remaining pieces of this type) in each square
(8∗8 checkerboard) were compared for high and low expertise groups at
different game stages (moves 5, 10, 20, 30, and 40). The t-value resulting of
the two-sample t-test (high vs. low expertise group), in each square is color
coded for those significantly different comparisons with p < 0.001 Bonferroni
corrected for multiple comparisons. Red positive values indicate significantly
higher probabilities for strong players and blue negative values, significantly
higher probabilities for weaker players. (A) Knights, (B) Rooks, and (C) Queen
occupancy comparisons reveal that strong players centralize more their
knights and rooks, delaying the queen development, compared with lower
rated players delaying more the development of knights and rooks (but not
the development of the queen, which is almost always not good) and/or
occupying more advanced squares with all. It should be noted that the this
figure represents the differential occupancy of each square, showing that
strong or weak players locate each type of piece comparatively more
frequently than the other group.
serve as salient detector providing new cues which compete with
the previous spatial cue. A third possibility is that expert players
can attend to themes or schemas (strings of pieces) and the focus
of attention is spread over the whole attended object (Houtkamp
et al., 2003; Alvarez and Scholl, 2005; Richard et al., 2008). In
line with this idea, the size and form of the selection window
has been proposed to be controlled by top-down mechanisms
and dependent on the task difficulty (Belopolsky and Theeuwes,
2010).
Our results based on the spontaneous distributions of actions
during a game are consistent with a recent report by Sheridan and
Reingold analyzing the distribution of attention in the Einstellung
Effect (Sheridan and Reingold, 2013). The authors present a prob-
lem in which there is a move which almost indefectibly attracts
attention (for instance a region on the board where there seems
to be mate, with the king exposed and many pieces attacking
it). In this construction, the best move is away from this specific
location of the board. Weaker players very often do not con-
sider this optimal (but distant from a very salient location) move
and their gaze remains in the Einstellung region of the board.
Instead, stronger players can disengage from this location which
allows them to find the distant and optimal move (Sheridan and
Reingold, 2013).
Weaker players are less likely to organize the representation
of the board in large chunks (Chase and Simon, 1973; Gobet
and Simon, 1996) and thus, comparing variations when many
pieces remain on the board requires more attentional shifts
and executive function. Koechlin and colleagues have coined the
idea of a “lazy” executive system which is triggered only when
strictly needed (Koechlin and Summerfield, 2007). Combining
these premises, we reasoned that all players will seek to min-
imize effort. To achieve this, weaker players will prefer posi-
tions with less number of pieces on the board. As expected by
this prediction we show that weak players tend to “simplify”
the problem by more rapidly removing pieces of the board
consistently.
We initially chose using 180 s games to test our hypotheses
based on: 1- evidences showing that rapid processes (related with
pattern recognition) rather than slow processes (fundamentally,
search mechanisms) are responsible of chess expertise (Burns,
2004; Sigman et al., 2010), 2- the time used for each movement
is close-related with the common psychological experiments and
3- the FICS database for 180 s games is larger than those for
longer time budgets. However, we also replicated all our results
for longer time budgets (300 and 900 s) indicating the robust-
ness of the conclusions and absence of 180 s time budget-related
artifacts.
The effect size of all our results is small but consistent with
our working hypotheses and each result was replicated in three
different time budgets, favoring the consistency and reliability of
our results.
Our study focused on chess but there is no reason to think
that the main of the conclusions derived here (with the excep-
tion of specific strategic patterns shown in Figure 3) are specific
to chess and hence are likely be generalized to the effect of exper-
tise on other domains of human action and decision making (i.e.,
novice car drivers focusing his/her attention only in the front road
but not in the car mirrors or novice sport players deciding their
actions based only in the ball location because they are not able to
simultaneously attend to their partners and opponents locations).
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Figure S1 | Spatial effects are also observed in longer games: 300 s time
budget. (A) Probability distributions of movement distances. As for 180 s
games (Figure 1B), probabilities to make a movement close to the
previous one are higher at short distances, for both expertise levels. (B)
Weak players made their movements closer to the previous one. The
same analysis explained for 180 s games was made for 300 s games,
obtaining similar results (see Figure 1C). Probability distributions for both
High and Low rated players were contrasted on each entry of the 15∗15
distance square independently. t-value of each independent two-sample
t-test (with p-value < 0.001, Bonferroni corrected for multiple
comparisons) is color-coded. Positive (red) t-values indicate significantly
higher probabilities for high rated players and negative (blue) values, for
weaker players. (C) Radial or Euclidean distances. Again, as in Figure 1D
for 180 s games, distances were one-dimension collapsed and the
difference between probabilities of making movements corresponding to
a distance square [P(High) – P(Low)] was plotted vs. each radial distance.
High and low rated groups distributions were independently compared in
each radial distance [two-sample t-test on each variable (D1 and D2)]. Red
asterisks (t > 5.2 for D1 and t > 4.9 for D2) indicates distances were
P(High) is significantly higher than P(Low); blue asterisks (t < −7.3 for D1
and t < −7.8 for D2), distances were P(Low) > P(High); in both p < 0.001,
Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons.
Figure S2 | Spatial effects are also observed in longer games: 900 s time
budget. (A) Probability distributions of movement distances. As for 180 s
(Figure 1B) and 300 s (Figure S1A) games, probabilities to make a
movement close to the previous one are higher at short distances (for
both expertise levels). (B) Weak players made their movements closer to
the previous one. The same analysis explained for 180 s and 300 s games
was made for 900 s games, obtaining similar results (see Figure 1C).
Probability distributions for both high and low rated players were
contrasted on each entry of the 15∗15 distance square independently.
t-value of each independent two-sample t-test (with p-value < 0.001,
Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons) is color-coded. Positive
(red) t-values indicate significantly higher probabilities for high rated
players and negative (blue) values, for weaker players. (C) Radial or
Euclidean distances. Again, as for 180 s games (Figure 1D) and 300 s
games (Figure S1C), distances were one-dimension collapsed and the
difference between probabilities of making movements corresponding to
a distance square [P(High) – P(Low)] was plotted vs. each radial distance.
High and low rated groups distributions were independently compared in
each radial distance [two-sample t-test on each variable (D1 and D2)]. Red
asterisks (t > 6.9 for D1 and t > 4.9 for D2) indicates distances were
P(High) is significantly higher than P(Low); blue asterisks (t < −5.3 for D1
and t < −5 for D2), distances were P(Low) > P(High); in both p < 0.001,
Bonferroni corrected for multiple comparisons.
Figure S3 | For longer games (300 and 900 s time budget), object-based
mechanisms also depend on expertise level. (A,B) Weak players repeat
the same piece on consecutive movements more frequently than strong
players. As for 180 s games (Figure 2A), we plotted the probability to
repeat the same piece on successive movements vs. the number of
pieces for both expertise levels for 300 and 900 s games. To quantify
these observations we first submitted the data to a Two-Way ANOVA test
with number of pieces and expertise level as independent factors and
their interactions. Results for 300 s games showed a main effect of both
factors (Expertise, p < 0.0001, F = 41.9, df = 1; Number of Pieces:
p < 0.0001, F = 61.6, df = 15 and Interaction, p < 0.0001, F = 10.1,
df = 15). Results for 900 s games showed a main effect of both factors
(Expertise, p < 0.0001, F = 197.8, df = 1; Number of Pieces: p < 0.0001,
F = 89.7, df = 15 and Interaction, p < 0.0001, F = 31.4, df = 15). We
followed these tests with independent two sample t-tests (corrected with
a strict Bonferroni criterion for multiple comparisons) for each number of
pieces left, comparing the distributions for high and low rated players.
Each value of the distribution is obtained from one of the 35 different sets
of each expertise level. All comparisons consistently showed greater
repetition probability for lower than higher rated player. For 300 s games,
this effect was significant for 7–14 pieces remaining on the board
[t(34) < −4.9, p < 0.001]. For 900 s games, this effect was significant for
8–16 pieces remaining on the board [t(34) < −6.4, p < 0.001]. Dashed
black line shows the random threshold. (C,D) Low-rated players reduce
the number of pieces more rapidly than high-rated players. As it was
previously showed for 180 s games, the number of remaining pieces over
the board is significantly higher for high rated players almost for the whole
game for both 300 and 900 s games. First, we made a two-way ANOVA
test with number of pieces and expertise level as independent factors and
their interactions showed a main effect of both factors. ANOVA results for
300 s games: Expertise, p < 0.0001, F = 1.3∗104, df = 1; Move number:
p < 0.0001, F = 3.2∗104, df = 39 and Interaction, p < 0.0001, F = 175,
df = 39. ANOVA results for 900 s games: Expertise, p < 0.0001,
F = 0.98∗104, df = 1; Move number: p < 0.0001, F = 2.2∗104, df = 39
and Interaction, p < 0.0001, F = 79, df = 39. We followed these tests
with independent two-sample t-tests (corrected with a strict Bonferroni
criterion for multiple comparisons) for each move number, comparing the
distributions for high and low rated players. All comparisons consistently
showed significant greater number of pieces almost along the whole
game [in 300 s games, move numbers 3, and 8–40, t(34) > 5, p < 0.001; in
900 s games, move numbers 3 and 7–40, t(34) > 6, p < 0.001] for high
rated players, evidencing than low rated players exchange (or loss) their
pieces more rapidly than stronger players in 300 and 900 s games.
Figure S4 | Occupation distribution of pieces throughout the game for
both expertise levels. Probabilities to find a (A) Knight, a (B) Rook, or the
(C) Queen at each square of the chess board is represented for each
rating group at different game stages (move numbers 5, 10, 20, 30, and
40). It should be noted that both groups occupy almost the same squares
along the board (there are not “exclusive” squares), but some places are
comparatively more occupied by weak or strong players (see Figure 3).
Figure S5 | Piece distribution over the board also reveals domain-specific
and expertise-dependent strategies in longer games (300 and 900 s time
budget). Probabilities to find a type of piece (normalized by the number of
remaining pieces of this type) in each square (8∗8 checkerboard) were
compared for high and low expertise groups at different game stages
(moves 5, 10, 20, 30, and 40). The t-value resulting of the two-sample
t-test (high vs. low expertise group), in each square is color coded for
those significantly different comparisons with p < 0.001 Bonferroni
corrected for multiple comparisons. Red positive values indicate
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significantly higher probabilities for strong players and blue negative
values, significantly higher probabilities for weaker players. (A,D) Knights,
(B,E) Rooks, and (C,F) Queen occupancy comparisons reveal that strong
players centralize more their knights and rooks, delaying the queen
development, compared with lower rated players delaying more the
development of knights and rooks (but not the development of the queen,
which is almost always not good) and/or occupying more advanced
squares with all. It should be noted that the this figure represents the
differential occupancy of each square, showing that strong or weak
players locate each type of piece comparatively more frequently than the
other group. (A–C) correspond to 300 s games. (D–F) correspond to 900 s
games.
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Across many domains, experts make
decisions based on the spatial relation-
ships of objects within an environment.
Firefighters, for example, need to evalu-
ate the fire in front of them, radiologists
the medical scan, and chess players the
position on the chess board before mak-
ing a decision. In order to be effective,
experts need to assess these spatial rela-
tionships quickly and despite possible
uncertainty. This ability is facilitated by
cognitive processes. According to the so-
called chunking and template theories,
this expertise is made possible by pat-
tern recognition (Gobet and Simon, 1996;
Gobet, 1997). Based on their experience
and practice, experts store in their long-
term memory meaningful configurations
of elements (i.e., patterns—chunks or
templates) in their domain of expertise.
These patterns are associated with typical
decisions and strategies. Thus, when an
expert faces a situation in their domain
of expertise, they are able to rapidly rec-
ognize patterns, which, in turn, prompt
them to consider decisions or strategies
that have been effective in previous situa-
tions. This allows experts to make superior
decisions to novices who are limited to a
real-time search through a large number
of possible options (Feltovich et al., 2006;
Gobet and Charness, 2006; Connors et al.,
2011).
Leone et al.’s (2014) elegant study adds
to existing evidence for this account. In
particular, Leone et al. demonstrate that
experts’ representation of space in their
domain of expertise is qualitatively differ-
ent to that of novices. Leone et al. focused
on chess. Chess has the advantage of being
a constrained task environment with rel-
atively high ecological validity to other
domains. Chess also has the advantage of a
precise measure of expertise in the form of
a numerical rating that is assigned to each
player on the basis of their performance
against their opponents. For these rea-
sons, a large amount of expertise research
has examined chess (Gobet and Charness,
2006). For Leone et al.’s study, chess has
the additional advantage of having large
amounts of data available: Leone et al.
examined well over 175,000 games drawn
from an internet chess server.
Given experts’ pattern recognition abil-
ity, Leone et al. predicted that experts
should make moves that were best for the
position at hand and so not be constrained
by the mere physical distance between
objects. In contrast, novices would be
more likely to make moves based on spatial
proximity to previous moves due to their
relative lack of pattern recognition and
their need to conserve cognitive resources.
Leone et al. made four specific hypotheses.
First, the authors predicted that novices
should make moves that are closer to their
or their opponent’s previous move. To test
this, they developed a novel methodol-
ogy in which they calculated the distance
between a player’s move and their previous
move, and the distance between a player’s
move and their opponent’s previous move.
Second, the authors predicted that novice
players would be more likely to move
the same piece multiple times. To test
this, they examined the frequency with
which players moved the same piece more
than once on consecutive turns. Third,
the authors predicted that novices would
be more likely to simplify the position
by exchanging pieces (capturing an oppo-
nent’s piece when the opponent can recap-
ture their own piece), thereby reducing
the cognitive load of dealing with large
numbers of pieces. To test this, they exam-
ined the rate at which pieces were removed
from the board according to the num-
ber of moves in the game. Finally, the
authors predicted that novices would be
less likely to keep with general strategic
principles (e.g., knights are more effec-
tive when centralized) than experts. To
test this, they examined the frequency
with which pieces were placed in suitable
parts of the board (e.g., knights in central
regions).
Leone et al. found evidence for all
four hypotheses. First, novices were more
likely to move pieces that were closer to
their or their opponent’s previous move
than experts. Second, novices were more
likely to move the same piece on consec-
utive turns than experts. Third, novices
were more likely to simplify positions
than experts. Finally, novices were less
likely to keep to general strategic princi-
ples than experts. Although the relative
size of the effects were small, Leone et al.
demonstrated the robustness of the effects
across very large datasets and across games
of different durations. Similar differences
between experts and novices were evident
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regardless of whether players had a total of
3, 5, or 15 min each.
Although the authors did not directly
assess the quality of the players’ decisions,
their work provides evidence that experts
base their decision on what is most mean-
ingful in a position, rather than being
limited by spatial proximity. As Leone
et al. note, these findings are consis-
tent with chunking and template mod-
els of expertise as the differences between
experts and novices exist at very short
time limits, when searching through var-
ious options is not possible. The findings
are also likely to generalize to a wide range
of other domains of expertise. In addi-
tion to revealing these effects, the work is
very important because it develops novel
methodologies for assessing spatial rela-
tionships in chess positions and across
large datasets. Indeed, Leone et al.’s use
of big data to test specific hypotheses
about cognition is particularly innovative.
In future, these methods might provide
further insight into how experts interpret
and represent space.
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Learning curves have been proposed as an adequate description of learning processes,
no matter whether the processes manifest within minutes or across years. Different
mechanisms underlying skill acquisition can lead to differences in the shape of learning
curves. In the current study, we analyze the tournament performance data of 1383 chess
players who begin competing at young age and play tournaments for at least 10 years.
We analyze the performance development with the goal to test the adequacy of learning
curves, and the skill acquisition theories they are based on, for describing and predicting
expertise acquisition. On the one hand, we show that the skill acquisition theories implying
a negative exponential learning curve do a better job in both describing early performance
gains and predicting later trajectories of chess performance than those theories implying a
power function learning curve. On the other hand, the learning curves of a large proportion
of players show systematic qualitative deviations from the predictions of either type of
skill acquisition theory. While skill acquisition theories predict larger performance gains in
early years and smaller gains in later years, a substantial number of players begin to show
substantial improvements with a delay of several years (and no improvement in the first
years), deviations not fully accounted for by quantity of practice. The current work adds
to the debate on how learning processes on a small time scale combine to large-scale
changes.
Keywords: learning curves, skill acquisition, expertise, chess, development
INTRODUCTION
Anderson (2002) drew attention to the problem of time scales
in psychology with the programmatic article Spanning Seven
Orders of Magnitude. On the one hand, acquisition of expertise
is known to takes years (e.g., Ericsson et al., 1993). On the other
hand, expertise research has a strong basis in cognitive psychology
paradigms wherein a large repertoire of laboratory tasks are used
to understand and chart changes in potential subcomponents of
expertise acquisition over minutes or hours. This includes com-
ponent skills such as verifying and storing chess patterns (Gobet
and Simon, 1996a,b,c, 1998; Campitelli et al., 2005, 2007; Bilalić
et al., 2009a), learning to discard irrelevant perceptual features
from processing (e.g., Gaschler and Frensch, 2007; Reingold and
Sheridan, 2011) or overcoming dysfunctional bindings of knowl-
edge structures (e.g., Bilalić et al., 2008a,b). Anderson suggested
that while meaningful educational outcomes take at least tens of
hours to achieve, those outcomes can be traced back to opera-
tions of attention and learning episodes at the millisecond level.
He went beyond offering the perspective that expertise acquisition
should in principle be reducible to small scale learning episodes.
Rather, Anderson suggested that the problem of linking domains
of (a) laboratory cognitive psychology/neurocognitive research
and (b) educational/developmental science should be tractable,
because small scale learning episodes would sum up to large
scale developmental/educational changes of the same functional
form. Increases in overall performance as well as increases in effi-
ciency of components (e.g., keystrokes, eye movements and fact
retrieval) over time are well described by the power function (see
also Lee and Anderson, 2001). Power functions of improvements
in simple components add up to a power-function improve-
ment at the large scale. Scalability across time-scales would offer
straightforward linking of change taking place within minutes to
change taking place over years.
The power function (as well as the negative exponential func-
tion, see Table 1 and Figure 1) describes negatively accelerated
change of performance with practice. Early in practice, the abso-
lute improvement in performance per unit of time invested is
large. Later on, the improvement per unit of time diminishes.
Apart from improvements in hour-long laboratory learning tasks,
the power function has been used to describe motor skills in
individuals differing in amount of practice on the scale of years
(e.g., up to 7 years of cigar-rolling in Crossman, 1959, see Newell
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et al., 2001 for an overview). Description of practice gains with
the power function are widespread in the literature (Newell and
Rosenbloom, 1981; Kramer et al., 1991; Lee and Anderson, 2001;
Anderson, 2002) and consistent with prominent models of skilled
performance such as ACT-R (Anderson, 1982) or the instance
model of automatization (Logan, 1988, 1992).
However, the reason for the dominance of the power func-
tion in describing the functional form of describing practice has
been debated in the literature on skill acquisition. Heathcote et al.
(2000) see also Haider and Frensch (2002) argued that the analysis
of averaged data favors the power over the exponential function
as a statistical artifact. They suggested computation of power and
exponential curves with non-aggregated data, separately for each
participant. They found an advantage of the negative exponential
function over the power function in 33 of 40 different re-analyzed
data sets with an average improvement in fit of 17%. Note that
success of a mathematical model in fitting data better than a com-
petitor model might not mean that it provides a more concise
description. Potentially, one mathematical model is more flexible
than the other, and better able to accommodate systematic as well
Table 1 | Formulas of negative exponential and power function and




Rating = A − B * Rating = A − B*













C = curvature 0.18 0.3
T = time Year 1–20 Year 1–20
as chance features in the data. Thus, further credence is lent to a
model by accurate prediction rather than fitting (i.e., without any
further parameter adjustments; cf. Roberts and Pashler, 2000; Pitt
et al., 2002; Wagenmakers, 2003; Marewski and Olsson, 2009).
It is worthwhile considering the exact shape of the learning
curve to predict future performance. Furthermore, the differ-
ences between exponential and power function are linked to
assumptions in theories of skill acquisition (see below). Figure 1
represents schematic examples of learning curves and deriva-
tives. The left panel depicts a power function and an exponential
function that start at the same level in the first year of chess tour-
nament participation and approach similar levels in year 20 of
tournament participation. The power function shows especially
strong performance gains in the first years. For instance, the gain
in rating points (e.g., Elo, 1978) in year one is about double the
size of the gain in year two. Year two still yields considerably more
performance gain as compared to year three, and so on and so
forth. Absolute gain per year is depicted in the right panel. It is
decreasing for both, the power and the exponential function. The
qualitative difference between the two types of learning curves
becomes most obvious when considering the relative learning rate
(RLR). This rate is decreasing for the power function, but remains
constant for the exponential function. In our example, the expo-
nential function has a relative learning rate of about 20%. In each
year, the players gain about 20% of the ELO points they have
not gained yet. If someone starts with 1000 and will end up with
1500 points (see Method for an explanation of the scale used in
chess), this would mean a gain of 100 points for the first year and
80 points in the second year (20% of 1500 − (1000 + 100) = 80
points).
One qualitative aspect of learning curves is that they rep-
resent the diminishing absolute payoff of practice-investment.
Exponential practice functions can be derived from a narrow
set of assumptions. As Heathcote et al. (2000) explained one
needs only to assume that learning is proportional to the time
taken to execute the component in case of a continuous mech-
anism. First, a component that takes longer to execute presents
more opportunity for learning. Second, as learning proceeds,





























Exp. abs. gain per year
Power abs. gain per year
Exp. % relave gain per year
Power % relave gain per year
A B
FIGURE 1 | (A) Schematic plot of the power function (blue lines) and negative exponential function (red lines) over 20 time points. (B) Shows the absolute
differences in performance from one time point to the next (filled symbols) and the relative learning rate (empty symbols).
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absolute learning rate decreases, resulting in exponential learning.
Similarly, for discrete mechanisms, such as chunking, exponential
learning can be explained by a reduction in learning opportu-
nity. As responses are produced by larger and larger chunks,
fewer opportunities for further composition are available. Time-
demanding control is no longer necessary for small steps but
only for scheduling sets consisting of fixed series of small pat-
terns. Naturally, the opportunities for compilation of small single
knowledge units into larger ones reduce, as more and more
patterns are already chunked.
Additional theoretical assumptions are needed to accommo-
date a decreasing RLR. For instance, Newell and Rosenbloom
(1981) see also Anderson (2002) assumed that chunks are
acquired hierarchically and that every time a larger chunk is prac-
ticed, this entails practice of its smaller components. Thus, by
practicing a knowledge unit consisting of sub-units, the sub-
units and the overall pattern are fine-tuned and strengthened.
Furthermore, at least in combinatorial environments, acquisition
proceeds ordered by chunk span. No larger span chunk is acquired
until all chunks of smaller span have been acquired.
The above research suggests that one or the other simple
learning function might be adequate to describe improvements
over long time intervals (cf. Howard, 2014). Functions known
from work on short-term skill acquisition should be relevant
to describe long-term expertise acquisition. We take chess as an
example to explore this perspective. First, longitudinal data span-
ning years of practice are available. Second, theories on expertise
in chess can be taken to suggest that scalability between small scale
learning and large scale expertise acquisition should be especially
likely to hold in this domain. Expertise development in chess
might predominantly be based on cumulatively storing more and
more patterns of chess positions (Chase and Simon, 1973; Gobet
and Simon, 1996b). Spatial (Waters et al., 2002; Connors and
Campitelli, 2014; Leone et al., 2014) and perceptual capabilities
are deemed crucial (Charness et al., 2001; Reingold et al., 2001;
Bilalić et al., 2008a,b; Kiesel et al., 2009; Bilalić et al., 2010; Bilalić
and McLeod, 2014). This suggests that attentional and learn-
ing episodes taking place at the time scale of milliseconds might
together lead to expertise acquisition. This in turn would make it
likely that expertise acquisition can be described by the learning
function exhibited during learning episodes that take place within
a single laboratory session.
In order to explore the potential of this conjecture in the cur-
rent study, we provide a descriptive analysis of the development of
chess performance in German players who start playing chess at
an early age and continue with the activity for at least 10 years.
Relevant for theoretical as well as practical purposes, the time
courses of expertise acquisition could thus potentially be pre-
dicted. Based on the shape of the curve of improvements during
the first years of expertise acquisition, one might be able to pre-
dict the time course of improvements over the years of practice to
come (Ericsson et al., 1993; Charness et al., 2005).
METHODS
DATABASE
We used archival data of the population of German play-
ers recorded by the German chess federation (Deutscher
Schachbund) from 1989 to 2007. Data were kindly provided
by the federation and analyzed in line with guidelines of the
ethics review board at Humboldt-Universität, Berlin. With over
3000 rated tournaments in a year, the German chess feder-
ation is one of the largest and the best-organized national
chess federations in the world. Given that almost all German
tournaments are rated, including events such as club champi-
onships, the entire playing careers of all competitive and most
hobby players in Germany are tracked in detail. This is par-
ticularly important because we wanted to capture the very
first stage of chess skill acquisition by focusing on the very
young chess players who just started to play chess. The German
database provides a perfect opportunity to study the initial
stages of skill acquisition because even school tournaments are
recorded.
THE MEASURE—CHESS RATING
Besides precise records of players, the German federation’s
database and chess databases in general use an interval scale, the
Elo rating, for measuring skill level. Every player has an Elo rating
that is obtained on the basis of their results against other players of
known rating (see Elo, 1978). Average players are assumed to have
rating of 1500 Elo points, experts over 2000 points, grandmaster,
the best players, over 2500. Beginners usually start at around 800
Elo points. The German database uses the same system but labels
the rating as Deutsche Wertzahl (DWZ), which is highly corre-
lated (r > 0.90) with the international Elo rating (Bilalić et al.,
2009b).
SELECTION CRITERIA AND GROUPING OF DATA ANALYZED
The German chess federation database contains records of over
124,000 players and the average rating of these players is 1387
points with standard deviation of 389 points. For all practical
purposes, the database contains the entirety of the population
of tournament chess observations in Germany (for more infor-
mation about the database, see Bilalić et al., 2009b; Vaci et al.,
2014). With interest in expertise development (rather than main-
tenance), we used the subset of data from all players who entered
the database between age 6 and 20. This population consisted of
1383 players that played competitive chess for at least 10 years.
All players took part in tournaments in each of the 10 years. To
be sure that the initial observation was indeed first entry into
competitive chess, we excluded players who were already listed
in the first year the federation started tracking players. For the
players starting young, there should have been little opportunity
for expertise acquisition prior to taking part in tournaments cov-
ered by the database. To track this issue, we split the sample into
age-groups (see Table 2 gender and age as well as for means and
standard deviations of games played, rating reached by year 10,
change in rating between year 1 and 10, and change in rating per
game played).
Note that since we are working with the entirety of tournament
chess performances in Germany since 1989, we provide descrip-
tion of the entire population of interest—chess players that played
competitive chess in Germany for at least 10 years (means,
standard deviations, correlations that allow for an estimation
of effect sizes). Generalization of findings, beyond the internal
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Table 2 | Sample characteristics and summary statistics on games played and ratings.
Age N (females) Mean age (SD) Mean total number Mean rating in Mean rating change Mean rating change
of games (SD) Year 10 (SD) from Year 1–10 (SD) per games played (SD)
6–9 173 (24) 8.3 (0.9) 359.9 (196) 1705.1 (308.2) 894 (368.6) 3.21 (1.72)
10–13 689 (72) 11.6 (1.1) 239 (135, 8) 1668.8 (268.9) 640.7 (294.9) 3.52 (2.15)
14–17 414 (22) 15.2 (1.1) 201.9 (116.1) 1660 (231.6) 457.4 (235.5) 3.04 (1.9)
18–20 107 (3) 18.8 (0.8) 180 (126.7) 1582.5 (200.6) 270.0 (201.7) 1.96 (1.5)
predictions, will have to be based on replications with other or
future databases (see e.g., Asendorpf et al., 2013).
PREDICTING AND FITTING WITH THE POWER AND EXPONENTIAL
FUNCTION
Fits were derived with constrained optimization, requiring the A
and B parameters to take sensible values (0 < B < A < 3000)
using the MATLAB Curve Fitting Toolbox. For each participant
we compared estimated and observed ratings and determined
whether the power function or the exponential function led to a
smaller squared deviation. For predictions, we only used the data
of the first 5 years to extract the parameters of the power function
and the exponential function. Then we used these parameters to
extrapolate the predicted ratings for the next years (at least 5—
each person in the sample had database entries for a minimum
of 10 years). The predicted values were then compared to the rat-
ings actually achieved. For instance, for a given participant who
played for 10 years, we took the performance in the first five,
acting as if the trajectory data of the next years were not yet avail-
able. The power function and the exponential function were fit
to the data of the first 5 years in order to obtain the parame-
ter values exemplified in Table 1. Next we used these values in
order to extrapolate for the coming years of tournament partici-
pation. These predicted values were than compared to the actual
ratings obtained. For each participant we could thus compare the
root mean square error (RMSE) between power function-based
prediction and prediction based on the exponential function.
RESULTS
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Table 2 indicates that our sample was predominantly male.
Participants starting to play tournaments younger accumulated
more games as compared to those starting at an older age. For
instance, the 6 to 9 year olds played twice as many games than
the 18 to 20 year olds. The rating reached by Year 10 was similar
across age groups. Yet, this implied a much stronger improvement
compared to Year 1 for the players starting young rather than old.
For instance, the youngest group showed trifold the increase of
the oldest group. The increase in rating relative to the number
of games played was similar across age groups (with the players
starting oldest, who showed a reduced gain per games played).
EXPONENTIAL BETTER THAN POWER FUNCTION IN PREDICTIONS
AND FITS
Figure 2 presents a random subset of individual time courses.
Despite fluctuations from one year to the next, participants
generally showed increases in skill, as measured by Elo, over years
FIGURE 2 | A random sample of individual time courses.
of chess played. Some participants showed large gains especially
in their first years. In order to systematize such observations, we
tested the capability of the power function and the exponential
function to fit and predict the observed trajectories. Prediction
is interesting for practical purposes as we can infer the skill
level someone will have after ten years of activity based on the
pattern of performance in their first years. On the other hand, pre-
diction circumvents methodological problems inherent in curve
fitting. For instance, one mathematical function might fit bet-
ter than another, because it is flexible enough to mimic the
competitor.
Across individuals from all age groups, the exponential func-
tion provided better prediction and fit to the data than the power
function (Table 3). The average RMSE and its standard devi-
ation were smaller for the exponential function than for the
power function (with exception of the prediction among those
starting chess at ages 18–20). For 88% of the players, the expo-
nential function was better in fitting the first 5 years the skill
acquisition process, and for 62% it was better in predicting the
skill level in later years. As shown in Figure 3, the distribution
of RMSE values was heavily left-skewed. For a substantial pro-
portion of participants neither the exponential nor the power
function provided an account of the dynamics of individuals’ skill
development.
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Table 3 | Average and standard deviation of RMSE per age group.
Prediction Fitting
Age Power Exponential Power Exponential
6–9 381.3 (179.9) 197.5 (127.4) 143.6 (88.7) 83 (37.8)
10–13 225.4 (135.6) 149.8 (99.3) 96 (62.8) 60.3 (28.1)
14–17 115.4 (84) 104.1 (63.3) 69.9 (45.9) 45.4 (20.4)
18–20 75.1 (48.1) 87.8 (56.7) 51.8 (30.5) 39 (19.6)
FIGURE 3 | Distribution of root mean square error (RMSE) of rating
points of the power function (blue) and exponential function (red) in
fitting the time course of the first 5 years (filled lines) vs. predicting
the time course for the next years based on the parameters derived
from fitting the first years (dotted lines).
INCREASING GAINS IN PARTICIPANTS STARTING YOUNG
We grouped players by the age they started to play tournaments
in order to explore reasons for the substantial problems in fit
and prediction encountered with both the power and exponential
functions. Potentially, players starting tournament participation
at older ages might have profited from substantial opportuni-
ties to practice chess before they entered our window of analysis.
Thus, the expected learning gains might manifest more readily in
those players that started at younger ages. Figure 4A indeed shows
that players entering tournament chess at older ages demonstrate
higher skill levels by the end of their first year, while players
entering at younger ages, start at lower levels. Most notably, how-
ever, the shape of the improvements deviates systematically from
the patterns of change that would be expected based on either
the exponential or the power function. Both learning functions
predict that participants should show a higher absolute gain in
rating points from the first to the second year compared to the
gain from the second to the third year, which in turn should
yield a higher gain as compared to the change from the third
to the fourth year, and so on and so forth. Among the subset
of players starting young, however, the contrary seemed to be
the case (see also Figure 4B for difference values). Over the first
years of tournament participation, the absolute amount of gain
per year increased rather than decreased. The deviation from the
expected learning curve might be related to year-to-year varia-
tions in practice. For example, the players starting young may,
at first, participate in very few tournaments, and then, in the
next few year, increase in the number of tournament games they
take part in. This is indeed the case (Figure 4C). Therefore, it is
conceivable that the amount of practice which increases over the
years accounts for the dynamics of the skill increase—only once
the players starting young take part in more and more games,
their skill might start to increase in the manner predicted by
the learning curves. As we do not possess any further data on
changes in the amount of practice per year (i.e., off tournament
practice), we cannot conclusively judge this account. However, at
least we can state that the increase in the number of tournament
games played cannot fully account for the dynamics. As shown in
Figure 4D, the change in rating per year per number of tourna-
ment games played also shows an increase over the first years for
players starting young.
FLUCTUATIONS IN GAMES PLAYED PER YEAR RELATE TO MISFIT WITH
POWER FUNCTION
It is conceivable that the misfit and inaccurate prediction of the
power and the exponential functions are related to variability in
the number of games played per year. While we only examined
the subset of players who played in tournaments in each of the 10
years tracked, the number of games per year might have fluctu-
ated. We computed the within-person (intraindividual) standard
deviation of games played per year, assuming that fits should
be optimal if the number of games a player takes part in does
not change over the years. This index is equivalent to comput-
ing the deviation from a zero-slope line in numbers of games
played. Table 4 shows the Spearman rank order correlation of
intraindividual variability in number of games played per year
with the RMSE obtained from fitting and predicting ratings based
on the power function and the exponential function. The corre-
lations suggest that larger intraindividual variability in number
of games played per year was weakly but consistently related to
worse fit in case of the power function (while the pattern was less
consistent for the exponential function). A similar pattern was
observed when correlating the overall number of games played to
accuracy in prediction and fitting. Participants who played more
games showed worse fits compared to participants who played less
games. This was likely the case, because the number of games
played over the ten years (a count variable) was closely linked
to the intraindividual variability in games per year (Spearman
correlations ranging between 0.84 and 0.88 across the four age
groups).
Figure 4C suggests that variability in number of games played
per year is not purely random. Instead it can be based on
an ordered pattern (inverted U-shape). Separately for each age
group, we took the average profile in number of games played per
year (displayed in Figure 4C) as a prototypical pattern. Then, we
determined for each participant the profile correlation between
his/her pattern of numbers of games played with the average
pattern of the respective age group. Our analyses suggested that
there was substantial variability, with some participants following
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FIGURE 4 | (A) Charts the average time course in tournament
performance for players starting at 6–20 years of age. (B) Shows the
time course of the gain in performance from one year to the next for
the different starting-age groups. In (C) the time course of number of
tournament games played per year is charted for the different
starting-age groups. (D) Shows the time course of the improvement in
tournament performance from year to year relative to the number of
tournament games played in the respective year.
the pattern represented in the group mean and others deviat-
ing from it. Median within-person correlations per age group
were r = 0.58, 0.5, 0.47, and 0.19. The percentage of individu-
als showing a negative correlation with the prototypical pattern
was 9.8, 15.2, 19.6, and 31.8%. However, as suggested by Table 4,
the extent to which the dynamics of an individual’s number of
games played per year was represented by the average pattern of
the age group was not systematically related to the accuracy in
power function or exponential function fits and predictions.
OFF-THE-CURVE PATTERNS IN 2/3rds OF THE SAMPLE
We sought to provide descriptive data on the number of partic-
ipants who deviated from the predictions of the learning curves
by showing smaller rather than larger rating gains during their
early as compared to their later years of tournament participa-
tion. For this we sorted individuals into tertiles based on the total
gains achieved during the first 3 years (lowest, medium, and high-
est rating gains). As shown in Figure 5A, the third of players with
the lowest gains even showed small decreases in rating during the
first years, while only the individuals with the largest gain yielded
performance changes in line with the predictions by the learn-
ing curves (i.e., larger gain per year in early rather than late years,
compare Figure 5B). Players that did not improve in their first
three tournament years caught up to some extent in later years,
but did not reach the same level by year 10 as those players with
a steep increase early on. Thus, irrespective of complex dynamics
of the shape of the performance curve, the first years do seem to
offer a proxy for predicting the level a player will eventually reach.
COHORT DIFFERENCES
There have been many changes in resources available for chess
players since 1989. We analyzed the time course in development
of chess ratings separately for different cohorts in order to explore
whether deviations from the pattern predicted by the learning
curves varied in relation to the historical period that a chess
career was started. Deviations from the learning curve were not
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Table 4 | Spearman rank order correlations of (a) indices of regularity
in numbers of games played per year with (b) the fitting and
prediction error.
Age Prediction Fitting
Power Exponential Power Exponential
SD of games per
year
6–9 0.13 −0.22 0.29 −0.05
10–13 0.14 −0.16 0.45 0.20
14–17 0.22 0.02 0.36 0.24
18–20 0.18 0.20 0.47 0.44
Overall number of
games
6–9 0.22 −0.30 0.37 −0.01
10–13 0.21 −0.14 0.50 0.21
14–17 0.24 −0.02 0.39 0.22
18–20 0.18 0.23 0.56 0.48
Prototypical profile
in games per year
6–9 −0.03 −0.36 0.21 −0.02
10–13 −0.06 −0.17 0.06 −0.06
14–17 0.04 −0.08 0.08 0.05







FIGURE 5 | (A) Charts the average time course in tournament performance
for players starting at 6–20 years of age grouped by improvement over the
first three years. (B) Shows the change in ELO per year.
Years played
FIGURE 6 | Average time course in tournament performance for
players starting at 6–20 years of age grouped by birth cohort
(1970–1990). Due to small n (11) we dropped the 14–17 year old starters
born between 1970 and 1975.
accounted for by cohort. Rather, for all 5-year cohorts from 1970
to 1990 and age-groups displayed in Figure 6, the increase in rat-
ing during the first years of performance was linear or positively
accelerated. The pattern of negative acceleration (larger gains in
earlier as compared to later years, compatible with the learning
curves) was not observed.
Age-groups and cohorts differed more with respect to the rat-
ing level they started out with (i.e., reached by end of their first
year) than with respect to their level of performance in Year
10. As already observable in Figure 5A, people starting to play
tournaments at younger age, started out at a lower level. In addi-
tion, Figure 6 shows that later cohorts started at lower levels.
This might be taken to suggest that players starting young in late
cohorts are the best candidates to track trajectories in chess per-
formance based on tournament ratings, while ratings of players
starting older and earlier cohorts might be shaped more strongly
by off-tournament practice.
GAIN IN RATING FROM GAMES PLAYED
The above analyses suggest that the success of the power func-
tion and the exponential function in predicting development of
chess performance might be rather limited due to quantitative
and qualitative misfit. Furthermore, the number of tournament
games played seemed to be linked to deviations from the learn-
ing curve. Therefore, we sought to describe the extent to which
early vs. late years in playing tournament chess are related to
gain in rating as well as performance level reached by Year 10.
For this we used games played per year and gain in rating per
year. We applied Spearman rank order correlations separately for
each age group and year of tournament participation. Figure 7A
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FIGURE 7 | Spearman rank order correlations per age group between performance variables taken from single years and rating gain per year (A,B) or
overall rating gain (C,D).
shows that number of games played per year is related to between-
person differences in gain in rating. Participants playing more
tournament games in a year tend to show a larger increase in rat-
ing compared to those playing less games. This holds consistently
across age-groups and especially so for early years of tournament
participation. However, diminishing returns seem to be observ-
able with respect to the extent to which more tournament games
can lead to an increase in rating. Figure 7B shows that the rela-
tionship between (a) games played per year and (b) gain per
games played per year can become negative. Thus, overall it does
not seem to be the case that playing more tournament games can
lead to an increase in efficiency in taking gains in rating from
a tournament game. For instance, those players starting tourna-
ment participation at age 10–13 who played more tournament
games, seemed to show a reduced gain in rating per tournament
game played in their middle years.
The gain in rating that players show from Year 1 to Year 10
can be predicted by gain in rating per year in early years of
tournament participation. As depicted in Figure 7C, gain in later
years is less predictive of the overall increase in rating. While the
power and the exponential function would have predicted that we
can observe large gains in rating in early years, we thus, somewhat
analogously, observer a larger predictive power of between-person
differences in early as compared to late years of chess tournament
participation. Apart from the gain per year, also the gain per year
relative to the number of games played per year could be used
to predict the overall increase in rating between Year 1 and 10
(Figure 7D). Participants who, during the first years of tourna-
ment participation, efficiently increased their rating per games
played, ended up at a higher performance level than those, who
did not show a large gain per games played during early years.
SELECTIVE ATTRITION
Finally, we checked for selective attrition. While in our main
analyses we only used 10 years of subsequent tournament partic-
ipation, some participants provided records for additional years
(up to 19 years overall). Rank order correlations indicated that
the number of overall years of tournament participation per age
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group was neither systematically related to gain between Year 1
and Year 10, nor the gain in rating within the first 3 years (rs
between −0.10 and 0.16).
DISCUSSION
In the current work we have explored the potential of the power-
and the negative exponential learning functions to account for the
development of chess performance measured in ratings based on
tournament outcomes. In line with re-evaluations of the power
law of practice (Heathcote et al., 2000; Haider and Frensch, 2002),
we documented that the exponential function was better than the
power function in fitting and predicting the time course of chess
ratings over years of practice. However, a crucial aspect shared by
both of these mathematical functions and the underlying theories
of skill acquisition was not reflected in the data. While accord-
ing to the power- as well as the negative exponential function
players should achieve large absolute gains early in practice and
small gains later in practice, this was not the case for many of
the participants. Rather, many players started to show substantial
improvements only after their first years of tournament participa-
tion. They were playing off the learning curves suggested by skill
acquisition theories. If expertise acquisition is not well described
by learning functions used to describe skill acquisition, the link-
ing of underlying cognitive processes of attention and learning
that proceed on time-scales measuring milliseconds to hours with
learning processes that proceed on time-scales measured in years
seems much less straightforward than one could have hoped for
(i.e., Anderson, 2002).
Many players showed an acceleration of gain in rating in the
first years of tournament participation, followed by a decelera-
tion. Based on the power function and the exponential function
we would have expected to only find the latter. Newell et al.
(2001) suggested to mathematically and conceptually accommo-
date such findings by assuming a mixture of learning processes
taking place on different time scales. Acceleration followed by
deceleration could be captured by a sigmoid function that con-
sists of two exponential components, a positive (acceleration)
and a negative one (deceleration). Learning opportunities and
efficiency in using them might increase during first years of tour-
nament performance for many players, while in later years returns
of investing in chess performance are diminishing. In line with
this view, year-long trajectories of skill acquisition might be better
understood from a perspective that takes lifespan-developmental
and educational changes into account (Li and Freund, 2005).
For instance, players starting to take part in tournaments at a
young age are likely to promote changes in self-regulation strate-
gies available (Lerner et al., 2001; Freund and Baltes, 2002) and
acquire the potential to shape their social and learning environ-
ment. Their ability to learn about chess from (foreign language)
media and options to travel to and communicate with other play-
ers will increase. Deliberate practice (cf. Ericsson et al., 1993)
might require that young players develop skills to competently
use of their motivational resources, by, for instance, scheduling
work on skill acquisition such that as many of the activities as
possible are intrinsically motivating (cf. Rheinberg and Engeser,
2010 as well as Christophel et al., 2014, for training of motiva-
tional competence). Underlining this challenge, Coughlan et al.,
2014 reported that participants in the expert group of their study
rated their practice as more effortful and less enjoyable compared
to other participants. The experts were successful in improving
performance, by predominantly practicing the skill they were
weaker at. However, such gains in potential to learn might for
many players no longer compensate for the physical and social
changes faced during puberty (Marceau et al., 2011; Hollenstein
and Lougheed, 2013), at the end of adolescence, during sec-
ondary education, family formation or labor force participation.
Future research should thus try to simultaneously account for
development in the individual, the opportunities provided by the
environment (cf. Ram et al., 2013) and to model different trajec-
tories in one framework (e.g., Grimm et al., 2010; Ram and Diehl,
in press).
For skill acquisition mechanisms such as chunking, negative
exponential learning can be explained by a reduction in learning
opportunities (cf. Heathcote et al., 2000). The later in practice, the
fewer chunks are yet to be learned. While a deceleration of learn-
ing should be observed late in practice, such an account does not
preclude that strong increases in learning opportunities early in
practice can lead to an acceleration of chunks acquired per time
invested. It appears that, for at least some players, opportunities
and efficiency in increasing chess performance are already fully
present at the time they start to play tournaments. They start at
the turning point of the sigmoid function. The “upper” negative
exponential portion of the sigmoid is sufficient to describe their
performance gains, which are large in their early years and then
diminish as performance approaches the asymptote. For other
players, both positive and negative exponential portions of the
sigmoid function are needed to represent the dynamics of their
chess performance over time. These players appear to be less sat-
urated with respect to learning opportunities and efficiency when
starting to take part in tournaments covered by the database. They
thus first show an acceleration in rating gains per year, followed
by the deceleration when approaching asymptote.
In line with these speculations, Howard (2014) reported
an average trajectory of rating increases showing deceleration
only for International Chess Federation (FIDE) players (rather
than acceleration followed by deceleration). The shape of the
curve reported by Howard matches the exponential curve from
Figure 1A. Starting at an average of about 2200 points, the sam-
ple mean increased beyond 2500 points with practice. Different
from the database used in the current study, the threshold to be
listed in the FIDE database is high (cf. Vaci et al., 2014 for a
discussion of problems implied by restriction of range in chess
databases). Likely, players were already taking full advantage of
opportunities to improve chess performance when entering the
database so that an acceleration in rating gain with practice was
no longer possible. Descriptive analyses suggest that the dynamic
in rating improvement that players at the international level show
with practice seems consistent with the negatively accelerated
exponential function. As implied by the exponential function, the
relative learning rate (RLR) estimated based on the average data
published by Howard (2014) is constant. While the power func-
tion should lead to a decrease of RLR with practice (cf. Heathcote
et al., 2000), the RLR is fluctuating around 20%. Focusing on
the first half of practice in order to avoid inflation of RLR at the
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end of the practice curve, we obtained an r = 0.11 correlation
of RLR with time point. Thus there was no hint toward a
decrease.
Our correlational analyses suggest that interindividual vari-
ability in rating gain over the course of ten years of tournament
participation can be predicted by between-person differences in
performance during the first years. Even by taking data from sin-
gle years, number of games played, rating points gained or rating
points gained per games played, allow to predict overall gain at
a moderate level. While the power and the exponential learn-
ing curve would suggest that the first years of practice should
be important because of the large performance gains, we thus
can somewhat analogously conclude that the first years are more
important than later years for predicting between-person differ-
ences in performance level reached on the long run (cf. Ackerman
and Woltz, 1994).
We focused on examining changes in rating with year of prac-
tice (rather than number of games played, cf. Howard, 2014).
This allowed us to explore changes in rating gain and rating gain
per games played with age and cohort. Yet, a direct compari-
son of the capability to capture performance change is lacking
so far for the two potential time scales, (1) number of games
played, (2) chronological time in years, as well as (3) a mixture
of both scales. Several issues are worth considering when explor-
ing the complexity of models needed to account for expertise
acquisition over years, as compared to models of skill acquisi-
tion in hour-long laboratory sessions. In the lab, quantity and
quality of practice per unit of time is usually well controlled. In
skill acquisition processes outside the lab they might vary con-
siderably over the years of practice an individual engages in. In
addition, potential cohort differences should not be neglected (cf.
Gobet et al., 2002; van Harreveld et al., 2007; Connors et al.,
2011). Future work should consider how data on both, quan-
tity of practice and quality of practice, can be used to explain
the time course of chess skill development (cf. Baker et al., 2003;
Charness et al., 2005; Gobet and Campitelli, 2007; Howard, 2014).
Apart from obtaining data on the amount of off-tournament
learning opportunities, available data sets could be used to gauge
variability in specific aspects of the learning opportunities. For
instance, taking part in tournaments with large spread in oppo-
nent strength might provide more opportunities for improve-
ment as compared to tournaments with more homogenous
competitors.
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Bilalić, M., McLeod, P., and Gobet, F. (2009a). Specialization effect and its influ-
ence on memory and problem solving in expert chess players. Cogn. Sci. 33,
1117–1143. doi: 10.1111/j.1551-6709.2009.01030.x
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The role of practice in the acquisition of
expertise has been a key research question
at least since Bryan and Harter’s (1899)
study on expertise in Morse telegraphy,
which proposed that it takes 10 years
to become an expert. The framework of
deliberate practice (Ericsson et al., 1993)
has taken an extreme position by deny-
ing the role of talent in most domains and
stating that superior performance is an
increasing monotonic function of delib-
erate practice—the more goal-oriented
practice, the higher the level of skill. For
example, Ericsson et al. (1993) argue that
“individual differences in ultimate perfor-
mance can largely be accounted for by
differential amounts of past and current
levels of practice” (p. 392). The deliber-
ate practice framework has captured the
imagination of the popular press, as can
be seen by the publication of several pop-
science books such as Talent is Overrated
(Colvin, 2008), Outliers (Gladwell, 2008)
and Bounce (Syed, 2011).
In recent years, this framework has
been criticized in academic circles; for
example, in retrospective studies, the
amount of deliberate practice accounts
for only about one third of the vari-
ance in expertise in music and in chess
(Hambrick et al., 2014). More naturalis-
tic data also question the validity of the
framework. As top performers have spent
similar number of hours to improve and
maintain their skills, the fact that indi-
viduals such as Roger Federer in ten-
nis, Michael Jordan in basketball, Usain
Bolt in sprint or Michael Schumacher
in auto racing have so outrageously
dominated their sport throws consider-
able doubt on the deliberate practice
framework.
A particularly spectacular example is
provided by chess grandmaster Magnus
Carlsen (Norway), who became world
champion in classic chess in November
2013 by beating Viswanathan Anand
(India) and who also became world
champion in rapid chess (15 min +
10 s additional time per move) and
speed chess (3 min + 2 s additional
time per move) in June 2014. In the
June 2014 rating list published by the
World Chess Federation (http://ratings.
fide.com/toparc.phtml?cod=309), 23-year
old Carlsen is ranked first with 2881
points1. This is just one point below 2882,
the highest rating in chess history that
Carlsen held in May 2014. There is a 66-
point difference between him and the sec-
ond player, grandmaster Levon Aronian
(Armenia, 2815 points; see Table 1). This
difference is nearly the same as that
between the 2nd and the 14th player in
the list (63 points), Dutch grandmaster
Anish Giri (2752 points). Table 1 shows
the rating of Carlsen and of the ten play-
ers following him in the list. A one-sample
t-test confirms that Carlsen’s rating is sta-
tistically different from the next ten grand-
masters (M = 2780.6), t(9) = −19.38, p <
0.001, mean difference = −100.4; 95% CI
[−112.1, −88.7]. One hundred points is a
considerable difference: it is half a standard
deviation in skill and means that, against
1 To measure chess players’ skill level, the World Chess
Federation (FIDE) uses the rating scale developed by
Elo (1978), which is an interval scale that computes
players’ rating as a function of their results against
other players of known rating. The scale has a nor-
mal distribution with a theoretical mean of 1500 and
a standard deviation of 200 points. Grand Masters are
typically rated above 2500 points. The best players of
the world have around 2800 points and the weakest
players less than 1200 points.
the very best players in the world, Carlsen’s
probability of winning is 63.7%.
To test the monotonic assumption, we
collected information from the internet
and biographies about the age at which
these grandmasters started playing chess
and about their current age (see Table 1).
Starting age is a good approximation of
when players started practicing seriously
(i.e., using some form of deliberate prac-
tice), as most of these players obtained
outstanding results in youth competitions
a few years after starting playing chess,
and indeed obtained the grandmaster title
rapidly. In the case of Carlsen, he has stated
that he had learned the rules at 5 years
but started practicing seriously only at
8 years (see Gobet and Campitelli, 2007)2.
To be consistent, we used starting age
anyway. (Note that this bias adds years
of deliberate practice, and thus is in a
favor of the monotonic assumption.) If the
monotonic assumption is correct, Carlsen
should have accumulated more hours of
deliberate practice than the other play-
ers, given the way he dominates the chess
world. We did find that Carlsen’s num-
ber of years of deliberate practice (18
years) is different to the average of the
following ten best players in the world
(M = 24.6 years), t(9) = 2.83, p < 0.05,
mean difference = 6.6 years; 95% CI [1.33,
11.87]. However, this result is exactly the
opposite of what is predicted by deliber-
ate practice: on average, Carlsen practiced
statistically significantly fewer years than
the other players. (Note also that, for the
players in Table 1, the correlation between
2 Ericsson et al. (2007) explanation that prodigies’ high
levels of performance can be accounted for by the
amount of deliberate practice made possible by a very
early start does not apply in Carlsen’s case.
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Table 1 | Rank, country, rating, starting age, current age, and number of years of practice of the 11 top players in the world (June 2014).
Rank Name Country Rating Starting age Current age Number of years of practice
1 Carlsen, Magnus Norway 2881 5 23 18
2 Aronian, Levon Armenia 2815 9 31 22
3 Grischuk, Alexander Russia 2792 4 30 26
4 Caruana, Fabiano Italy 2791 5 21 16
5 Anand, Viswanathan India 2785 6 44 38
6 Kramnik, Vladimir Russia 2783 5 38 33
7 Nakamura, Hikaru USA 2775 7 26 19
8 Topalov, Veselin Bulgaria 2772 7 39 32
9 Karjakin, Sergey Russia 2771 5 24 19
10 Vachier-Lagrave, Maxime France 2762 4 23 19
11 Dominguez Perez, Leinier Cuba 2760 8 30 22
Source: http:// ratings.fide.com/ toparc.phtml?cod=309.
rating and the number of years of practice
is negative (r = −0.21) but not statistically
significant (p = 0.55)).
In this analysis, we have assumed that,
at the top level, all players practice with
extreme dedication and with the best
training methods available. If expertise
was solely a monotonic function of prac-
tice, then it follows that Carlsen, who
learned the rules at age of five but started
playing chess seriously at the relatively old
age of eight, should be much weaker than
most of the ten players that follow him
in the international rating list, as these
opponents had time to clock in substan-
tially more deliberate practice (on aver-
age, at least 6.6 years more). The fact that
Carlsen dominates the chess world so out-
rageously, being world champion not only
in classic chess but also in rapid chess and
in blitz, refutes this hypothesis, central to
the theory of deliberate practice.
Several objections can be leveled at
this analysis. We discuss three of them,
and show that they do not invalidate our
argument. First, Carlsen’s prodigious skill
throughout adolescence and early adult-
hood may not be as remarkable as it first
appears, as numerous young players per-
form better that their older competitors.
For example, Howard (1999) has shown
that the top chess players are increasingly
younger. Key changes have taken place in
the last decades that enable more efficient
practice (Gobet et al., 2002). In partic-
ular, the quality and quantity of chess
books have dramatically increased over
the last decades, and chess programs and
computer databases have revolutionized
training methods. That more efficient
deliberate practice should lead to quicker
progress is consistent with Ericsson et al.’s
(1993) framework. However, as all play-
ers in the Table have benefitted from these
improvements in training, this factor does
not explain away Carlsen’s superiority.
Second, it could be argued that, just
like in sport, age plays an important role
in chess and youth will give an edge
to younger top competitors. It is known
that the effects of ageing occur depress-
ingly early with cognitive variables such
as reasoning, visualization and processing
speed, peak performance being observed
in the early to mid-twenties (Salthouse,
2009). However, whether this is a key fac-
tor in chess is unclear, as six of the absolute
top players shown in Table 1 are 30 years
old or older. In addition, Gary Kasparov
and Viswanathan Anand were still world
champions when they were 37 and 44 years
old, respectively. In any case, in Table 1
the correlation between age and rating
(r = −0.21) is not statistically significant
(p = 0.54), but Carlsen is reliably younger
than the other ten top players, t(9) = 3.16,
p < 0.05, mean difference = 7.6 years;
95% CI [2.16, 13.04]. Nevertheless, the age
variable does not explain why Carlson is so
clearly better than the four players who are
roughly his age.
Third, Carlsen might have engaged in
more intense deliberate practice. Although
we do not know the details of Carlsen’s
training, this is unlikely, in particular if
we use Ericsson et al.’s (1993) criterion
that deliberate practice is not enjoyable.
In a recent interview, Carlsen said that
“in chess training, I do the things I enjoy.
I don’t particularly enjoy playing against
computers, so I don’t do that” (Anders,
2014). In addition, he is a keen sportsman,
with a penchant for playing or watching
football rather than practicing chess inten-
sively (Sujatha, 2013).
Thus, the question arises, in the risk
of offending the proponents of deliber-
ate practice: Does Carlsen have a par-
ticular talent for chess? The answer to
this question is so obvious in the chess
world that it is not even posed—Carlsen
is known as the “Mozart of chess.” Several
factors support the hypothesis of talent.
Carlsen showed clear signs of intellectual
precocity early in his life. At the age of
five, he knew “the area, population, flag,
and capital of all the countries of the
world,” and memorized similar informa-
tion for all Norway’s 430 municipalities
(Agdestein, 2004, p. 10). He became a
grandmaster just five years after starting
playing chess seriously, at the age of 13
years and 148 days3. He has also adopted a
highly unconventional approach to chess.
While most grandmasters specialize in
specific openings that they study at great
length (Chassy and Gobet, 2011), often
using computers, Carlsen plays a wide
range of openings and avoids known vari-
ations, even accepting inferior positions
as a consequence of this choice. Rather
than preparing lengthy opening varia-
tions, he relies on his uncanny ability to
find near-optimal moves in middle games
and endgames. Together with scientific
research, the case of Magnus Carlsen
3 This contradicts another key prediction of the delib-
erate practice framework: “More specifically, expert
performance is not reached with less than 10 years of
deliberate practice” (Ericsson et al., 1993, p. 372).
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demonstrates that deliberate practice is
necessary, but not sufficient, for achiev-
ing high levels of expert performance
(Campitelli and Gobet, 2011).
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Deliberate practice (DP) is a task-specific structured training activity that plays a key role in
understanding skill acquisition and explaining individual differences in expert performance.
Relevant activities that qualify as DP have to be identified in every domain. For example,
for training in classical music, solitary practice is a typical training activity during skill
acquisition. To date, no meta-analysis on the quantifiable effect size of deliberate practice
on attained performance in music has been conducted. Yet the identification of a
quantifiable effect size could be relevant for the current discussion on the role of
various factors on individual difference in musical achievement. Furthermore, a research
synthesis might enable new computational approaches to musical development. Here
we present the first meta-analysis on the role of deliberate practice in the domain of
musical performance. A final sample size of 13 studies (total N = 788) was carefully
extracted to satisfy the following criteria: reported durations of task-specific accumulated
practice as predictor variables and objectively assessed musical achievement as the target
variable. We identified an aggregated effect size of rc = 0.61; 95% CI [0.54, 0.67] for the
relationship between task-relevant practice (which by definition includes DP) and musical
achievement. Our results corroborate the central role of long-term (deliberate) practice for
explaining expert performance in music.
Keywords: deliberate practice, music, sight-reading, meta-analysis, expert performance
INTRODUCTION
Current research on individual differences in the domain of
music is surrounded by controversial discussions: On the one
hand, exceptional achievement is explained within the expert-
performance framework with an emphasis on the role of struc-
tured training as the key variable; on the other hand, researchers
working in the individual differences framework argue that (pos-
sibly innate) abilities and other influential variables (e.g., working
memory) may explain observable inter-individual differences (see
Ericsson, 2014 for a detailed discussion). The expert-performance
approach is represented by studies by Ericsson and cowork-
ers (e.g., Ericsson et al., 1993) who assume that engaging in
relevant domain-related activities, especially deliberate practice
(DP), is necessary and moderates attained level of performance.
Deliberate practice is qualitatively different from work and play
and “includes activities that have been specially designed to
improve the current level of performance” (p. 368). In a more
comprehensive and detailed definition, Ericsson and Lehmann
(1999) refer to DP as a
“Structured activity, often designed by teachers or coaches with
the explicit goal of increasing an individual’s current level of
performance. (· · · ) it requires the generation of specific goals
for improvement and the monitoring of various aspects of
performance. Furthermore, deliberate practice involves trying to
exceed one’s previous limit, which requires full concentration and
effort.” (p. 695)
In other words, we have to distinguish between mere experience
(as a non-directed activity) and deliberate practice. An individ-
ual’s involvement with a new domain entails the accumulation
of experience, which may include practice components and lead
to initially acceptable levels of performance. However, only the
conscious use of strategies along with the desire to improve will
result in superior expert performance (Ericsson, 2006). Note that
in most studies DP is only indirectly estimated using durations of
task-relevant training activities that also include an unspecified
proportion of non-deliberate practice components. The unre-
flected use of the “accumulated deliberate practice” concept to
denote durations of accumulated time spent in training activities
is therefore misleading, because the measured durations might
theoretically underestimate the true effect of deliberate practice
on attained performance. In the context of classical music per-
formance, the task-relevant activity can often consist of some
type of solitary practice (e.g., studying repertoire or practicing
scales) or the execution of a particular activity in a rehearsal or
training context (e.g., sight-reading at the piano while coach-
ing a soloist; receiving lessons). The theoretical framework for
the explanation of expert and exceptional achievement has been
validated in various domains and is widely accepted nowadays
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(Ericsson, 1996), as evidenced by the extremely high citation fre-
quencies of key publications in this area. For example, according
to Google Scholar, the study by Ericsson et al. (1993) has been
cited more than 4000 times in the 20 years since its publication.
As an internationally known proponent of research on giftedness,
Ziegler (2009) concludes that even modern conceptions of gifted-
ness research have integrated the perspective of expertise theory.
However, controversial discussions persist (see Detterman, 2014).
In contrast, researchers relying more on talent-based
approaches maintain that DP might not explain individual
differences in performance sufficiently and emphasize innate
variables as the explanation for outstanding musical achievement,
such as working memory capacity (Vandervert, 2009; Meinz and
Hambrick, 2010), handedness (Kopiez et al., 2006, 2010, 2012),
sensorimotor speed (Kopiez and Lee, 2006, 2008), psychometric
intelligence (Ullén et al., 2008), intrinsic motivation (Winner,
1996), unique type of representations (Shavinina, 2009), or
verbal memory (Brandler and Rammsayer, 2003). According to
Ericsson (2014), the predictive power of additional factors, such
as general cognitive abilities, is usually of small to medium size
and diminishes as the level of expertise increases.
Although expertise theory provides convincing arguments for
the importance of structured training on expert skill acquisi-
tion and achievement, no comprehensive quantification for the
influence of DP on musical achievement has been presented so
far. A first and highly commendable attempt to estimate the
“true” (population) effect of DP via estimates of durations of
accumulated practice on musical achievement was published by
Hambrick et al. (2014) who identified a sample of eight studies for
their review. However, their methodology, assumptions, and use
of the term DP raise some issues that have to be resolved. These
open questions and concerns spawned our initial motivation for
the present meta-analysis.
REANALYSIS OF DATA PRESENTED IN Hambrick et al. (2014)
First, we carefully studied the publication by Hambrick et al.
(2014) (Table 1). Using Table 3 of their paper, we extracted
the correlations between training data and measures of music
performance and entered these data into a meta-analysis soft-
ware (Comprehensive Meta-Analysis, see Borenstein, 2010). This
analysis brought to light an aggregated efffect size value of r = 0.44
for the influence of training data on musical performance (see
Table 1, for details). According to Cohen’s (1988) benchmarks,
this corresponds to a large overall effect (see also Ellis, 2010, p. 41).
Unlike Hambrick et al. (2014), we did not use the correlation
values corrected for measurement error variance (attenuation
correction) in the present paper because their correction of con-
fidence intervals relied on the biased Fisher’s z transformation (see
Hunter and Schmidt, 2004, Ch. 5) and not on the corrected sam-
pling error variance for each individual correlation as suggested by
Hunter and Schmidt (2004, Ch. 3). Therefore, to allow for later
comparisons, we decided to use the uncorrected (attenuated)
correlation as the basis for our analysis of heterogeneity.
The effect size, however, is not the only relevant parameter
in a meta-analysis, and it should be examined in the light of a
possible publication bias. To test for the strength of the result-
ing effect size estimate, we conducted a test for heterogeneity for
Table 1 | Aggregation of data from Table 3 in Hambrick et al. (2014) for
the reanalysis of effect sizes regarding the influence of deliberate
practice on music performance.
Study N Variance r (95% CI) Relative
weight [%]
Lehmann and Ericsson, 1996 16 0.07 0.36 (−0.17, 0.73) 2.15
Meinz, 2000 107 0.01 0.41 (−0.24, 0.56) 17.22
Tuffiash, 2002 135 0.01 0.58 (−0.46, 0.68) 21.85
Kopiez and Lee, 2008 52 0.02 0.25 (−0.03, 0.49) 8.11
Ruthsatz et al., 2008—study 1 178 0.01 0.34 (−0.20, 0.46) 28.97
Ruthsatz et al., 2008—study 2A 64 0.01 0.31 (−0.07, 0.52) 10.10
Ruthsatz et al., 2008—study 2B 19 0.06 0.54 (−0.11, 0.80) 2.65
Meinz and Hambrick, 2010 57 0.02 0.67 (−0.50, 0.79) 8.94
MEAN AGGREGATED EFFECT SIZE
Fixed effect model 0.44 (−0.37, 0.50)
Random effects model 0.44 (−0.33, 0.55)
Aggregation of studies shows a large (I2 = 60.3%) and significant heterogeneity
(Q(7) = 17.7, p < 0.02).
the underlying sample of studies. Following Deeks et al. (2008),
the I2 value describes the percentage of variance in effect size
estimates that can be attributed to heterogeneity rather than to
sampling error. The I2 value of 60.3 obtained for the Hambrick
et al. (2014) sample of studies implied that it “may represent
substantial heterogeneity” (Deeks et al., 2008, p. 278). The main
reason for possible heterogeneity, in our opinion, could be a
less selective inclusion with resulting inconsistent predictor and
target variables. For example, in their study on the acquistion
of expertise in musicians, Ruthsatz et al. (2008) used inconsis-
tent (non-standardized) indicators for the estimation of musical
achievement that made it difficult to compare the observed dif-
ferences in performance: In Study 1, the band director’s audition
scores for each of the high school band members were ranked and
used as individual indicators of musical achievement; in Study
2A, audition scores from the admission exam were used as the
outcome variable; and in Study 2B, a music faculty member
rated the students’ general musical achievement. In no instance
was a standardized performance task used as the target vari-
able. Unfortunately, no information was reported on the rating
reliabilities.
Although our reanalysis of Hambrick et al.’s (2014) review con-
firmed a large effect size for the relation between training data
and musical achievement, this finding still underestimates the
“true” value. In order to arrive at a convincing effect size for
deliberate practice in the domain of music we also aggregated
studies, but invested great effort in the selection of studies for our
meta-analysis. As will be shown below, our meta-analysis was not
affected by potential publication bias and heterogeneity. We also
applied transparent and consistent criteria for study selection as
this is one of the most important prerequisites for the aggregation
of studies.
CHOICE OF METHOD
Two methods are available to evaluate past research: (a) a narra-
tive and systematic review and (b) a meta-analysis. The narrative
reviewer uses published studies, reports other authors’ results in
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his or her own words and draws conclusions (Ellis, 2010, p. 89).
A systematic review is also sometimes referred to as a “quali-
tative review” or “thematic synthesis” (Booth et al., 2012) and
necessitates a comprehensive search of the literature. The disad-
vantage of this approach is that it depends on the availability
of results published in established journals and tends to show
a publication bias toward the Type I error (false positive). The
reason for this is that journals prefer to publish studies with sig-
nificant results, and negative findings or null results have a lower
probability of publication (Masicampo and Lalande, 2012). In
the field of music, narrative reviews on the influence of DP on
musical achievement play an important role and have been con-
ducted in the last two decades (Lehmann, 1997, 2005; Howe et al.,
1998; Sloboda, 2000; Krampe and Charness, 2006; Lehmann and
Gruber, 2006; Gruber and Lehmann, 2008; Campitelli and Gobet,
2011; Hambrick and Meinz, 2011; Nandagopal and Ericsson,
2012; Ericsson, 2014).
The other approach is that of a meta-analysis. Here, studies
are included following “pre-specified eligibility criteria in order
to answer a specific research question” (Higgins and Green, 2008,
p. 6). Within the meta-analytic approach, studies’ effect sizes have
to be weighted before they are aggregated. Every study’s effect size
weight then reflects its degree of precision as a function of sam-
ple size (Ellis, 2010). Consequently, studies with smaller sample
sizes, particularly in combination with larger variation, will result
in smaller weights compared to studies with larger sample sizes
and more narrow variation. These weights of the individual stud-
ies then function as estimators of precision. If these weights differ
markedly from each other, statistical heterogeneity is present. The
final result of a meta-analysis is the weighted mean effect size
across all studies included. Compared to an individual study’s
effect size, this weighted mean effect size represents a more pre-
cise point estimate as well as an interval estimate surrounding
the effect size in the population (Ellis, 2010, p. 95). Moreover,
a meta-analysis generally increases statistical power by reducing
the standard error of the weighted average effect size (Cohn and
Becker, 2003). Researchers who use meta-analysis techniques have
two goals: First, they want to arrive at an interval of effect size
estimation in a population based on aggregated effect sizes of
individual studies; second, they want to give an evidence-based
answer to those questions that reviews or replication studies can-
not give in part due to their arbitrary collection of significant and
insignificant results.
Despite the fact that meta-analyses have been shown to be an
important constituent for the production of “verified knowledge”
(Kopiez, 2012), they have only recently been applied to various
topics in music psychology (e.g., Chabris, 1999; Hetland, 2000;
Pietschnig et al., 2010; Kämpfe et al., 2011; Platz and Kopiez, 2012;
Mishra, 2014). To date, there has been no formal meta-analysis
concerning the influence of DP on attained music performance.
GOAL OF THE PRESENT STUDY
The aim of our study was two-fold: First, by means of a systematic
literature review we wanted to identify all relevant publications
that might help us answer the question of how strongly task-
specific practice influences attained music performance. Second,
we wanted to quantify the effect of DP on music performance in
terms of an objectively computed effect size. This effect size is an
important component for the development of a comprehensive
model for the explanation of individual differences in the domain
of music. Although this meta-analysis is supposed to reveal the
“true” effect size of deliberate practice on musical achievement,
for theoretical reasons it is possible that it is still underestimating
the upper bound of deliberate practice (see Future Perspectives).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The study was conducted in three steps: First, to arrive at a
relevant sample of selected studies, we conducted a systematic
review (Cooper et al., 2009) that helped to control for publica-
tion bias (Rothstein et al., 2005). In the second step, we identified
each study’s predictor and outcome variable in line with Ericsson
(2014), and we identified all artifactual confounds that might
attenuate the studies’ outcome measures (Hunter and Schmidt,
2004, p. 35). Third, we carried out a meta-analysis of individually
corrected (disattenuated) correlations as well as a quantifica-
tion of its variance (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004; Schmidt and
Le, 2005) to obtain the true mean score correlation (ρ) between
music-related practice and musical achievement.
SAMPLE OF SELECTED STUDIES
Our sample of selected studies for the subsequent meta-analysis
was the outcome of a systematic literature search which had led to
a preliminary corpus of selected studies (see Figure 1A). Due to a
wide variety of methodological approaches, and for the purpose
of later generalizability of our meta-analytical results, we decided
to select only studies with comparable experimental designs.
Therefore, in the next step of generating a sample, we excluded
all studies from the preliminary corpus that did not meet all of
our selection criteria (see Figure 1B). Consequently, our prelim-
inary corpus of n = 102 studies dwindled to the final sample of
n = 13 studies which served as input for the meta-analysis.
LITERATURE SEARCH
The acquisition of studies for our systematic review derived from
(a) the search for relevant databases of scientific literature, (b)
queries of conference proceedings, and (c) personal communi-
cations with experts in the field of music education or musical
development. First, a database backward and forward search for
literature was conducted in January 2014 (Figure 1A). To control
for publication bias (see Rothstein et al., 2005), we considered a
large variety of databases for our literature search: peer-reviewed
studies in the field of medical and neuroscientific (PubMed),
psychological (PsycINFO), educational (ERIC), social (ISI), and
musicological research (RILM). To avoid an overestimation of the
effect size due to possibly unpublished results (Rosenthal, 1979),
so-called “gray literature” (Rothstein and Hopewell, 2009) with
often non-significant study results, we also searched doctoral dis-
sertations (DAI), proceedings or newspaper articles (PsycEXTRA)
as well as book chapters containing psychological study results
(PsycBOOKS).
Studies were excluded from the preliminary corpus if they did
not conform with at least one of the following three descrip-
tors (Figure 1A): (1) “music” AND “deliberate practice,” (2)
“music” AND “formal practice,” (3) “music” AND “expertise.”
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FIGURE 1 | Arriving at a study sample for the meta-analysis. In the first
step (A), a search for literature was based on selected descriptors applied to
eight data bases. This resulted in a preliminary corpus of 102 studies. In the
second step (B), studies were evaluated and selected for meta-analysis
according to seven criteria. N = 13 studies matched all criteria and were
included into the meta-analysis.
In addition, we included in the preliminary corpus those music-
related studies which cited Ericsson et al.’s (1993) first extensive
review of skill acquisition research. Finally, authors who had con-
ducted experimental studies on predictors of music achievement
were contacted and queried for currently unpublished correla-
tional data involving music-related deliberate practice and musi-
cal achievement. In total, our initial literature search resulted in a
preliminary corpus of 102 studies (Figure 1A).
CRITERIA-RELATED LITERATURE SELECTION
While Hambrick et al. (2014) performed a more intuitive search,
resulting in a significant heterogeneity of the study sample, the
aim of our method was to arrive at a homogenous sample of
pertinent studies. To this end, we selected studies based on objec-
tive criteria which we derived from the theoretical framework
of expert performance according to Ericsson et al. (1993). Thus,
studies were successively removed from the preliminary corpus of
studies if they did not meet all the criteria shown in Figure 1B. As
a result of our study selection (see Table 2), we identified studies
which met the following 6 criteria: (1) they followed a hypothesis-
testing design; (2) they contained a correlation between accumu-
lated deliberate practice and a corresponding task-related level of
musical achievement; (3) the amount of relevant practice had to
be accrued across at least 1 year, (4) musical performance had to
be measured by means of objective criteria such as a computer-
based assessment (e.g., scale analysis by Jabusch et al., 2004) or
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expert evaluation based on psychometric scales (e.g., Hallam,
1998). (5) Furthermore, studies were excluded if they did not
contain sufficient statistical information for effect size calculation
or estimation. (6) Finally, in the case of duplicate publication of
data (as happens when original articles are also published in chap-
ter form), study results were considered only once for effect size
aggregation in the meta-analysis.
Following our selection criteria n = 89 studies had to be
excluded from our preliminary corpus. Our final sample size was
thus n = 13 studies, comprising results from peer-reviewed stud-
ies as well as “gray” literature from 1992 to 2012 (see Table 2).
For comparison, Hambrick et al.’s (2014) sample size of studies
included in his review was n = 8.
PROCEDURE
According to Hunter and Schmidt (2004, p. 33), the aim of a
psychometric meta-analysis is two-fold: namely, to uncover the
variance of observed effect sizes (s2r )—in our study, this was the
variance of observed correlations between the task-related prac-
tice (predictor) and musical achievement (outcome variable)—





. The use of the term “psychometric”
refers to the idea in classical testing theory (Gulliksen, 1950) that
every observed correlation is subject to an attenuation due to the
imperfect measurement of variables, sampling error, and further
artifacts (for an overview see Hunter and Schmidt, 2004, p. 35). If
the influence of all such artifactual influences on an observed cor-
relation are known (ro), each study’s correlation can be corrected
first for its individual attenuation bias (rc). In a subsequent step,
the population variance of the “true” correlation (σ2ρ) is estimated
by subtracting the observed variance of corrected correlations
(s2rc ) from the observed variance attributable to all attenuating
factors (s2ec ). In the case of a perfect concordance between the
observed variance of corrected correlations (s2rc ) and the observed
Table 2 | Studies, included in meta-analysis.
ID Study Comments
Kornicke, 1992 Kornicke, L. E. (1992). An exploratory study of individual difference variables in piano
sight-reading achievement (Doctoral Dissertation, Indiana University, Ann Arbor, USA).
Available from ProQuest Dissertations and Theses database. (UMI No. 9301458).
Ericsson et al., 1993—Study II Ericsson, K. A., Krampe, R. T., and Tesch-Römer, C. (1993). The role of deliberate
practice in the acquisition of expert performance. Psychological Review 100, 363–406.
Two studies reported; only
data of study II was
considered.
Lehmann and Ericsson, 1996 Lehmann, A. C., and Ericsson, K. A. (1996). Performance without preparation: structure




Krampe, R. T., and Ericsson, K. A. (1996). Maintaining excellence: deliberate practice
and elite performance in young and older pianists. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
General 125, 331–359.
Two studies reported; only
data of study I was
considered.
Hallam, 1998 Hallam, S. (1998). The predictors of achievement and dropout in instrumental tuition.
Psychology of Music 26, 116–132.
Meinz, 2000 Meinz, E. J. (2000). Experience-based attenuation of age-related differences in music
cognition tasks. Psychology and Aging 15, 297–312.
Tuffiash, 2002 Tuffiash, M. (2002). Predicting individual differences in piano sight-reading skill:
practice, performance, and instruction. Unpublished master’s thesis, Florida State
University, Tallahassee, FL.
McPherson, 2005 McPherson, G. E. (2005). From child to musician: skill development during the
beginning stages of learning an instrument. Psychology of Music 33, 5–35.
Author contacted for data.
Jabusch et al., 2007 Jabusch, H.-C., Yong, R., and Altenmüller, E. (22–23 Nov. 2007). Biographical predictors
of music-related motor skills in children pianists. Paper presented at the International
Symposium on Performance Science, Porto.
Kopiez and Lee, 2008 Kopiez, R., and Lee, J. I. (2008). Towards a general model of skills involved in sight
reading music. Music Education Research 10, 41–62.
Jabusch et al., 2009 Jabusch, H. C., Alpers, H., Kopiez, R., Vauth, H., and Altenmüller, E. (2009). The
influence of practice on the development of motor skills in pianists: a longitudinal study
in a selected motor task. Human Movement Science 28, 74–84.
Meinz and Hambrick, 2010 Meinz, E. J., and Hambrick, D. Z. (2010). Deliberate practice is necessary but not
sufficient to explain individual differences in piano sight-reading skill: the role of
working memory capacity. Psychological Science 21, 914–919.
Kopiez et al., 2012—Study II Kopiez, R., Jabusch, H.-C., Galley, N., Homann, J.-C., Lehmann, A. C., and Altenmüller,
E. (2012). No disadvantage for left-handed musicians: the relationship between
handedness, perceived constraints and performance-related skills in string players and
pianists. Psychology of Music 40, 357–384.
Two studies reported; only
data of study II was
considered.
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variance attributable to all artifacts (s2ec ), there is no population
variance left to be explained (σ2ρ = 0). Then all studies’ effect
sizes in the meta-analysis are homogenous and assumed to derive
from one single population effect (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004, p.
202). Therefore, we will first identify each study’s theoretically
appropriate predictor and outcome variable as well as reliability
information for both variables in order to calculate effect size and
estimate artifactual influence.
IDENTIFICATION OF PREDICTORS AND OUTCOME VARIABLES
Although accumulated deliberate practice on an instrument has
been identified as a generally important biographical predictor
in the acquisition of expert performance (Ericsson et al., 1993),
it is sometimes erroneously considered a catch-all predictor for
achievement in music-specific tasks. However, as Ericsson clearly
states, “it is not the total number of hours of practice that mat-
ter, but a particular type of practice [emphasis by the third author,
AL] that predicts the difference between elite and sub-elite ath-
letes” (Ericsson, 2014, p. 94). For example, according to Lehmann
and Ericsson (1996) as well as Kopiez and Lee (2006, 2008),
sight-reading performance as a domain-specific task of musical
achievement should be less well predicted by accumulated generic
deliberate practice in piano playing (i.e., solitary practice) than
by the accumulated amount of task-specific deliberate practice
in the field of accompanying and sight-reading. Therefore—
and in contrast to Hambrick et al.’s (2014) procedure—for each
study we identified the most corresponding predictor variable.
For example, the researcher might have summed up the num-
ber of pieces sight-read (Kornicke, 1992, p. 133), determined
the size of the accompanying repertoire (Lehmann and Ericsson,
1996, p. 29), counted the number of accompanying performances
(Meinz, 2000, p. 301), reported cumulated piano accompanying
performances (Tuffiash, 2002, p. 81), calculated the accumulated
sight-reading expertise until the age of 18 (Kopiez and Lee, 2008,
p. 49) or aggregated the durations of accompaniment and hours
of specific sight-reading practice (Meinz and Hambrick, 2010, p.
3). Information on the task-specific accumulated practice dura-
tion until the age of 18 or 20 years was used in the case of Ericsson
et al. (1993, p. 386), Krampe and Ericsson (1996, p. 347), and
Kopiez and Lee (2008, p. 49). In the absence of such data, we used
the total accumulated practice time (at the time of the data collec-
tion) instead (e.g., in the case of Hallam, 1998, p. 124; McPherson,
2005, author contacted for data; Jabusch et al., 2007, p. 366; and
Kopiez et al., 2012, p. 372).
In addition to the predictor variable, the measurement of
the outcome variable should be representative of the investi-
gated skill (Ericsson, 2014). Consequently, inter-onset evenness in
scale-playing as well as performed (rehearsed) music were iden-
tified as truly domain-specific tasks of musical achievement in
our sample of studies on music performance. Here, participants’
performances were measured either by a reliable psychologi-
cal evaluation based on psychometric scale construction (e.g.,
Kornicke, 1992) or by an objective, computer-based, physical
measurement such as obtaining the number of correctly per-
formed notes (e.g., Lehmann and Ericsson, 1996) or identifying
the inter-onset evenness of scale-playing (e.g., Ericsson et al.,
1993; Krampe and Ericsson, 1996; Jabusch et al., 2007). In the
case of multiple tasks, as was the case in Ericsson et al. (1993, p.
386) as well as in Krampe and Ericsson (1996, p. 347), we decided
to choose the task with the stronger measurement reliability, the
highest difficulty and the highest discrimination ability for musi-
cal achievement (different movements with each hand (Ericsson
et al., 1993, p. 386), simultaneously [Exp. 1], see Krampe and
Ericsson, 1996).
RELIABILITY OF IDENTIFIED PREDICTORS AND OUTCOME VARIABLES
For the purpose of adjusting the correlation coefficient of the
observed studies for attenuation, the measurement error in the
predictor as well as in the outcome variable had to be identified
(Hunter and Schmidt, 2004, p. 41). As shown in Table 3, only a
small number of studies reported information on the reliability
for either the predictor or the outcome variable. Specifically, only
Tuffiash (2002, p. 36) reported test-retest reliability in cumulative
piano accompaniment performance (rxx = 0.91) for the quan-
tification of measurement error in the predictor variable. His
test-retest reliability estimations were similar to those reported
in Bengtsson et al. (2005, p. 1148), who stated a mean test-retest
reliability rxx = 0.89 for the estimation of accumulated deliber-
ate practice obtained from retrospective interviews. Thus, when
no reliability was reported for the predictor variable, we used the
mean correlation of test-retest reliability according to Bengtsson
et al. (2005) to estimate the imperfection of the predictor
variable.
To quantify measurement error in the outcome variable, we
used the Cronbach’s alpha reported in Kornicke (1992, p. 109)
for the inter-rater reliability of the sight-reading test and in
McPherson (2005, p. 13) for performing rehearsed music. In
Krampe and Ericsson (1996, p. 339) and Meinz and Hambrick
(2010, p. 4), Cronbach’s alpha of the construct reliability for the
psychometric measurements could be copied from the respective
papers. Finally, in the case of Tuffiash (2002, p. 28) we computed
a mean correlation on the basis of all the test-retest reliabilities of
sight-reading tests the author reported. For studies in which no
measurement error was stated for the outcome variable, we esti-
mated the reliability of the outcome variable’s measurement: To
estimate the reliability of experts’ performance ratings for the out-
come variable in Lehmann and Ericsson (1996) and Kopiez and
Lee (2008), we used the intercorrelations between the expert judg-
ment of overall impression and the amount of correctly played
notes (ryy = 0.88) as reported in Lehmann and Ericsson (1993, p.
190). In the cases of Ericsson et al. (1993), Jabusch et al. (2007,
2009) and Kopiez et al. (2012), we estimated ryy = 0.91 as the
construct reliability according to Spector et al. (in revision); they
computed a mean correlation of test-retest reliability for Jabusch
et al.’s (2004) measurement of note-evenness in scale playing. The
same test-retest reliability of the scale-analysis by Spector et al.
(in revision) was used for the estimation of the test-retest relia-
bility for the ABRSM in Hallam (1998). Along the lines of Bergee
(2003), we underestimated the disattenuated correlation by using
ryy = 0.91 and obtained a more conservative correction. Finally,
a reliability estimate of ryy = 0.96 for Meinz (2000) was commu-
nicated by the author and also reported in Hambrick et al. (2014,
p. 6). In summary, all studies showed a weak attenuation with a
1–17% downwards bias (see Table 4, column A).
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Table 3 | Reported effect size data on the relationship between indicators of deliberate practice and objective measurement of musical
achievement.
ID Study design Effect size data
Sample Predictor Performance measure Sig. report Reliability*
n r p rxx ryy
























(until age of 20)
Evenness of inter-onset
intervals
48 −0.62 <0.01 0.97
Hallam, 1998 Beginners Accumulated practice
time

















Expert ratings of music
performances
135 0.426 <0.01 0.91 0.75
McPherson, 2005 Beginners Accumulated practice
time (over 3 years)
Expert rating of performed
rehearsed music
99 0.568 <0.01 0.92









(until age of 18)






























+Absolute values were used in meta-analysis.
◦Aggregated correlation based on all four correlations between accumulated deliberate practice and outcome variable.
◦◦Aggregated correlation based on two reported correlations between accumulated life-time deliberate practice and outcome variable.
◦◦◦According to Lehmann and Ericsson (1996) the mean correlation of accompaniments (r = 0.63) and hours of deliberate sight-reading practice (r = 0.48) was used
as task-specific predictor for sight-reading performance.
*Reliability coefficients reported in studies; assumed reliability (if not reported) of predictor variable used for attenuation correction in meta-analysis: rxx = 0.89;
assumed reliability (if not reported) of outcome variable (ryy ) for attenuation correction in meta-analysis: Ericsson et al., 1993 (ryy = 0.91), Lehmann and Ericsson,
1996 (ryy = 0.88), Hallam, 1998 (ryy = 0.91), Meinz, 2000 (ryy = 0.96), Jabusch et al., 2007 (ryy = 0.91), Kopiez and Lee, 2008 (ryy = 0.88), Jabusch et al., 2009
(ryy = 0.91), Kopiez et al., 2012 (ryy = 0.91).
STATISTICAL REANALYSIS AND META-ANALYSIS WITH
CORRELATIONS CORRECTED FOR ARTIFACTS
All studies reported correlations that could be used for quantify-
ing the effect of deliberate practice on the musical achievement
(see Table 3). Meinz and Hambrick (2010) reported multi-
ple predictors of sight-reading skill along the theoretical out-
line for the acquisition of sight-reading skill (Lehmann and
Ericsson, 1996; Kopiez and Lee, 2006). We aggregated the two
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predictors, number of accompanying events/activities (r = 0.63)
and hours of sight-reading practice (r = 0.48), into a mean
correlation (r = 0.56) to be used as a global predictor for
sight-reading performance (see Table 3). As a result of a 2 ×
2 experimental design, four correlations of pianists’ accumu-
lated task-specific practice times and scale performances were
reported in Kopiez et al. (2012). Again, the four individual cor-
relations
(
rLi = −0.47; rLo = −0.23; rRi = −0.46; rRo = −0.50
)
were aggregated to the study’s effect size (r = −0.42) (Kopiez
et al., 2012, Table 6 on p. 372; see comment on negative values
below). Finally, in the case of Jabusch et al. (2009, p. 77), two
correlations between total life-time practice and music perfor-
mance (as measured by evenness in scale playing on various dates
with a distance of 1 year; r1 = −0.47; r2 = −0.40) were reported.
We calculated and used the mean correlation (|r| = 0.44) in our
meta-analysis.
Jabusch et al.’s (2004) scale-playing paradigm generally
resulted in negative correlations (see Table 3). Since the authors
report the median of the scale-related inter-onset interval stan-
dard deviation (medSDIOI) as an indicator for evenness, a low
medSDIOI signals high evenness. A positive association between
accumulated practice times and the medSDIOI can still be pos-
tulated: the longer the pianist’s deliberate practice durations,
the smaller the degree of unevennes. For the sake of simplicity
we used the absolute values of the correlations reported in our
meta-analysis (this also applies to Ericsson et al., 1993; Krampe
and Ericsson, 1996; Jabusch et al., 2007, 2009; Kopiez et al.,
2012).
Finally, the observed correlations as well as the reliabilities of
predictor and outcome variables were entered into the Hunter-
Schmidt Meta-Analysis software (Schmidt and Le, 2005) so that
we could correct all observable correlations for artifacts (Hunter
and Schmidt, 2004, p. 75) within the meta-analysis and estimate
the population correlation for the “true” effect size (see Table 4).
RESULTS
STATISTICAL PROCEDURE
The observed correlation (ro) for each study was transformed into
its disattenuated rc value. This disattenuation procedure is based
on the assumption that the observed correlation (ro) comprises
the “true” value plus the influence of a measurement error that
depends on the reliability of both the predictor (rxx) and out-
come (ryy) variable. According to Hunter and Schmidt (2004),
the ro value has to be corrected for limited reliability of both vari-
ables, and this correction is implemented in the Hunter-Schmidt
Meta-Analysis Programs (see Schmidt and Le, 2005). Detailed
results with all steps and for each study are shown in Table 4.
It is remarkable that 81.2% of the complete variance in all cor-
rected correlations was attributable to the artifacts, a finding
which leaves no residual variance to be explained (for an expla-
nation, see Hunter and Schmidt, 2004, p. 401). In other words,
our meta-analysis is based on an homogenous corpus of data
(Q(12) = 8.19, p = 0.77; I2 = 0.00%) which is the outcome of
a careful sampling and study selection, guided by the criteria
of task-specific practice and objective measurements of music
performance.
Table 4 | Statistical values of the meta-analysis.
ID N ro Reliability A Var(eo) Var(ec) w Weight [%] rc
rxx ryy
Kornicke, 1992 73 0.50 0.89 0.99 0.94 0.01 0.01 64.32 10.10 0.53
Ericsson et al., 1993—study II 24 0.86 0.89 0.91 0.90 0.02 0.03 19.44 3.05 0.96
Lehmann and Ericsson, 1996 16 0.72 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.03 0.04 12.53 1.97 0.81
Krampe and Ericsson, 1996—study I 48 0.62 0.89 0.97 0.93 0.01 0.01 41.44 6.51 0.67
Hallam, 1998 109 0.67 0.89 0.91 0.90 0.00 0.01 88.28 13.87 0.74
Meinz, 2000 107 0.57 0.89 0.96 0.92 0.00 0.01 91.42 14.36 0.62
Tuffiash, 2002 135 0.43 0.91 0.75 0.83 0.00 0.01 92.14 14.47 0.52
McPherson, 2005 99 0.57 0.89 0.92 0.90 0.01 0.01 81.06 12.73 0.63
Jabusch et al., 2007 30 0.46 0.89 0.91 0.90 0.02 0.02 24.30 3.82 0.51
Kopiez and Lee, 2008 52 0.36 0.89 0.88 0.88 0.01 0.01 40.73 6.40 0.41
Jabusch et al., 2009 19 0.44 0.89 0.91 0.90 0.03 0.03 15.39 2.42 0.49
Meinz and Hambrick, 2010 57 0.56 0.89 0.99 0.94 0.01 0.01 50.22 7.89 0.60
Kopiez et al., 2012—study II 19 0.42 0.89 0.91 0.90 0.03 0.03 15.39 2.42 0.47
N, sample size; ro, observed correlation (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004, p. 96); rxx , reliability of predictor variable (error of measurement in the predictor variable, Hunter
and Schmidt, 2004, p. 96); ryy , reliability of outcome variable (error of measurement in the outcome variable, Hunter and Schmidt, 2004, p. 96); A, attenuation
factor (ro/rc , Hunter and Schmidt, 2004, p. 118); Var(eo), sampling error variance of each study’s uncorrected correlation (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004, p. 87); Var(ec),
sampling error variance of each study’s corrected correlation (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004, p. 119); w, study weight (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004, p. 125); rc , corrected
study correlation (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004, p. 118); weighted mean observed correlation ro = 0.54 (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004, p. 81); frequency-weighted average
squared error S2r = 0.01 (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004, p. 81); mean true score correlation ρ = 0.61 (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004, p. 125); variance of true score
correlations S2ρ = 0 (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004, p. 126); observed variance of the corrected correlations S2rc = 0.01 (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004, p. 126); variance in
corrected correlations attributable to all artifacts S2ec = 0.01 (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004, p. 126); complete variance in corrected correlations (81.2%) is attributable
to all artifacts (Hunter and Schmidt, 2004, p. 401); Q-test on study homogeneity as well as I2 suggest no significant variation across studies (I2 = 0.00; Q(12) =
8.19, p = 0.77).
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MAIN OUTCOME
The result from 13 studies regarding the effect of the indica-
tors of DP on musical achievement is summarized in Figure 2
using a forest plot. Our meta-analysis yielded an average aggre-
gated corrected effect size of rc = 0.61, with CI 95% [0.54, 0.67].
According to Cohen’s benchmarks (1988, p. 80), this corresponds
to a large effect. The size of the squares in the forest plot indi-
cates each study’s weight and error bars delimit the 95% CI. The
remarkably strong relationship between task-specific practice and
musical achievement as measured by objective means is only one
facet of the aggregated and corrected correlations. Another facet
of the results is the 95% CI as a measure of dispersion for the
population effect which is rather narrow [0.54, 0.67] and positive.
This feature indicates the stability of our finding. The forest plot
also shows that the aggregated correlation is not biased by one or
two studies with extreme relative weights. Rather, a total of 4 stud-
ies (Hallam, 1998; Meinz, 2000; Tuffiash, 2002; McPherson, 2005)
with high relative weights contribute 50% to the aggregated result.
TEST FOR PUBLICATION BIAS
Evidence suggests that due to their selective decision processes
and preference for significant results, peer-reviewed journals only
partially reflect research activities (Rothstein et al., 2005). This
so-called publication or availability bias is an indicator for the
existence of unpublished results, and it is a sign of how strongly
those unpublished studies could influence the results of a meta-
analysis. To detect the presence of a systematic selection bias of
publications, we used the so-called funnel plot (Egger et al., 1997)
(see Figure 3). If publication bias is present, the distribution of
results will form an asymmetrically shaped funnel. Fortunately,
Figure 3 shows a nearly symmetrical distribution of effect sizes in
relation to the standard error (the indicator of precision). With
the exception of one, the effect sizes lie within the funnel’s shape
and are centered symmetrically around the aggregated mean of
rc = 0.61. Such considerably low bias is one of the strengths of
our meta-analysis and the result of carefully defined criteria for
inclusion (see Figure 1).
DISCUSSION
One of the main results of our meta-analysis is the identification
of a reliable, aggregated correlation between task-relevant prac-
tice and objectively measured musical achievement. Although the
central parameter of our analysis of 13 studies is similar to the
one calculated by Hambrick et al. (2014) on the basis of 8 stud-
ies, there are some marked differences between both approaches.
Our results may currently represent the best estimate of this
correlation given the published data and methodological tools.
COMPARISON OF OUR FINDINGS TO THOSE BY Hambrick et al. (2014)
An important step in the use of correlation coefficients in meta-
analyses is the correction for attenuation (Hunter and Schmidt,
FIGURE 3 | Funnel plot of studies’ effect sizes (rc ) against standard
error of effect sizes as a test for publication bias.
FIGURE 2 | Forest plot of corrected effect sizes for individual studies and of the aggregated mean effect size (rc = 0.61, 95% CI [0.54, 0.67]) based on
the total number of N = 788 participants. Error bars indicate 95% CI; the size of the squares corresponds to the relative weight of the study.
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2004). It considers the reliability of the outcome and predictor
variables in a study. Although we chose conservative estimates
of reliability for the disattenuation procedure in the present
paper, our resulting correlation value is higher (rc = 0.61) than
Hambrick et al.’s (2014) (rc = 0.52), and it covers a smaller con-
fidence interval (95% CI [0.54, 0.67]) compared to theirs (95%
CI [0.43, 0.64]). Therefore, we conclude that our meta-analysis is
a more reliable approximation of the “true” correlation between
task-relevant practice (including DP) and musical achievement.
In some instances, the predictors we used were different from
those Hambrick et al. (2014) had used for their study. For
example, they selected the value of ro = 0.25 from the sight-
reading study by Kopiez and Lee (2008). However, this correlation
between task-relevant study (i.e., sight-reading expertise) and
actual sight-reading achievement was based on the lifetime accu-
mulated practice time in sight-reading (up to the time of data
collection). In line with the criteria for the calculation of accu-
mulated practice time employed in Ericsson et al. (1993); Ericsson
et al. (Study II, see Table 3), and for reasons of comparability, we
used the correlation between accumulated sight-reading exper-
tise up to the age of 18 years and sight-reading performance (ro =
0.36; Kopiez and Lee, 2008) for our meta-analysis. Life-time accu-
mulated practice durations were only used when no information
on the task-specific accumulated practice time until the age of 18
or 20 years could be obtained from the studies. We believe that
the careful selection of studies and variables based on selection
criteria of objective measurement for the outcome (performance)
variable and clear calculations of accumulated practice durations
are the main reasons for the differences between Hambrick et al.’s
results and ours.
THE ROLE OF POSSIBLE FURTHER MODERATING VARIABLES ON
PERFORMANCE
The discussion on the influence of variables other than study
durations that might influence musical achievement is ongoing
and interesting. Here, we wish to comment on the tendency of
authors to use headings for publications that can be misleading
for the uninformed reader. For example, Meinz and Hambrick
(2010) insinuate that there might be (heritable) variables which
have a significant influence on musical achievement, and they
suggest working memory capacity as such an influential factor.
Yet, their main finding regarding the central role of various forms
of relevant practice on sight-reading achievement (within a range
from ro = 0.37 to 0.67) implies that working memory capacity
can only contribute a smaller proportion of the variance (ro =
0.28). Although the authors conclude “that deliberate practice
accounted for nearly half of the total variance in piano sight-
reading performance” (Meinz and Hambrick, 2010, p. 914), the
article title, “Limits on the Predictive Power of Domain-Specific
Experience and Knowledge in Skilled Performance,” defames the
role of deliberate practice. A second case is the publication by
Ruthsatz et al. (2008) in which the authors found a low corre-
lation between general intelligence (IQ) and musical achievement
of ro = 0.25 (Study 1), 0.11 (Study 2A), and −0.01 (Study 2B)
but a large one between accumulated practice time and musi-
cal achievement (ro = 0.34 [Study 1], 0.31 [Study 2A], and 0.54
[Study 2B]). Their combination of “other” variables exceeds the
influence of deliberate practice times only when the aggregated
correlations of IQ and music audiation are compared with the
influence of the individual predictor of practice. However, it is
well-known that Gordon’s tests of audiation (AMMA), which
Ruthsatz uses, is influenced by musical experience and thus
already captures effects of DP. In light of such findings, the
authors’ claim that “higher-level musicians report significantly
higher mean levels of characteristics such as general intelligence
and music audiation, in addition to higher levels of accumulated
practice time” (Ruthsatz et al., 2008, p. 330) is grossly misleading.
Another argument for a differentiated view of our findings
arises from the erroneous interpretation of r (or rc) values as r2
values known from common variance. For example, Hambrick
et al. (2014, p. 7) state: “On average across studies, deliberate
practice explained about 30% of the reliable variance in music
performance.” However, according to Hunter and Schmidt (2004,
p. 190), this is a problematic interpretation with regard to findings
from a meta-analysis, because the r2 value is “related only in a very
nonlinear way to the magnitudes of effect sizes that determine
their impact in the real world.” Instead, relationships between
variables should be interpreted in terms of linear relationships.
Therefore, we could illustrate the relevance of our meta-analytical
finding by means of a correlation simulation based on a sample
size of N = 788 and a given correlation of rc = 0.61. Figure 4
displays this simulation with the linear increase of one unit on
the x-axis corresponding to an increase of musical skill level or
achievement by 0.61 units. If we expressed this in terms of an
experimental between-groups design, this rc value of 0.61 would
translate to a Cohen’s d of 1.52 which implicates a very large effect
(Ellis, 2010, p. 16). In our view, this is a strong argument for the
eminent importance of long-term DP for skill acquisition and
achievement.
FIGURE 4 | Illustration of the (linear) correlation (rc = 0.61) between
indicators of DP and musical achievement based on a simulation with
N = 788 normal distributed cases with a mean of 0. An increase of 1
unit on the x-axis corresponds to an increase of 0.61 units on the y -axis.
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In summary, it is incorrect to interpret our findings (rc =
0.61) as evidence that DP explains 36% of the variance in attained
music performance. Instead, it is correct to state that the currently
trackable correlation between an approximation of deliberate
practice with indicators such as solitary study or task-relevent
training experiences is related to measurements of music perfor-
mance with rc = 0.61.
FUTURE PERSPECTIVES
Currently, there is a lack of controlled empirical studies based
on the expertise theory in the domain of music. This problem
is reflected in the small number of studies (N = 13) conducted
over the last 20 years which matched the rigorous selection cri-
teria of our meta-analysis. One of the main challenges in the
future will therefore be to extend the base of reliable experi-
mental data. This means that studies should use state of the
art measurements of relevant deliberate practice durations (e.g.,
year-by-year retrospective reports, diaries etc.) and objective and
reliable assessments of performance variables (e.g., preferably
hard performance measurements or consensual expert ratings of
performance achievements). All of this was demanded many years
ago (e.g., Ericsson and Smith, 1991). The use of standardized
performance tasks (e.g., intact performance such as sight-reading
with a pacing voice or isolated subskills such as scale playing
at a given speed) with the objective measurement of perfor-
mance and additional information on their reliabilities will be
mandatory for investigating the “true” relationship between task-
specific practice and musical achievement. This demand under-
scores Ericsson’s (2014, p. 16) claim that “the expert-performance
framework restricts its research to objectively measurable perfor-
mance. It rejects research based on supervisor ratings and other
social indicators. . . .” Consequently, self-reports on abilities, the
rating of a musican’s skill level by an orchestra’s conductor, and
reports of parents about their child’s level of achievement are not
acceptable as objective indicators of performance. The question
of whether the expert performance framework generalizes to the
general population also awaits investigation (Ericsson, 2014). As
our findings are currently limited to music, it will be necessary to
cross-validate them with meta-analytic findings in other domains
of expertise, such as sports or chess. The likelihood of their being
generalizable is high, though, due to the methodological rigor of
our study.
One general problem for the domain of music is that time
estimations of practice durations are only approximate indicators
of deliberate practice, which by definition only constitutes opti-
mized practice and training activities. If we were able to identify
the actual amount of deliberate practice inherent in the dura-
tional estimates that currently also include suboptimal practice
activities, especially in sub-expert populations, then the aggre-
gated correlations could certainly be higher than rc = 0.61.
Solitary practice might also not cover all aspects of deliberate
practice (e.g., competition experience). Thus, our figure of rc =
0.61 might currently be considered as the theoretically lower
bound of the true effect of DP. The most suitable future studies
that could untangle this empirical conundrum would include
micro-analyses of practice activities and in particular longitudi-
nal studies like the one’s by McPherson et al. (2012) for music; or
Gruber et al. (1994) for chess. Such studies should be the natu-
ral next step in the quest for the factors that mediate expert and
exceptional performance.
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A commentary on
The influence of deliberate practice on
musical achievement: a meta-analysis
by Platz, F., Kopiez, R., Lehmann, A. C., and
Wolf, A. (2014). Front. Psychol. 5:646. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00646
More than 20 years ago, Ericsson and col-
leagues proposed that “individual differ-
ences in ultimate performance can largely
be accounted for by differential amounts
of past and current levels of practice”
(Ericsson et al., 1993, p. 392). We empir-
ically tested this claim through a meta-
analysis of studies of music and chess
(Hambrick et al., 2014). The claim was not
supported. Deliberate practice accounted
for about one-third of the reliable variance
in performance in each domain, leaving
most of the variance explainable by other
factors.
Focusing on music, Platz et al. (2014)
identified 13 studies of the relationship
between deliberate practice and perfor-
mance and found a correlation of 0.61
after correcting for unreliability. We credit
Platz et al. for their effort and thank them
for their criticisms of our meta-analysis.
However, none of these criticisms chal-
lenge our conclusion that deliberate prac-
tice is not as important as Ericsson and
colleagues have argued.
Platz et al.’s (2014) major criticism tar-
gets our conclusion that deliberate prac-
tice accounted for 30% of the variance
in music performance. They write that
“relationships between variables should be
interpreted in terms of linear relation-
ships” (p. 10), and that “it is incorrect
to interpret our findings (rc = 0.61) as
evidence that DP explains 36% of the
variance in attained music performance”
(p. 11). They base this criticism on Hunter
and Schmidt’s (2004) argument that effect
sizes from meta-analyses (and primary
research) be reported as correlations rather
than estimates of variance accounted for
(i.e., rs rather than r2s).
Platz et al.’s (2014) criticism is puzzling
for two reasons. First, other researchers
have characterized the importance of
deliberate practice in terms of vari-
ance (individual differences) accounted
for—including not only Ericsson et al.
(1993), but also two authors of the Platz
et al. article (Reinhard Kopiez and Andreas
Lehmann). For example, Kopiez and col-
leagues concluded that “the total life prac-
tice time at the beginning of the study cor-
related moderately with the baseline per-
formance values and predicted only 17%
of their variance” (Jabusch et al., 2009,
p. 80, italics added; see also Lehmann
and Ericsson, 1996; Kopiez and Lee, 2006,
2008). Second, Hunter and Schmidt’s
(2004) point is not that r2 is statistically
incorrect. Indeed, r and r2 are both stan-
dard indexes of effect size (Cohen, 1988),
providing different ways to conceptual-
ize the strength of statistical relationships.
Rather, their point is that r2 can make the-
oretically and practically important rela-
tionships seem trivially small—as when a
correlation of, say, 0.30 between a predic-
tor and an outcome is dismissed because
“only” 9% of the variance is explained.
For this reason, we reported both r and
r2 values in our meta-analysis. Moreover,
to avoid trivializing the role of deliberate
practice, we have repeatedly emphasized
its importance—the necessity of it for
becoming an expert. In no less a pub-
lic forum than the opinion pages of The
New York Times, two of us commented that
there is no denying the “power of practice”
(Hambrick and Meinz, 2011). Again, our
conclusion is not that deliberate practice
is unimportant, either statistically or the-
oretically; it is that deliberate practice is
not as important as Ericsson and colleagues
have argued, in the precise sense that fac-
tors other than deliberate practice account
for most of the variance in performance.
Platz et al. apparently miss this point.
Platz et al. (2014) also take aim at
the criteria we used for including a study
in our meta-analysis, calling them “intu-
itive” (p. 4). In fact, our criteria were dic-
tated by the theoretical claim we sought
to test and were clearly stated in our
article—measures of accumulated amount
of deliberate practice and performance
were collected and a correlation between
these measures was reported. Platz et al.
did find a few studies in their literature
search that we did not, but this does not
bear on our conclusion that deliberate
practice is not as important as Ericsson
and colleagues have argued. In fact, the
results of Platz et al.’s meta-analysis sup-
port this conclusion: A correlation of 0.61
between deliberate practice and music per-
formance leaves room for two additional
orthogonal predictors of nearly the same
magnitude (rs = 0.56).
Perhaps with an inkling of this, Platz
et al. (2014) argue that their correlation
of 0.61 might be regarded as the “theo-
retically lower bound of the true effect of
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DP” (p. 11) because “time estimations of
practice durations are only approximate
indicators of deliberate practice” (p. 11).
But their correlation could equally well
be regarded as an upper bound on the
true effect of deliberate practice. For exam-
ple, using retrospective questionnaires to
measure deliberate practice could lead to
inflated correlations between deliberate
practice and performance if people base
practice estimates on their skill rather than
recollections of engaging in practice. The
more general problem with Platz et al.’s
argument is that it can always be made:
if the correlation between deliberate prac-
tice and performance is not as high as
one likes, one can always argue that this is
because the measure of deliberate practice
is imperfect—making it impossible to fal-
sify hypotheses about the predictive value
of deliberate practice.
Finally, some measures used by Platz
et al. (2014) may not be estimates of
deliberate practice. For example, for some
studies, they used the correlation between
number of accompanying performances
and sight-reading performance, but num-
ber of accompanying performances could
be considered a measure of what Ericsson
et al. (1993) termed “work,” as distinct
from deliberate practice. Platz et al. are
also inconsistent in what they consider the
accumulation period for deliberate prac-
tice (e.g., lifetime for some studies, to age
18 for others).
The bottom line is that, in all major
domains in which deliberate practice has
been studied, most of the variance in per-
formance is explained by factors other
than deliberate practice (Macnamara et al.,
2014). These factors may include starting
age (Gobet and Campitelli, 2007), working
memory capacity (Meinz and Hambrick,
2010), and genes (Hambrick and Tucker-
Drob, 2014). For scientists, the task now
is to develop and test falsifiable theories
of expertise that include as many relevant
constructs as possible.
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INTRODUCTION
There are three forms of task engage-
ment that are the basis of successful train-
ing for expertise—acquisition, retention,
and transfer—and three corresponding
goals of training—efficiency, durability,
and generalizability. This paper reviews
training conditions that facilitate acqui-
sition, enhance retention, and promote
transfer to contexts not encountered dur-
ing training. Diligent practice under these
training conditions can lead eventually
to an elite level of performance or to
expertise.
In this review of training principles,
we emphasize those that are derived from
work in our laboratory. We have found
that developing training that optimizes
efficiency, durability, and generalizability,
however, is something of a balancing act
because what promotes efficient train-
ing often comes at a price in durability,
and durable training is not always gen-
eralizable (see Healy et al., 2012; Bourne
and Healy, 2014). These tradeoffs are due
in part to the fact that training might
involve two different types of knowledge—
declarative and procedural. Declarative
knowledge consists of facts, whereas pro-
cedural knowledge consists of skills, or
ways to use the facts, and these two types
of knowledge differ in terms of their dura-
bility and generalizability.
ACQUISITION
There are training principles that can be
used to improve the efficiency of acquiring
knowledge and skills. One way to increase
training speed involves the scheduling of
feedback given to the trainee. Trial-by-
trial feedback can facilitate learning in
many situations, especially by improving
motivation and by identifying and cor-
recting errors. Frequent feedback can be
distracting, however, when the trainees
already have a good sense of how well
they are responding. In those cases peri-
odic summary feedback, which is provided
on only some percentage of training tri-
als, can be a more effective procedure for
promoting skill acquisition (Schmidt et al.,
1989, demonstrated this principle with a
ballistic timing task).
In terms of the difficulty of new mate-
rial that is presented during training, there
is an optimal zone of learnability, implying
that training changes should be neither too
difficult nor too easy. Specifically, train-
ing trials should contain information that
is a little beyond what the trainee already
knows or should require a bit faster or
more accurate performance (Wolfe et al.,
1998).
Training can be based on mental, as
opposed to physical, practice. Although
physical practice is better than mental
practice in many circumstances, mental
practice can be superior to physical prac-
tice when the practice involves differ-
ent effectors from those used at testing
(Wohldmann et al., 2008a). For example,
training with the right hand and testing
with the left hand can lead to interference
during physical practice, but not during
mental practice, which involves a more
abstract representation of the skill that
appears to be effector independent. Mental
practice is especially useful, of course,
when circumstances do not allow physical
practice.
The focus of attention can be varied
in training, and training usually benefits
from an external focus on the results of
body movements as opposed to an internal
focus on the body movements themselves
(Wulf, 2007). For example, to perfect the
skill of dart throwing, attention should be
focused on the trajectory of the dart rather
than on the motion of the arm (Lohse
et al., 2010).
Research has concluded that for learn-
ing new skills (but not necessarily for
learning new facts) rest intervals should be
interpolated between practice trials (dis-
tributed practice) rather then practicing
without rest intervals (massed practice),
especially if testing occurs after a delay fol-
lowing practice (see Cepeda et al., 2006,
for a review of effects involving spacing of
practice).
When engaged in prolonged work on
a routine task, it is often advisable to
introduce into the training regimen a cog-
nitive antidote, which is a simple cogni-
tive requirement that can be added to
minimize task disengagement and bore-
dom and to mitigate a decline in accu-
racy across trials (Kole et al., 2008). For
example, when entering into a computer
a long sequence of numbers, alternat-
ing between using the + and − keys
as the concluding keystroke, rather than
using only a single key to conclude each
number, increases the accuracy of digit
entry and eliminates the usual increase
in errors that occurs with increasing
practice.
Task requirements can sometimes be
broken up into parts, with practice at
the beginning of training involving only
one or more parts of a task rather than
the whole task (Wickens et al., 2012).
The recommendation to use part-task
training applies to a segmented task,
when the parts are performed sequen-
tially (Wightman and Lintern, 1985), but
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not to a fractionated task, when the parts
are performed simultaneously (Adams and
Hufford, 1962).
RETENTION
The durability of training can be enhanced
by selected training principles. Some of
these principles benefit training retention
with a cost in training efficiency, but oth-
ers benefit retention with little or no cost
in training efficiency.
RETENTION VARIABLES WITH A COST IN
EFFICIENCY
Complications can sometimes be added to
training to promote retention (Schneider
et al., 2002). However, not all complica-
tions that increase task difficulty are desir-
able (Bjork, 1994); difficulties at training
facilitate retention only when they force
learners to apply task-relevant cognitive
processes (McDaniel and Butler, 2011).
For example, in training RADAR detec-
tion, adding to training a secondary task
that was irrelevant lowered RADAR detec-
tion performance at test, but adding a
relevant secondary task at training aided
RADAR detection accuracy at test (Young
et al., 2011).
As research on experts has shown
(Ericsson et al., 1980), training should
make strategic use of knowledge that
trainees already have (Kole and Healy,
2007). For example, when learning facts
about unknown people, associating each
of those people with someone famil-
iar (e.g., a friend or relative) requires
additional learning but can considerably
enhance acquisition and retention of those
facts.
Also following the methods of experts,
training can be improved by using mem-
ory strategies, such as the keyword method,
by which two items can be associated
in memory through a keyword serving
as a mediating link (Kole and Healy,
2013). When learning the association
between the French word jambe and the
English word leg, for example, learn-
ers could use the keyword jam and
form an interactive image of some sticky
jam on someone’s leg. This method will
allow the learners to derive the transla-
tion of jambe, but it does require form-
ing extra links from jambe to jam and
from jam to leg, which slows initial
acquisition.
RETENTION VARIABLES WITH NO COST IN
EFFICIENCY
Items can be grouped together in chunks
during training to promote retention. Item
chunking yields no loss, and probably a
gain, in training efficiency (Miller, 1956).
For example, when required to type a
four-digit number (e.g., 9632), individu-
als often find it helpful to represent the
number as two two-digit chunks (96 and
32) (Fendrich et al., 1991). Also, mem-
ory experts can learn a long list of digits
by dividing them into chunks represent-
ing familiar sequences like running times
or dates (Ericsson et al., 1980).
Similar to chunking, two separate tasks
can often be combined into a single func-
tional task to promote durability with no
cost to efficiency. If a secondary task is
combined with a primary task at test,
the two tasks should be combined during
training as well for best test performance
(Wohldmann et al., 2012). In fact, in some
cases removing at test a difficult secondary
task that was available during training
can retard test performance; for example,
removing an alphabet-counting task used
during the training of time estimation can
increase errors in time estimation during
test (Healy et al., 2005).
For optimal retention, the procedures
used in training should be duplicated at
test. Procedural reinstatement is effective
because declarative information (facts)
shows strong generalizability but weak
durability, whereas procedural informa-
tion (skills) shows strong durability but
weak generalizability (Lohse and Healy,
2012). Despite the high degree of transfer
for declarative information, when learn-
ing facts it is best to make sure that there
is an overlap in the processing required
at training and test (i.e., ensure that there
is transfer appropriate processing; Morris
et al., 1977; Roediger et al., 1989). Another
way to improve the retention of factual
material is by studying it at its most mean-
ingful level, as opposed to studying it at a
superficial level (e.g., paying attention to
the sound or spelling of the material), an
effect called depth of processing (Craik and
Lockhart, 1972).
Practice retrieving factual information,
instead of simply restudying the mate-
rial, can improve retention, demonstrat-
ing a testing effect (Roediger and Karpicke,
2006). A related method to enhance fact
retention is to generate the information
rather than just to read it, demonstrat-
ing a generation effect (Slamecka and Graf,
1978). For example, if the task is to
remember the answers to a set of multi-
plication problems, it is better to generate
or verify the answers to the problems than
to simply read them or perform the multi-
plication using a calculator (Crutcher and
Healy, 1989). See Karpicke and Zaromb
(2010) for a comparison of the similar
but not identical benefits of testing and
generation.
For skills, periodic restudy of mate-
rial during periods of disuse, called
refresher training, enhances skill reten-
tion (McDaniel, 2012). On the other
hand, training should not be done more
than necessary, resulting in overlearning or
overtraining, because extra practice pro-
duces diminishing performance enhance-
ment returns (Driskell et al., 1992).
TRANSFER
Improving the generalizabilty of knowl-
edge and skills is considerably more dif-
ficult than improving their efficiency and
durability. There are only a few train-
ing principles shown to be effective for
enhancing task transfer.
One way to enhance transfer is to
change the conditions of practice period-
ically, thereby increasing the variability of
practice (Schmidt and Bjork, 1992). Not
all forms of variable practice are effec-
tive, however. Varying parameters within
a single generalized motor program can
enhance transfer, but varying the gener-
alized motor programs themselves might
not benefit transfer. For example, learn-
ing how to cope with a variety of defective
computer mice that vary in their prop-
erties (e.g., a mouse that reverses only
vertical movements and another mouse
that reverses both horizontal and verti-
cal movements) does not enhance transfer
to a new type of defective mouse (e.g., a
mouse that reverses only horizontal move-
ments) (Healy et al., 2006). Practicing to
move a single defective mouse to a variety
of targets, however, does enhance transfer
to moving that same mouse to new targets
(Wohldmann et al., 2008b).
For tasks involving quantitative estima-
tion (e.g., of country populations or inter-
city distances), a technique of seeding the
knowledge base can be used, in which a few
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition February 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 131 | 167
Healy et al. Training principles to advance expertise
selected examples are given that define a
domain and thereby enhance transfer to
unpracticed examples (Brown and Siegler,
1996).
When possible, the discovery of rules
can lead to generalizable knowledge, so
that searching for systematic relationships
among examples can bolster transfer of
training, showing the advantage for rules
vs. instance memory (Bourne et al., 2010;
McDaniel et al., in press). For example, in
learning how to choose between the alter-
nate pronunciations for the word the (as
thuh or thee) individuals can either learn
the pronunciation preceding every single
word or can learn the rule that thuh is used
preceding words starting with a consonant
sound and thee is used preceding words
starting with a vowel sound.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This summary, which is outlined in
Table 1, does not include all training
principles that have been shown to be
effective in promoting training efficiency,
durability, and generalizability. For addi-
tional principles, readers are referred to
Table 1 | Training principles as a function of
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Strategic use of knowledge
Memory strategies











Seeding the knowledge base
Rules vs. instance memory
Bourne and Healy (2014) and Healy et al.
(2012), and for an initial attempt to
account for the principles in a single the-
oretical framework, readers are referred to
Jones et al. (2012), which is available by
request from the corresponding author.
Almost all of the studies reviewed
here have involved novice learners.
Nevertheless, these same principles should
apply for training at any level, so they
should be informative with respect to the
issue of training to an elite level of perfor-
mance. In fact, some of these principles
(e.g., focus of attention) seem to apply
more strongly for experts than for novices
(e.g., Perkins-Ceccato et al., 2003). To
reach elite levels of performance, how-
ever, the learners need to couple these
training principles with the use of deliber-
ate, highly focused, and effortful practice
(Ericsson et al., 1993).
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INTRODUCTION
The study of expertise tends to focus
on humans who can perform extraordi-
nary feats. Although the way in which
expertise is acquired is often character-
ized as similar to everyday skill acquisi-
tion, the attainment of basic numeracy
skills is rarely considered in the same con-
text as the attainment of expertise. It is
clear, though, that average numeracy skills
possess all the hallmarks of expert per-
formance. In this paper I argue that the
traditional classroom of Western educa-
tion systems pays insufficient attention to
the idea that effective numeracy skills rep-
resent a level of expertise that requires
a particular form of training. Using the
five principles of skill acquisition identified
by Speelman and Kirsner (2005), I argue
that the modern classroom is not the most
appropriate environment for acquiring
important cognitive skills, and that com-
puter programs, such as games and tai-
lored training tasks, should be considered
a valuable adjunct to traditional didactic
instruction.
THE NATURE OF EXPERTISE
Experts in most fields are characterized
as people who have more knowledge and
abilities than non-experts. In cognitive
science, this superiority in knowledge
and abilities has been reported as bet-
ter memory, more extensive knowledge,
and highly developed procedural and
perceptual skills. More often than not,
experts are described as people who can
perform extraordinary feats of mem-
ory and cognition, whilst possessing
the same cognitive apparatus as non-
experts. Their superior performance is
typically explained as the end prod-
uct of skill acquisition through many
years of dedicated practice in their
field.
ACQUISITION OF EXPERTISE
Based on over 100 years of research on skill
acquisition and expertise (e.g., Anderson,
1982; Logan, 1988; Ericsson et al., 1993),
Speelman and Kirsner (2005) identified
five principles of skill acquisition that
explain how expertise is associated with
superior feats of cognition. In brief, the
five principles of skill acquisition state
that (1) practice leads to faster and (2)
more efficient uses of knowledge, which
enables faster performance and (3) results
in less demand on mental resources. As a
result, the performance of low level tasks
becomes second nature, and (4) this frees
up mental resources that can be utilized to
attempt higher level behaviors. Ultimately
(5) skilled performance reflects the devel-
opment of many component processes.
ACQUISITION OF NUMERACY SKILLS
The five principles of skill acquisition
were derived from research in a broad
range of fields in which people have been
reported to have acquired expertise. As a
result, Speelman and Kirsner (2005) claim
that these principles apply to any area
of cognition in which practice can lead
to improved performance. Importantly,
these principles can also explain perfor-
mance improvements along the trajec-
tory of expertise attainment, even at levels
below which someone would be consid-
ered an expert. So, whereas in a discus-
sion of mathematics experts Butterworth
(2006) considered only those 1 in sev-
eral million people with extreme abilities,
the principles suggest we all show ele-
ments of expertise as we learn to count
and add. I have been surprised to learn,
however, how little of this view of skill
acquisition is reflected in current educa-
tion practice. In particular, the attainment
of basic numeracy skills is rarely consid-
ered as a form of expertise acquisition,
and nor are difficulties with the learning
of numeracy skills seen as problems in
the acquisition of expertise (e.g., a lack of
practice). Instead, learning difficulties are
often seen as resulting from some neu-
rological or developmental disorder that
adversely affects a child’s ability to learn
mathematics (Clark et al., 2014; Haase
et al., 2014), or some systemic issue related
to the school system (Ramsden, 1984;
Biggs, 1999; van Kraayenoord and Elkins,
2004) or the child’s culture (Whitburn,
1996) or SES (OECD, 2013). And yet,
numeracy skills, particularly those related
to early learning of arithmetic and num-
ber facts, share features with many exam-
ples of expertise. For example, they require
many years of practice to attain, perfor-
mance relies on pattern recognition of a
large number of items (i.e., numbers and
symbols) and retrieval from memory of
a large number of facts, and expertise
attainment is characterized as a transition
through a hierarchy of skills (e.g., count-
ing to addition) that can only occur when
performance at the lower level has attained
a particular level of skill (Pellegrino and
Goldman, 1987; Neumann et al., 2013).
These are all features that have been identi-
fied in experts in a range of other domains
(e.g., Ericsson, 1996). It is rare to see
the development of basic numeracy skills
characterized in this manner in education
research (e.g., Griffin, 2009; Lei et al., 2009;
Yelland and Kildery, 2010; Neumann et al.,
2013), and certainly my conversations with
primary school teachers reveals they are
unaware of such concepts.
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THE TRADITIONAL WESTERN
CLASSROOM
The traditional model of the western
classroom, with a teacher at the front
delivering instruction to a class of 20–30
children, does not sit easily with the view
of skill acquisition reflected in the five
principles. Although a teacher may be able
to effectively convey declarative and pro-
cedural information relevant to an arith-
metic task (e.g., demonstrate how 2 × 4 is
equivalent to 4 + 4), for a child to con-
vert this sort of knowledge into a form
of expertise requires a great deal of prac-
tice. Traditionally a child would get this
practice by attempting to solve many prob-
lems like 2 × 4 = ? until the teacher is
satisfied that most children have grasped
the concept. But “grasping” the concept
may not be sufficient. According to the
five principles, what counts as “sufficient”
practice is determined by what comes next
in the trajectory of skill acquisition. For
instance, if the “2×” problems are intro-
duced as an extension of addition facts, it
is important that the child is sufficiently
skilled at retrieving relevant addition facts.
If they stumble over the idea of 4 + 4 (i.e.,
they do not retrieve the answer quickly)
while the teacher is explaining the “2×”
concept, they may be forced to generate
the answer by a counting method (e.g.,
start from 4 and count a further 4 places)
(Pellegrino and Goldman, 1987). Such a
counting strategy will tax working mem-
ory and as a result the child may not have
sufficient working memory capacity to fol-
low the explanation of the “2×” concept.
This strategy will also take extra time and
so the student may fall behind the teacher’s
explanation. It is difficult for a teacher to
ensure that the pace of a lesson matches the
learning rates of all children in the class,
and also to monitor that all children have
mastered a concept prior to introducing
the next concept. Children who are fast
learners may become bored and disruptive
if the lesson is paced too slow. Children
who are slower learners may be left behind
by a lesson that is paced to match the learn-
ing rate of the faster learners. It would not
take too many experiences of being left
behind for someone to believe they just
do not have a “maths brain” (Swan, 2004),
or even develop a “maths phobia” (Furner
and Berman, 2003). Even if the attainment
of proficiency is assumed to occur through
homework drills, it is likely that only accu-
racy is checked by a teacher, when speed of
access to number facts is also necessary to
avoid the problem just described.
THE DECLINE IN NUMERACY SKILLS
The suggestion that the traditional
classroom may lead to some children
struggling with the acquisition of basic
numeracy skills goes some way to explain
the slide in numeracy skills in many west-
ern countries like Australia [as indicated in
the PISA results of 2009 (OECD, 2013)].
The problem in Australia appears to be
longstanding as 53% of the Australian
adult population is functionally innu-
merate (ABS, 2006), which indicates that
many would not comprehend a bank state-
ment. Failures in elementary mathematics
courses are likely to be compounded by a
lack of confidence regarding higher level
mathematics, and so many people neglect
maths at the higher levels, leading to uni-
versities having to provide remedial classes
for their commencing students (Healy
et al., 2010; Slattery, 2010; Arlington, 2012;
Maslen, 2012).
AN ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION MODEL
According to the five principles of skill
acquisition, overcoming the problems
identified here with the traditional
Western classroom would require children
to be presented with a structured learning
program that involved instruction regard-
ing each level of a hierarchy of concepts,
interspersed with practice opportunities.
Further, each child would only be intro-
duced to the next level of a concept when
they have reached some degree of fluency
with the previous level. Until that point
they would continue practicing with prob-
lems at the previous level, possibly with
some form of intervention by a tutor to
ensure their understanding of the concept
is appropriate. This is probably the aim of
most teachers, however the level of mon-
itoring required to ensure each child has
reached the requisite level of fluency is
possibly beyond the capacity of a teacher
responsible for 20–30 children in the one
classroom. An alternative model would be
to develop computer software in the form
of games and tailored training tasks. Such
software can be developed to not only pro-
vide hours of practice opportunities, but
it can do so in an exciting and enjoyable
manner that will hold the attention of
children and provide them with the moti-
vation to spend many hours mastering a
concept (Rosas et al., 2003). Further, the
software can be designed to deliver feed-
back on every response, and monitor the
level of performance (i.e., both accuracy
and response time) such that a child will be
allowed to move to the next higher level of
the concept when they have mastered the
previous level, as is the case with computer
games designed purely for entertainment
(Towne et al., 2014). A recent study (Main
and O’Rourke, 2011) demonstrated the
benefits of such software, where the speed
and accuracy of performance on a stan-
dard arithmetic test was improved for
children who had played a maths game
(Dr Kawashima’s Brain Training) on a
hand held games console compared to
children who received standard classroom
lessons.
Another computer game, Numbeat, has
been designed explicitly according to the
five principles. This game was developed
to facilitate the acquisition of basic arith-
metic skills in primary school children.
Numbeat requires a player to destroy some
“bad” characters on the screen, before
they convert “good” characters into “bad”
characters, by filling up some destruction
device (e.g., a cannon) with an amount
of ammunition that matches the num-
ber of “bad” characters. To achieve this
aim requires the player to perform several
types of mental arithmetic operations. The
game is structured so that performance
speed is important (e.g., levels have time
limits). If a player beats the time limit
for a particular level, they are considered
to be sufficiently fluent with the arith-
metic operations tested in that level, and
so are allowed to progress to the next level
of the game, which typically represents a
slightly more advanced level of arithmetic.
A level is repeated if the player does not
meet the required performance standard.
As such, the game approximates the delib-
erate practice of challenging tasks that is
required to acquire expertise in a domain
(Towne et al., 2014). In preliminary tri-
als involving 248 children, playing this
game for 10–15 min per day for 8–10 days
resulted in an average 5% reduction in the
time to solve simple arithmetic problems
presented in a traditional manner (e.g.,
3 × 4 = ?) (Speelman, 2013).
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Although I do not claim that games
such as Dr Kawashima’s Brain Training and
Numbeat will be the solution to all of the
mathematical ills facing many countries,
evidence that playing such games can facil-
itate the acquisition of arithmetic skills in
primary school children is a positive step
toward addressing learning difficulties in
mathematics. This type of research may
pave the way toward a situation where
teachers can provide the necessary con-
tent lessons, and computers can facilitate
the necessary practice that will enable stu-
dents to master each level of a skill before
tackling the next step in the skill hierar-
chy. Ultimately such evidence supports the
argument that education in basic numer-
acy skills should reflect principles of exper-
tise attainment.
REFERENCES
ABS. (2006). Adult Literacy and Life Skills Survey:
Summary Results. Australian Bureau of Statistics.
Anderson, J. R. (1982). Acquisition of cognitive
skill. Psychol. Rev. 89, 369–406. doi: 10.1037/0033-
295X.89.4.369
Arlington, K. (2012, February 20). Push to multiply
positive points of maths in minds of students. The
Australian, p. 13.
Biggs, J. (1999). What the student does: teaching
for enhanced learning. Higher Educ. Res. Dev. 18,
57–75. doi: 10.1080/0729436990180105
Butterworth, B. (2006). “Mathematical expertise”
in Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert
Performance, ed K. A. Ericsson (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press), 553–568. doi:
10.1017/CBO9780511816796.032
Clark, C. A. C., Nelson, J. M., Garza, J., Sheffield,
T. D., Wiebe, S. A., and Espy, K. A. (2014).
Gaining control: changing relations between exec-
utive control and processing speed and their rel-
evance for mathematics achievement over course
of the preschool period. Front. Psychol. 5:107. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00107
Ericsson, K. A. (1996). The Road to Excellence: The
Acquisition of Expert Performance in the Arts
and Sciences, Sports, and Games. Mahwah, NJ:
Erlbaum.
Ericsson, K. A., Krampe, R. T., and Tesch-Römer, C.
(1993). The role of deliberate practice in the acqui-
sition of expert performance. Psychol. Rev. 100,
363–406. doi: 10.1037/0033-295X.100.3.363
Furner, J. M., and Berman, B. T. (2003). Math anxiety:
overcoming a major obstacle to the improvement
of student math performance. Child. Educ. 79, 1–6.
doi: 10.1080/00094056.2003.10522220
Griffin, S. (2009). Learning sequences in the acqui-
sition of mathematical knowledge: using cog-
nitive developmental theory to inform curricu-
lum design for Pre-K–6 mathematics education.
Mind Brain Educ. 3, 96–107. doi: 10.1111/j.1751-
228X.2009.01060.x
Haase, V. G., Júlio-Costa, A., Lopes-Silva, J. B.,
Starling-Alves, I., Antunes, A. M., Pinheiro-
Chagas, P. et al. (2014). Contributions from spe-
cific and general factors to unique deficits: two
cases of mathematics learning difficulties. Front.
Psychol. 5:102. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00102
Healy, G. (2010, September 1). Survey finds graduates’
mathematics doesn’t add up. The Australian, p.24.
Lei, P.-W., Wu, Q., DiPerna, J. C., and Morgan, P.
L. (2009). Developing short forms of the EARLI
numeracy measures comparison of item selection
methods. Educ. Psychol. Meas. 69, 825–842. Doi:
10.1177/0013164409332215
Logan, G. D. (1988). Toward an instance theory of
automatization. Psychol. Rev. 95, 492–527. doi:
10.1037/0033-295X.95.4.492
Main, S., and O’Rourke, J. (2011). New directions for
traditional lessons: can handheld game consoles
enhance mental mathematics skills? Aust. J. Teach.
Educ. 36, 42–55.
Maslen, G. (2012 May 15). Chief seeks new spark in
science. The Age, p. 13.
OECD (2013), PISA 2012 Results: What Students
Know and Can Do – Student Performance in
Mathematics, Reading and Science, Vol. I. Paris:
OECD Publishing.
Neumann, M. M., Hood, M., Ford, R. M., and
Neumann, D. L. (2013). Letter and numeral iden-
tification: their relationship with early literacy and
numeracy skills. Eur. Early Child. Educ. Res. J. 21,
489–501. doi: 10.1080/1350293X.2013.845438
Pellegrino, J. W., and Goldman, S. R. (1987).
Information processing and elementary math-
ematics. J. Learn. Disabil. 20, 23–32. doi:
10.1177/002221948702000105
Ramsden, P. (1984). “The context of learning in
academic departments,” in The Experience Of
Learning, eds F. Marton, D. Hounsell, and N.
Entwistle (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press),
198–216.
Rosas, R., Nussbaum, M., Cumsille, P., Marianov,
V., Correa, M., Flores, P., et al. (2003). Beyond
Nintendo: design and assessment of educational
video games for first and second grade students.
Comput. Educ. 40, 71–94. doi: 10.1016/S0360-
1315(02)00099-4
Slattery, L. (2010 March 10). Equation for maths
warns of disaster. The Australian, p. 21.
Speelman, C. P. (2013). “A test of a computer game
designed to facilitate the acquisition of arithmetic
skills,” in Enhancing Human Performance, ed C.
P. Speelman (Cambridge: Scholars Publishing),
1–21.
Speelman, C. P., and Kirsner, K. (2005). Beyond
the Learning Curve: The Construction of
Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198570417.001.0001
Swan, P. (2004). “I hate mathematics,” in MAV
Annual Conference, Monash University. Available
online at: http://www.mav.vic.edu.au/pd/confs/
2004/ (Accessed September 12, 2012).
Towne, T. J., Ericsson, K. A., and Sumner, A.
M. (2014). Uncovering mechanisms in video
game research: suggestions from the expert-
performance approach. Front. Psychol. 5:161. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00161
van Kraayenoord, C. E., and Elkins, J. (2004).
Learning difficulties in numeracy in
Australia. J. Learn. Dis. 37. 32–41. doi:
10.1177/00222194040370010401
Whitburn, J. (1996). Contrasting approaches to the
acquisition of mathematical skills: Japan and
England. Oxford Rev. Educ. 22, 415–434. doi:
10.1080/0305498960220403
Yelland, N., and Kildery, A. (2010). Becoming
numerate with information and commu-
nications technologies in the twenty-first
century. Int. J. Early Years Educ. 18, 91–106.
doi: 10.1080/09669760.2010.494426
Conflict of Interest Statement: The author declares
that the research was conducted in the absence of any
commercial or financial relationships that could be
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Received: 15 March 2014; accepted: 25 May 2014;
published online: 12 June 2014.
Citation: Speelman CP (2014) The acquisition of exper-
tise in the classroom: are current models of education
appropriate? Front. Psychol. 5:580. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.
2014.00580
This article was submitted to Cognition, a section of the
journal Frontiers in Psychology.
Copyright © 2014 Speelman. This is an open-access
article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, dis-
tribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted,
provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited
and that the original publication in this journal is cited,
in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use,
distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not
comply with these terms.
www.frontiersin.org June 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 580 | 172
OPINION ARTICLE
published: 22 May 2014
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00470
Designing a “better” brain: insights from experts and
savants
Fernand Gobet1*, Allan Snyder 2, Terry Bossomaier 3 and Mike Harré4
1 Department of Psychological Sciences, University of Liverpool, Liverpool, UK
2 Centre for the Mind, School of Medicine, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia
3 Centre for Research in Complex Systems, Faculty of Business, Charles Sturt University, Bathurst, NSW, Australia
4 Complex Systems Research Group, Faculty of Engineering and IT, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia
*Correspondence: fernand.gobet@liv.ac.uk
Edited and reviewed by:
Guillermo Campitelli, Edith Cowan University, Australia
Keywords: autism, brain, cognitive illusion, creativity, Einstellung effect, expertise, perception, savants
If we naively, simply scale up the brain—
more of the same—we would not necessar-
ily have a brain that is qualitatively better.
Taking the analogy from visual ecology—
the eagle—it could just see better at greater
heights (Snyder and Miller, 1978)—more
of the same!
Instead, let us ask how to design a brain
that is qualitatively better in some sense,
say at being creative. One bottleneck to
creativity is our inability to see things in
a new light, free of prior interpretations.
Once a pattern is identified and labeled,
it is difficult to identify different patterns
and find alternative solutions. A classic
example is the duck/rabbit illusion, where
we can see either a duck or a rabbit but
not be simultaneously aware of both. We
are blinded by our mindsets, by our exper-
tise! This presumably is a consequence
of our hypothesis-driven, cognitive make
up. Hypotheses are mental templates that
encapsulate expectations of the world as
derived from past experience—a brilliant
strategy for coping rapidly with partial
information in a dynamic but famil-
iar environment (Snyder et al., 2004;
Bossomaier et al., 2009). [Although we use
the human brain as an example, there is
considerably evidence that the concept-
dominated architecture is characteristic of
the mammalian brain, and possibly also
in birds, in particular corvids (e.g., Emery
and Clayton, 2004)].
Our brain can recall a seemingly unlim-
ited number of meaningful patterns and
labels, but often not the attributes that
compose them. In contrast, some autistic
savants can recall a seemingly unlimited
amount of details, without any attempt
to impose meaning (e.g., Wiltshire, 1989).
But, savants are less prone to cognitive
illusions (Bogdashina, 2003) and that fact
gives us a clue for a “better” brain—
a brain that is hypothesis driven, but is
resilient to cognitive illusions, a brain that
can in addition see the world with direct
perception and thus open to alternative
interpretations (Snyder, 2009).
A better brain—natural or artificial—
would have tremendous implications for
our world. Most importantly, it would
boost creativity, both in art and in science.
Better decisions would be made in poli-
tics and business, and long-standing issues
such as pollution and hunger would be
more likely to be solved. How do we go
about to developing such a brain?
A possible strategy is to start from the
things humans are doing so well as a result
of our adaptation to the environment due
to evolutionary pressure, and then to con-
sider why the products of this adaptation
sometimes are associated with penalties.
Finding a way to fix these instances of
penalties in humans leads to insights that
can be further applied to the design of
better brains.
As a first example, consider visual per-
ception. Overall, our eye and our visual
cortex, honed by millions of years of evo-
lution, work very well. However, human
visual perception can be fooled surpris-
ingly easily by perceptual and cognitive
illusions. We can see things that do not
exist (e.g., Escher’s impossible figures), do
not see things that exist (e.g., reading
words rather than seeing black and white
pixels), see two objects from the same
drawing (e.g., the duck-rabbit illusion),
and grossly misjudge the dimensions of
objects (e.g., the Ebbinghaus and Ponzo
illusions). How can we avoid these illu-
sions? What would this tell us about brain
design?
As a second example, consider exper-
tise. Experts can show extreme adapta-
tions to their environment and are capa-
ble of great achievements (Ericsson et al.,
2006; Didierjean and Gobet, 2008). Tennis
players can return services with balls
hit at more than 200 km/h, and they
can even counter-attack when doing so.
Mnemonists can memorize more than 100
digits read at 1 s each. Some chess players
can play more than 30 games simultane-
ously, without seeing the board and the
pieces. But expertise sometimes fails. In
their study on the Einstellung effect in
chess, Bilalić et al. (2008a,b, 2010) showed
that even experts can fail to find an opti-
mal solution when a common solution
comes first to their mind. The effect is
surprisingly powerful: compared to con-
trol positions, players lose about 1 stan-
dard deviation in skill when showing
the Einstellung effect. This illustrates the
strength of the schemas we hold in long-
term memory and the power that our
preconceptions have on our mind.
What are the solutions to percep-
tual/cognitive illusions, such as those
displayed in visual illusions and in the
Einstellung effect? Intuitively, there are
two main approaches. The first one is to
use more knowledge (i.e., scaling up) and
could be called “quantitative scaling.” It
could be summarized by the phrase “more
of the same.” This is the standard approach
in computer science and artificial
intelligence.
Quantitative scaling has had some
tremendous successes in artificial
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intelligence, such as the victory of Deep
Blue against chess world champion
Kasparov in 1997 (Campbell et al., 2002).
But increase of knowledge does not always
provide a solution; for example, many
visual illusions persist in spite of our
knowledge that they exist. Indeed, quanti-
tative scaling has also met with problems
in artificial intelligence. Most notably, it
has failed in many attempts, such as play-
ing Go at master level (Gobet et al., 2004;
Hsu, 2007), providing computers with
common sense (McCarthy, 2007; Sarbo,
2007), and in general developing genuine,
domain-general intelligence and creativity
(Bridewell and Langley, 2010; Jennings,
2010).
A second approach could be called
“qualitative scaling.” In essence, this leads
to the definition and use of new concep-
tual spaces. To get to these new spaces, we
need to break apart the existing conceptual
structures, whereas in quantitative scal-
ing we build increasingly elaborate con-
cepts on top of what we have already.
A classic example is Einstein’s conjec-
ture that the speed of light was constant
in all inertial reference frames, leading
to conclusions very different to those of
Newtonian physics. Serialism, cubism or
simply Dadaism itself illustrate this notion
in the arts.
We know that individuals with autism
are less susceptible to some illusions
(Walter et al., 2009; Mitchell et al., 2010),
and that they process information in a less
holistic way (Nakahachi et al., 2008), for
example paying more attention to details,
which can result in savant skills such as
extreme memory for detail and speed in
counting objects (numerosity) (Soulieres
et al., 2010). We also know that some
savant skills can be artificially induced in
normal individuals, for example by low-
frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic
stimulation (Snyder et al., 2006; Boggio
et al., 2009; Snyder, 2009) or transcra-
nial direct current stimulation (Chi and
Snyder, 2012).
Our key argument is that our nor-
mal cognition, while very efficient, tends
to develop cognitive mind sets. Breaking
these mind sets can help explore new
conceptual spaces, and thus be more cre-
ative. Rather than reorganizing knowledge
in some superficial way, we propose two
radical approaches. The first is to inhibit
some concepts or a class of concepts (e.g.,
a group of concepts that are strongly
connected or the most likely concepts in
a given situation). The second is to avoid
concepts altogether (or at least as much as
possible), by using raw perception instead,
thus imitating the autistic mind. Our pro-
posal is thus that creativity can be boosted
by decreasing conceptual processing and
increasing the role of low-level perceptual
processing.
Our proposal raises intriguing issues.
What is the link between concepts and raw
perception? Are they two discrete states,
or are they part of a more graded space?
How can “raw perception” mitigate or
even eliminate Einstellung-like effects? Is
raw perception enough? Autism seems to
offer a counter-example, where the lack
of use of concepts leads to serious intel-
lectual and social impairments. But is it
necessarily so?
The history of human thought pro-
vides us with creativity examples where
the inhibiting-concept strategy was used
(possibly unconsciously) and worked.
When 2005 Nobel Laureates Marshall
and Warren (1984) correctly proposed
that stomach ulcers were caused by heli-
cobacter pylori rather than by excess
acid, they had to jettison a whole raft
of concepts. There are also examples of
this in AI research—for instance com-
puter chess and checkers, where new
profound insights were gained from brute
force search, without using sophisticated
concepts. In the latter case, the literal per-
ception used by computers, which is often
derided, turns out to be a strength. The
cost of deleting concepts might also be
studied. If the concepts that are inhibited
are infrequent and are not the building
blocks of a large number of other concepts,
the benefits might outweigh the costs. But
what is the threshold? Another solution
with artificial systems is parallelism. A
possibility would be that the original con-
ceptual base stays online while concepts
are inhibited in a copy of the original base
that operates offline.
The examples in this article focus on
finding novel creative solutions without
being bound by prior knowledge. It is an
open question as to exactly what a better
brain would be: more creative, more effi-
cient, more rational, more adaptive, more
altruistic? Answering this question is a
huge challenge in itself, and we should be
alert to our own mindset in defining the
space of possible answers.
The implications for the study of
human cognition and the psychology
expertise in particular are profound. A bet-
ter brain would shed considerable but also
cruel light on the limits of human cog-
nition and expertise. We already had a
preview of this with developments in com-
puter chess. No players, even world cham-
pion Magnus Carlsen, can compete with
computers nowadays. Computers some-
times find moves that are considered by
humans as highly creative, although some
of these moves are just beyond human
discovery. In addition, computers have
led to re-evaluations of large aspects of
the game, in particular openings and
endgames, which humans had researched
for centuries. Be ready to be surprised with
better brains!
Irrespective of possible benefits for sci-
ence and technology, including artificial
intelligence, our proposal for a better brain
raises important questions for the nature
of the human mind. Are qualitative scaling
and quantitative scaling really in opposi-
tion? Is it adaptive to inhibit some con-
cepts “just” to be creative? Why has such a
system not evolved? Is it because, now, we
have the luxury to be creative—courtesy of
cultural evolution?
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In 2011 van Dijk and Fias with an inno-
vative working memory paradigm showed
for the first time that words to-be-
remembered, presented sequentially at the
center of a screen acquired a new spatial
dimension: the first words of the sequence
acquired a left spatial value while the last
words acquired a right spatial value. In this
article, we argue that this spatialization
which putatively underpins how order is
coded in immediate memory1 allows brid-
ging the domain of memory expertise with
classic immediate memory studies.
After briefly reviewing the mecha-
nisms for coding order in immediate
memory and the recent studies pointing
toward spatialization as an explanatory
mechanism, we will pinpoint similar
mechanisms that are known to exist in
memory expertise, particularly in the
method of loci. We will terminate by ana-
lyzing what these similarities can tell us
about expertise.
HOW ORDER IS CODED?
Surprisingly, this very fundamental ques-
tion has not yet received a definitive
answer. If one tries to naively think about
a way order could be coded, generally
the first idea that comes is chaining:
items in a list to-be-remembered are just
chained together by our cognitive system.
And indeed, for more than four decades,
this has been the most prominent idea
among researchers (e.g., Wickelgren, 1965;
Jordan, 1986; Lewandowsky and Murdock,
1989). This idea beyond being simple and
1 Immediate memory is an umbrella term for working
memory and short-term memory.
intuitive, is also ancient since it roots
back at least to Ebbinghaus (1885/2010).
However, in the last two decades chaining
models have lost ground, mostly because
of experimental results. In immediate
memory, error patterns (i.e., transposi-
tion and protrusion errors, Estes, 1991;
Henson, 1996, 1999) and the distance
effect (e.g., Hacker, 1980; Marshuetz et al.,
2000) have been difficult to explain with
the chaining concept.
POSITIONAL TAGGING
Nowadays prominent models are of a posi-
tional kind (e.g., Anderson and Matessa,
1997; Burgess and Hitch, 1999; Brown
et al., 2000, 2007; O’Reilly and Soto,
2001; Lewandowsky and Farrell, 2008a;
Oberauer and Lewandowsky, 2011).
Based on various studies (e.g., Dale,
1987; Poirier and Saint-Aubin, 1996;
Mulligan, 1999; Engelkamp and Dehn,
2000; Henson et al., 2003), these mod-
els assume that item information and
order information are coded and rep-
resented separately (for a review, see
Marshuetz, 2005). Order is putatively
coded through positional coding mech-
anisms, where a positional marker (or
tag)–a context–is associated to each item.
These contexts or positional markers
can be temporal or not (Lewandowsky
and Farrell, 2008b), but several studies
seem to run against temporal markers
(e.g., Lewandowsky and Brown, 2004,
2005; Lewandowsky et al., 2006), which
favors non-temporal ones. Nonetheless
if temporal tags are by definition well-
known, the nature of non-temporal tags
remains unknown (Lewandowsky and
Farrell, 2008b)2. It could be an external
context such as the environment or/and
an internal context such as the inner
states of the mind associated with each
items.
WHAT DOES VAN DIJCK AND FIAS
(2011) STUDY CHANGE CONCERNING
ORDER CODING?
In 2011 van Dijck and Fias pro-
posed an alternative explanation of the
SNARC (Spatial-Numerical Association
of Response Codes) effect. This effect
was first popularized by Dehaene et al.
(1993). They used a classic parity judg-
ment task where participants had to
decide if a number was odd or even.
However, the left-/right-hand key assign-
ment was varied: the answer “even” (as
the answer “odd”) was assigned for half
of the trials to one hand and for the other
half to the other hand. Results showed
a SNARC effect, that is, small numbers
triggered faster responses when partic-
ipants answered with the left hand and
large numbers triggered faster responses
when participants answered with the right
hand. According to Dehaene et al. (1993),
the effect was due to the representation
2 Lewandowsky and Farrell (2008b) wrote: “The use
of context markers does, however, entail a cost: As in
many other models (e.g., SEM; Henson, 1998), the
structure of the markers across positions is assumed
rather than explained by the model. That is, although
it is entirely plausible to postulate that the contexts
of adjacent items are more similar to each other than
the contexts of items separated by intervening events,
the precise form of their similarity relationship is not
derived from the model’s architecture. Are there any
candidate mechanisms on the horizon that might per-
mit a more principled derivation of context markers?.”
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numbers have in (semantic) long-term
memory (LTM), that of a mental line,
which in western cultures increases from
left to right (e.g., Dehaene et al., 1993;
Göbel et al., 2011).
This LTM conception of the SNARC
was disputed by van Dijck and Fias (2011)
using a new paradigm. They proposed
that the SNARC effect depended on the
organization numbers assume in working
memory. In the study, participants were
presented five random numbers (ranging
from 1 to 10) to-be-remembered in cor-
rect order. Numbers were displayed at the
center of a screen. After the presentation
phase, numbers ranging from 1 to 10 were
displayed randomly at the center of screen.
When a number to-be-remembered was
displayed, participants had to execute a
parity judgment task. As in Dehaene et al.
(1993), the left-/right-hand key assign-
ment was varied. But instead of the
usual SNARC effect, results showed a
Spatial-Positional Association of Response
Codes (SPoARC) effect, that is, left hand
responses were faster with numbers pre-
sented in the first positions of the to-be-
remembered numbers (instead of small
numbers in the SNARC effect) and right
hand responses were faster with numbers
presented in the last positions (instead of
big numbers).
A NEW POSITIONAL TAGGING
MECHANISM: SPATIALIZATION
This result and others (i.e., van Dijck et al.,
2013; Guida, under review) suggest that
the initial words of a sequence have a
left spatial value while the last words
of the same sequence have a right spa-
tial value. Apparently individuals tend
to create a spatial mental line based on
the order items enter immediate mem-
ory (Example 1, Figure 1). This is highly
compatible with the idea that in verbal
immediate memory, items order is coded
spatially, through spatialization. Given
the fuzzy nature of non-temporal tags,
this discovery could allow specifying the
way items order is coded in immediate
memory.
WHAT HAS SPATIALIZATION GOT TO
DO WITH MEMORY EXPERTISE?
Since the very first (internal) mnemonic
(Yates, 1966; Worthen and Hunt, 2011)
which is thought to be the loci method
proposed by Simonides of Ceos (556 BC–
448 BC) and reported by Marcus Tullius
Cicero in De Oratore, visuo-spatial pro-
cesses have played a central role to enhance
memory for verbal material. Concerning
the loci method, Simonides of Ceos pro-
posed to visualize a familiar route or a
sequence of familiar locations (like rooms
in one’s own house) and use them to
FIGURE 1 | Schematic representation of retrieval structures through two
examples. The upper part of the figure offers a generic and abstract
representation of retrieval structures, from Ericsson and Kintsch (1995). The
first example is taken from the spatial positional mental line and adapted
from Guida (under review), it represent the encoding of three letters via three
spatial positional tags. The second example is from the method of loci, and
represents the encoding of three words via known locations used as retrieval
cues.
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mentally store a list of words (Example
2, Figure 1), before a speech for example.
Then during the speech, one would take
a mental tour and retrieve each word
via each familiar location (e.g., kitchen).
Greek orators (Yates, 1966; Worthen and
Hunt, 2011) soon became experts of the
method of loci.
THE METHOD OF LOCI: EXPERTISE
THROUGH SPATIALIZATION
Of interest here, is the fact that the loci
method necessitates to spatialize the items
to-be-remembered in various locations.
Moreover the method is not just an ancient
oddity, the method efficiency has been
confirmed since and still is nowadays.
Memory experts (i.e., mnemonists) use it
and several memory world records have
been set with it. For example Pridmore
(2013) was the first man to break the 30-
s barrier in the Speed Cards discipline,
which necessitates to memorize the order
of a shuffled deck of cards. To do so, he
used a system based on the method of loci,
he spatialized groups of two cards the long
of a familiar route.
IS THERE A THEORY OF EXPERTISE
THAT SUPPORTS THE LOCI METHOD
PHENOMENOLOGY WHICH POINTS
TOWARD SPATIALIZATION?
Even if mnemonics and memory exper-
tise are very ancient (certainly due to oral
tradition, see Rubin, 1997; Ong, 2012),
grounded cognitive theories describing
them are recent. It could be argued that
the first complete theoretical contribu-
tion on mnemonic expertise (but see
the Chunking theory, Chase and Simon,
1973) was Chase and Ericsson’s (1981)
Skilled memory theory, which was to be
completed with the Long-term working
memory (LT-WM) theory (Ericsson and
Kintsch, 1995).
LONG-TERM WORKING MEMORY AND
RETRIEVAL STRUCTURES
In order to explain memory expertise,
Chase and Ericsson (1981) proposed three
principles: the significant encoding, the
structured retrieval and the principle of
acceleration. The first principle proposes
that in order to swiftly and reliably
store items in LTM, information need
to be transformed into meaningful units.
Of interest here is the second principle
which states that to increase mnemonic
performances, hierarchical spatial cogni-
tive structures, named retrieval struc-
tures (for a discussion, see Ericsson and
Kintsch, 2000; Gobet, 2000a,b) can be
used to encode and retrieve items from
LTM. These structures constitute an inter-
nal artificial context to which items are
linked to. In the loci method, it is
done via the visuo-spatial knowledge of a
sequence of familiar locations. Each loca-
tion is a retrieval cue, and all the cues
together constitute a retrieval structure
(Figure 1). The skilled memory theory was
first proposed to account for the per-
formances of experts capable to increase
their digit span above 80. The LT-WM
(Ericsson and Kintsch, 1995) was a gen-
eralization of this theory to all activi-
ties and to all individuals, experts and
novices.
WHAT DOES SPATIALIZATION AS A
LINK BETWEEN CLASSIC IMMEDIATE




Notwithstanding Ericsson and Kintsch’s
(1995) generalization, the LT-WM the-
ory remains underused in the classic
domain of verbal immediate memory
(but, see Guida et al., 2009, 2013). As
stated by Ericsson and Kintsch (1995, p.
217) concerning the Skilled memory the-
ory (but the same can be said for LT-
WM), even if this theoretical construct is
largely accepted as accounting for experts,
“several investigators (e.g., Schneider and
Detweiler, 1987; Carpenter and Just, 1989;
Baddeley, 1990) have voiced doubts about
its generalizability.” Retrieval structures
are often dismissed because considered too
artificial or idiosyncrasies to be reserved
to experts. Thank to van Dijck and Fias’s
(2011) study, this could change.
RETRIEVAL STRUCTURE AS
SPATIALIZATION: A GENUINE AND
UNIVERSAL PROCESS
As seen previously, van Dijck and col-
leagues’ results (van Dijck and Fias, 2011;
van Dijck et al., 2013; see also Guida,
under review) clearly point toward the idea
that in all-comers, spatial processes are
also at stake in verbal immediate mem-
ory. When comparing retrieval structures
such as in the method of loci and spatial
positional tags, the similarities are strik-
ing (Figure 1). In both cases, a virtual
spatial construct, used as a context, is asso-
ciated to the incoming information. And
the context can later be used to retrieve
the items. Even if the mental line (Dehaene
et al., 1993; van Dijck and Fias, 2011) used
by all-comers is much simpler and lesser
sophisticated, compared to mnemonists
using the method of loci, spatialization
seems the same underpinning process. If
this standpoint is adopted, then it becomes
more explicit why the loci method is so
ancient and efficient: because experts’ spa-
tialization via retrieval structures roots on
basic processes that all individuals can use.
Ipso facto, retrieval structures stop being
idiosyncrasies to be reserved to experts.
The link between both kinds of spa-
tialization becomes even more tangible
when considering that the spatial men-
tal line could also be due to our exper-
tise, in this case in mastering the writing
system. In fact the orientation and direc-
tion of our mental line varies according
to reading/writing habits (e.g., Dehaene
et al., 1993; Shaki et al., 2009; Göbel et al.,
2011; for the influence of reading habits on
visuo-spatial processes, e.g., see Maass and
Russo, 2003; Dobel et al., 2007). Therefore,
it is very plausible that our reading and
writing habits foster our spatial mental
line.
When considering the privileged link
between space and memory, it is also inter-
esting to conclude taking a brief glance to
anthropology, which shows that this link
seems to be far more ancient than our
reading habits and already present in non-
literate societies. In fact myths around the
world have often been linked to specific
locations. This “myth spatialization” can
be found in the Tobriand culture from
Papua New Guinea for example, or in
the Australian aborigines famous song-
lines (Chatwin, 1987) or even in Zunis’
legends from southwestern United States.
In all these cases, “spatial location func-
tions as a mnemonic device for the recall
of a corpus of myth” (Harwood, 1976, p.
783). Building on Harwood’s (1976) myth
spatialization, the loci method can be con-
sidered as a phylogenetic protraction of the
myth spatialization, and the mental spatial
line as an ontogenetic protraction of our
reading habits.
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BUILDING BETTER BRAINS—SCHOOL
DAY BY SCHOOL DAY
In this essay we highlight feedback
application as a domain to study the
knowledge and abilities involved in the
construct of teachers’ expertise. One
approach to advance the discussion in a
field of research such as expertise acquisi-
tion generally is to combine (a) analysis of
complex natural phenomena by division
into hypothetical simple building blocks,
with (b) the synthesis of complex phe-
nomena based on known simple building
blocks (e.g., Braitenberg, 1984; Gaschler
et al., 2012). For instance, (a) knowledge
representations such as chunks have been
hypothesized to underlie chess expertise
and (b) this analysis in turn was supported
by a computer-run expert system based
on chunks (cf. Lane et al., 2001; Guida
et al., 2012). Gobet et al. (2014) summa-
rize research on expert knowledge as well
as the Einstellung effect (e.g., missing a to
spot an efficient procedure, because a well-
known one is available; cf. Bilalić et al.,
2010), and neuro-interventions targeting
it. They conclude with the desidera-
tum to build better brains—brains that
can take full advantage of the power of
hypothesis-driven cognition while being
safeguarded against cognitive illusions and
the Einstellung effect.
In the current article we argue that
building better brains is (an admittedly
to-be-optimized) everyday practice, rather
than a thought experiment. Like Gobet
et al. (2014) we ask how creativity can
be fostered by gaining control over prior
knowledge so that it can be flexibly used
or blocked at demand (cf. Bilalić et al.,
2008). Teacher education in universities
delivers quasi-experimental conditions for
studying how expertise on learning can be
acquired and applied best. In particular,
concepts of motivation and action con-
trol relevant in robotics and psychology
seem promising in order to capture and
structure the gist of teacher expertise.
BECOMING EXPERTS IN FACILITATING
KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION
While expertise is often studied in
domains that yield only hundreds or
thousands of experts, universities all over
the world are taking efforts to continu-
ously contribute to a large population of
experts on knowledge acquisition. Based
on theoretical input and years of practice,
teachers should be experts for shaping
school lessons such that knowledge acqui-
sition is optimized (Bromme, 1997, 2008).
Focusing on the demands placed by school
lessons can help to obtain an overview
on the skills teaching experts should have
(Bromme, 2008). Teachers have to orga-
nize and maintain a structure of student
and teacher activities. This includes the
anticipation of students’ inferences as well
as disturbances of the social context of
learning. Teachers need a broad and flex-
ible knowledge base covering the subject,
as well as a repertoire of instructional
methods to stimulate students’ learn-
ing activities for reaching instructional
objectives. Like managers, teachers have
to organize the timetable of each lesson to
make sure that the time is mainly used for
the subject matter. Shulman (1986, 1987)
attributes to teaching experts a repertoire
of content knowledge (e.g., diagnosis of
task specific requirements), pedagogical
content knowledge (e.g., how to present
the subject matter content), and curricu-
lar knowledge. Leading to the appropriate
generation and scheduling of feedback to
the students, teaching experts should have
a strong background in the philosophy of
the subject (e.g., subject-related epistemic
beliefs), diagnostic competences (e.g.,
judgment of students’ abilities), and skills
that allow them to juggle between student-
related aspects of the learning situation as
well as content-related aspects (Bromme,
2008). Teachers’ instructional routines
include categorical units called “curricu-
lum scripts,” in which subject-related
and didactic-methodological aspects are
linked. As a consequence of this integrated
knowledge, most actions of experienced
teachers proceed automatically (Blömeke
et al., 2003). They are difficult to access via
verbal protocols, because in the classroom
or a face-to-face situation, verbalization
of the teacher could reduce the learn-
ers’ amount of cognitive resources and




STATES OF ACTION REGULATION
Learners face the challenge to acquire and
employ self-regulation strategies in order
to obtain educational outcomes (e.g.,
Lerner et al., 2001; Ley and Young, 2001).
In order to scaffold learning through adap-
tive feedback, teachers need knowledge
about the dynamics of learning pro-
cesses and opportunities to apply feed-
back that takes motivational, cognitive
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and emotional aspects of learning into
account. Apart from finding the appropri-
ate frequency for feedback (Healy et al.,
2014), we suggest consideration of the
match of feedback type and action phase
the learner is currently in Heckhausen and
Gollwitzer (1987) have proposed distin-
guishing between motivational and voli-
tional phases of action regulation. The
distinction between motivational and voli-
tional phases of action regulation has been
used in two different ways to bridge the
gap between analysis and synthesis high-
lighted by Braitenberg (1984). On the
one hand, many architectures of artificial
agents in robotics implement the distinc-
tion between a motivational phase (the
agent is open to new information and
ready to re-evaluate current preferences
and plans) and a volitional phase (the
agent is executing a plan and shielding
itself from novel information that might
lead to a re-evaluation of the plan cur-
rently executed; e.g., Visser and Burkhard,
2007). On the other hand, cycles of moti-
vational and volitional phases are present
in theories of the cyclical and recursive
dynamic of learning in educational con-
texts (e.g., Zimmerman, 2000; Schmitz
and Wiese, 2006).
According to Zimmerman (2000) as
well as Schmitz and Wiese (2006), the
learning process proceeds in three phases.
(1) In the goal-setting phase, the learner
chooses goals (e.g., appropriate tasks),
plans actions or action steps and selects
adequate strategies. (2) In the perfor-
mance phase, the selected strategies have
to be applied in order to complete the
task. (3) In the self-reflection phase, the
learner evaluates his/her learning out-
come. Gollwitzer (1990) assumes that in
each one of these phases the learners’
attention is focused on specific informa-
tion that helps him/her to accomplish the
demands of the task. Taking the current
focus of the learner into account, feed-
back can be better adapted with respect to
effects on the learners’ performance, mood
and effort (Ley and Young, 2001; Narciss,
2004; Baadte and Schnotz, 2013).
Three types of feedback can be dis-
tinguished that align to the respective
phases of the learning process. In the
goal setting phase, the learner should
receive goal-setting feedback that informs
him/her about how realistic completion of
the chosen task is according to his/her pre-
vious performances. In the performance
phase, process-feedback offers informa-
tion about specific task-inherent demands
and error-related information. In the
self-reflection phase, the learner should
obtain appropriate outcome-feedback that
informs him/her about the possible causes
for success or failure and about the qual-
ity of his/her performance. In contrast,
feedback is inappropriate if it does not
take the learner’s phase-specific mind-set
into account and if it does not sup-
port the task completion but instead
decreases the learner’s amount of cognitive
resources available for processing the rel-
evant information (e.g., Sweller, 2005; see
Christophel and Baadte, in press).
Matching feedback to the phase-
specific requirements of the learning
process might require flexible strategy
changes and adaptation of routines to
the specific content being taught, epis-
temic beliefs and motivational/volitional
state diagnosed. Thus, adaptation and
shifting skills seem at least as impor-
tant as a large repertoire of strategies.
This view is reflected in the notion of
adaptive expertise advocated in educa-
tion psychology (Verschaffel et al., 2009;
Godau et al., 2014). In contrast to routine
expertise (e.g., expertise that allows the
expert to solve problems very efficiently
and precisely), Hatano and Inagaki (1984)
describe adaptive expertise as the potential
to create new solutions and new problem
solving procedures. Adaptive experts are
“those who not only perform procedu-
ral skills efficiently but also understand
the meaning of the skills and nature of
their object” (p. 28). In contrast, “routine
experts are outstanding in terms of speed,
accuracy, and automaticity of perfor-
mance, but lack flexibility and adaptability
to new problems” (Hatano and Inagaki,
1984, p. 31). Verschaffel et al. (2009) have
pointed out that flexibility can be defined
as the “use of multiple strategies” while
adaptivity includes “making appropriate
strategy choices” (p. 338). This flexibil-
ity and adaptivity is necessary in order
to support students’ individualized learn-
ing processes with appropriate feedback.
Thus, teachers need adaptive expertise
which should include knowledge about the
task specific requirements, the learner abil-
ities, the cyclical and recursive dynamic of
the learning process and the implications
of this dynamic on motivational, cognitive
and emotional levels. On the one hand,
there are first formalized efforts to teach
future teachers relevant motivational com-
petencies (e.g., Rheinberg and Engeser,
2010). On the other hand, there are more
cautious outlooks as well. According to
Verschaffel et al. (2009) “adaptive exper-
tise is not something that can be trained or
taught but rather something that has to be
promoted or cultivated” (p. 348).
MORE TEACHING EXPERIENCE DOES
NOT NECESSARILY LEAD TO BETTER
FEEDBACK SKILLS
Teachers’ expertise emerges during the
theoretical and practical phases of teacher
education and professional experience
after university education (Bromme,
2008). It is an open question as to what
extent the professional experience of
teachers promotes and cultivates adaptive
expertise with regard to adequate stu-
dents’ support in individualized lessons.
For instance, Christophel (2014) demon-
strated that more experienced teachers
did not give more appropriate feedback
(i.e., feedback that offers phase-specific
information) but actually gave more inap-
propriate feedback than less experienced
teachers (e.g., feedback that does not sup-
port the task completion but reduces the
learner’s amount of cognitive resources
available for processing the relevant infor-
mation; Sweller, 2005). Christophel (2014)
studied 30 more experienced teachers with
a mean professional experience of 11.15
years (SD = 12.85) and 30 less experi-
enced teachers with a mean professional
experience of 42.07 days (SD = 89.40).
Teachers watched three video-vignettes
of students passing through the dif-
ferent phases of self-regulated learning
(goal-setting, performance and the self-
reflection phase). The teachers were
instructed to stop the films whenever
they wanted to give feedback to the stu-
dents. The results revealed that the more
experienced teachers stopped the video-
vignettes more frequently and more often
provided inappropriate feedback to stu-
dents as compared to their less experienced
counterparts. In addition, the study of
Baer et al. (2011) showed that professional
experience did not lead to better school-
ing. Baer and colleagues examined the
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development of teacher competences in
transition between academic and profes-
sional careers. The results demonstrate
that teachers with more professional expe-
rience did not perform better in the
measured aspects of schooling than grad-
uate teachers at the end of their university
education.
These findings suggest that professional
experience alone is not a good predic-
tor for the progress of teachers’ exper-
tise (Baer et al., 2011; cf. Campitelli and
Gobet, 2011; Hambrick et al., 2014). Years
of teaching are possibly not sufficient to
informally and implicitly sensitize most
teachers to cues conveying action phases
and the matching feedback. This could
have diverse reasons. As explained above,
school lessons place numerous demands:
teachers have to organize and maintain
the structure of schooling and can be
absorbed by organizational and admin-
istrative activities. After university and
practical education, there is a lack of
peer-coaching (e.g., colleagues who dis-
cuss classroom situations) or qualified
instruction (e.g., best-practice examples).
A lack of (time) resources and motivation
to reflect ones feedback behavior might
result.
ATTENDING THE LARGER PICTURE
However, training studies can support
an optimistic outlook on the develop-
ment of teachers’ expertise in feedback
application. Experienced and inexperi-
enced teachers can be trained to apply
feedback that supports realistic goal-
setting and adequate self-reflection of
learners (Christophel et al., in press).
Recommendations helped teachers to
increase feedback in line with the moti-
vational phase of the learner from pre-
to post-test while phase-inappropriate
feedback could be reduced. Also, atten-
tion allocation in the classroom—often
a prerequisite for feedback application—
seems to be open to intervention. For
instance, Miller (2011; cf. Speelman,
2014; Wiggins et al., 2014) suggested to
employ eye-tracking in order to provide
(becoming) teachers with feedback on
how evenly they distribute their atten-
tion across students in the classroom.
Students disturbing the setting should not
monopolize attention at the cost of other
students. While experienced teachers agree
that uneven distributions of attention
should be avoided, they lack awareness of
how well they are yet managing to imple-
ment the respective strategies of attention
allocation.
REFERENCES
Baadte, C., and Schnotz, W. (2013). Feedback effects
on performance, motivation and mood: are they
moderated by the learner’s self-concept? Scand.
J. Edu. Res. 1–22. doi: 10.1080/00313831.2013.
781059
Baer, M., Kocher, M., Wyss, C., Guldimann, T.,
Larcher, S., and Dörr, G. (2011). Lehrerbildung
und Praxiserfahrung im ersten Berufsjahr und
ihre Wirkung auf die Unterrichtskompetenzen
von Studierenden und jungen Lehrpersonen
im Berufseinstieg. [Teachers‘academic career
and their professional experience in the first
year of their professional career and its impact
on their schooling competences]. Zeitschrift
für Erziehungswissenschaft, 14, 85–117. doi:
10.1007/s11618-011-0168-5
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Previous research into the effects of action video gaming on cognition has suggested
that long term exposure to this type of game might lead to an enhancement of cognitive
skills that transfer to non-gaming cognitive tasks. However, these results have been
controversial. The aim of the current study was to test the presence of positive cognitive
transfer from action video games to two cognitive tasks. More specifically, this study
investigated the effects that participants’ expertise and genre specialization have on
cognitive improvements in one task unrelated to video gaming (a flanker task) and
one related task (change detection task with both control and genre-specific images).
This study was unique in three ways. Firstly, it analyzed a continuum of expertise
levels, which has yet to be investigated in research into the cognitive benefits of
video gaming. Secondly, it explored genre-specific skill developments on these tasks
by comparing Action and Strategy video game players (VGPs). Thirdly, it used a very
tight experiment design, including the experimenter being blind to expertise level and
genre specialization of the participant. Ninety-two university students aged between 18
and 30 (M = 21.25) were recruited through opportunistic sampling and were grouped
by video game specialization and expertise level. While the results of the flanker task
were consistent with previous research (i.e., effect of congruence), there was no effect of
expertise, and the action gamers failed to outperform the strategy gamers. Additionally,
contrary to expectation, there was no interaction between genre specialization and image
type in the change detection task, again demonstrating no expertise effect. The lack
of effects for game specialization and expertise goes against previous research on the
positive effects of action video gaming on other cognitive tasks.
Keywords: change detection task, expertise, flanker task, transfer, video game playing
INTRODUCTION
Transfer—the extent to which skills generalize—is an important
theoretical concept that has serious practical implications. In a
classic article, Thorndike and Woodworth (1901) propounded
their theory of “identical elements,” according to which transfer
from a first domain to a second domain is possible only when
the components of the skills required in each domain overlap.
For example, a pianist can use their knowledge of music theory
to understand a violin concerto, and a mathematician will under-
stand the differential equations of an economics paper better than
a person without background in mathematics. But even in these
cases, transfer is far from perfect; for example, the pianist will not
be able play the violin concerto itself without extensive additional
training.
FAR-TRANSFER
In line with Thorndike and Woodworth’s (1901) hypothesis, most
theories of expertise predict that transfer from one domain to
another (far-transfer) will be difficult. This is particularly the case
for theories based on the notion that expertise in great part relies
on domain-specific perceptual knowledge [e.g., chunking theory
(Chase and Simon, 1973) and template theory (Gobet and Simon,
1996)]. While perceptual knowledge enables fluid behavior in the
original domain, it is of little use in other domains as it does
not match the new environment. Research on chess has provided
considerable support for this prediction. Chess players’ percep-
tual skills do not extend to visual memory for shapes (Waters
et al., 2002), nor do their planning capabilities transfer to the
Tower of London, a task measuring executive function and plan-
ning (Unterrainer et al., 2011). Moreover, contrary to widespread
belief, there is no robust empirical evidence that playing chess
improves scholastic abilities (Gobet and Campitelli, 2006).
One of the rare domains in which evidence of far transfer
has been found is playing action video games (e.g., Green et al.,
2009)1. Repeated playing of this kind of game has been reported
1In this study, the term “video game” refers to any published computer or con-
sole video game from 1952 to the present day. The term “video game player”
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to lead to improvements in perceptual and attentional processes
and to reduce reaction time in other tasks where one must be
both fast and accurate (e.g., Green et al., 2009; Bavelier et al.,
2012).
One of the main advantages proposed to be the result of
habitual action video game playing is that of a more efficient
attentional system. For example, Chisholm et al. (2010) com-
pared action vs. non-action video game players (VGPs) on an
attentional capture task where participants searched for a target
that could appear in isolation or with a salient task-irrelevant
distractor. Action VGPs showed faster reaction times to detect tar-
gets and a reduced effect of distractor interference, leading the
authors to conclude that the action video gamers had better top-
down attentional control, with the consequence that they spend
less time processing irrelevant distractors. Consistent with this
result, Hubert-Wallander et al. (2011) found that, compared with
non-action gamers, action gamers demonstrate superior visual
selective attention as measured in a visual search task, with the
greatest benefit occurring at the highest cognitive loads (largest
search arrays). Additional evidence comes from neuroimaging
where differences in brain activation support the idea that long-
term video game playing impacts on cortical functioning. For
example, using functional magnetic resonance imagery (fMRI),
Bavelier et al. (2012) compared a group of action and non-action
video gamers on a task involving locating a target stimulus under
conditions of increasing distractor load. In addition to overall
faster reaction times, compared to the non-video game playing
group, the VGPs showed little increase in the level of activation
in a network of fronto-parietal sites as distractor load increased.
This fronto-parietal network has commonly been associated with
attentional processing (Ptak, 2012). These data were taken to
suggest that the VGPs were more efficient in their allocation of
attentional resources such that the cortical sites deploying atten-
tion were able to filter out the distracting information more
easily and therefore showed less load dependent increases in
cortical activity, supporting the behavioral finding of Chisholm
et al. (2010). The proposed superior attentional resource alloca-
tion of VGPs (e.g., Hubert-Wallander et al., 2011; Bavelier et al.,
2012), that may be at the heart of the observed enhancement
of stimulus processing and reduced distractor interference, has
now been observed in a number of experiments examining video
game expertise based improvements in spatial selective attention
(Green and Bavelier, 2003; Feng et al., 2007; Spence et al., 2009),
distractor inhibition (Chisholm et al., 2010; Hubert-Wallander
et al., 2011; Mishra et al., 2011; Bavelier et al., 2012), enhanced
image search (Dye et al., 2009) and target detection (Castel et al.,
2005; Dye et al., 2009).
As detailed above, a number of reports using different atten-
tional tasks have suggested that VGPs have an improved ability to
“filter out” unnecessary or irrelevant stimuli partly through the
enhancement of attentional functioning (Chisholm et al., 2010;
Bavelier et al., 2012). One task that has been used successfully to
test VGPs proposed advantage at distractor filtering directly is the
(shortened to VGP) refers to any individual who plays these games, and the
term “non-video game player” (shortened to nVGP) refers to any individual
who partakes in video game play for less than 1 h per week.
Flanker Compatibility Task (Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974; Bavelier
et al., 2012). The Flanker Task requires participants to ignore
salient laterally presented distractors while making responses to a
centrally presented target stimulus. Mishra et al. (2011) employed
a flanker task to examine whether there was any neuroelec-
trophysiological evidence of VGP showing enhanced distractor
inhibition. The results showed that, behaviourally, VGPs were bet-
ter able to ignore flanking items competing for attention with
a central stimulus than nVGPs and that this increase in behav-
ioral performance was associated with a greater P300 component
in the ERP. The P300 electrophysiological component has been
associated with perceptual discrimination and decision-making
(Picton, 1992; Mishra et al., 2011). These data, together, were
taken to support the hypothesis that VGP were better at filtering
out the distractor stimuli leading to improved perceptual deci-
sion making. Lavie (1995) also reported that through extensive
game play VGPs gain the ability to identify task-irrelevant flankers
before further processing stimuli. This indicates that VGPs pos-
sess an enhanced capability to logically filter information for
relevance before attempting to ignore distractors, rather than
trying to process everything at once as nVGPs do.
An experimental task that is homologous to the task require-
ments of many action video games is the change detection task.
In the change detection task, participants are asked to moni-
tor a visual display for a small change that they indicate finding
via a keypress response. For example, Clark et al. (2011) found
that VGPs display a superior ability to spot changes when pre-
sented with rapidly alternating sets of images. In this study, 35
participants were presented with an unedited/edited image cycle
switching at 4 Hz. The image cycle repeated until the participants
indicated via a mouse click that they had spotted the edited ele-
ment by clicking the image in the position they thought believed
contained the image edit. Video game players performed better
than nVGPs, replicating previous work on attentional improve-
ments in VGP (e.g., Green et al., 2009), and there were also
strategic changes in their search patterns. Compared with nVGP,
the VGP showed broader search strategies, further supporting the
view that VGPs develop top-down processing.
It follows from the above arguments that, if video-game exper-
tise leads to the observed enhanced attentional and perceptual
processing, then it should be possible to train nVGP using video
games and observe an improvement in their cognitive function-
ing. Green and Bavelier (2003) recruited two groups of partici-
pants that had no history of video gaming; one group was then
trained on a fast-paced action game (Medal of Honor) and the
other on a slow-paced puzzle game (Tetris). After a period of 10 h
training (1 h a day over 10 days), compared with the Tetris group,
participants trained on Medal of Honor displayed better Useful
Field-of-View (Ball et al., 1988), that is they had an enhance-
ment in their ability to search for and identify cued targets. It was
also found that the Medal of Honor trainees showed a reduced
attentional blink (Raymond et al., 1992), i.e., a reduction in the
window of attentional “blindness” that occurs after detecting or
recognizing the first of two temporally close visual stimuli (Green
and Bavelier, 2003; Feng et al., 2007; Bailey et al., 2010).
While intriguing, the research on the cognitive benefits of
video game playing has been criticized on several grounds.
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Boot et al. (2011) note that experts and novices have different
expectations about their performance, which is likely to affect
their behavior due to demand characteristics. They also observe
that playing video games might affect the kind of strategies that
are being used rather than basic perceptual or cognitive capacities.
Finally, as some studies have failed to find differences between
VGPs and nVGPs, the literature might suffer from a file-drawer
problem. Kristjánsson (2013) note that, in many training stud-
ies, the control groups do not improve their performance on the
tasks of interest, as one would expect, based on the extensive lit-
erature on learning, given the test-retest methodology used. In
addition, the results might be affected by gender differences, as it
is difficult to find expert female VGPs. Both Boot et al. (2011) and
Kristjánsson (2013) note the necessity to carry out independent
replications.
Near transfer
Research has also investigated whether transfer occurs between
sub-disciplines of the same field (near transfer). For example,
do physicians specializing in neurosurgery generalize their skills
when solving problems from pediatrics, or do chess players spe-
cializing in specific openings (i.e., the first moves of the game)
maintain their skill level when making decisions in board posi-
tions in which they are not specialized?
Several studies have addressed this issue in medicine (Rikers
et al., 2002), political science (Chiesi et al., 1979), and the design
of experiments (Schunn and Anderson, 1999). The pattern of
results suggests that experts fall back on general heuristics when
they cannot use domain-specific knowledge. Emphasizing the
role of general problem-solving methods, these studies also high-
light the role of domain-specific patterns and methods, as clearly
some degree of expertise is lost when domain-specific methods
are replaced by domain-general one. While these studies com-
pared individuals of the same level of expertise, Bilalić et al. (2009)
compared individuals of different skill levels. They took advantage
of several features of chess: chess skill is precisely and quantita-
tively measured by the Elo rating; chess players enjoy trying to
find the best move in a chess position; and chess players specialize
in different openings, which makes it relatively easy to find play-
ers who have the same strength (as measured by their Elo points)
but who have different specialized opening knowledge.
Bilalić et al. compared the performance, in both a memory and
problem solving task, of players who specialized in two different
chess openings. In addition to positions coming from these two
types of defense, they also used neutral positions (positions dif-
ficult to classify with respect to the opening they came from).
The players were Candidate Masters, Masters, and International
Masters/Grandmasters. The results were dramatic. With only one
exception, all players obtained the best results with the positions
taken from the openings they specialized in. When confronted
with positions outside their domain of specialization, players per-
formed one standard deviation on average below the level shown
with positions taken from their domain of specialization.
AIMS OF THE STUDY
Many studies have investigated the differences between VGPs
and nVGPs but there is as yet, to our knowledge, no research
establishing whether differing levels of video gaming expertise
vary with performance on cognitive tasks. Thus, the first aim of
this study was to test the hypothesis that, as the level of exper-
tise increases, task accuracy increases, and reaction times become
faster.
In addition, a number of studies compare VGPs who iden-
tify as “Action” players to nVGPs, but as yet there has been no
research into whether the skills demonstrated by action players
cross over into other genres, such as strategy games, or indeed
if each genre improves different skills. Data from a consumer
survey by the Entertainment Software Association found that
action and strategy games proved popular with both console and
computer VGPs, and so these two genres were chosen as a vari-
able to test the hypothesis (Entertainment Software Association,
2012).
The second aim of the study was thus to test to what extent
different video-game genre specialization tap into different cog-
nitive abilities. Action games typically involve fast-paced game-
play, such as “Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3” (Infinity Ward,
2011), which was the best selling action console video game in
2011 (Entertainment Software Association, 2012). It was pre-
dicted that the speed of gameplay will heighten action VGPs
speeded response times to stimuli other than those normally
responded to in a VG, as shown by Green and Bavelier (2003).
Strategy players, however, are predicted to possess a stronger
reliance on maintaining accuracy as a gained trait from long-
term play where accuracy over response time is key to success.
This is because, typically, strategy games require the ability to
move and place items in carefully decided places and forma-
tions. While often these changes are in response to an in-game
target event and can result in swift determination and sequenc-
ing of new actions to fulfill a shifting long-term goal, there is
less emphasis on rapid direct responding to an appearing tar-
get. Games such as “StarCraft 2: Wings of Liberty” (Blizzard
Entertainment, 2010), the best-selling PC strategy game of 2011
(Entertainment Software Association, 2012), demonstrate the
need for this ability, particularly in games with a military basis.
As a consequence, it was predicted that strategy players would
perform with significantly higher mean accuracy and action
players would perform with a significantly faster mean reaction
time.
The final aim was to replicate the effect of action video-playing
on two tasks: a flanker task (Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974) and
change detection task (Clark et al., 2011). In particular the flanker
task has shown a mixed pattern of results; a basic flanker task has
shown both no effect of expertise (Cain et al., 2012), and effects of
expertise only once an additional perceptual load has been added
(Green and Bavelier, 2003). In the case of Green and Bavelier
(2003) it was argued that the addition of a perceptual load pre-
vented flanker interference in the case of nVGP because, unlike
the VGP, there were fewer spare resources to process the distract-
ing flankers. However, it did appear in the original Green and
Bavelier (2003) that there was a small advantage for VGP com-
pared to nVGP at low loads. We therefore predict that, using a
basic “low-load” flanker task, there should be a smaller flanker
effect for VGP compared to nVGP and that this will increase as
VG expertise decreases.
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OVERALL METHOD
ETHICAL APPROVAL
This study was granted ethical approval from the Brunel
University School of Social Sciences ethics board in accordance
with the British Psychological Society (BPS) guidelines. All par-
ticipants gave informed consent and were fully debriefed after the
study.
PILOT STUDY
An online pilot, carried out several months before the main study,
asked participants (N = 115) to identify the last three action
and strategy video games they had played. The Call of Duty and
Assassin’s Creed video game series were identified as the most pop-
ular action video games, and the Starcraft and FIFA series were
found to be the most popular strategy video games.
PARTICIPANTS
Ninety-two participants (56 male) aged between 18 and 30
(M = 21.25, SD = 2.07) were recruited by opportunistic sam-
pling through social networking sites and word of mouth. Most
of the participants had filled out the online questionnaire (Pilot
study). Each participant was offered a food reward for partici-
pating in the study, with a further cash reward incentive (£20) if
they achieved the best score on one of the two tasks out of all
participants.
APPARATUS
The experiment was run using the E-Prime software package
(Psychology Software Tools, Inc., 2008) on a Dell desktop com-
puter running Windows 7, with stimuli presented on a 15 inch
Lenovo LCD screen running at a resolution of 640 × 480 pixels at
a refresh rate of 60 Hz. Keyboard and mouse responses were col-
lected via a standard keyboard and mouse. Participants were sat
approximately 60 cm from the computer screen.
DESIGN
This study was pseudo-experimental in nature, as the indepen-
dent variables were not directly manipulated. In both experi-
mental measures, the independent variables were skill (experts,
intermediates, novices, and controls) and specialization (action
vs. strategy). In some analyses, in order to allow direct compari-
son with the literature, we used skill with only two levels (VGPs
vs. nVGPs).
In order to operationalise the study variables, criteria for each
between-subject variable needed to be established. A question-
naire was given at the end of the study. In addition to stan-
dard questions such as asking age and gender, information was
obtained on the participants gaming habits to allow for allocation
of each participant to the levels of the two independent variables
(i.e., VGP or nVGP). The following three questions were asked.
(i) “How many hours a week, on average, do you play video
games for? 0–1, 2–5, 6–10, 11–15, 16–20, 21+.” This ques-
tion was used to allocate participants to either the VGP or
nVGP group based on their hours of play. Participants who
answered “0–1” were allocated to the nVGP group and any
answers above were assigned to the VGP group. Sixty-two
VGPs and 19 nVGPs were identified.
(ii) “On average, what percentage of the games that you
play do you complete? (By completed, we mean attain-
ing the highest in-game ‘level’ or ‘rank’ or completing
the game’s storyline. You don’t need to include optional
missions, achievements or DLC (Downloadable Content).”
Participants who answered “76–100%” to this were deemed
as Experts (n = 22), those who answered “51–75%” were
deemed Intermediates (n = 24) and those who answered
“26–50%” were deemed Novices (n = 22). Those who
answered “0–25%” were allocated to the Control group
(n = 24).
(iii) “Would you identify yourself predominantly as an action
or strategy video gamer?” This question was used to decide
each participant’s genre specialization. Thirty six partici-
pants identified themselves as predominantly action VGPs,
alongside 32 strategy VGPs.
Table 1 presents the frequency of participants for each genre ×
expertise cell of the design.
GENERAL PROCEDURE
Upon arrival, one of the research team allocated the participant
a random number that corresponded to the participant’s entry in
the pilot database that contained information pertaining to their
game playing history and experience. They were then handed
over to a second experimenter who ran the experiment and who
was blind to the participant’s details and questionnaire scoring.
This method ensured that both the participant and the second
researcher were unaware of the participants’ genre or expertise
allocation. Participants carried out the two experimental mea-
sures that formed the study in a random order. For each measure
(described below), the first screen to appear was a set of task
instructions (see below for details of each experiments instruc-
tion). Once the series of tasks was complete, participants com-
pleted the “General Information Sheet,” wherein they answered
questions such as age, genre specialization, average weekly hours
played etc.
Table 1 | Participation allocation to the experimental groups (genre
specialization and expertise level).
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DATA ANALYSIS
Outliers were identified as either reaction times or correct
responses that were notably outside the general distribution.
Boxplots for each data set were analyzed and any outliers SPSS
identified were removed. All reaction time analyses were per-
formed using correct only trials.
The experiment comprised two measures, an Eriksen Flanker
task and a change detection task. Each of these measures is
described below.
MEASURE 1: ERIKSEN FLANKER TASK
This measure was a modified version of Eriksen and Eriksen’s
(1974) flanker task. Arrows were used instead of letters, similar
to other video gaming studies such as Cain et al. (2012).
MATERIALS
Congruent and incongruent stimuli were created prior to the start
of the experiment by combining arrow stimuli such that the cen-
tral arrow to which the participant responded was surrounded
by equally spaced, directionally congruent stimuli (e.g., < < <
or > > >) or directionally incongruent stimuli (e.g., < > <
or > < >). The flanker stimuli subtended 8◦ of visual angle.
DESIGN
The experiment was a mixed factorial design with the within sub-
jects factor being Congruence and between-subjects factors of
Expertise Level, Genre Affiliation and “Video Game Players vs.
Non-Video Game Players.” The dependent variables in this task
were reaction time and percent correct accuracy.
PROCEDURE
Participants completed 24 congruent and 24 incongruent trials
(trial order randomized) in two blocks of equal number (i.e., 24
trials per block). On each trial the participant viewed a centrally
presented fixation cross for 500 ms that was replaced by either a
congruent or incongruent trial image. Participants viewed each
trial image and were asked to indicate in which direction the
central arrow using the arrow keys on the keyboard. Each trial
remained onscreen until the participant made a key press. The
next trial immediately followed.
MEASURE 2: CHANGE DETECTION TASK
MATERIALS
Images were sourced from Google Image Search and were edited
using Adobe Photoshop CS5 (Adobe Systems, 2010). Based on the
pilot study, which provided information on the most commonly
played action and strategy games, images from Call of Duty and
StarCraft were chosen. As both games are part of a much larger
series of games, the most recent versions of each franchise were
used (StarCraft II: Wings of Liberty; Blizzard Entertainment, 2010)
and Call of Duty: Black Ops 2 (Treyarch, 2012). All trial images
were scaled such that they subtended 26◦ of visual angle.
DESIGN
As it used both expertise and specialization as independent vari-
ables, this experiment had the same design as described in Bilalić
et al. (2009). Players of different skill levels and specialized with
the video games Call of Duty or StarCraft, as well as a control
group of non-players, were presented with images from these
two games in addition to non-video game related (defined as
“neutral”) stimuli.
The task itself was an adapted form of Clark et al. (2011).
There were 13 trials in total, the first of which was a practice
trial and was not included in later analyses. Three repeated mea-
sures conditions were used: Call of Duty, StarCraft and Landscape
(Control) with each condition consisting of all those trials con-
taining the images derived from those games or scenes. There
were four images in each condition.
PROCEDURE
Participants fixated a centrally presented cross for 4000 ms prior
to the start of the change detection task image presentation. The
first, unedited (UE), image was then presented for 240 ms, fol-
lowed by a blank gray screen for 80 ms. A second image, identical
to the first, would then appear for a period of 240 ms before being
replaced by a blank gray screen for 80 ms. The process would then
repeat but with the edited (E) version (identical save for a change
in a single image feature) of the same image, i.e., the sequence
appeared as UE, UE, E, E, UE, UE, E, E. . . This cycle repeated
until the participant responded by pressing the spacebar on the
computer keyboard (see Figure 1).
On detection of a change, the participant ceased the trial via
keypress (spacebar) and then reported both the location and
nature of the perceived change to the experimenter who remained
with the participant in the room during data collection. The par-
ticipant then pressed the spacebar again in order to trigger the
next trial presentation.
RESULTS
MEASURE 1: ERIKSEN FLANKER TASK
Prior to analysis, one outlier was removed for failing to comply
with task instruction. Data were analyzed using a mixed ANOVA
FIGURE 1 | One cycle of a sample Change Detection trial showing a
Landscape (Control) image. The sequence involved two presentations of
the unedited image prior to two presentations of an edited image. An
example of an unedited and associated edited image is shown in the
bottom right corner: The feature missing in the edited version of the image
is indicated by the red circle on the original image.
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to determine the effect of specialization and skill (between-
subjects) with performance on congruent and incongruent trials
(within-subjects).
Accuracy
Analyses indicated a main effect of congruence, F(1, 83) = 27.90,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.25, f = 0.58. The Congruent (Same) condi-
tion (M = 23.69, SD = 0.69) had a higher average score than
the Incongruent (Distractor) condition (M = 18.90, SD = 8.38).
This effect was not qualified by participant expertise, F(3, 83) =
0.57, p = 0.64, η2p = 0.02, f = 0.14, or genre, F(1, 83) = 2.55,
p = 0.11, η2p = 0.03, f = 0.18. No interaction was found between
congruence, expertise and genre, F(3, 83) = 2.00, p = 0.12, η2p =
0.07, f = 0.27.
Reaction time
Analyses showed a main effect of congruence on reaction time,
F(1, 73) = 53.31, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.42, f = 0.85; overall, a lower
mean reaction time was demonstrated in the Congruent (Same)
condition (M = 433.85, SD = 70.47) than the Incongruent
(Distractor) condition (M = 529.46, SD = 155.82). This effect
was not qualified by participant expertise, F(3, 73) = 0.42, p =
0.74, η2p = 0.02, f = 0.14, or genre, F(1, 73) = 1.71, p = 0.59,
η2p = 0.006, f = 0.08. No interaction was found between congru-
ence, expertise and genre, F(3, 73) = 1.71, p = 0.17, η2p = 0.07,
f = 0.27.
VGPs vs. nVGPs
In order to attempt to replicate previous research using this task,
we also carried out analyses where the participants were allocated
to only two groups (VGPs and nVGPs). nVGPs were identified
as any participant who played, on average, less than 1 h of either
console or computer video games per week. Figure 2 shows a
summary of the reaction time and accuracy data for the flanker
task for VGPs and nVGPs.
With respect to accuracy, there was a main effect of con-
gruence on accuracy, F(1, 89) = 19.96, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.18, f =
0.47, that was not qualified by the players’ status [F(1, 89) = 0.24,
p = 0.62, η2p = 0.008, f = 0.09].
With respect to reaction time, both groups performed over-
all faster in the Congruent (Same) condition (M = 433.85, SD =
70.47) than the Incongruent (Distractor) condition (M = 529.46,
SD = 155.82). Analysis indicated a main effect of congruence on
reaction time, F(1, 79) = 32.23, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.29, f = 0.64,
that was not qualified by the players’ status, F(1, 79) = 1.12, p =
0.29, η2p = 0.01, f = 0.1.
MEASURE 2: CHANGE DETECTION TASK
After outliers were removed due to task non-compliance, 85 par-
ticipants remained from the original 92. A Mixed ANOVA was
carried out and outliers were controlled in an identical way to the
Flanker Task.
Analysis indicated a main effect of image type on reac-
tion time, F(2, 154) = 36.57, p < 0.001, n2p = 0.32, f = 0.69.
Response times were quicker in the Landscape condition (M =
9399 ms, SD = 5119 ms) than in the Call of Duty condition
(M = 16, 138 ms, SD = 7556 ms) and Starcraft condition (M =
20, 247 ms, SD = 10, 761 ms). This effect was not qualified by
participant expertise [F(6, 154) = 1.06, p = 0.39, n2p = 0.04, f =
0.2] or genre [F(2, 154) = 0.57, p = 0.57, n2p = 0.01, f = 0.1]. No
interaction was found between image type, expertise and genre
[F(6, 154) = 0.27, p = 0.95, n2p = 0.01, f = 0.1].
We also analyzed the data by grouping the participants
into players and non-players. Mauchly’s Test indicated a vio-
lated assumption of sphericity, χ2(2) = 21.57, p < 0.001, therefore
degrees of freedom (df ) were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser
estimates of sphericity (ε = 0.81). Analysis indicated a main
effect of image type on reaction time, F(2, 166) = 25.06, p <
0.001, n2p = 0.23, f = 0.55, that was not qualified by the “Video
Game Players vs. Non-Video Game Players” variable [F(2, 166) =
1.37, p = 0.26, n2p = 0.02, f = 0.14]. Figure 3 shows a summary
FIGURE 2 | Mean accuracy (left), reaction times (right) and the associated 95% confidence intervals for the VGP and nVGP from the Eriksen Flanker
Task.
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FIGURE 3 | Mean reaction times along with the associated 95%
confidence intervals for VGP and nVGP from the Change Detection
Task.
of the reaction time data for the change detection task for VGPs
and nVGPs.
POWER SUMMARY
One advantage of this study is the relatively large number of par-
ticipants who were involved. However, to ensure that the absence
of expertise effects was not due to a lack of statistical power, we
investigated the size of effects we could be expected to find. All
calculations are based on a power criterion of 0.8 and a 0.05 alpha
level. For Measure 1: Eriksen Flanker task, one could expect to
find significant differences of effect sizes for the interaction of
congruency and specialization of 0.31 and of 0.36 for the two-way
interaction of congruency with skill and for the three-way inter-
action of congruency with skill and specialization. For Measure 2:
Change Detection Task, effect size of 0.25 could be expected to be
identified for interactions of image type with specialization and
effect sizes of 0.30 for both the two-way interactions of special-
ization and skill with image type and the three-way interaction of
image type, specialization, and skill.
In all cases, the observed effect sizes for game specialization
and skill in each of the measures was considerably smaller than the
minimum expected detectable effect size even given our relatively
large sample size. The power analyses also highlight that given our
sample size we could expect to detect small effect sizes.
DISCUSSION
One of the major conclusions of research into learning and exper-
tise is that transfer from one domain to another is rare and
difficult, and happens only when the two domains share com-
ponents that ask for the same cognitive skills. In recent years, a
series of experiments on action video game playing have found
that playing this kind of game leads to substantial transfer, in par-
ticular with tasks engaging attentional processing. The aim of this
study was to replicate this phenomenon with two tasks that had
previously been used in the action video-game literature. In addi-
tion, the study aimed to use a finer measure of expertise than had
been done in the past, and to look at the extent to which skills
acquired in a specific VG genre (action or strategy) can be used in
a task using material linked to either of the two genres.
In neither task were we able to find any effect of skill or a supe-
riority of the VGPs when compared to the nVGPs. Thus, our study
did not support the hypothesis of far transfer, in line with most
theories of expertise but in contradiction with previous VG stud-
ies. Our failure to replicate previous results cannot be ascribed to
a lack of power, as the number of participants (n = 92) was high
for this kind of study and our design, incorporating different lev-
els of skill, was in principle able to identify subtle skills effects that
cannot be found when only two groups are compared (VGPs vs.
nVGPs). In addition, the results we obtained in each task were
consistent with the results normally obtained in these tasks. For
example, we found significantly faster reaction times and a greater
number of percent correct accurate trials for the congruent trials
compared to the non-congruent trials in the flanker task.
For the flanker task, despite strong congruency effects, the
absence of a significantly different interference effect for VGP vs.
nVGP is not entirely unexpected, despite our predictions to the
contrary. We argued that based on previous work that we might
expect a small difference (Green and Bavelier, 2003), especially
given our sample size and a finer division of game expertise than
previously used. However, this was not the case and, although the
null hypothesis cannot be accepted, the absence of a significant
interaction of game expertise and congruency does add to a num-
ber of results showing that, at low loads there is little difference
between the performance on VGP and nVGP on a flanker task
(Green and Bavelier, 2003; Cain et al., 2012).
We followed Boot et al.’s (2011) advice of pre-screening par-
ticipants long before the experiments per se, and of asking them
to fill in the questionnaire on video game activities at the end of
the study. Thus, our procedure minimized demand characteris-
tics. Together with the fact that other studies have failed to find
a VGP effect (e.g., Castel et al., 2005; Boot et al., 2008; Murphy
and Spencer, 2009), our results are consistent with the possibility
that such demands might have played a role in previous research
showing VGPs’ superiority. However, given that this conclusion
is based on null results, further research is needed to validate or
invalidate this hypothesis.
Most unexpected was perhaps the failure to find an expertise
effect in the change detection task. Near transfer did not occur
in spite of the fact that the material used came from the players’
domain of expertise (either action or strategy players) and that we
based the stimulus choice on the most popular games within each
genre, an expected level of increased familiarity. Why is it that
the patterns that the players had presumably acquired by playing
their favorite game did not enable them to find changes in the
stimuli more rapidly? One possible explanation is that the change
detection paradigm is unsuitable for detecting domain-specific
patterns used for unconscious pattern recognition. An examina-
tion of the mean reaction times shows that the average time spent
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on task was very long (about 20 s on average in the Starcraft con-
dition) and thus is likely to engage more conscious mechanisms.
This explanation gains further plausibility given that Gobet et al.
(in preparation) did find an interaction between specialism and
expertise in a recognition task using a similar design as that used
here: action players specializing in the Call of Duty and rac-
ing players specializing in Gran Turismo performed better when
dealing with images from their own game.
Our study was not without weaknesses. The measure of video-
game expertise and the allocation to a specific genre were based
on self-reports, and perhaps it would have been desirable (albeit
unpractical) to ask players to play segments of their favorite game
to estimate their level. With regard to obtaining a pure mea-
sure of specific video game genre benefits a study, such as this,
that concentrates on training effects in nVGP (e.g., Green and
Bavelier, 2003) may be in a better suited to detect subtle changes
in performance. A comparison of preferred gametype may be
expected to find subtle differences between players of different
games but only when those players partake of a single type of
game. Anecdotally, many game players are “poly-gamers” and will
play other game types in addition to their preferred category. A
training study where nVGP gain experience playing only a single
genre of game would therefore be better placed to detect subtle
differences between expertise benefits of individual game types.
A similar argument can be made to better examine any potential
gender differences. The sample here did not allow for a meaning-
ful investigation of potential gender differences and, for the same
reasons previously argued to account for poly-gamers, a training
study would be ideal. Finally, there were few trials in the change
detection task.
In the last year several professional associations and journals
have emphasized the need for more replications. However, in spite
of previous calls (e.g., Gobet et al., 2004), and partly due to the
difficulty of finding experts, research into expertise is rarely repli-
cated. The current paper contributes to this effort of obtaining
more robust empirical data.
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Bilalić, M., McLeod, P., and Gobet, F. (2009). Specialization effect
and its influence on memory and problem solving in expert chess
players. Cogn. Sci. 33, 1117–1143. doi: 10.1111/j.1551-6709.2009.
01030.x
Boot, W. R., Blakely, D. P., and Simons, D. J. (2011). Do action video games improve
perception and cognition? Front. Psychol. 2:226. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2011.
00226
Boot, W. R., Kramer, A. F., Simons, D. J., Fabiani, M., and Gratton, G. (2008). The
effects of video game playing on attention, memory, and executive control. Acta
Psychol. 129, 387–398. doi: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2008.09.005
Cain, M. S., Landau, A. N., and Shimamura, A. P. (2012). Action video game experi-
ence reduces the cost of switching tasks. Atten. Percept. Psychophys. 74, 641–647.
doi: 10.3758/s13414-012-0284-1
Castel, A. D., Pratt, J., and Drummond, E. (2005). The effects of action video
game experience on the time course of inhibition of return and the efficiency
of visual search. Acta Psychol. 119, 217–230. doi: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2005.
02.004
Chase, W. G., and Simon, H. A. (1973). Perception in chess. Cogn. Psychol. 4, 55–81.
doi: 10.1016/0010-0285(73)90004-2
Chiesi, H. L., Spilich, G. J., and Voss, J. F. (1979). Acquisition of domain-related
information in relation to high and low domain knowledge. J. Verbal Learn.
Verbal Behav. 18, 257–273. doi: 10.1016/S0022-5371(79)90146-4
Chisholm, J. D., Kingstone, A., Hickey, C., and Theeuwes, J. (2010). Reduced atten-
tional capture in action video game players. Attent. Percept. Psychophys. 72,
667–671. doi: 10.3758/APP.72.3.667
Clark, K., Fleck, M. S., and Mitroff, S. R. (2011). Enhanced change detection per-
formance reveals improved strategy use in avid action video game players. Acta
Psychol. 136, 67–72. doi: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2010.10.003
Dye, M. W. G., Green, C. S., and Bavelier, D. (2009). The development of atten-
tion skills in action video game players. Neuropsychologia 47, 1780–1789. doi:
10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2009.02.002
Entertainment Software Association. (2012). Essential Facts About
the Computer and Video Game Industry. Available online at:
http://www.theesa.com/facts/pdfs/ESA_EF_2012.pdf (Accessed March 11,
2013)
Eriksen, B. A., and Eriksen, C. W. (1974). Effects of noise letters upon identifica-
tion of a target letter in a nonsearch task. Percept. Psychophys. 16, 143–149. doi:
10.3758/BF03203267
Feng, J., Spence, I., and Pratt, J. (2007). Playing an action video game reduces
gender differences in spatial cognition. Psychol. Sci. 10, 850. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2007.01990.x
Gobet, F., and Campitelli, G. (2006). “Education and chess: a critical review,”
in Chess and Education: Selected Essays from the Koltanowski Conference, ed
T. Redman (Dallas, TX: Chess Program at the University of Texas at Dallas),
124–143.
Gobet, F., de Voogt, A. J., and Retschitzki, J. (2004). Moves in Mind. Hove:
Psychology Press.
Gobet, F., Patel, K., and Johnston, S., (in preparation). The Effects of Video Game
Specialisation on a Recognition Task.
Gobet, F., and Simon, H. A. (1996). Templates in chess memory: a mechanism for
recalling several boards. Cogn. Psychol. 31, 1–40. doi: 10.1006/cogp.1996.0011
Green, C. S., and Bavelier, D. (2003). Action video game modifies visual selective
attention. Nature 423, 534. doi: 10.1038/nature01647
Green, C. S., Li, R. J., and Bavelier, D. (2009). Perceptual learning during
action video game playing. Topics Cogn. Sci. 2, 202–216. doi: 10.1111/j.1756-
8765.2009.01054.x
Hubert-Wallander, B., Sugarman, M., Bavelier, D., and Green, C. S. (2011).
Changes in search rate but not in the dynamics of exogenous attention in
action videogame players. Attent. Percept. Psychophys. 73, 2399–2412. doi:
10.3758/s13414-011-0194-7
Infinity Ward. (2011). Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 3 [Video Game]. Santa Monica,
CA: Activision.
Kristjánsson, Á. (2013). The case for causal influences of action videogame
play upon vision and attention. Attent. Percept. Psychophys. 75, 667–672. doi:
10.3758/s13414-013-0427-z
Lavie, N. (1995). Perceptual load as a necessary condition for selective atten-
tion. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 21, 451–468. doi: 10.1037/0096-
1523.21.3.451
Mishra, J., Zinni, M., Bavelier, D., and Hillyard, S. A. (2011). Neural basis
of superior performance of action videogame players in an attention-
demanding task. J. Neurosci. 31, 992–998. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.4834-
10.2011
Murphy, K., and Spencer, A. (2009). Playing video games does not make for better
visual attention skills. J. Artic. Support Null Hypothesis 6, 1–20.
Picton, T. W. (1992). The P300 wave of the human event-related poten-
tial. J. Clin. Neurophysiol. 9, 456–479. doi: 10.1097/00004691-199210000-
00002
Ptak, R. (2012). The frontoparietal attention network of the human brain: action,
saliency, and a priority map of the environment. Neuroscientist 18, 502–515. doi:
10.1177/1073858411409051
Raymond, J. E., Shapiro, K. L., and Arnell, K. M. (1992). Temporary sup-
pression of visual processing in an RSVP task—an attentional blink.
J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 18, 849–860. doi: 10.1037/0096-1523.
18.3.849
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition November 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1337 | 192
Gobet et al. Player 1 level up!
Rikers, R. M. J. P., Schmidt, H. G., Boshuizen, H. P. A., Linssen, G. C. M., Wesseling,
G., and Paas, F. G. W. C. (2002). The robustness of medical expertise: clinical
case processing by medical experts and subexperts. Am. J. Psychol. 115, 609–629.
doi: 10.2307/1423529
Schunn, C. D., and Anderson, J. R. (1999). The generality/specificity of exper-
tise in scientific reasoning. Cogn. Sci. 23, 337–370. doi: 10.1207/s15516709cog
2303_3
Spence, I., Yu, J. J., Feng, J., and Marshman, J. (2009). Women match men when
learning a spatial skill. J. Exp. Psychol. Learn. Mem. Cogn. 35, 1097–1103. doi:
10.1037/a0015641
Thorndike, E. L., and Woodworth, R. S. (1901). The influence of improvement
in one mental function upon the efficiency of other functions. Psychol. Rev. 9,
374–382.
Unterrainer, J. M., Kaller, C. P., Leonhart, R., and Rahm, B. (2011). Revising
superior planning performance in chess players: the impact of time restriction
and motivation aspects. Am. J. Psychol. 124, 213–225. doi: 10.5406/amer-
jpsyc.124.2.0213
Waters, A. J., Gobet, F., and Leyden, G. (2002). Visuo-spatial abilities in chess play-
ers. Br. J. Psychol. 30, 303–311. doi: 10.1348/000712602761381402
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was con-
ducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be
construed as a potential conflict of interest.
Received: 31 May 2014; accepted: 03 November 2014; published online: 28 November
2014.
Citation: Gobet F, Johnston SJ, Ferrufino G, Johnston M, Jones MB, Molyneux A,
Terzis A and Weeden L (2014) “No level up!”: no effects of video game specialization
and expertise on cognitive performance. Front. Psychol. 5:1337. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.
2014.01337
This article was submitted to Cognition, a section of the journal Frontiers in
Psychology.
Copyright © 2014 Gobet, Johnston, Ferrufino, Johnston, Jones, Molyneux, Terzis and
Weeden. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other
forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that
the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic
practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with
these terms.
www.frontiersin.org November 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1337 | 193
ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE
published: 28 July 2014
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00794
Multi-domain computerized cognitive training program
improves performance of bookkeeping tasks: a
matched-sampling active-controlled trial
Amit Lampit1,2*, Claus Ebster2,3 and Michael Valenzuela1
1 Regenerative Neuroscience Group, Brain and Mind Research Institute, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia
2 Lauder Business School, Vienna, Austria
3 Department of Marketing, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
Edited by:
David Zachary Hambrick, Michigan
State University, USA
Reviewed by:
Zach Shipstead, Arizona State
University, USA
Michael Francis Bunting, University
of Maryland Center for Advanced
Study of Language, USA
*Correspondence:
Amit Lampit, Regenerative
Neuroscience Group, Brain and
Mind Research Institute, University
of Sydney, 94 Mallett St.,
Camperdown, NSW 2050, Australia
e-mail: amit.lampit@sydney.edu.au
Cognitive skills are important predictors of job performance, but the extent to which
computerized cognitive training (CCT) can improve job performance in healthy adults is
unclear. We report, for the first time, that a CCT program aimed at attention, memory,
reasoning and visuo-spatial abilities can enhance productivity in healthy younger adults
on bookkeeping tasks with high relevance to real-world job performance. 44 business
students (77.3% female, mean age 21.4 ± 2.6 years) were assigned to either (a) 20 h of
CCT, or (b) 20 h of computerized arithmetic training (active control) by a matched sampling
procedure. Both interventions were conducted over a period of 6 weeks, 3–4 1-h sessions
per week. Transfer of skills to performance on a 60-min paper-based bookkeeping task was
measured at three time points—baseline, after 10 h and after 20 h of training. Repeated
measures ANOVA found a significant Group X Time effect on productivity (F = 7.033,
df = 1.745; 73.273, p = 0.003) with a significant interaction at both the 10-h (Relative
Cohen’s effect size = 0.38, p = 0.014) and 20-h time points (Relative Cohen’s effect
size = 0.40, p = 0.003). No significant effects were found on accuracy or on Conners’
Continuous Performance Test, a measure of sustained attention. The results are discussed
in reference to previous findings on the relationship between brain plasticity and job
performance. Generalization of results requires further study.
Keywords: cognitive training, bookkeeping, young adults, job performance, far transfer
INTRODUCTION
Cognitive abilities are one of the most significant predictors of
future job performance (Schmidt, 2002). The question therefore
arises as to whether interventions that augment cognitive and
psychomotor skills can improve work-related outcomes (Arthur
et al., 2003; Academy of Medical Sciences, 2012). Computerized
cognitive training (CCT), which is particularly effective in clini-
cal groups and the elderly, is one method for improving cognitive
performance (Buschert et al., 2010; Vinogradov et al., 2012). A
recent report by leading British scientific societies cited CCT as
a potentially effective intervention to improve workplace perfor-
mance, stressing the importance of examining the transferability
of CCT into vocational tasks (Academy of Medical Sciences,
2012). Previous studies have reported positive effects of CCT on
tasks with high psychomotor demands such as flight (Hart and
Battiste, 1992; Gopher et al., 1994), driving (Roenker et al., 2003;
Cassavaugh and Kramer, 2009; Pradhan et al., 2011) and laparo-
scopic surgery (Schlickum et al., 2009; Adams et al., 2012), as
well as enhanced employment outcomes in schizophrenic patients
(Vauth et al., 2005b; McGurk et al., 2007; Bell et al., 2008;
Lindenmayer et al., 2008; McGurk et al., 2009). Conversely, a
recent RCT conducted by our group (Borness et al., 2013) did not
find any effect of an online CCT program on job performance in
a large cohort of white collar employees of an Australian public
sector organization. Thus, the extent to which CCT can augment
performance of middle-skill office tasks in young healthy adults
remains unclear. Here, we use a classic example of mid-level
skilled occupational task—bookkeeping—to explore the effec-
tiveness of a cognitive training program on work-related task
performance.
The rapid computerization of accounting practice has trans-
formed the nature of contemporary bookkeeping into repetitive
translation of transactions from natural language into an accoun-
tancy software system (Bhaskar et al., 1983; Cooper and Taylor,
2000). The objective of basic bookkeeping tasks is to analyze
and organize newly acquired data according to the principles of
double entry bookkeeping and subsequently transpose these into
journal entries. The objectivity of these tasks, their prevalence
in accounting education, and their relatively low dependency
on external factors (e.g., trends in consumer behavior) make
bookkeeping a convenient and occupationally- relevant work-
related outcome when studying skill acquisition and the effect of
cognitive factors (Dillard et al., 1982).
An accurate entry of transactions into an accounting system is
a bookkeepers’ key performance indicator; therefore, our measure
of productivity was based on the number of transactions correctly
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transposed. Both speed and accuracy of work are important, as
speed (transactions per unit of time) determines the maximum
number of transactions that a worker can execute while accuracy
rate (the ratio of correct entries out of total transactions) reflects
the relative frequency of errors. Theoretically, improvements in
productivity could result from an increase in speed and/or accu-
racy. However, in practice, increases in task speed usually decrease
accuracy, a phenomenon known as the speed-accuracy tradeoff
(Wickelgren, 1977). When evaluating the effectiveness of any CCT
program on work-related productivity, the potential influence of
such tradeoff must therefore be analyzed (Förster et al., 2003).
Since a CCT intervention typically involves many procedural
features beyond the CCT program itself, which include trainer
contact, socialization, motivational prompts, increased stimula-
tion, and the traditional Hawthorne expectancy bias and retest
effect, it is vital to compare the putative effects of CCT on pro-
ductivity outcomes with respect to an intensity-matched active
control (AC) condition to make valid inferences (Jacoby and
Ahissar, 2013). Yet, of the thirteen trials of CCT in vocational set-
tings mentioned above, seven (Gopher et al., 1994; Vauth et al.,
2005a; McGurk et al., 2007, 2009; Bell et al., 2008; Cassavaugh and
Kramer, 2009; Pradhan et al., 2011) did not include an AC arm.
We therefore aimed to assess whether CCT can increase the speed
or accuracy of work-related task productivity over and above any
effects seen in an active control condition.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
RESEARCH DESIGN
This study was a matched-sampling, double-blind, repeated-
measures, active-control trial. Subjects were allocated to either
(1) 20 h of CCT arm or (2) active control arm matched in time
and intensity. Performance on a 60-min paper-based bookkeep-
ing task (see below) was measured three times, at baseline, after
10 h of training, and after 20 h of training. All procedures took
place in a university classroom converted into a training lab.
The study was approved by the Lauder Business School Ethics
Committee.
PARTICIPANTS AND SAMPLING PROCEDURE
In January 2009, all at Lauder Business School (n = 242), an
English-language teaching business school in Vienna, Austria,
were invited by email to participate in the study. None of the par-
ticipants spoke English as first language. Inclusion criteria were
(1) successful completion of at least one semester in account-
ing, (2) lack of any major neurological or psychiatric disorders,
and (3) active participation in a scholarship program offered by
the school. These criteria ensured an adequate understanding of
basic accounting principles, including the posting task used in this
study, and enabled compensation to be offered to volunteers as
outlined below. All candidates gave a written informed consent
prior to the baseline assessment.
Of the 44 participants who completed the study, 34 (77.3%)
were females and 10 were males. Four subjects (9%) were left-
handed. The average age was 21.4 ± 2.6 years. Fourteen partici-
pants (31.8%) were 2nd semester students, 15 (34.1%) were 4th
semester students, 14 (31.8%) were 6th semester students, and 1
(2.3%) was an 8th semester student. Subjects were compensated
with one “credit” (which provides approximately C40 worth of
dining and housing from the scholarship program) for every hour
of participation. The total number of credits was 25, equivalent
to about C1000, provided in-kind by the school. Compensation
was offered for participation (in hours) rather than on a pay-per-
performance basis. To ensure ethical compensation, participants
who left the study prematurely were compensated based on the
number of hours performed.
Due to the conservable attentional demand of CCT and
documented interactions between baseline cognitive ability and
response to CCT (White and Shah, 2006), we aimed to distribute
attentional skill equally between our two groups. The Conners’
Continuous Performance Test (Conners, 2000) was adminis-
tered to assess sustained attention. Two scores derived from the
test, namely confidence interval and response time variability
(Response Time Block Change, RTBC), were used. A lower con-
fidence interval indicates better overall attention skills, as does
RTBC as it approaches zero (Homack and Riccio, 2006). Subjects
with the same confidence interval were graded according to the
RTBC score and then divided into pairs.
MEASURES
Primary outcome measure: performance on a bookkeeping task
Performance on a repetitive paper-based posting task was the
primary outcome measure. The task was based on basic rules
of double-entry bookkeeping (Bhaskar et al., 1983) and adapted
from didactic tasks included within the students’ curriculum
(Kieso et al., 2004). Task materials included: (1) A journal of
300 randomly generated transactions, based on 25 different cash
and accruals transactions (i.e., payables and receivables) with a
sum between 1 and 500; (2) A blank general ledger containing
14 accounts (assets, liability, equity, income, and expenses), with
a summary line every 37 lines of data; and (3) An instruction
sheet containing the correct debit and credit postings for each of
the 25 types of transactions, which was designed to help partic-
ipants when not sure how to handle a transaction. Examples of
the materials used for the measuring bookkeeping performance
are provided in the Supplementary Material.
Three 60-min bookkeeping test sessions were administered, at
baseline (pre-training, T1), after 10 h of training (T2) and after
20 h of training (T3). Every test session started with 3 practice
tasks to unsure understanding. Participants were asked to work
as quickly and as accurately as possible. A performance goal of
200 transactions per hour (based on a pilot study) was defined
to facilitate self-regulation (Kozlowski and Bell, 2006). A blinded
research assistant recoded the number of correct debit and credit
postings entries in the corresponding row according to the rules
provided (productivity) and total entries (to calculate accuracy
rate). Only rows in which both postings (debit and credit) were
entered according to the rules were considered as correct.
Secondary measure: sustained attention
In addition to its role in the matched-sampling process, the
Conners’ Continuous Performance Test (Conners, 2000) was used
to detect potential intervention effects on participants’ attention
skills. The test was administered at baseline and post-training.
The confidence interval, RTBC and Overall (i.e., average) Hit
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition July 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 794 | 195
Lampit et al. Cognitive training improves bookkeeping performance
Reaction Time measures were used (with a lower score indicating
better performance).
INTERVENTIONS
Both the experimental (CCT) and active control (AC) groups par-
ticipated in 3–4 1-h training sessions weekly for the duration
of 6 weeks—the total duration of training in both groups was
20 h. Supervised training took place in a computer lab with up
to six subjects per session. Supervision aimed to enhance motiva-
tion and meta-cognition, according to studies of instruction in
cognitive training (Gopher et al., 1994; Salas and Burke, 2002;
Sandford, 2003; Leemkuil and De Hoog, 2005). The training
software played sounds through standard speakers, producing a
degree of auditory distractions for all participants and increasing
selective attentional demands.
Computerized cognitive training (CCT)
CCT was based on the commercially available cognitive train-
ing software “Captain’s Log” (BrainTrain Inc, Richmond, VA).
Captain’s Log has a history of use in clinical populations such as
adults diagnosed with traumatic brain injury (Tinius and Tinius,
2000; Stathopoulou and Lubar, 2004), schizophrenia (Bellucci
et al., 2003), and chronic psychiatric disorders (Burda et al., 1994)
as well as children with attention difficulties (Rabiner et al., 2010)
and older adults (Eckroth-Bucher and Siberski, 2009).
An adaptive and personalized training program was set using
the software’s Personal Trainer Wizard, which adjusts training dif-
ficulty and content according to predefined settings as well as
individual performance. Visual and auditory distractions were
set at 10% of cases for each type. Seven exercises from the
Conceptual Memory Skills module (The Ugly Duckling, Happy
Trails, Total Recall, Domino Dynamite, Tower Power, Max’s
Match, and What’s Next) and five exercises from the Numerical
Concepts/Memory Skills modules (Bits and Pieces, Match Maker,
City Lights, Counting Critters, and Happy Hunter) were used.
Table 1 describes the cognitive skills trained by each exercise. A
detailed description of each of the exercises is provided in the
Supplementary Material.
Active control (AC)
Several studies suggest that accounting is associated with strong
arithmetic skills, a view that is more likely based on accoun-
tancy stereotypes rather than actual demands of the profession
(Wells and Fieger, 2006). We therefore chose arithmetic train-
ing as our AC condition to control fully for non-specific training
effects as well as maintenance of blinding of subjects to the train-
ing condition of interest. AC training was based on Maths Trainer,
a commercially available computerized arithmetic training pro-
gram (Oak Systems, Binstead, UK). The program entails 24 dif-
ferent arithmetic exercises (addition, subtraction, multiplication,
division, fractions, percentage, number sequence, rounding), as
well as daily tests, kakuro and sudoku. The level of complexity
rises as the user progress along the training program. Since a typ-
ical training session on Maths Trainer lasts about 45 min, subjects
in the AC group also played Math Ninja (a freeware published by
Piotr J. Walczack) a computerized calculation game, for about 10
more minutes during each session in order to match the duration
of CCT sessions.
ANALYSIS
Analyses were perfomed using SPSS 20. Time X Group effects
were tested using repeated measures ANOVA. Where assumption
of sphericity was violated, the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was
applied to degrees of freedom. Within-group and relative effect
sizes were calculated using Cohen’s ds at T2 and T3, using differ-
ence from baseline and pooled standard deviation for each time
point.
RESULTS
RECRUITMENT AND PARTICIPANT FLOW
Participant flow is depicted in Figure 1. Overall, 62 students
expressed interest to participate. 57 of them were screened
Table 1 | Cognitive skills trained by exercise.
Exercise Skills trained
The Ugly Duckling CPS CR VP WM IM
Happy Trails CR VSQ VPS WM IM SLA
Total Recall CR VSC VPS WM GA IM
Domino Dynamite CR DA VSQ VPS IM
Tower Power CR VSQ VP VT FMC SLA
Max’s Match CPS CR VSC GA IM
What’s Next CPS CR DA VSC VSQ WM FA IM
Bits & Pieces CPS CR VSC VP WM GA IM
Match Maker AA CR VP IM SLA
City Lights CR VSC WM GA IM
Counting Critters CR VSC VSQ VP WM GA IM
Happy Hunter CR VSQ WM FA IM
AA, Alternating Attention; CPS, Central Processing Speed; CR, Conceptual Reasoning; DA, Divided Attention; FA, Focused Attention; FMC, Fine Motor Control; GA,
General Attention; IM, Immediate Memory; SLA, Selective Attention; VP, Visual Perception; VPS, Visual Processing Speed; VS, Visual Scanning; VSC, Visuospatial
Classification; VSQ, Visuospatial Sequencing; VT, Visual Tracking; WM, Working Memory. Detailed description of the exercises can be found in the Supplementary
Material.
www.frontiersin.org July 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 794 | 196
Lampit et al. Cognitive training improves bookkeeping performance
for eligibility and were administered the baseline Continuous
Performance Test; 48 attended an introductory lecture and com-
pleted baseline bookkeeping assessment. Subsequently, they were
assigned to groups. Forty four completed the first and second
follow-up sessions. Of the four participants who left the study
following group assignment (two from each group), three with-
drew from the study and one was expelled from the university for
reasons unrelated to the study.
BASELINE DATA
Descriptive statistics and baseline performance are provided
in Table 2. Two-sample tests revealed no significant differ-
ences between the treatment groups in age, gender, Continuous
Performance Test scores, productivity, and accuracy. Pearson
zero-order intercorrelations analysis among the study variables at
baseline found a positive correlation between age and attentional
capacity, as indicated by lower Continuous Performance Test
confidence interval, which implies lower probability of attention
disorders (r = −0.305, p < 0.05). Males performed worse than
did females on this measure (T = −2.82, p = 0.007). Students
who had completed more years of their university degree also
performed better in baseline bookkeeping (r = 0.446, p < 0.01).
There was no relationship between Continuous Performance Test
scores and bookkeeping performance.
PRIMARY OUTCOMES
Table 3 reports changes in the outcome variables across the
three time points. Repeated measures ANOVA found a significant
Group X Time interaction effect on productivity, as defined by
Table 2 | Baseline measures.
Cognitive training Active control p
(n = 22) (n = 22)
M SD M SD
1. Sexa 72.7 81.8 0.47b
2. Age 21.27 2.51 22.0 2.71 0.36
3. Completed university years 1.27 1.16 1.64 1.18 0.31
4. Productivityc 143.09 50.4 128.91 41.57 0.31
5. Accuracy (%) 91.65 11.71 89.38 7.05 0.44
6. CCPT-II CI 27.07 14.75 28.25 15.69 0.80
7. CCPT-II RTBC -0.021 0.09 -0.02 0.05 0.64
8. CCPT-II Hit RT (msec) 346.46 49.27 352.79 54.07 0.69
aPercentage of females.
bPearson X2.
cNo. of correct entries in a 60-min session.
CI, Confidence index; RTBS, Response time block change.
FIGURE 1 | Study design and participants flow.
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the number of correct entries in a 60-min test session (F = 7.033,
df = 1.745; 73.273, p = 0.003), at both the 10-h (Cohen’s effect
size = 0.38, p = 0.014) and 20-h time points (Cohen’s effect
size = 0.40, p = 0.003—see Figure 2). No significant effects were
found for accuracy, although slight improvements of accuracy
rates were noted in both the CCT and the AC group (2.61 and
4.69%, respectively).
The results indicated strong correlations between performance
in these two time points for both productivity (r = 0.65, p <
0.01) and accuracy (r = 0.707, p < 0.01). Whilst the speed of cor-
rect entries increased in the CCT group as a result of our training
(i.e., increased productivity), we observed no evidence for a corre-
sponding drop in accuracy, as accuracy rates at baseline (91.65%)
were similar to accuracy at both T2 (95.58%) and T3 (94.32%)
(repeated measures F = 0.225, p = 0.638).
SECONDARY OUTCOMES
The results indicated no significant TIME X GROUP interac-
tion on either Continuous Performance Test Confidence Index
(F = 3.665, p = 0.62), Response Time Block Change (F = 0.663,
p = 0.62) or Overall Hit Reaction Time (F = 0.527, p = 0.47, see
Table 3).
DISCUSSION
Participation in 10 and 20 h of CCT produced significant relative
Cohen’s effect sizes (i.e., after accounting for active control train-
ing effects) of 0.38 and 0.40 on an untrained bookkeeping task.
Because the active control condition included all non-specific fac-
tors inherent to training, such as socialization, supervisor inter-
action, motivational factors, as well as to some extent cognitive
stimulation, the observed effects are unique to CCT and cannot
be explained by test-retest and Hawthorn effects. Moreover, since
performance on similar bookkeeping tasks is generally predic-
tive of actual bookkeepers’ proficiency (Bhaskar et al., 1983), it is
reasonable to hypothesize that this outcome may potentially gen-
eralize into real-life job performance in the bookkeeping sector.
As CCT may represent a cost-effective type of on-the-job training
for the better promotion of workforce productivity (Academy of
Medical Sciences, 2012), replication of this study in the workplace
environment is critical.
We sought to determine whether changes in measures of
attention accompanied and potentially explained our observed
bookkeeping effects. None of the Continuous Performance Test
measures were correlated with either baseline bookkeeping per-
formance or changes thereof, and CCT produced no discernible
change in any of the test measures. One interpretation of this
result is that sustained attention and inhibitory control has no
ecological relevance to bookkeeping task performance in healthy
young adults. Alternatively, a more likely explanation for the lack
of effect on response inhibition is that our cognitive training pro-
gram did not specifically target this domain, and so the resulting
improvement in bookkeeping skills may be attributed to other
cognitive domains. Similarly, we did not observe any difference in
FIGURE 2 | Performance on the 60-min bookkeeping task at the three
time points. Error bars represent standard error. Significant TIME X
GROUP differences were observed at T2 and T3.
Table 3 | Estimated marginal means, change rates and summary statistics for outcome variables by training group and assessment time.
Cognitive training Active control Group × Time
(n = 22) (n = 22) Relative effect size
M SD Change, %a M SD Change, %a F p d
Productivity, T2 190 53.88 32.78 150.91 43.91 17.07 6.521 0.014 0.38
Accuracy, T2 (%) 95.58 2.97 4.29 93.24 3.33 4.32 0.001 0.983 −0.24
Productivity, T3 250.73 64.65 75.23 193.5 46.98 50.1 10.226 0.003 0.40
Accuracy, T3 (%) 94.32 4.35 2.91 93.57 3.59 4.69 0.225 0.638 −0.45
CCPT CI, T3 21.77 13.15 −19.61b 26.1 17.21 −7.61b 3.665 0.62 0.25
CCPT RTBC, T3c −0.0005 0.018 −97.62 0.0064 0.016 −1.64 0.663 0.42 0.13
CCPT Hit RT, T3 352.79 26.4 3.37 332.35 56.44 −5.79 0.527 0.47 −0.07
aFrom baseline.
bNegative scores mean improvement.
cScores closer to zero represent higher attentional performance.
The results in bold highlight significant TIME X GROUP interactions. CCPT, Continuous Performance Test; CI, Confidence index; RTBS, Response time block change;
RT, Response time.
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the Continuous Performance Test’s response time measure, whilst
participants in both groups clearly improved their information
processing speed ability on the bookkeeping task.
Therefore, whilst the results indicate that CCT can enhance
performance on the target bookkeeping task, the nature of the
underlying cognitive mediators remain unclear. Lack of addi-
tional cognitive measures to probe for these mechanisms is there-
fore a major limitation of this study, and future studies should
complement functional outcomes with a wider neuropsycholog-
ical battery. What cognitive changes could theoretically medi-
ate the observed improvement in bookkeeping performance?
Previous task analyses in the field of bookkeeping (Dillard et al.,
1982; Bhaskar et al., 1983; Dillard, 1984) point to several cog-
nitive processes that may be taxed by bookkeeping tasks and
thus underpin skill acquisition. Typically, bookkeeping involves
integrating new information (a particular transaction) with pre-
vious knowledge of how to categorize this information within
the bookkeeping set of accounts. Working memory and rule-
based decision-making may therefore play an important role in
bookkeepers’ ability to quickly and accurately classify and record
transactions (Dillard, 1984). It is also clear that participants in
the CCT group spent less time on each individual transaction
compared to controls, suggesting a CCT-induced improvement
in information processing speed. Indeed, of the 12 exercises in
our CCT regimen, 8 (66%) had a working memory component,
7 (58%) had a processing speed component, and all had a con-
ceptual reasoning component at increasing rate of difficulty (see
Table 1 and Supplementary Material for descriptions of the exer-
cises and the cognitive skills trained by each). However, transfer
to these domains was not formally tested and remains an open
area for further research.
Our study has several other limitations. First, the sample size
was quite small and warrants replication. Second, the results did
not identify cognitive skills that are essential to bookkeeping per-
formance or factors (e.g., age, experience, and compensation)
that may predict response to training. Third, the subjects were a
highly-educated, young, and relatively-restricted university-based
volunteer cohort, unlike the heterogeneous workforce. Subjects
were also highly motivated to complete the training (and did so)
for secondary gains. Whether workers in a busy work environ-
ment facing multiple time- and productivity- pressures would
respond similarly is debatable, and the dollar value of CCT to
organizations is unknown.
To that end, we have recently reported negative results
from a larger trial of CCT in organizational settings (Borness
et al., 2013). This trial was based on short (15–20 min) self-
administered sessions, whereas the current study provided 60-
min group-based, supervised sessions. Supervision and support
may therefore be crucial for training success (Salas and Burke,
2002; Sandford, 2003; Medalia and Richardson, 2005), and was
associated with greater effects in healthy older adults (Kelly et al.,
2014). Other differences between these two studies, most notably
the use of distinct CCT programs and choice of productivity-
related endpoints emphasize the need for more specific protocols
in this area.
Improving workforce cognition along the life span may be a
key factor in maintaining economic prosperity in the context of
ageing populations and growing weight of cognitively demand-
ing tasks in the contemporary workplace. Though limited in
scope, our laboratory-based study suggests that supervised CCT
can help improve performance on a work-related task such as
bookkeeping. Field-based research in workplace settings is now
required to test the idea that CCT can boost workers’ cogni-
tive abilities and translate to enhanced real-world occupational
outcomes such as work productivity.
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What are the effects of chess training—
especially on scholastic achievement
among school-aged students? Can chess
instruction facilitate the acquisition of
scholastic competency? The current state
of the research literature is that chess
training tends not to provide educational
benefits. This article provides a critical
review of research on the effects of chess
training on the scholastic achievement
levels of school-aged students.
EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS OF CHESS
Various studies and conference presenta-
tions (e.g., Christiaen and Verholfstadt,
1978; Liptrap, 1998; Bart and Atherton,
2004) provided results in support of the
educational benefits of chess instruction in
the schools. Gobet and Campitelli (2006)
reviewed that research and reached the
following conclusions: (a) the educational
effects of optional scholastic chess train-
ing remain undetermined; (b) compulsory
scholastic chess instruction may engender
motivational problems among students;
and (c) chess instruction may be bene-
ficial among novices, but is less impor-
tant among intermediate and advanced
players for whom the amount of prac-
tice and the acquisition of knowledge are
of paramount importance. Gobet et al.
(2004) contended that such conclusions
are in line with the view of de Groot
(1977, 1978) that educational benefits
of chess instruction are likely “low-level
gains” such as improvements in attention
and concentration and interest in learn-
ing, rather than “high-level gains” such
as improvements in intelligence, scholastic
achievement, and creativity.
Additional research is supportive of de
Groot’s view. Bilalić et al. (2007) deter-
mined that intelligence explained a smaller
amount of the variance in chess skill
among competent young chess players
than the amount of practice time. Waters
et al. (2002) also found little support for
a relationship between intelligence and
chess skill.
Contrary to the results of Gobet and
Campitelli (2006) that chess instruction
provides very modest if any educational
benefits is research that attests to the bene-
fits of chess training. For example, Smith
and Cage (2000) reported the effects of
120 h of chess instruction on the mathe-
matics achievement among rural, African-
American secondary school students in
northern Louisiana. They determined that
the treatment group composed of 11
females and 10 males scored significantly
higher in mathematics achievement and
non-verbal cognitive ability than the con-
trol group composed of 10 females and
10 males after controlling for differences
among pretest scores.
In a more recent study Aciego et al.
(2012) used a quasi-experimental study
to examine the cognitive effects of chess
training. The experimental group con-
sisted of 170 students, 6–16 years of
age, who received extracurricular chess
instruction. The comparison group con-
sisted of 40 students in a similar age range.
Those students received extracurricular
sports (soccer or basketball) activities. The
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children
(WISC-R) and a record completed by the
tutor-teacher to measure problem solving
were dependent variables.
After adjusting for pretest scores, the
chess group registered significantly higher
posttest scores than the sports group for
five of nine WISC-R subtests—i.e., the
Similarities, Digit Span, Block Design,
Object Assembly, and Mazes subtests. The
chess group also registered significantly
higher posttest scores in problem solving
capacity than the sports group. The
authors concluded that chess is a “valuable
educational tool” (p. 558).
In another recent study Kazemi et al.
(2012) examined the cognitive effects
of chess play. They employed an experi-
mental group composed of 86 randomly
selected school-aged students, who
received chess instruction for six months,
and a control group of 94 randomly
selected school-aged students. All par-
ticipants were male and from 5th, 8th, and
9th grades from schools in Shanandaj in
western Iran. All participants were admin-
istered a measure of metacognitive ability
and a grade-appropriate mathematics
exam prior to and after the intervention.
The chess group participants registered
significantly higher posttest metacognitive
ability scores and higher posttest math-
ematics test scores than the non-chess
group participants. A major conclusion
of the study is that chess instruction
improves significantly the mathematical
abilities and the metacognitive capacities
of school-aged students.
In a third study, Trinchero (2013)
examined the effects of chess instruction
on the mathematical ability of primary
school students. His study involved 568
primary school children in Italy placed in
four groups: (1) experimental, (2) control,
(3) experimental without a pretest, and (4)
control without a pretest. The experimen-
tal group received chess training in addi-
tion to ordinary class lessons. The control
group only received ordinary class lessons.
One prominent result was that the exper-
imental group that received chess training
registered a modest but statistically signifi-
cant increase in scores on mathematics test
www.frontiersin.org August 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 762 | 201
Bart On the effect of chess training on scholastic achievement
items that required problem-solving skills
on complex tasks. That effect was greater
among students who had more hours of
chess instruction.
These last four studies lend support
to the view that chess training has pos-
itive cognitive effects on regular school-
aged students. In addition, there are some
studies that address the issue of cognitive
effects of chess training on school-aged
students with disabilities.
Scholz et al. (2008) investigated the
effects of chess training on mathemat-
ics learning among students with learning
disabilities based on intelligence scores in
the 70–85 IQ range. School classes from
four elementary schools in Germany were
randomly assigned to two groups: (a) an
experimental group that received chess
instruction of one hour per week for one
entire school year; and (b) a comparison
group that received supplementary math-
ematics instruction of one hour per week.
The two groups did significantly differ in
their calculation abilities for simple addi-
tion tasks and counting. The authors con-
cluded “chess could be a valuable learning
aid for children with learning disabilities”
(p. 138).
In a second study Barrett and Fish
(2011) investigated the cognitive effects of
a 30-week chess-training program within
mathematics classes for students in special
education in a middle school in southwest-
ern United States. All participants qual-
ified for special education services and
were in either 6th, 7th, or 8th grades.
A sample of 31 participants were ran-
domly placed into two groups: (a) an
experimental group composed of 15 stu-
dents who received the chess instruc-
tion along with a sizable portion of the
regular instruction in resource mathe-
matics specially designed for students in
special education; and (b) a compari-
son group composed of 16 students who
received all of the regular mathematics
instruction in resource mathematics rather
than any chess instruction. The depen-
dent variables for this study were scores
on the mathematics Texas Assessment of
Knowledge and Skills (TAKS) that is a
standardized test of mathematics compe-
tencies for pre-collegiate students in Texas,
and end-of-year course grades in resource
mathematics. All participants completed
a version of the mathematics TAKS
that was modified for special education
students.
This study had some interesting results.
First, there was a significant relationship
between chess instruction and end-of-
year grades. Second, there was a statisti-
cally significant relationship between chess
instruction and mathematics TAKS test
scores.
This study provided support that chess
instruction facilitates transfer of cogni-
tive skills from chess to mathematics for
students in special education.
These latter two studies using spe-
cial education students indicate that chess
instruction has the potential to promote
mathematics achievement among students
in special education.
In a third study Hong and Bart (2007)
examined the cognitive effects of chess
instruction on students at risk for aca-
demic failure in Korea. The total sample
of participants was 38 students from three
elementary schools randomly placed into
two groups: (a) an experimental group
that received 90-min chess lessons weekly
for 3 months; and (b) a comparison group
that received regular school activities after
class.
All participants were tested prior to
and after the intervention with the fol-
lowing several instruments: (a) the Test
of Nonverbal Intelligence—Third Edition
(TONI-3) to measure cognitive ability in
a language-free manner; and (b) a Chess
Skill Rating method using chess software
to assess level of chess competency.
TONI-3 posttest scores and chess skill
ratings were significantly correlated after
controlling for TONI-3 pretest scores.
This statistical finding suggests that chess
instruction that produces higher chess skill
ratings may lead to gains in levels of non-
verbal intelligence among students at risk
for academic failure.
These studies indicating positive effects
of chess training among students with dis-
abilities support the view of Storey (2000)
who extolled the use of chess training as
a means to promote higher-order think-
ing skills among disabled students. Storey
(2000, p. 47) recommended that teachers
consider “chess as an instructional strat-
egy for reinforcing skills such as concen-
tration, problem identification, problem
solving, planning strategies, creativity, and
lucid thinking.”
But why would chess training lead to
improvements in scholastic achievement?
To play chess well, one must attend to and
comprehend chess positions and induce
patterns among the pieces, an indication of
fluid intelligence and concentration capac-
ity. The chess positions can be very com-
plex with up to 32 pieces from six piece
types arrayed on a 64 square board.
One must then formulate and evalu-
ate possible moves, an indication of exec-
utive functioning and critical thinking.
For example, middle game positions often
permit 30 different legal moves at every
turn. The chess player must ideally eval-
uate positions resulting from such moves
selecting the move that produces the posi-
tion most advantageous to the player. The
chess player must evaluate chess moves
and their resulting positions without actu-
ally moving any pieces. There are thus
substantial demands on visual working
memory.
In chess, one must engage in this
sequence of (1) position comprehension,
(2) pattern induction, and (3) move for-
mulation and evaluation relatively quickly.
This coordinated set of cognitive skills
required in competent chess play likely
transfers to the learning of mathematics
and related fields that also often require
comprehension, induction, analysis, and
evaluation of complex phenomena. This
constitutes a theoretical framework why
chess training likely has cognitive benefits.
This cognitive explanation for the benefits
of chess training is compatible with com-
parable explanations provided by Storey
(2000) and Trinchero (2013).
CHESS TRAINING, EXPERTISE, AND
THE ISSUE OF RESEARCH RIGOR
The research reported thus far provides
evidence that chess training has salutary
cognitive and educational effects among
school-aged students. However, the argu-
ment of Gobet and Campitelli (2006)
needs to be considered before we can
be confident that chess training is a
valid means to improve scholastic achieve-
ment levels. To Gobet and Campitelli
(2006), rigorous experimental research is
needed to determine the extent to which
chess training has strong cognitive and
educational effects.
However, such rigorous experimen-
tal inquiry involving, for example,
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random placement of participants into
experimental and control groups is costly
and difficult to implement in a school set-
ting. What is needed is an increase in the
quality and quantity of empirical stud-
ies to determine the extent to which the
acquisition of chess expertise facilitates the
acquisition of scholastic expertise among
students.
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THE EXPERTISE APPROACH AND SKILL
ACQUISITION
Research on expertise is by definition
focused on a restricted sample of indi-
viduals. Experts are people who consis-
tently produce outstanding performance
in their domains (Ericsson, 2006) and as
such are without exception located on the
positive side of the skill distribution. The
usual approach in the study of exper-
tise is to compare the extreme group of
the skill distribution, experts, with the
extreme group at the other end, that of
novices. This contrasting approach, which
we have called the “expertise approach”
(Bilalić et al., 2010, 2012), has a long tra-
dition (Chase and Simon, 1973; Simon
and Chase, 1973; De Groot, 1978; Preacher
et al., 2005). Its main advantage over the
common approach in cognition, where all
participants are at the same skill level,
is the presence of a control group of
novices that enables falsification of results
obtained on experts (Wason, 1960; Kuhn,
1970; Campitelli and Speelman, 2013). In
that way, the expertise approach is not
unlike the neuropsychological approach
that contrasts results obtained on patients
with the results of “normal” participants
(Shallice, 1988).
The main goal of the expertise
approach is to provide evidence relating
to the cognitive and neural mechanisms
behind processes such as object and pat-
tern recognition, which would be difficult
to obtain from subjects who possess
approximately the same level of expertise.
The skill acquisition process, which is one
of the main topics of expertise (William
and Harter, 1899), is of secondary impor-
tance in the expertise approach. This is
understandable as the contrast between
experts and novices captures only the
beginning and the end product of the
skill acquisition process. It is unrealistic
to follow people for the length of time
required in order to achieve expertise
in a given domain. However, expertise
researchers have recently started employ-
ing an archival approach that provides a
more complete picture of the skill acquisi-
tion process (Charness and Gerchak, 1996;
Chabris and Glickman, 2006; Howard,
2008, 2009; Bilalić et al., 2009). In the
game of chess, a domain commonly stud-
ied in expertise research, there are precise
records of all practitioners from an early
age (Howard, 2006a; Bilalić et al., 2009).
These records include not only personal
information such as gender and age, but
also skill levels at different stages, num-
bers of games played, and corresponding
skill change. The records provide a wealth
of data for investigating the influence of
factors such as age, gender, and even tal-
ent, on the skill acquisition process. Here
we want to draw attention to the fact
that some of the databases used in pre-
vious research only provide records of the
very best practitioners. In the expertise
approach, such restriction is an integral
part of the methodology, but restricting
the range of population in the archival
approach could have grave consequences




One of the advantages of chess as a domain
is that there is an objective and reliable
measure of skill. Skill is measured on an
interval scale that reflects the performance
of a player against other players. The Elo
rating, named after Arpad Elo who intro-
duced the scale as a measure of chess skill
(Elo, 1978), is measured in the same way
all over the world. A beginner is supposed
to have 600–800 Elo points, average play-
ers about 1500 Elo points, master play-
ers above 2200 Elo points, while the very
best players, called grandmasters, have rat-
ings above 2500 Elo points. Expert players
are considered to have above 2000 rating
points.
The most frequently used database in
skill acquisition studies is the database
of the International Chess Federation,
FIDE (for more information, see Howard,
2006a). This database, like other chess
databases we will mention here, offers
multiple advantages for skill acquisition
research. Firstly, it gathers records from the
1970s to the present, and so it is possi-
ble to obtain trajectories of ratings over
the course of players’ lives. Secondly, it
represents the whole population of the
very best players in the world. Thirdly,
this database contains multiple measure-
ment points from players, so it can be
used to observe individual skill trajec-
tories. Besides rating points, numerous
other variables are recorded (e.g., num-
ber of games played, gender of partic-
ipants, nationality, title, rating change,
rating rank) which could be used for
research purposes (Howard, 2006a). In
other words, the FIDE database offers a
fruitful basis for exploration and descrip-
tion of the multiple factors and processes
behind chess skill acquisition.
For all its advantages, the FIDE
database provides only the records of the
very best players. Due to technical and
logistical reasons, the FIDE database at the
beginning logged only master level players
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(above 2200 Elo). Only in the 1990s was
the level lowered to expert level players
(2000 Elo) and then in the last decade to
the level of average players (1500 Elo and
below). In other words, the worst play-
ers in the FIDE database are still average
practitioners.
The ideal situation would be to have
records of all players from the very begin-
ning of their careers, not only when they
reach a particular level of expertise. In this
scenario, the database would also encom-
pass people who for whatever reasons do
not become experts. Fortunately, there
are such databases. National databases,
such as the databases of the German
Chess Federation and the United States
Chess Federation (USCF), keep records
of all their members and thus repre-
sent the whole population of competi-
tive (national) players. They provide all
the information the FIDE database offers
without restricting the range of skill.
If one is trying to examine factors that
influence skill acquisition, a database that
contains only average and above-average
players should not be the starting point
of investigations. As is well known in
the field of statistics, the conclusions
obtained on data with restricted range
could be misleading especially if they
are not obtained by appropriate analy-
ses (Long, 1997; Sackett and Yang, 2000).
The best possible way to examine dif-
ferences in effects that researchers could
obtain while analyzing the data is through
the comparison of effects made on differ-
ent databases. Here we illustrate the pos-
sible pitfalls of skill range restriction by
comparing distributions of ratings from
a database with restricted range (FIDE)
and a database with unrestricted range
(German).
The FIDE and German databases con-
tain similar number of practitioners,
around 120,000 (see Figure 1). However,
the ratings of the two distributions overlap
only at the highest values of the German
distribution and the lowest values of FIDE
distribution. Not only are the mean and
variance of both distribution vastly differ-
ent, but also other parts of the distribu-
tion, such as quartiles, are also extremely
different.
Restricting the database to the best
players also has a consequence for the skill
trajectories of players. One needs time to
become an expert and the players in the
FIDE database are older (37 years) than the
players in the German database (32 years).
The differences between the two databases
are also evident when we compare typi-
cal skill trajectories. Figure 2A shows the
FIDE players entering the database at
around age 10, having already become
competent players (rating of 1900 Elo),
with a subsequent shallow increase to the
peak at age 39. In contrast, the German
players have a steeper increase, since they
are entered the database as novices and
learn faster at beginning skill level, as
implied by the power law of practice
(Newell and Rosenbloom, 1981), until the
same peak at age 39. The decline in later
years is also different in the two databases
with FIDE players declining faster than
their German counterparts.
One could say that the FIDE and
German players have vastly different rat-
ings that make the comparison between
them difficult. One way around this
FIGURE 1 | Distribution of chess skill as measured by Elo rating in
FIDE (blue color) and German (red) databases (as of 2008). The
databases contain similar number of players, but differ vastly in the
distribution shape and coverage—the only overlap is at the highest
values of the German database and lowest values of the FIDE
database.
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FIGURE 2 | (A) Average skill trajectories, in Elo with 95% confidence intervals, over the years in FIDE database (blue color) and German (red) database. (B)
Average standardized skill trajectories, in Z -values with 95% confidence intervals, over the years in FIDE database (blue color) and German (red) database.
problem is to standardize ratings in each
database separately and check if the skill
trajectories are similar in both datasets.
Figure 2B shows the standardized rating
as a function of age. Again, on aver-
age FIDE players start at a higher skill
level but improve more slowly. They also
have a higher peak but their decline is
so rapid that in the latter stages of their
careers their standardized performance is
lower than the standardized performance
of their German colleagues.
EXPLAINING CONTRADICTORY
RESULTS
We have demonstrated that there are vast
differences between the databases com-
monly used in the archival approach to
skill acquisition. The two datasets are com-
pletely different in the range of values
as well as in the number of participants
that are obtaining a particular rating. The
restricted databases, such as FIDE, do not
represent the whole skill range and may
provide inadequate answers to the ques-
tions under investigation. The restriction
of range and its consequences may also
explain some of the inconsistencies and
contradictory findings in the field.
For example, Roring and Charness
(2007) used the FIDE databases to inves-
tigate age effects on skill acquisition. They
demonstrated the peak age in chess skill
to be around 43 years, much later than
previously proposed peak around 35 years
(e.g., Howard, 2005). Another surpris-
ing result was the fact that the decline
is steeper for initially lower rated par-
ticipants than for higher rated partici-
pants. In other words, initially more able
participants were declining significantly
more slowly than their initially weaker col-
leagues. Our illustrations (Figures 2A,B)
indicate that both peak age and declining
rate are influenced by the range restric-
tion in the FIDE database. The conclu-
sion would be significantly different if a
whole range database, such as the German
database, were used.
To further illustrate possible conse-
quences of the range restriction, we
can consider the inconsistent findings
in the research on gender differences
in skill acquisition. It is notable that
the studies using the restricted FIDE
database regularly find gender differences
in skill acquisition (Howard, 2005, 2006b,
2014 but see, Bilalić and McLeod, 2006,
2007). Furthermore, the studies using the
national German and USCF databases
(Chabris and Glickman, 2006; Bilalić et al.,
2009) also noted the differences in the
mean and highest ratings of women and
men. However, using the unrestricted
range and the full lifespan data, they
observed that factors such as participation
rates and dropout rates could explain
the differences. This kind of analysis is
impossible with the FIDE database where
dropouts are not recorded because the
people concerned stopped playing chess
before they achieved expert level.
Researchers using the FIDE database
to investigate talent (Howard, 2008, 2009)
face a similar problem. The time required
to reach a certain level and the amount
of practice (as measured by games played)
may well provide clues about the differ-
ent natural endowments of certain players.
This in turn may allow us to speculate
about different levels of talent. It is, how-
ever, impossible to make any certain con-
clusions if we lack the very first part of
their skill acquisition process, as we do
in the FIDE database. As with the gen-
der factor in skill acquisition process, the
differences in the early stages may as well
overshadow the differences at the highest
level. Similarly, the causes behind dropouts
may remain unresolved because the data
of the people who for whatever reasons
stopped playing chess is not available.
Both the expertise and archival
approaches are important vehicles for the
investigation of expertise and cognition in
general. The restricted range of focus in
the expertise approach is a fundamental
part of the methodology and an advan-
tage over usual research on cognition. The
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archival approach offers the possibility of
capturing the full cycle of the long-term
skill acquisition process. In this paper
we have demonstrated that the results
obtained on the restricted range do not
necessarily generalize to the whole range of
values. The effects obtained with restricted
range cannot and should not be used to
make inferences about the mechanisms
and factors that influence skill acquisition.
When we restrict our data, we restrict our
conclusions too.
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I recently had the pleasure of editing
a volume of essays on the determinants
of greatness (Kaufman, 2013a). A vari-
ety of perspectives were represented in
the volume, including behavioral genetics,
individual differences, and expert perfor-
mance. The clearest conclusion from the
volume was that the development of high
achievement involves a complex interac-
tion of many personal and environmental
variables that feed off each other in non-
linear, mutually reinforcing, and nuanced
ways, and that the most complete under-
standing of the development of elite per-
formance can only be arrived through an
integration of perspectives.
To help spur more integration, I sug-
gest that cognitive psychologists who are
studying deliberate practice and chunking,
and individual differences researchers who
are investigating cognitive ability and per-
sonality, focus more on common ground.
I’ve noticed that the debate often ends up
being “innate talent vs. deliberate prac-
tice” (see Ericsson et al., 2007; Ericsson,
2014), when that false dichotomy is detri-
mental to scientific progress (Gobet, 2013;
Kaufman, 2013a). Deliberate practice—
defined by Ericsson (2013) as “engage-
ment with full concentration in a training
activity designed to improve a particu-
lar aspect of performance with immediate
feedback, [and] opportunities for grad-
ual refinement by repetition and problem
solving”—depends on many traits which
vary in the general population, and which
have a genetic basis. But that doesn’t
mean that heritable traits are necessarily
“immutable constraints on the acquisition
of various types of expert performance”
(Ericsson, 2014).
Given our current state of scientific
knowledge, I hope we can all agree that:
• There is no such thing as “innate tal-
ent.” All skills require practice and sup-
port for their development (Kaufman,
2013b).
• The sheer number of hours engaged
in practice is not as important as the
quality of deliberate practice (Ericsson,
2013).
• There is nothing magical about 10,000 h
of deliberate practice: the average hours
of deliberate practice associated with
expert performance varies by domain,
and within domains, varies among
individuals (Ericsson, 2013; Kaufman,
2013a).
• Deliberate practice does not explain all
of the variation in elite performance
(Ericsson, 2013; Hambrick et al., 2014).
• Other traits beyond deliberate prac-
tice are critical for the development of
expert performance.
• Virtually all psychological traits are
influenced by a complex, dynamic inter-
play of genetic and environmental fac-
tors (Johnson et al., 2009).
• Individual differences at any single
moment of time don’t necessarily con-
strain ultimate levels of performance,
even though they may influence the rate
of expertise acquisition.
Assuming researchers can agree on these
seven basic principles, a fruitful research
direction is the investigation of the manner
in which individual differences influence
(but not necessarily constrain) the devel-
opment of expertise. One mode of oper-
ation is by influencing the efficiency of
expertise acquisition, therefore speeding
up the rate of acquisition. Ericsson (2013)
acknowledges that the 10,000 h of prac-
tice he found among elite violinists at
age 20 was just an average, with substan-
tial variation around the mean. In fact,
Simonton has found across the arts, sci-
ences, and leadership, that those with the
greatest lifetime productivity and high-
est levels of eminence required the least
amount of time to acquire the requisite
expertise (Simonton, 1991a,b, 1992, 1997,
1999).
General cognitive ability is one fac-
tor that can influence the efficiency of
expertise acquisition. Individual differ-
ences researchers have spent over 100 years
studying patterns of variation in cognitive
ability (e.g., Carroll, 1993; Jensen, 1998).
Brain imaging studies support the idea
that people who do well on tests of cog-
nitive ability use fewer brain resources to
solve novel and complex problems (Haier
et al., 1992; Neubauer and Fink, 2009; Van
den Heuvel et al., 2009; Deary et al., 2010;
Prabhakaran et al., 2011). Unfortunately,
this literature (which emphasizes cogni-
tive efficiency) is not well integrated with
the research of cognitive psychologists who
emphasize deliberate practice, chunking,
and strategy use. However, I believe these
various approaches are better suited for
integration than it may seem at first blush.
Consider a set of studies conducted
by Bor and colleagues, in which they
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found that chunking consistently activates
the prefrontal-parietal brain network (Bor
et al., 2004; Bor and Owen, 2007; Bor,
2012; Bor and Seth, 2012). Bor and Owen
(2007) had participants memorize unfa-
miliar verbal and numerical double-digit
sequences. The sequences were either ran-
domly arranged (e.g., 31, 24, 89, 65)—
and therefore not conducive to the use of
strategies—or structured (e.g., 57, 68, 79,
90)—which made them amenable to the
use of chunking strategies. The prefrontal-
parietal brain network was consistently
most active during the structured trials,
even though the unstructured trials placed
a higher demand on working memory,
and were more difficult for participants to
memorize.
The prefrontal-parietal network has
also been heavily implicated on tests of
working memory and general cognitive
ability (Prabhakaran et al., 2000; Jung
and Haier, 2007; Colom et al., 2009).
The research of Bor and colleagues sug-
gests that one of the primary functions
of the prefrontal-parietal brain network
is the conscious detection of patterns,
which aids in the efficiency of learning.
Indeed, Spearman (1904) argued that the
best measure of general cognitive ability
requires grasping relationships, inferring
rules, noticing similarities and differences,
and “educing” (Lating for “drawing out”)
the relevant relations in a complex pattern.
Indeed, the Ravens Progressive Matrices
test—which is strongly correlated with the
general cognitive ability factor—appears
to measure these skills (Conway et al.,
2003). The Ravens test places a heavy
burden on working memory because you
must engage in fluid reasoning on the
spot, with no external aids and often with
strict time limits. However, those who have
more efficient cognitive strategies for less-
ening the cognitive load will be at a distinct
advantage in this testing environment.
Consistent with this idea, Nandagopal
et al. (2010) had twins think aloud
while they solved various tasks, includ-
ing an associative learning task that is
significantly correlated with general cog-
nitive ability (see Kaufman et al., 2009).
They found that performance on tests
of cognitive ability were heavily influ-
enced by the use of strategies, and
differences in strategy use on an associa-
tive learning task (which was amenable to
use of strategies) explained a significant
amount of the genetic influences on
performance.
Their study raises the intriguing sug-
gestion that the heritability of general
cognitive ability may be due, in part, to
the ability to efficiently chunk informa-
tion in working memory. Therefore, while
Ericsson (2014) may be right that cogni-
tive ability does not necessarily constrain
the acquisition of expertise, it’s still entirely
possible that cognitive ability influences the
efficiency and rate of expertise acquisi-
tion (especially when expertise acquisition
draws heavily on general cognitive ability;
2014 special issue). Consistent with this,
Meinz and Hambrick (2010) found that
although deliberate practice accounted
for 45.1% of the variation in piano
sight-reading performance among expert
pianists, working memory accounted for
an additional 7.4% of the variance.
Of course, cognitive efficiency isn’t the
only way that individual differences can
influence expertise acquisition. Another
mode of operation is by sustaining the
motivation to practice over an extended
period of time. Ericsson et al. (1993)
acknowledged this possibility when they
say: “It is quite plausible, however, that
heritable individual differences might
influence processes related to motiva-
tion and the original enjoyment of the
activities in the domain and, even more
important, affect the inevitable differ-
ences in the capacity to engage in hard
work (deliberate practice)” (p. 399). Even
Arthur Jensen (one of the biggest propo-
nents of general cognitive ability) once
concluded that “some kind of motiva-
tional factor that sustains enormous and
prolonged interest and practice in a par-
ticular skill probably plays a larger part
in extremely exceptional performance than
does psychometric g or the speed of ele-
mentary information processes (Jensen,
1990, p. 259, italics added).”
I believe an overlooked characteris-
tic that influences the motivation to
engage in deliberate practice is inspi-
ration (Kaufman, 2013b). When people
become inspired, they usually are inspired
to realize some future image of them-
selves (Torrance, 1983). It is the clarity of
this vision, and the belief that the vision
is attainable, that can propel a person
from apathy to engagement, and sustain
the energy to engage in deliberate practice
over the long haul, despite obstacles and
setbacks. Indeed, Todd Thrash, Andrew
Elliot, and colleagues have conducted
multiple studies showing that inspiration
(measured both as a trait and a motiva-
tional state) is associated with an approach
motivation, positive emotions, and an
increase in creative productivity (Thrash
and Elliot, 2003, 2004; Thrash et al., 2010).
In fact, in one of their studies (Thrash
et al., 2010), inspiration not only predicted
the creativity of writing samples in science
and poetry, but also increased the efficiency
of the writing samples (e.g., a larger num-
ber of typed words that were retained in
the final product, and less time pausing
and more time writing). This raises the
intriguing idea that motivational charac-
teristics may cause an increase in cognitive
efficiency, which would ultimately increase
the rate of expertise acquisition. I believe
this is a promising area for future research.
These are just a few examples of
how the cognitive psychology approach to
expertise and the investigation of individ-
ual differences can be more tightly inte-
grated. To conclude: while others have sug-
gested the importance of computer mod-
eling for integration (Gobet, 2013), I have
argued here that other important con-
tributors to scientific progress are accu-
rate framing of the issues, standing on
a common ground of assumptions, and
investigating the influence of traits on the
development of expertise.
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INTRODUCTION
Science aims to define, describe, and
explain significant natural phenomena.
Each of these goals of science suggests an
increasingly deeper understanding of the
target phenomenon. We discuss in this
paper how these goals are or might be
realized in the science of expertise.
DEFINITION
Definitions are given in an attempt to
identify phenomena and to delineate
examples from non-examples. Expertise
is consensually defined as elite, peak, or
exceptionally high levels of performance
on a particular task or within a given
domain. One who achieves this status is
called an expert or some related term,
such as virtuoso, master, maven, prodigy,
or genius. These terms are meant to label
someone whose performance is at the top
of the game. An expert’s field of exper-
tise can be almost anything from crafts-
manship, through sports and music, to
science or mathematics. People usually
agree on examples of expertise, like Yo-Yo
Ma (musical performance), Fred Astaire
and Ginger Rogers (ballroom dancing),
Antiques Roadshow Appraisers, Albert
Einstein (physics), Tiger Woods (golf),
Bette Davis (acting), Nelson Mandela
(politics), or Hillary Rodham Clinton
(international relations).
Why different terms? Each term car-
ries with it a slightly nuanced meaning.
Shaded meanings vary in their empha-
sis on experience or constitutional factors
as the source of high levels of perfor-
mance. The term chosen to characterize
superior performance carries with it an
implied cause. Like expert, virtuoso or
master is the result of hard work and long
training. If talent is involved, it is a tal-
ent for hard labor. In contrast, prodigy, like
genius, results from an endowment, which
shows up early in life without the benefit
of training.
It might be appealing to the layperson
to believe that a genius is just born that
way. Elite performance just comes natu-
ral to a genius; you don’t have to invest all
that time and effort on training, because if
you don’t have what it takes you’ll never get
there. Moreover, you don’t have to explain
why you never had a significant insight,
because you just didn’t inherit the right
abilities or genes. But the facts seem to be
that, although people do differ in some-
thing called ability or talent, in sports or
medicine or any area of human endeavor,
talent is a necessary starting point, a plat-
form from which to begin. To become an
elite performer one has to capitalize on his
or her abilities. Training is the sine qua non.
Consider a specific case. Pablo Picasso,
Spanish painter and sculptor, was one of
the greatest and most influential artists
of the 20th century. Born into a family
that cultivated the arts, he demonstrated
extraordinary artistic ability at an early
age, encouraged by his parents. All the ele-
ments were in place for Picasso—paints,
brushes, canvases, and parents who could
recognize good artistic work. Painting
in the beginning in a naturalistic man-
ner, his style changed later in life as he
experimented with different theories, tech-
niques, and ideas, for example, creating
(with Braque) a unique style that has come
to be known as cubism. There is no doubt
that Picasso was a child prodigy. He had
an ability to create significant objects that
the art world and collectors recognized
early on for their value. He seems to have
been endowed with pure genius for paint-
ing and sculpting. But it is less often rec-
ognized that he was trained classically in
the arts and that he worked incessantly
at his craft, devoting long hours day and
night. And, over time, the quality of his
work improved, as judged by his peers,
and expanded into previously unexplored
areas and techniques. He could produce
new paintings later in life quickly, some
consisting of little more than three or four
strokes of his pen, and more or less at will,
each of them a virtuoso performance. But
that performance was based on a level of
expertise achieved, by dint of hard work, by
few other mortals. Picasso is but one case
of expertise and, as such, cannot validate a
general rule. Nonetheless, his accomplish-
ments are clearly based on a combination
of ability and effort, a characteristic that
other experts share.
DESCRIPTION
We all know an expert when we see one.
Normally people will quickly recognize the
difference between expertise and normal
or ordinary performance in any domain.
Expertise, itself, is a descriptive term. To
describe is to add detail in the specific case
to a more general definition. A descrip-
tion of expertise requires an inventory of
what the expert knows, knows how to
do, wants or intends to do, and what he
or she does or achieves. Psychologically,
knowledge and skills are mental or cogni-
tive concepts. They are not material enti-
ties, known by their physical make-up,
but rather they are states of mind. This
fact alone does not make them unscien-
tific. Rather they are quite sound scien-
tific concepts, known by their function, by
the behavior potential they provide. Mind,
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knowledge, skill, and other cognitive con-
cepts are analogous to gravity in physics or
evolution in biology, understood in terms
of their effects or functions, not by their
material structure.
Obviously, there is more to exper-
tise that just acquiring the right knowl-
edge and skills. Expertise is based in
some measure on the resources a person
comes equipped with, his or her natu-
ral talent or biological endowment. We
put an emphasis on practice and expe-
rience primarily because their contribu-
tion to expert performance is too often
overlooked or minimized by the layperson
(Ericsson et al., 1993). But clearly, inher-
ited prodigiousness, body characteristics,
dexterity, and the like, which are part and
parcel of the equipment we come to any
task with, all play a role, allowing some
people just to be flat out better prepared
than others. These natural factors provide
essentially a foundation for expertise in
any task. Given abilities and potential are
useless unless they are capitalized on or
activated by experience and practice, and,
conversely, practice might be futile if one
doesn’t have some initial capacity. Both
endowment and experience must be a part
of a complete description of expertise.
Thus, to describe expertise is to identify
the endowed resources, catalog the knowl-
edge, and specify the skills of a person who
is capable of performing in some domain
at the very highest level, achieved by few
others (perhaps by only a very small per-
centage of the general population).
EXPLANATION
How do experts get to be experts? What’s
the explanation? Is there something deeper
than a description that we need to know
about expertise? Maybe the brain or genes
are at the bottom of it.
Mind and brain are often conflated
terms and used interchangeably (Bourne
and Healy, 2014). It is tempting to equate
mind and brain, and it’s quite commonly
done among psychologists and other sci-
entists, not to mention laypersons. Brain
scanning is often used to study “how
the mind works.” The general assump-
tion behind brain-scanning procedures is
that the brain provides a mechanism for
mental functions. Thus, you commonly
come across phrases such as, “How to
train the brain,” “The brain learns (this,
that, or the other thing),” “Learning is a
rewiring of the brain,” or “The brain is the
mind’s machine.” The implication is that
the brain causes thinking and behavior to
be what they are. The psychological aspects
of behavior are caused by a material, bio-
logical entity called the brain. Thus, the
ultimate explanation for why and how we
behave as we do is to be found in a mate-
rial thing called the brain. In theories of
this type, the brain is the deus ex machine
that resolves difficulties we might have
in understanding why people behave as
they do.
But the facts of the matter are dif-
ferent. Training, experience, and practice
directly change the mind (i.e., thought and
behavior), but only indirectly the brain.
It is a person or a mind, defined by the
collection of all current knowledge and
skill, that is trained, not a brain. A per-
son learns, not the brain. That is not
to say that the brain and what goes on
in the brain are irrelevant, inconsequen-
tial, or unimportant in skill or knowl-
edge acquisition. Quite the contrary, what
happens in the brain as we learn and
behave is essential to understanding the
mind. As thinking happens, so do brain
processes. Mind and brain processes are
time-locked, and one can actually mea-
sure brain changes during thought. Still,
there is no good reason to believe that
one of these processes, say, brain activ-
ity, is more fundamental or causes the
other, thought or behavior, to be what it
is. In fact, the other causal direction—
that thought causes brain activity to be
what it is—is just as plausible. Consider
the possibility that neither causes the other
in a direct way but that both are going
on in parallel simultaneously and in an
interrelated way at all times. We think
of that position as consistent with the
long accepted first principle of the unity
of the sciences. What we observe to be
true in one domain of science should
not conflict with what we observe at the
same time in another domain of science.
What we observe to be true psychologi-
cally should be consistent with what we
observe biologically (or chemically, phys-
ically, etc.). Thus, mind (psychological)
and brain (biological) are unique but dif-
ferent, and both will reflect, in their dif-
ferent ways, the expression of expertise in
behavior.
So what is the explanation for exper-
tise? Consider this, can you explain some-
thing you cannot first describe? Logically,
we need to be able to describe exper-
tise before attempting to explain it. That
is why we tried to explicate description
before attempting to deal with explana-
tion. The more specific and detailed the
description of a phenomenon, the bet-
ter we understand it. So, given the right
description of expertise, what are we miss-
ing? Reductionism asserts that explana-
tions go beyond mere description to find
more fundamental causes of the target
behavior. The causes lie in more basic sci-
ences. For psychological phenomena the
immediate causes are likely to be biologi-
cal. That’s why the brain is often invoked
as the controller, monitor, or generator of
behavior.
Does brain activity then explain behav-
ior? Does the explanation of expertise lie
in brain circuitry or in genes? The correla-
tions are there, between brain activity and
behavior. But saying my brain made me do
it is akin to saying “The Devil made me
do it.” It’s attributing a cause where there
is no causal evidence. The available scien-
tific evidence is strictly correlational. No
one has yet demonstrated that the inde-
pendent creation of a brain process will
result in the specific behavior for which it
is claimed to be the cause. Thus, asserting
that the brain causes behavior is a matter
of faith or belief. And faith has no place in
science. Remember that correlation does
not imply causation. Neither does correla-
tion imply explanation. There is no good
reason other than faith to believe that the
explanation of behavior lies in biological
events. The claim that psychological pro-
cesses or behaviors cause biological events
to be what they are is just as plausible or
believable.
So, in our view, a scientific explana-
tion (or “deep understanding”) of exper-
tise, based on other sciences, remains to
be realized. We suggest that, if thorough
and complete descriptions of specific cases
of expertise can be achieved, then there
might be nothing left to explain, at least
not in these cases. This possibility suggests
that, among other things, the implied dif-
ference among the three goals of science
(definition, description, explanation) is an
illusion. Proper and complete description
might supersede the need to explain.
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But, if an explanation is to be sought,
it will be found, in our view, in the
domain of psychology, rather than some
physical or biological science. By this psy-
chological explanation, expertise results
from practice and experience, built on
a foundation of talent, or innate ability.
The psychology laboratory has revealed
empirically based training principles that
further elucidate the explanation of exper-
tise. These principles enable learners
to maximize the acquisition, retention,
and transfer of knowledge and skills,
as summarized in Healy and Bourne
(2012).
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Significant insights into visual cognition have come from studying real-world perceptual
expertise. Many have previously reviewed empirical findings and theoretical developments
from this work. Here we instead provide a brief perspective on approaches, considerations,
and challenges to studying real-world perceptual expertise.We discuss factors like choosing
to use real-world versus artificial object domains of expertise, selecting a target domain
of real-world perceptual expertise, recruiting experts, evaluating their level of expertise,
and experimentally testing experts in the lab and online. Throughout our perspective, we
highlight expert birding (also called birdwatching) as an example, as it has been used as a
target domain for over two decades in the perceptual expertise literature.
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INTRODUCTION
In nearly every aspect of human endeavor, we find people who
stand out for their high levels of skill and knowledge. We call
them experts. Expertise has been studied in domains ranging
from chess (Chase and Simon, 1973; Gobet and Charness, 2006;
Connors and Campitelli, 2014; Leone et al., 2014) to physics
(Chi et al., 1981) to sports (Baker et al., 2003). Perceptual
experts, such as ornithologist, radiologists, and mycologists,
are noted for their remarkable ability to rapidly and accu-
rately recognize, categorize, and identify objects within some
domain. Understanding the development of perceptual exper-
tise is more than characterizing the behavior of individuals with
uncanny abilities. Rather, if perceptual expertise is the end-
point of the trajectory of normal visual learning, then studying
perceptual experts can provide insights into the general princi-
ples, limits, and possibilities of human learning and plasticity
(e.g., Gauthier et al., 2010).
Several reviews have highlighted empirical findings and
theoretical developments from research on perceptual exper-
tise in various modalities (for visual expertise, see, e.g.,
McCandliss et al., 2003; Palmeri and Gauthier, 2004; Palmeri and
Cottrell, 2009; Richler et al., 2011; for auditory expertise, see,
e.g., Chartrand et al., 2008; Holt and Lotto, 2008; for tactile
expertise, see, e.g., Behrmann and Ewell, 2003; Reuter et al.,
2012). Here, we instead highlight more practical considera-
tions that come with studying perceptual expertise; we highlight
visual expertise because this modality has been most exten-
sively studied. We specifically consider some choices that face
researchers: whether to use real-world or artificial objects, what
domain of perceptual expertise to study, how to recruit par-
ticipants, how to evaluate their expertise, and whether to test
in the lab or via the web. Throughout our perspective, we
use birding as an example domain because it has been com-
monly used in the literature (e.g., Tanaka and Taylor, 1991;
Gauthier et al., 2000; Tanaka et al., 2005; Mack et al., 2007;
Mack and Palmeri, 2011).
REAL-WORLD vs. ARTIFICIAL DOMAINS OF EXPERTISE
Expertise-related research has been conducted using both artificial
and real-world objects. Artificial objects include simple stimuli
like line orientations, textures, and colors (e.g., Goldstone, 1998;
Mitchell and Hall, 2014), and relatively complex novel stimuli
like random dot patterns (Palmeri, 1997), Greebles (Gauthier and
Tarr, 1997; Gauthier et al., 1998, 1999), and Ziggerins (Wong et al.,
2009a). Real-world objects include birds, dogs, cars, and other
categories (Tanaka and Taylor, 1991; Gauthier et al., 2000). Studies
using artificial objects are often training studies, where researchers
recruit novices and train them to become “experts” in a domain.
Changes in behavior or brain activity are measured over the course
of training to understand the development of expertise, making
these studies longitudinal. The weeks of training used in these
studies can only be a proxy for the years of experience in real-world
domains. Because real-world expertise takes so long to develop,
most real-world studies are cross-sectional.
An advantage of training studies with artificial objects is
the power to establish causality. Experimenters have precise
control over properties of novel objects, relationships between
them, and how categories are defined (e.g., Richler and Palmeri,
2014). Participants can be randomly assigned to conditions and
training and testing can be carefully controlled. As one exam-
ple, Wong et al. (2009a,b) used novel Ziggerins and trained
people in two different ways, one of which mirrored individu-
ation required for face recognition, another of which mirrored
the letter recognition demands required for reading. Accord-
ingly, the face-like training group showed behavior and brain
activity similar to that seen in face recognition while the
letter-like training group showed behavior and brain activity
similar to that seen in letter recognition. Studies of artifi-
cial domains of expertise can provide insights into real-world
domains.
If researchers are interested in understanding what makes
experts experts, not just investigating limits of experience-
related changes, then it is important to complement carefully
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controlled laboratory studies using artificial domains with the
study of real-world experts. Because of their quasi-experimental
nature – recruiting novices and those with varying levels of exper-
tise as they occur in the real world – these studies cannot establish
unambiguous causal relationships between expertise and behav-
ioral or brain changes. Apart from considerations of external
validity, studies of real-world experts permit the study of a range
and extent of expertise that cannot easily be reproduced in the
laboratory. And practically speaking, testing real-world percep-
tual experts on real-world perceptual stimuli saves researchers the
effort and expense needed to train participants in an artificial
domain.
Studies using real-world domains also come full circle to inform
studies using artificial domains. For example, consider the classic
result of Tanaka and Taylor (1991), reproduced in our own online
replication in Figure 1. Bird experts categorized birds (their expert
domain) and dogs (their novice domain). For novices (Rosch et al.,
1976), objects are categorized faster at a basic level (dog) than a
superordinate (animal) or subordinate level (blue jay), while for
experts (Tanaka and Taylor, 1991; Johnson and Mervis, 1997),
objects are categorized as fast at a subordinate level as a basic level.
This entry-level shift (Jolicoeur et al., 1984; see also Tanaka et al.,
2005; Mack et al., 2009; Mack and Palmeri, 2011) has been used
as a behavioral marker of expertise in training studies employing
artificial domains (Gauthier et al., 2000; Gauthier and Tarr, 2002).
Our group recently reviewed considerations that factor into
studies using artificial domains (Richler and Palmeri, 2014), so
here we focus on real-world domains for the remainder of our
perspective.
DOMAINS OF REAL-WORLD PERCEPTUAL EXPERTISE
In addition to everyday domains of perceptual expertise, like faces
(Bukach et al., 2006) and letters (McCandliss et al., 2003), stud-
ies have used domains ranging from cars and birds (Gauthier
et al., 2000), where expertise is not uncommon, to more spe-
cialized and sometimes esoteric domains like latent fingerprint
identification (Busey and Parada, 2010; Dror and Cole, 2010),
budgie identification (Campbell and Tanaka, 2014), and chick
sexing (Biederman and Shiffrar, 1987). The particular choice of
expert domain depends on a combination of theoretical goals and
practical considerations.
For example, consider a goal of understanding how the abil-
ity to categorize at different levels of abstraction changes with
perceptual expertise (Mack and Palmeri, 2011), which impacts
understanding of how categories are learned, represented, and
accessed. Birding is a useful domain because birders must make
subordinate and sub-subordinate categorizations, sometimes at a
glance, and often under less than ideal conditions with poor light-
ing and camouflage. Other kinds of bird experts have different
skills: budgie experts (a budgerigar is a bred parakeet) can keenly
identify unique individuals in cages, but need not have expertise
with other birds, while professional chick sexers can quickly dis-
criminate male from female genitalia on chicken hatchlings. In
an entirely different domain, fingerprint experts typically match
latent prints with a known sample, with both clearly visible, pre-
sented side by side, and with time limits imposed by the analyst,
not the environment.
FIGURE 1 | Mean correct categorization response times for a novice
domain (dogs) and an expert domain (birds) measured online.
Following Tanaka and Taylor (1991), bird experts were tested in a speeded
category verification task where they categorized images at the
superordinate (animal ), basic (bird or dog), or subordinate (specific species
or breed) level. In their novice domain (dogs), a classic basic-level
advantage was observed, whereby categorization at the basic level was
significantly faster than the superordinate (t22 = 2.67, p = 0.014) and
subordinate level (t22 = 6.75, p < 0.001). In their expert domain (birds),
subordinate categorization was as fast as basic-level categorization
(t22 = 0.81, p = 0.429). This replication was conducted using an online
Wordpress + Flash custom website with only 23 participants from a single
short 10 min experimental session. Error bars represent 95% confidence
intervals on the level × domain interaction.
There are real-world consequences for studying certain
domains of perceptual expertise, such as latent fingerprint exam-
ination. Despite the widespread use of forensic evidence – as well
as its popular depiction on television – a recent National Research
Council of the National Academy of Sciences (2009) noted a
“dearth of peer-reviewed, published studies establishing the sci-
entific bases and validity of many forensic methods,” especially
those methods that require subjective visual pattern analysis and
expert testimony. That scientific evidence is emerging, especially
in the case of latent fingerprint expertise (e.g., Busey and Parada,
2010; Busey and Dror, 2011).
The choice of domain can also be influenced by various prac-
tical considerations. It is easier to study perceptual expertise in
a domain with millions of possible participants than an esoteric
domain with a few isolated members. It is easier to study a domain
where relevant stimuli are widely available in books and online.
And it is easier to study a domain without barriers to contact,
which can be the case for experts in the military, homeland security,
and certain professions. For example, studies of expert baggage
screeners require coordination with the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) and many details regarding stimuli and
procedures cannot be shared with the public (e.g., Wolfe et al.,
2013). In the case of birding, there are millions of people in the
US alone who consider birding a hobby, spending hours in their
yards and parks, and billions on books, equipment, and travel (La
Rouche, 2006). Photos of birds are widely available; books have
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been published on particularly difficult bird identifications (e.g.,
Kaufman, 1999, 2011). Birders regularly participate in citizen sci-
ence efforts, such as the Christmas bird count and provide data on
bird sightings to databases like ebird.org. Anecdotally, this trans-
lates into a keen interest in science and a willingness to participate
in research.
RECRUITING
In the past, experts usually had to be recruited locally, with
advertisements posted around a university campus and in local
newspapers. It may be hard for some to remember that it has only
been in the past several years that not having an email address has
become almost equivalent to not having a phone number, and that
only recently has it become the case that most people have some
Internet access. Being able to recruit participants more widely via
the Internet promises not only to increase heterogeneity of par-
ticipants, but also, and especially relevant for expertise research,
promises to locate participants with a far greater range of exper-
tise than might be possible when recruiting in a local geographic
region.
One rapidly exploding means of recruiting and testing (see
“Testing”) participants is Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). AMT
allows hundreds of subjects to be easily recruited and tested in a
matter of days; participants on AMT are more demographically
diverse than typical American college samples (Buhrmester et al.,
2011). This diversity is important for research examining individ-
ual differences in perception and cognition. While the potential
population of AMT workers is large, it is unknown how many
with high levels of domain expertise might be workers on the plat-
form. For expertise research, recruitment via AMT may need to be
supplemented by more direct recruitment of true domain experts
(e.g., Van Gulick, 2014).
Large domains of expertise have organizations, web sites,
blogs, and even tweets and Facebook updates that target par-
ticular individuals. In principle, online recruiting through these
channels offers a quick, easy, and inexpensive means of finding
experts. These could involve paid advertisements online and in
electronic newsletters. More directly, these could involve mes-
sages sent to email lists. The biggest challenge to this, however,
is that many professional organizations or workplaces would
rarely allow, and many outright prohibit, direct solicitation of
members or employees, even for basic research; researchers can-
not directly contact TSA baggage screeners or latent fingerprint
examiners. By comparison, birding organizations, including local
Ornithological and Audubon Societies, whose members join
as part of a hobby, not a profession, can be less restrictive
in terms of allowing contact with members, so long as con-
tact is non-intrusive. In our case, we have identified several
hundred birding groups in the US and Canada, we have con-
tacted several dozen directly, and have received permission to
solicit volunteer participants from most, having so far tested
several hundred birders with a wide range of experience and
expertise.
EVALUATING LEVELS OF PERCEPTUAL EXPERTISE
How do we know someone is a perceptual expert? A simple
approach relies on subjective self-rating, often supplemented by
self-report on the amount of formal training, years of expe-
rience, or community reputation. For example, bird experts
in Tanaka and Taylor (1991) were recommended by mem-
bers of bird-watching organizations and had a minimum of
10 years of experience, and those in Johnson and Mervis
(1997) led birding field trips and some had careers related to
birding.
It is now well-recognized that self-reports of expertise are insuf-
ficient and that objective measures of expert performance are
needed (e.g., Ericsson, 2006, 2009); self-report measures of per-
ceptual expertise are not always good predictors of performance
(e.g., McGugin et al., 2012; Van Gulick, 2014). Therefore, recent
work has used quantitative measures to assess expert abilities (e.g.,
see Gauthier et al., 2010). A detailed review and discussion of such
measures is well beyond the scope of a brief perspective piece.
A variety of quantitative measures of perceptual expertise have
been used and new measures are currently being developed – these
efforts to develop and validate new measures reflect a quickly grow-
ing interest in exploring individual difference in visual cognition
(e.g., Wilmer et al., 2010; Gauthier et al., 2013; Van Gulick, 2014).
While expert-novice differences are sometimes loosely
described as if they were dichotomous, it is self-evident that
expertise is a continuum, people vary in their level of exper-
tise, and any measure of expertise must place individuals along
a (perhaps multidimensional) continuum. Some behavioral or
neural markers might distinguish pure novices from those with
some experience but asymptote at only an intermediate level
of expertise, while other behavioral or neural markers might
distinguish the true experts from more middling experts and
novices. Understanding the continuum of behavioral and brain
changes, whether they are asymptotic, monotonic, or even
non-monotonic over the continuum of expertise, can have
important implications for understanding mechanistically and
computationally how perceptual expertise develops (e.g., see
Palmeri et al., 2004).
Briefly, one useful measure has focused on the perceptual
part of perceptual expertise: using a simple one-back match-
ing task, images are presented one at a time and participants
must say whether consecutive pictures are the same or differ-
ent. Experts have higher discriminability (d′) on images from
their domain of expertise relative to non-expert domains, and
this difference predicts behavioral and brain differences (e.g.,
Gauthier et al., 2000; Gauthier and Tarr, 2002). Another mea-
sure has focused on memory as an index of perceptual expertise:
the Vanderbilt Expertise Task (VET; McGugin et al., 2012) mir-
rors aspects of the Cambridge Face Memory task (Duchaine and
Nakayama, 2006). Participants memorize exemplars from sev-
eral different artifact and natural categories and then recognize
other instances under a variety of conditions, and these differ-
ences in memory within particular domains predict behavioral
and brain differences (e.g., McGugin et al., 2014). With our inter-
est in categorization at different levels of abstraction, in work in
preparation, we have developed a measure that has focused on
categorical knowledge in perceptual expertise: adapting common
psychometric approaches, we are refining what could essentially
be characterized as an Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT, a stan-
dardized test widely used for college admission in the United
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States) of birding knowledge, with multiple-choice identifications
of bird images ranging from easy (common backyard birds like
the Blue Jay), to intermediate (distinctive yet far less common
birds, like the Pileated Woodpecker or Great Kiskadee), to quite
difficult identifications that even fairly expert birders find diffi-
cult (like discriminating Bohemian from Cedar Waxwing, Hairy
from Downy Woodpecker, or correctly identifying the many
extremely similar warblers, sparrows, or flycatchers). Future work
must consider to what extent different measures of perceptual
expertise capture the same dimensions of expert knowledge and
predict the same behavioral and brain measures that vary with
expertise.
TESTING
Laboratory testing allows careful control and monitoring of
performance, permits experiments that require precisely-timed
stimulus presentations, and of course allows sophisticated behav-
ioral and brain measures like eye movements, fMRI, EEG, and
the like. But laboratory testing incurs a potential cost in that
the number of laboratory participants is often limited due to the
expense of subject reimbursement, personnel hours, lab space,
and equipment. And for any study of unique populations who
might be geographically dispersed, such as perceptual experts, the
cost of bringing participants to the laboratory can be prohibitively
expensive.
Until fairly recently, the only real methods for testing partic-
ipants from a wide geographic area, apart from having experi-
menters or participants travel, was to have the experiments travel.
For simple studies, this could mean mailed pencil-and-paper tests,
while for more sophisticated studies, this could mean sending
disks or CDs to participants to run on a home computer (e.g.,
Tanaka et al., 2010). As anyone who programs well knows, getting
software to run properly on a wide range of computer hardware
and operating system versions can be a daunting task. In the past
few years, it has become popular, and wildly successful, to have
experiments run via a web browser. While not entirely immune to
the vagaries of hardware and operating system versions, browser-
based applications are often more robust to significant variation,
and can often automatically prompt users for upgrades to requisite
software plug-ins.
There are multiple platforms and approaches to online web-
based experiments. One approach, highlighted earlier, uses AMT.
In AMT, researchers publish Human Intelligence Tasks (HITs) that
registered workers can complete in exchange for modest monetary
compensation. AMT integrates low-level programming tools for
stimulus creation, test design, and programming into one web-
based application; other elements in AMT include automated
compensation, recruitment, and data collection. Aside from the
availability of these tools, a clear advantage of AMT is the poten-
tial to recruit from a large and diverse pool of participants. An
alternative approach is to develop and support a custom web-
based server for experiments. There are powerful tools for creating
web pages, such as Wordpress (wordpress.org), and fairly sophis-
ticated programs can be developed in Adobe Flash or Javascript
(e.g., De Leeuw, 2014; Simcox and Fiez, 2014). Perhaps an advan-
tage of such custom portals is that people may be more attracted
to them because of their interest in participating in research, not
because of the potential to earn money, as might sometimes be
the case for AMT. In the end, we suspect that most labs will
use a combination of both platforms for recruiting, testing, or
both.
At least given current computer hardware in wide use, a
potential vexing problem for web-based experiments is tim-
ing. Fortunately, platforms such as Flash and Javascript run
on the local (participant) computer, so properly-designed pro-
grams can avoid problems that could be introduced by variability
in Internet connection speeds. Thankfully, reasonable response
time measurements can be obtained (Reimers and Stewart, 2007;
Crump et al., 2013; Simcox and Fiez, 2014). Indeed, as illus-
trated in Figure 1, we have successfully observed differences
in RTs for expert and novice domains in online experiments
using a Wordpress + Flash environment that mirror observations
of expert speeded categorization from classic laboratory studies
(Tanaka and Taylor, 1991). Unfortunately, the most critical lim-
itation for now concerns stimulus timing. It is well known that
LCD monitors in wide use have response characteristics far too
sluggish to permit the kind of “single-refresh” presentations that
would have been possible on previous CRTs. While presentation
times of 100 ms or more are probably a safe bet, anything faster
would require calibration to check that a participant had a suffi-
ciently responsive monitor; it may be that the next generation of
LCD, LED, or other technologies will (hopefully) eliminate these
limitations.
SUMMARY
Most human endeavors have a perceptual component. For exam-
ple, keen visual perception is required in sports, medicine, science,
games like chess, and a wide range of skilled behavior. Thus
research on real-world perceptual expertise has potential theo-
retical and applied impacts to many domains. Here we briefly
outlined at least some of the practical considerations that factor
into research on real-world perceptual expertise. Several of these
considerations are things that researchers often fret over behind
the scenes without making it into a typical research publication,
so in that sense we hope this brief perspective fills a small but
important hole in the literature.
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For over a century, psychologists have investigated the mental processes of expert perform-
ers – people who display exceptional knowledge and/or skills in specific fields of human
achievement. Since the 1960s, expertise researchers have made considerable progress
in understanding the cognitive and neural mechanisms that underlie such exceptional
performance. Whereas the first modern studies of expertise were conducted in relatively
formal knowledge domains such as chess, more recent investigations have explored
elite performance in dynamic perceptual-motor activities such as sport. Unfortunately,
although these studies have led to the identification of certain domain-free generalizations
about expert-novice differences, they shed little light on an important issue: namely,
experts’ metacognitive activities or their insights into, and regulation of, their own mental
processes. In an effort to rectify this oversight, the present paper argues that metacognitive
processes and inferences play an important if neglected role in expertise. In particular,
we suggest that metacognition (including such processes as “meta-attention,” “meta-
imagery” and “meta-memory,” as well as social aspects of this construct) provides a
window on the genesis of expert performance. Following a critique of the standard
empirical approach to expertise, we explore some research on “metacognition” and
“metacognitive inference” among experts in sport. After that, we provide a brief evaluation
of the relationship between psychological skills training and metacognition and comment
on the measurement of metacognitive processes. Finally, we summarize our conclusions
and outline some potentially new directions for research on metacognition in action.
Keywords: metacognition, expertise, cognition, motor cognition, social cognition, cognitive neuroscience, sport,
sport psychology
INTRODUCTION
Expertise is characterized by superior reproducible performances
and “refers to the characteristics, skills, and knowledge that distin-
guish experts from novices and less experienced people” (Ericsson,
2006a, p. 3). Quintessentially, sport provides many such instances.
For example, when Lewis (Lewis and Marx, 1996) became the first
track and field athlete to win four consecutive Olympic titles, he
accomplished this feat with a long jump of 8 m 50 cm, winning
by a margin of 21 cm. Sport is a domain that provides bench-
marks to distinguish experts from novices, through performance
outcomes (e.g., podium placing), player statistics (e.g., batting
average in baseball) or competition level (e.g., Olympic vs. Colle-
giate). Given such criteria, it is not surprising that the question of
how one becomes an expert within the sport domain has been of
increasing scientific (Ericsson, 2014; Hambrick et al., 2014a) and
popular interest (Ross, 2006; Gladwell, 2008) in the two decades
since Ericsson’s seminal paper on deliberate practice. “Deliberate
practice presents performers with tasks that are initially outside
their current realm of reliable performance, yet can be mastered
within hours of practice by concentrating on critical aspects and
by gradually refining performance through repetitions after feed-
back” (Ericsson, 2006b, p. 692). Although subject of much debate
(e.g., Baker and Young, 2014; Detterman, 2014), the theory of
deliberate practice and the development of expertise both war-
rant further analyses. This paper adds to the expertise debate
by presenting a novel argument contending that metacognitive
processes are central to expertise in the sport context. Further-
more, we suggest that some of the aforementioned controversies
in the research literature, that stem from conflict between those
focused largely on exploring the role of automaticity in skilled
performance, and researchers focused on understanding the rep-
resentation of experts knowledge, may have led to the explanatory
role of metacognition being overlooked.
In this review we propose that our understanding of aspects
of both social and cognitive dimensions of sporting expertise
can be adequately explained from a metacognitive perspective.
The potential of metacognitive inferences and domain-general
skills including psychological skills training (PST) are posited
as integral to the genesis of expert performance. Subsequently,
the contribution of both mental imagery (e.g., mental practice)
and attentional strategies (e.g., routines) to our understanding
of expertise and metacognition will be discussed. Finally, new
directions for future research that emanate from our metacog-
nitive perspective on sporting expertise will be outlined. Firstly,
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however, in the rationale for our approach we will attempt to
answer the following questions: are there limits to the current
expertise approach? Why is sport an appropriate field of study?
And finally, what is metacognition?
ARE THERE LIMITS TO THE EXPERTISE APPROACH?
Historically, the rich tapestry of research on expert performance
has been interwoven with a common thread-the study of grand-
masters in chess (Williams and Ericsson, 2005). Investigations
into expertise in chess, a competitive sporting activity that was
rule bound, amenable to measurement through objective rat-
ings (e.g., ELO rankings), with a range of possible contextual
requirements (e.g., blindfold chess; Campitelli and Gobet, 2005)
led to a proliferation of literature on the topic (de Groot, 1965;
Chase and Simon, 1973; Holding, 1985, 1992). Chess is a chal-
lenge of perceptual-cognitive skill and thus provides a fitting
laboratory for testing constructs such as pattern recognition,
visual imagery, and memory (Bilalic et al., 2010). Sport in the
more traditional sense emphasizes motor skill execution under
stressful conditions typically in a dynamic environment (Baker
and Young, 2014). One legacy of the chess expertise literature
was that this perceptual-cognitive lens was subsequently applied
in the sport domain (MacIntyre et al., 2013). Two interlinked
events led researchers to become enthusiastic in their study of
visual cognition and sport (Williams and Ford, 2007). Firstly, the
emergence of the expert performance approach (Ericsson and
Smith, 1991) and later, the theory of deliberate practice (Eric-
sson et al., 1993), both provided an impetus for investigations
into perceptual-cognitive skills, such as anticipation and decision-
making in sport. The tenet that sport could be a dynamic natural
laboratory was well made (Moran, 1996; Williams and Erics-
son, 2005) and the development of innovative methodologies
occurred in parallel (e.g., eye-tracking as a measure of atten-
tion). A burgeoning literature developed and sport as a domain of
study gained popularity as a result (Moran, 2009; MacIntyre et al.,
2013).
However, there were limits to this approach, particularly in
the focus on visual-cognitive expertise, which arguably was to the
detriment of our understanding of the underlying psychological
processes. Take, for example, the quiet eye phenomenon which has
recently gained prominence in sport science research (Vine et al.,
2014). Increasingly, this is becoming a topic of interest within both
cognitive psychology (Klostermann et al., 2013) and neuroscience
(Vine et al., 2011). The quiet eye is defined as “a final fixation or
tracking gaze that is located on a specific location or object in
the visuomotor workspace within 3◦ of visual angle (or less) for a
minimum of 100 ms” (Vickers, 2007, p. 11) prior to the onset of
a critical movement. According to Vickers, quiet eye offset occurs
when the gaze deviates off a specific location for more than 100 ms
(Vickers, 2007, p. 11). Despite the success in establishing a quiet
eye phenomenon “there has been a lack of explicit tests of the pro-
cesses through which quiet eye training interventions exert their
positive effect” (Vine et al., 2014, p. S237). To date, little knowl-
edge of the psychological basis of the quiet eye phenomenon has
emerged (Moran, 2012a). Similarly, while a wealth of knowledge
has accumulated on the characteristics of individuals’ saccadic
pursuit during visual attention tasks (Williams and Ford, 2007),
little evidence exists to support the trainability of visual search
(Mann et al., 2007).
A further limitation to the expertise approach is that, for exam-
ple, the focus has been on a narrow set of conclusions from
the original publication on deliberate practice (Ericsson et al.,
1993). Therefore, it is not surprising that the debate over the
contribution of deliberate practice to expert performance con-
tinues in chess (Campitelli and Gobet, 2011; Detterman, 2014),
sporting expertise (Williams and Ford, 2007; Baker and Young,
2014) and professional expertise (Ericsson, 2009; Hoffman, 2014).
Disagreements over the number of hours accumulated, start-
ing age, and the link to general cognitive abilities continue to
dominate the field (e.g., Gobet and Campitelli, 2007; Baker and
Young, 2014; Hambrick et al., 2014a). For example, Hambrick
et al. (2014b, p. 113) concluded that evidence had accumulated
to suggest that, although relevant, deliberate practice, in itself,
“does not largely account for individual differences in perfor-
mance.” One caveat to be considered here is that these authors
were concerned with the predictive ability of the theory solely
within the context of chess. The acquisition of motor skills in
the traditional sporting context is arguably more complex (Voss
et al., 2010). For example, even defining deliberate practice among
athletes is more challenging than with chess grandmasters (Mac-
Intyre et al., 2013; Healy et al., 2014). Nevertheless, the conclusion
by Hambrick et al. (2014b, p. 114) that “the question now is
what else matters” suggests that we should consider a broader
range of constructs in order to more comprehensively understand
expertise.
Before we consider the construct of metacognition, the ratio-
nale for studying athletes and sport performers must be made
readily apparent. Numerous authors have highlighted the role
in which sport can provide a natural laboratory for the study of
constructs within psychology and expertise (Ericsson and Smith,
1991; Moran, 1996; MacIntyre et al., 2013). According to Erics-
son (2009, p. 18) “performance can be publically observed and
even objectively measured in open competition and public perfor-
mances.” Similarly, it has been noted that the high performance
sport environment is dynamic. For example, typically perform-
ers have to execute complex skills under conditions of extreme
stress where their limits are being constantly challenged (Baker
and Young, 2014). Among the topics that have only recently
received scrutiny are the role of attention and the allocation
of effort in deliberate practice (Baker and Young, 2014). One
explanation for this is that researchers concentrated on the vari-
ables that were most measurable, including the quantification of
hours in practice (Helsen et al., 1998). A challenge for researchers
has been reconciling the automaticity and procedural knowl-
edge, central to expert sport performance, with the notion that
declarative knowledge and metacognitive abilities may also play a
role in the acquisition of expertise (Stanley and Krakauer, 2013;
Toner, 2014). To explain, while procedural knowledge is inherently
linked to optimum sport performance, declarative knowledge may
have both a debilitative (Beilock and Carr, 2001) and facilitative
role (Carson and Collins, 2011; MacIntyre et al., 2013; Brick et al.,
2014). For example, it is probable that Carl Lewis knew his precise
stride count to enable him to hit the board and take off into the
sandpit at the 1984 Olympic Games. Thus, expertise in sports goes
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beyond mere procedural knowledge and arguably metacognitive
processes are present at all stages of the target skill and may work
in parallel. We thus propose an integrative model of expertise in
sports, one that explores action and cognition in sport, a topic that
has arguably only recently returned to the forefront of psychology.
In Rosenbaum (2005) suggested that researchers in psychology
have historically turned relatively late to cognition and action.
While this point is debatable, given the recent emergence of
research on exceptional performance states (e.g., Choking; Beilock
and Carr, 2001), the paucity of research on action in prior
decades may be worthy of review. Understanding movement had
long been the preserve of the fields of motor control, biome-
chanics, and neurophysiology perhaps due to the complexity of
the cognition-action nexus and the lack of clear methodological
approaches within psychology (Rosenbaum, 2005).“Thinking and
action seem to lie at opposite ends of the behavioral spectrum”
(Moran, 2012b, p. 1). The disembodied approach of information
processing theorists in the 1970s led scientists to conduct research
on thinking independently from the study of sensorimotor pro-
cesses and mechanisms (Laakso, 2011). It was not until the advent
of the motor cognition paradigm (Jeannerod, 1994) that “action”
became subject to intensive scrutiny by researchers in psychology
(MacIntyre et al., 2013). Jeannerod proposed that action, rather
than movement per se, was vital to understand, as evidence for
the role of cognition in movement planning was accumulating.
The interest in understanding action from different perspectives
was increasing rapidly (see Guillot and Collet, 2010). According
to Moran (2009) importance of inter-disciplinary collaboration
between researchers in cognitive sport psychology, cognitive psy-
chology, and cognitive neuroscience has been brought to the
fore by this new paradigm. Similarly, social cognition has devel-
oped as a field of study which has added considerably to our
understanding of action (Gallese et al., 2004; Frith, 2012). And
recently, cognitive researchers have embraced the study of the
domain of sport in their quest to understand how the mind
works (MacIntyre et al., 2013). Consequently, we propose that
metacognition, a construct that is central to motor cognition,
social cognition and action, can augment our current explanations
and understanding of the preparation and execution of motor
skills within the sport context and elucidate our conceptions of
expertise.
WHAT IS METACOGNITION?
Metacognition, or “knowledge or cognition about cognitive phe-
nomena” (Flavell, 1979, p. 906) is curiously under-explored in
the domain of expertise among sports performers (Moran, 1996;
MacIntyre and Moran, 2010). Elite athletes are not just experts
in movement execution but conceivably they are also experts in
planning, metacognition, and reflection. Metacognition has been
defined as an individual’s insight into and control over their own
mental processes (Flavell, 1979). In the decades since Flavell’s
(1979) pioneering article, the term metacognition has been oper-
ationalized as the scientific study of the mind’s ability to monitor
and control itself or, in other words, the study of our ability to
know about our knowing (Van Overschelde, 2008, p. 47). It is a
different kind of cognition as explained by Nelson (1999, p. 625):
“If one aspect of cognition is monitoring or controlling another
aspect of cognition, then the former aspect is metacognitive in
relation to the latter aspect. Flavell and subsequent investiga-
tors have suggested a tripartite model of metacognition, with
knowledge, control and monitoring components (Flavell, 1979,
1987; Tarricone, 2011; Halpern, 2014). Recently, Tarricone (2011)
indicated that the main interaction between metacognition and
self-regulation is to control, monitor, and regulate strategies to
meet task demands and goals. Previously, the study of metacog-
nition has targeted intellectual skills and a substantial corpus of
research exists on metacognition in educational settings (Hacker
et al., 2009). However, Augustyn and Rosenbaum (2005, p. 911)
recently challenged the status quo in metacognition research and
stated that “if intellectual and perceptual-motor skills rely on sim-
ilar mechanisms, one would expect metacognition to apply to the
guidance of perceptual-motor skills, just as it does to the guidance
of intellectual skills.” The approach among cognitive neuroscien-
tists, focused on visual perceptual tasks to measure metacognition
(Palmer et al., 2013; Weil et al., 2013), is similarly narrow, per-
haps due to methodological issues. Metacognition and action,
on the other hand, offers new possibilities in illuminating our
understanding of expertise and action.
EXPERTISE AND METACOGNITION
Expertise is tightly coupled with metacognition in both training
(e.g., knowledge of when a skill has been acquired) and com-
petitive settings (e.g., self-regulation under stress). We propose
that metacognitive processes are inherently related to expertise in
sports and we have summarized recent findings in the sport liter-
ature that reflect the prominence of metacognitive explanations
(see Table 1). Early investigations were focused on judgments
of learning (Simon and Bjork, 2001) and more recently more
specificity in the research questions has led to the development
of specific models (MacIntyre and Moran, 2010). In the coming
sections, we postulate that people use different sources of infor-
mation, including metacognitive inferences. Firstly, we contend
that expertise in any given area facilitates metacognitive inference
and secondly, that expertise itself may consist of metacognitive
inference, among a range of other non-metacognitive processes
including working memory and motivation. Given that exper-
tise is explained by differences in knowledge, many processes
involving the use of that knowledge are more or less auto-
matic or procedularized, and consequently they do may not
place onerous demands on working memory (Beilock and Carr,
2001). This creates the opportunity for metacognitive reason-
ing to optimize the assessment of situations and to structure
one’s goal pursuit. Furthermore, experts have quite good ideas
about standards and deviations from such standards, whether
this refers to one’s own behavior or to the behavior of oth-
ers. Deviations from sophisticated mental models (e.g., the
ideal long jump) are thus more likely to become salient to
experts than to non-experts, also providing opportunities for
reflective thoughts and interventions. The use of both action
simulations (e.g., mental practice) and pre-performance rou-
tines by elite performers can be conceptualized as domain-general
strategies which rely upon metacognitive processes. Evidence to
support these contentions will be presented in the forthcoming
sections.
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Table 1 | Recent research in sport that has highlighted the role of metacognition.
Topic Authors Method Emerging literature on metacognition
Meta-imagery Moran (2002) Conceptual Posed the question of whether meta-imagery abilities would
distinguish elite from non-elite performers.
Attentional strategies Nietfield (2003) Survey Indicated that the runners relied mostly on monitoring and
information management strategy (i.e., strategy thoughts during
running) regulatory cognitions.
Meta-imagery Weinberg et al. (2003) Survey Athletes were surveyed, not just on their use of imagery, but on
their perceived effectiveness of imagery for distinct functions.
Meta-imagery MacIntyre and Moran (2007a) Qualitative Relative to non-athletes (Denis and Carfantan, 1985), the participants
demonstrated an intricate understanding of imagery processes
including the use of imagery of realistic behaviors as opposed to
ideal performance imagery.
Meta-imagery MacIntyre and Moran (2007b) Qualitative Evidence from elite performers suggested that they possessed
sophisticated meta-imagery control skills – being able, for instance,
to restructure negative imagery so that it facilitates future
performance.
Psychological skills training Foster and Weigand (2008) Conceptual Psychological skills in sport (e.g., imagery, goal setting) can be
applied more efficiently, particularly in developmental contexts, by
applying metacognitive models to understand the role of
self-monitoring and self-regulation in the application of the above
strategies.
Meta-imagery MacIntyre and Moran (2010) Conceptual A model of meta-imagery was proposed with a specific emphasis on
expertise effects.
Attention and choking behavior DeCaro et al. (2011) Experimental Skill failure was linked to the extent to which skill execution depends
on explicit attentional control. Increased metacognitive awareness
may cause performers to evaluate their performance diverting
attention away from skill execution.
Meta-imagery Pearson et al. (2011) Experimental Findings support the role of meta-cognitive knowledge of imagery
ability and relate it to our ability to judge individual episodes of
imagery.
Attention and ironic processes Toner et al. (2013) Experimental Over-compensatory behavior was more prevalent amongst
low-skilled than high-skilled golfers and they concluded that future
research explore metacognition.
Attentional strategies Brick et al. (2014) Conceptual The authors in developing a tentative framework for attentional focus
in endurance activity, highlighted the potential benefits of applying a
metacognitive approach in future studies.
THE ROLE OF METACOGNITIVE INFERENCES
The Coliseum, Los Angeles, XXIII Olympic Games, August 8th
1984. A strong wind was swirling around the stadium in the
afternoon as Carl Lewis’s was preparing for his long jump (50
stunning Olympic moments No. 44: Carl Lewis’s four golds in
1984, 2012). ABC network commentators were referring to Carl
Lewis’ adjustments: “He has to block that out and has to only think
about heading down the runway and getting off as long a jump as
possible.” The other reporter then stated: “He has got a bit of a
headwind. I think that’s what he was waiting for. . . to decide what
he is going to do with his step with regard to this wind.” Carl Lewis
ran down the runway and leapt into the history books with a jump
that at that stage was 50 cm greater than his rivals. Nevertheless,
the commentators stated that it“looked like a very restrained effort
to me, the last four or five strides. . . he really looked like he was
sort of in that same stride that he was running in the last 50 m of
the 200 this morning [200 m heats]” (Corry, 1984).
After fouling his next jump, Lewis decided not to take his four
other allotted jumps and many of the crowd responded by booing
despite the margin of victory ultimately being 30 cm (Corry, 1984).
Many of the spectators plausibly wanted him to break Bob Bea-
mon’s longstanding world record. However, Lewis’ rationale was
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that he had other goals to achieve (e.g., to equal Jesse Owens four
track and field gold medals in 1936) and he still had his additional
rounds to run in the 200 and 100 m relay. Given that Carl Lewis
won four gold medals, just as Jessie Owens had, we can conclude
that his strategies were successful. Both, the execution of the final
jump, in addition to his decision to rest, indicate metacognitive
inferences in addition to his athletic expertise.
When individuals perform skills in the sporting context the
social situation provides many pieces of information. For exam-
ple, when Carl Lewis is about to perform a long jump, he may
remember his coach’s words about his holding back on his speed
both to hit the board accurately and to preserve energy. As he
looks down the runway and notices that it is somewhat slippery,
and is unsure whether his left foot will begin to ache again, just
as it did 30 years ago he is metacognitively engaged. There may
be even much more metacognitive activity occurring than the
aforementioned examples may suggest. The cognitive system is
challenged with the amount of information that is accessible at a
given time and the implications that these pieces of information
may have for the execution of skill need to be considered. For
optimum adjustments, people need to be attuned to thoughts and
feelings about the self and the requirements of the social situa-
tion. Yet, given that most social situations provide a tremendous
amount of information, people need to be able to focus, that is,
they need to be selective. So, when it comes to particular tasks
such as a long jump, people need to select “what is relevant” and
ignore “what is not relevant” for the task at hand. How does this
work?
A model of metacognition
Bless et al. (2009) proposed a model of metacognition that focuses
on different information types. Specifically, cognitively accessi-
ble declarative knowledge (i.e., knowledge about something) and
feelings (e.g., how people feel about an action) and memories
(e.g., whether they can remember a coach’s instruction) serve
as information about the situation and the target in question.
This has particular resonance when people are uncertain about
the judgmental target or when affective states are not in line with
implications of the situation, then metacognitive processes are
more likely to come into play (e.g., Martin et al., 1993; Bless et al.,
2009). Metacognitive inferences are governed by rules or theories
that decide whether the accessible information should be used and
how it should be used in the moment.
When an expert judges performance, this may access a rep-
resentation about the target behavior (e.g., a motor image). For
example, imagine Carl Lewis watching his 1984 long jumps at
the Olympic Games. A vast amount of information about long
jumps, such as Bob Beamon’s Leap of the Century at the Olympic
Games in Mexico City in 1968, and his own jump might be cog-
nitively accessible at the time. Which pieces of information are
relevant? People apply filtering rules, considering whether the
information is relevant and representative for the target behav-
ior (e.g., Martin, 1986; Bless et al., 2009). Information might
just as easily become accessible in a conversation and thus com-
prise declarative information. Declarative knowledge is defined
as “knowing that” (e.g., taping factual information) and contrasts
with procedural knowledge, or skill memory, which is explained
as “knowing how” (Sternberg and Sternberg, 2012). For exam-
ple, Carl Lewis might have a chat with Bob Beamon and Mike
Powell about his 1984 long jump performance. If information
becomes accessible as part of conversations, the person also needs
to ask him or herself whether the information is appropriate to be
used for a judgment or decision. Here conversational rules as out-
lined seem to guide decisions on relevance and informativeness of
communicated information (e.g., Schwarz, 1994; Igou and Bless,
2003, 2005, 2007; Bless et al., 2009). Furthermore, metacognitions
may relate to past or future affective states. These are thoughts
that include many different sources of information (e.g., Wil-
son and Gilbert, 2003; Igou, 2004, 2008) and assessments of the
past or forecasts of future affective states are likely to influence
one’s behavior (Kahneman and Snell, 1992). For example, a long
jumper may know that he has felt good being in competitions
and thus decides to take part in one that is coming up in 2 weeks
time.
Another important type of information and likely source of
metacognitive processes are people’s feelings at the time of judg-
ments or behavior. For example, a long jumper’s mood, emotion,
or the ease with which information comes to mind, may influ-
ence the execution of the long jump. Importantly, these feelings
have informational value (e.g., Schwarz, 2002) for the judgment
or behavior at hand. Usually, affective feelings are distinguished
from cognitive feelings (Bless et al., 2009). Moods and emotions
are considered affective feelings, and they can inform us about
the situation and the target (e.g., Schwarz, 1990). For example,
according to Schwarz and Clore (1983), when asked to judge a
target (e.g., life in general), people ask themselves “How do I feel
about it?” which leads to positive evaluations when people are in
a positive mood, and to negative evaluation when they are in a
negative mood (e.g., Forgas, 2001).
The feeling of knowing (e.g., Koriat, 1993), ease of retrieval
(e.g., Schwarz et al., 1991), familiarity (e.g., Jacoby et al., 1989),
and processing fluency (e.g., Reber et al., 1998) are examples of
cognitive feelings (e.g., Bless et al., 2009; Huntsinger and Clore,
2011). In a nutshell, these are all experiences that accompany cog-
nitive processes and interact with these processes by serving as
information about judgmental targets. For example, according to
the ease of retrieval heuristic (Schwarz et al., 1991), if it is easy to
think of having performed long jumps, then one would be likely
to evaluate one’s jumping capacity more favorably, than if it was
difficult to retrieve such examples.
Memories have direct effects on how cognitive representations
are formed. However, congruent with Strack and Bless (1994)
and Bless et al. (2009), we argue that people also use theories
about the functioning of memory as an indicator as to whether
accessible information is valid and relevant for a judgment at
hand. For example, Carl Lewis may not remember that the coach
warned him to run within himself for the long jump run-up. Pos-
sibly, Carl would reason that he would remember that because
it would have been very untypical for his coach to hold this
opinion.
Our conceptualization of metacognition is in line with a broad
definition of the construct, namely that metacognition is cognition
about both thoughts and feelings. However, the narrower defini-
tion of metacognition as control process (e.g., Shea et al., 2014) is
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also just as valid. The latter refers to processes in which attention
and cognitive control are essential in structuring peoples’ thoughts
and actions. As Shea et al. (2014) describe in detail, these types of
thoughts are associated with cognitive effort and limited capac-
ity (cognitive system 2) rather than automatic, effortless processes
(cognitive system 1; Stanovich, 2011).
Generally, monitoring and excluding accessible items of infor-
mation requires cognitive resources. As a result, reduction in
cognitive capacity increases the likelihood that relatively irrele-
vant information is used for the judgment task at hand (Bless
et al., 2009). To be clear, we do not think that metacognitions
always need awareness and controlled thought processes; however,
we believe that metacognitive inferences are especially influential
when people need to engage in this type of reflective behavior
in order make a judgment or decision. This is especially the case
when situations are ambiguous and complex, when more or less
automatic processes fail, or when accessible information is con-
flicting, contradictory, or perceived as inappropriate for the task
at hand.
PST AND METACOGNITION: THE CASE FOR DOMAIN-GENERAL SKILLS
Interestingly, the ability of Carl Lewis to combine excellence in
both track (e.g., 100, 200 m sprints and relay) and field events
(e.g., long jump) supports the domain-specificity of expertise. To
explain, long jump performance is determined largely by the ath-
lete’s ability to attain a fast horizontal speed at the end of the
approach runway, thus the physiological task demands were com-
patible (Bridgett and Linthorne, 2006). However, it is also likely
that what are termed “domain-general skills” including psycho-
logical skills and metacognition may have played a role in his nine
Olympic gold medal winning performances.
As noted earlier (see Table 1), Foster and Weigand (2008) high-
lighted that some theoretical inadequacies in sport psychology
could be reconciled by considering other conceptual frameworks,
including meta-cognitive approaches (Flavell, 1979). For exam-
ple, by augmenting our understanding of psychological skills in
sport with the construct of metacognition, we could more clearly
understand the role of self-monitoring and self-regulation in the
application of the aforementioned strategies.
Moran (1996) suggested that PST in sport is essentially an exer-
cise in meta-cognitive instruction. Thus, in order to help athletes
become independent thinkers, we need to know what they know
and believe about how their own minds work. In this regard, meta-
cognitive control processes are especially valuable because they
allow people to change their behavior strategically in accordance
with task demands. Eccles and Feltovich (2008) proposed that
accelerated learning and enhanced performance, and ultimately
expertise, may be the result of a combination of psychological
support skills (e.g., self-talk, goal-setting, relaxation, and mental
practice) and metacognitive abilities. They are domain-general in
that they “can be applied to a variety of novel tasks and domains”
(Eccles and Feltovich, 2008, p. 43). Meta-cognitive skills in this
case are higher order skills that regulate learning and performance,
including the coordination of the use of psychological support
skills (i.e., PST).
Within sport psychology, psychological skills have been shown
to differentiate successful Olympians from their less successful
counterparts (Orlick and Partington, 1988; Gould et al., 2002;
Fletcher and Sarkar, 2012). The coordinating role of metacogni-
tion may be a key factor in the efficient use of psychological skills.
Furthermore, emotional regulation is trainable and sustainable by
the application of PST and this has applications beyond the realm
of sport (Eccles et al., 2011). Two other aspects of psychological
skills that are indeed trainable are now discussed, meta-imagery
and routines.
Is meta-imagery linked to expertise?
One dimension of metacognition that has been illuminated by
recent research activity is “meta-imagery,” a performer “beliefs
about the nature and regulation of their own imagery skills”
(Moran, 2002, p. 415). In 2002, little was known about this
topic relative to the knowledge base on other aspects of imagery,
such as motor imagery. Over the preceding years research in
the expertise literature emerged to suggest that meta-imagery is
another factor that differentiates novices from experts (Moran
et al., 2012). Researchers had explored the topic by asking athletes
to indicate why, where, how, what, and when they use men-
tal imagery processes (e.g., Munroe et al., 2000; MacIntyre and
Moran, 2007a,b). Athletes’ responses from both interviews and
surveys demonstrated a comprehensive knowledge of the multi-
modal potential of imagery, showed they employed imagery in
creative ways for contingency planning (see Moran, 2009) and
were also aware of robust imagery effects (e.g., mental prac-
tice). Interestingly, a meta-analysis conducted in 1994, indicated
a possible constraint on the efficacy of mental practice for novice
learners (i.e., experts improved more). Driskell et al. (1994) sug-
gested that novices may not have an appropriate approximation
of the motor skill or that their imagery abilities may be insuffi-
cient to generate and manipulate the requisite visuo-spatial motor
configuration. An alternative possibility is that experts may sim-
ply possess greater meta-cognitive knowledge of how to employ
imagery effectively for skill improvement as compared to novices
(MacIntyre et al., 2013). In fact, a model of meta-imagery was
developed to account for the above findings and this also gener-
ates possibilities of developing a test of meta-imagery (MacIntyre
and Moran, 2010).
Furthermore, contemporary evidence from cognitive psychol-
ogy supports the role of meta-cognitive knowledge of imagery
ability and relates it to our ability to judge individual episodes of
imagery (Pearson et al., 2011). The voluntary nature of imagery
and the role of conscious awareness during imagery tasks make
it amenable to introspection, ironically the method that was cen-
tral to the demise of the scientific study of imagery, a century ago
(Roeckelein, 2004).
Is winning just a matter of routine?
Pre-performance routines are integral to performance excellence
in many self-paced sporting skills, from sprint running to penalty
taking in field games (Singer, 2000, 2002; Jackson and Baker, 2001).
Defined by Moran (1996, p. 177) as “a sequence of task-relevant
thoughts and actions which an athlete engages in systematically
prior to his or her performance of a specific sports skill.” The
widespread use of routines in sport demonstrates that attention is
central to cognitive sport psychology because the ability to exert
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mental effort effectively is vital for optimal athletic performance
(Moran, 2009). One function of routines is to regulate arousal
prior to skill execution and evidence for their role in buffering
stress or choking has also emerged (Mesagno and Mullane-Grant,
2010). While routines have been explored across a range of sports,
perhaps, the sport of golf has received the most attention from
researchers (e.g., McCann et al., 2001; Cotterill et al., 2010). Inter-
estingly, three time major winner golfer Padraig Harrington is
quoted as saying “my key isn’t working at the moment so we
have to figure out a way. . . I have gone a bit stale focusing
on the target.” What is instructive about this statement is that
the golfer appears to realize that his routine is no longer func-
tioning appropriately. Routines need to be revised regularly to
avoid the routine itself becoming too automatic (Moran, 1996).
From a metacognitive perspective, this may be accounted for by
metacognitive monitoring. Thus metacognition may be funda-
mental to the refinement of pre-performance routines as well
as their acquisition. A recent review noted that “at a funda-
mental level it is still not clear what function routines fulfill,
what they should consist of or the most effective way to teach
them” (Cotterill, 2010, p. 132). The potential for metacogniton
research to shed light on the development and refinement of
routines as well as their theoretical and conceptual basis is readily
apparent.
NEW AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
In the preceding paragraphs, arguments for the potential for the
construct of metacognition to clarify our understanding of exper-
tise have been made. Now we wish to specify research topics
augmented by appropriate methodologies and possible tasks (see
Table 2).
Measurement
One of the key challenges in the operationalization of any con-
struct is the development of appropriate measurement tools. At
present, there is a paucity of questionnaires to assess metacog-
nitive abilities. One such measure is the 52-item Metacognitive
Awareness Inventory (Schraw and Dennison, 1994) which employs
a two factor model (knowledge of cognition; regulation of cog-
nition). Currently, there is a need to develop and validate revised
psychometric instruments to assess, for example, meta-imagery
beliefs and knowledge. Further questionnaires for meta-attention
Table 2 | Proposed research topics, methods, and objectives of future studies to study expertise and metacognition in sport settings.
Research topic Methods Objectives
Measurement Psychometric and
experimental approach
To engage in conceptual analysis of the construct of metacognition (and related constructs).
To investigate, using dual-task methods, the distinct cognitive processes underlying metacognition (e.g.,
interference with aspects of working memory).
To create psychometrically valid measures of metacognition and action processes (e.g., meta-imagery).
Motor cognition Action simulation and
converging methods
To generate specific hypotheses to empirically test if metacognition is a domain-general skill across
different motor simulation processes.
To use paradigms from motor cognition (e.g., mental travel studies) to evaluate metacognitive monitoring
ability.
Anxiety Experimental and field
study approach
To investigate stereotype threat and the interaction with metacognitive processes in both well-learned
and novel skills.
To examine how current affect and anticipated affective responses to performance influence action in
sports via meta-cognitive thoughts.
To examine how metacognitive training can influence skilled performance and athletes’ susceptibility to
overcompensation of attention.
Neuroscience Neural imaging To investigate the neural substrates of the existing models of cognitive control that relate to
metacognition processes.
To specify the neural architecture underlying metacognitive abilities.
To elucidate whether metacognition is linked to a global mechanism or if distributed neural substrates
underlie different components of metacognition.
Developmental Mixed-methods To assess the role of cognitive development in the acquisition of meta-cognitive skills.
To explore the potential of interventions to enhance metacognitive abilities among those who experience
deficits in, for example, their judgments of learning.
To understand the interaction between metacognitive abilities and motor skill acquisition across the
lifespan (e.g., how the elderly can cope using metacognitive skills to supplement diminishing working
memory).
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or social metacognition (for team sports) could also be piloted,
refined and analyzed using factor analysis. Parallel with the objec-
tive would be the refinement of the construct of metacognition
as it relates to both expertises. Tarricone (2011) had conducted
a comprehensive “taxonomy of metacognition” which is primar-
ily focused upon on the wide-scale research in the educational
research domain. A similar task would be beneficial for metacog-
nition within the context of expertise and the models discussed
in this review (e.g., Bless et al., 2009). The approach of Fleming
and Lau (2014, p. 1) who distinguish between “metacognitive bias
(a difference in subjective confidence despite basic task perfor-
mance remaining constant), metacognitive sensitivity (how good
one is at distinguishing between one’s own correct and incor-
rect judgments) and metacognitive efficiency (a subject’s level
of metacognitive sensitivity given a certain level of task perfor-
mance)”raises interesting questions for the study of metacognition
and conscious awareness. Their approach, focusing on percep-
tual expertise, includes elements which have a direct relevance
to expert performance. For instance, they suggest that “metacog-
nitive confidence” can be interpreted as a probability judgment
directed toward one’s own decisions-the probability of a previous
judgment being correct. This is synonymous with expertise (i.e.,
ability to predict actions). It is our view that the exploration of the
construct of metacognition and how they interface with action
related processes (e.g., motor imagery), we can contribute to the
conceptual development of the construct of metacognition. The
divergent approaches to date necessitate a degree of conceptual
analysis, a process that is all too rare in psychology (Machado and
Silva, 2007).
Motor cognition
Recent conceptualizations of imagery, action observation and
motor execution, view these processes as overlapping, differing
by degree rather than kind (Jeannerod, 1994, 2006; Vogt et al.,
2013). The preceding section on meta-imagery is illustrative of
the progress that can be made in our understanding of exper-
tise, metacognition and imagery, alike. Given the overlap between
for example, imagery (e.g., visualizing a long jump-the run-up,
take-off, and landing phases) and action observation (e.g., view-
ing Bob Beamons’ world record long jump), a question arises as to
whether the same metacognitive processes underlie these related
processes. This issue is further complicated by evidence from sev-
eral sources which suggests motor imagery is grounded in physical
experience, for example, the specific training either simulated or
executed (Olson and Nyberg, 2011; Debarnot et al., 2014). The
question remains as to whether the respective metacognitive pro-
cesses are domain-general or domain-specific? As a result, deeper
conceptual analysis is required to comprehensively describe and
explain the range of metacognitive processes that pertain to cog-
nitive simulation strategies. This new dimension to metacognition
research offers a range of experimental possibilities that can enable
a greater understanding of metacognition with regard to action
preparation, simulation, and execution.
Anxiety
Research on “choking” in sport has illuminated our understand-
ing of anxiety across both cognitive skills (e.g., Lyons and Beilock,
2012) and motor skill contexts (e.g., Beilock and Carr, 2001;
Beilock and Gonso, 2008; DeCaro et al., 2011; Toner and Moran,
2011; Toner et al., 2013). The “explicit monitoring hypothesis”
suggests that attending to a well learned skill may lead to failure
in the precise execution of the skill under pressure. Metacogni-
tive abilities obviously have a role in regulation emotion, based on
the aforementioned model by Bless et al. (2009). Furthermore,
the role of “stereotype threat” which occurs when “knowledge
of a negative stereotype about a social group leads to a les-
than-optimal performance by members of that group” should
be investigated from a metacognitive perspective (Beilock and
McConnell, 2004). Previous investigations supported the con-
tention that stereotype threat prompts attention to the executed
action and thus can disrupt performance (Beilock et al., 2003).
However, this effect can be alleviated by the inclusion of a sec-
ondary task. Findings across two studies conducted by Beilock
et al. (2003) were inconsistent and the impact of stereotype threat
may be more telling across a tournament than a putting skill
as it may interfere with the metacognitive processes that help
modulate attention and regulate emotion. Another avenue is to
systematically examine how current affect and anticipated affective
responses to performance influence action in sports via meta-
cognitive thoughts. This is based on the recent literature on
affect regulation (e.g., Baumeister et al., 2007; Loewenstein, 2011)
Moreover, it would be interesting to investigate how training
in metacognition can influence skilled performance and ath-
letes’ susceptibility to overcompensation of attention and affect
regulation.
Neuroscience
The rise of neuroscience in recent decades has been based largely
upon advances in methodologies that facilitate the study of inter-
nal mental experiences, such as metacognition, in a robust and
scientific way. Cognitive neuroscience, in particular, has had a
dramatic effect on our understanding of individual domains of
cognition from vision to memory (Beran et al., 2012), in chess
(Bilalic et al., 2010, 2012; Bartlett et al., 2013) and more recently
in sport (Debarnot et al., 2014). As we have seen throughout the
current paper sport and athletic skills offer a dynamic and fascinat-
ing arena to study and explore cognitive processes, metacognitive
processes, and experiences.
Regarding expertise, we saw that in order to engage in effec-
tive training episodes for long periods of time, athletes must be
highly self-disciplined and self-regulated (Crews et al., 2001). This
notion of self-regulation, defined as a set of cognitive, behavioral,
and motivational processes that interact to influence performance
(Kitsantas and Kavussanu, 2011) has been the go-to approach
for examining expertise differences in performance domains.
This approach has been concerned with self-regulatory processes
(imagery, attentional control, for example) and researchers typi-
cally attempted to make confidence judgments about the efficacy
of some aspect of their cognition. Neuroscience has enabled
researchers to move beyond the study of processes and focus on
metacognitive judgments instead (a case in point being; the feel-
ing of inaccessibility otherwise known as the tip of the tongue
phenomena). This temporary failure of retrieval for a memory
highlights a problem with a particular cognitive process but not
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a problem with one’s metacognitive judgment. What tip of the
tongue research has shown us is that different underlying pro-
cesses are responsible for the cognition and metacognition that
monitors it (Schwartz and Diaz, 2014). Metacognitive experiences
arise from cognitive processes and correspond to particular behav-
iors. The cognitive processes that produced the behavior are not
the same as the processes that gave rise to the metacognition.
For example, an object is recognized as having been seen before
(cognitive process) accompanied by an experience of confidence,
and the person then says that they know the answer (behavior).
Essentially, there are a set of cognitive processes driving the recall
of information but another set of processes driving our aware-
ness of it. “Thus understanding any metacognitive judgment must
involve understanding the cognition it measures and the multiple
processes that contribute to the judgment” (Schwartz and Diaz,
2014, p. 9). Attempts at componential analysis of metacognition
are in their infancy (Fleming and Lau, 2014; Garrison, 2014), but
they appear to be fruitful with regard to understanding its impact
upon visual perceptual tasks. Nevertheless, the investigation of the
neural basis of metacognition (Baird et al., 2013) is not without
its limitations. It has been noted that the application of neu-
rophysiological measurement techniques impose restrictions on
the ecological validity of studies which are not readily overcome
(Mann et al., 2013).
Developmental
Currently, a gap exists in our knowledge of how performers
acquire pre-performance routines (Singer, 2000, 2002; Cotter-
ill, 2010). Unfortunately, researchers have neglected to explore
how these strategies are developed over time with one recent
notable exception, a study with gymnastics athletes (Faggiani et al.,
2012). The role of cognitive development in the acquisition of
meta-cognitive skills may be a limiting factor for applied sport
psychology interventions (Foster and Weigand, 2008). Thus the
gap in the knowledge base may be due to the complex inter-
action of domain-general and domain-specific cognitive skills.
Given that our approach has centered on the role of metacog-
nitive abilities and processes, we propose that a developmental
approach to understanding pre-performance routines could be
augmented by exploring metacognitive skill development from a
longitudinal perspective. The potential of specific interventions
to enhance metacognitive ability could be explored for those who
are impaired in their metacognitive development or for those who
suffer plateaus in their skill development. For example, recent
research has demonstrated the ability of a 2-week meditation pro-
gram in enhancing metacognitive ability in a perceptual task (Baird
et al., 2014).
CONCLUSION
Do metacognitive processes enhance performance? Are they help-
ful in the acquisition of expertise? The general answer to these
questions is in the affirmative. Metacognitive processes are part of
the inventory of human thought (Nelson and Narens, 1994; Stern-
berg, 2001; Perfect and Schwartz, 2002). As such, they serve as a
resource to structure thought and regulate behavior. Will metacog-
nitive processes always lead to better outcomes? No, certainly
not. As for all areas of information processing, people can err.
However, understanding the role of metacognition, the breadth
and flexibility of processes involved and how they are associated
with expertise, allows for more precise predictions of behavior.
We argue that more research and empirical scrutiny of the con-
struct of metacognition can help to develop principles that govern
the relation between internal cognitive processes and subjective
experience. These principles could be very effective for expertise
research looking to differentiate a “real” expert from a “skilled”
performer, currently a major challenge in expertise research (e.g.,
MacIntyre et al., 2013; Bourne et al., 2014).
In the sporting domain, training athletes to initiate, develop
and engage in metacognition can equip them with the proper
strategies, beliefs, and self-understanding to excel in sports.
Currently, there is no unified view as to what athletic train-
ing entails and coaches, despite a burgeoning literature (Healy
et al., 2014) have, for example, focused on a relatively nar-
row set of conclusions from the deliberate practice literature
(Baker and Young, 2014). Metacognition offers the potential to
expand our understanding of expertise and individual domains
of cognition through a rigorous examination of the mecha-
nisms underlying self-initiated monitoring and control of ones
own performance. Consequently, our understanding of expertise
can be illuminated by studying metacognition in the sporting,
domain, specifically, by using a strength-based approach with
expert samples (MacIntyre et al., 2013). Sport offers researchers
a fertile natural laboratory where expertise is easily quantifiable
through the quest to be faster, higher and stronger. In conclu-
sion, we have demonstrated that the construct of metacognition
has the potential to be a springboard for research into sporting
expertise.
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A key postulate of traditional theories of motor skill-learning (e.g., Fitts and Posner, 1967;
Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977) is that expert performance is largely automatic in nature and
tends to deteriorate when the performer “reinvests” in, or attempts to exert conscious
control over, proceduralized movements (Masters and Maxwell, 2008). This postulate
is challenged, however, by recent empirical evidence (e.g., Nyberg, in press; Geeves
et al., 2014) which shows that conscious cognitive activity plays a key role in facilitating
further improvement amongst expert sports performers and musicians – people who
have already achieved elite status (Toner and Moran, in press). This evidence suggests
that expert performers in motor domains (e.g., sport, music) can strategically deploy
conscious attention to alternate between different modes of bodily awareness (reflective
and pre-reflective) during performance. Extrapolating from this phenomenon, the current
paper considers how a novel theoretical approach (adapted from Sutton et al., 2011) could
help researchers to elucidate some of the cognitive mechanisms mediating continuous
improvement amongst expert performers.
Keywords: expertise, continuous improvement, attention, embodiment, bodily awareness
Many traditional and contemporary theories of motor learning
emphasize the apparently “spontaneous” nature of skilled perfor-
mance. For example, Fitts and Posner (1967) and Shiffrin and
Schneider (1977) argued that skilful action runs “automatically”
or “procedurally.” Similarly, Dreyfus (2002) claimed that expert
performance proceeds “without calculating and comparing alter-
natives . . . what must be done, simply is done” (p. 372). Common
to these accounts of expertise is the belief that any form of con-
scious involvement during on-line skill execution is likely to prove
deleterious to movement and performance proficiency (Beilock
et al., 2002). Challenging these dominant perspectives on skill-
learning, however, is an emerging body of theory (e.g., Breivik,
2013; Toner and Moran, in press; Winter et al., 2014) and empiri-
cal evidence (see Nyberg, in press) which suggests that“continuous
improvement” (i.e., the phenomenon whereby certain skilled per-
formers appear to be capable of increasing their proficiency even
though they are already experts) at the elite level of sport is heavily
reliant upon the performer’s ability to move efficiently between
reflective and unreflective modes of bodily awareness. For exam-
ple, experts are often required to pay conscious attention to, or
“reinvest” in the training context, when their movements become
“attenuated” (see Collins et al., 1999) because they believe that in
order to optimize their performance they must “experiment with
and research their moving body” (Ravn and Christensen, in press).
Interestingly, evidence suggests that many skilled performers
remain “somaesthetically” aware (i.e., focusing on the propriocep-
tive “feel”, Shusterman, 2008) of their movement during on-line
skill execution (in the performance context; see Nyberg, in press)
and can use global or holistic cue words to improve performance
proficiency under pressurized conditions (see Mullen and Hardy,
2010). Therefore, instead of relying wholly on unthinking spon-
taneity to guide their performance, elite athletes appear to alternate
between different modes of cognitive processing, and also between
types of bodily self-awareness (i.e., reflective and pre-reflective)
in practice and performance contexts. Here athletes might adopt
what Colombetti (2011) refers to as a reflective awareness of their
bodily selves when they consider their intentions or actions and
assess whether they are appropriate to a certain situation. By con-
trast, pre-reflective awareness occurs when we are immersed in an
activity but our attention is not on our bodily selves. However,
in the latter case, Colombetti (2011) argues that the body is not
entirely invisible or absent from experience as it remains “as a
source of feeling, affect, agency and expressivity” (p. 27).
In a recent paper (see Toner and Moran, in press), we argued
that self-focused attention (including reflective bodily awareness)
plays an important role in allowing skilled athletes to refine inef-
ficient movements during deliberate practice. The present paper
extends this argument by postulating that skilled performers are
capable of strategically allocating attention, and hence alternat-
ing between reflective and pre-reflective modes of awareness, in
order to meet the requirements of dynamically unfolding and con-
textually contingent performance environments. Furthermore, we
argue that influential theoretical accounts (such as self-focus theo-
ries; e.g., Beilock and Carr, 2001) used by researchers to identify the
cognitive mechanisms underpinning performance at the expert
level may be unable to adequately capture or explain the dynamical
(i.e., that it may be freely allocated) nature of attentional process-
ing amongst elite performers. Arising from these arguments, we
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propose that Sutton et al.’s (2011) “Applying intelligence to the
reflexes” (AIR) approach, and a number of methodologies which
aim to uncover participants’ phenomenological descriptions of
training and performance, may be better suited in achieving this
latter aim.
Over the last decade or so, experimental psychologists have used
standardized laboratory tasks in order to identify the attentional
processes that govern skilled movement and performance in sport
(e.g., Beilock and Carr, 2001; Jackson et al., 2006). For example,
Beilock et al. (2002) found that when skilled golfers attended to a
specific aspect of their putting technique (e.g., the exact moment
that the clubhead finished its follow-through), their performance
was impaired relative to counterparts in a dual-task condition
who putted while performing a secondary task (an auditory tone-
monitoring activity). Further evidence for the detrimental effects
of skill-focused attention on skilled performance have been found
in a baseball batting task (Gray, 2004); in soccer dribbling (Ford
et al., 2005); and in a golf putting task (Mullen and Hardy, 2000).
According to self-focus theories of attention (including Beilock
and Carr, 2001, “explicit monitoring hypothesis” and Masters,
1992, “conscious processing hypothesis”) attending to the step-
by-step component processes of a proceduralized skill results
in its control structures being broken down into a sequence of
smaller, separate, independent units. Ultimately, this creates the
opportunity for error that was not present in the “chunked” con-
trol structure (Beilock et al., 2002). Accordingly, performers have
been advised to avoid focusing on their bodily movement and,
instead, to “shift the focus to the external world, in particular on
the impact or effect of one’s behaviors” (Weiss and Reber, 2012,
p. 174).
At first glance, it would seem that the case is quite clear – any
form of conscious processing that directs the performer’s atten-
tion to their bodily movement is likely to disrupt fluent skill
execution. However, a closer look at the laboratory-based evi-
dence base would suggest that its findings must be interpreted
with caution. To explain, in each of the aforementioned stud-
ies athletes were asked to focus on a feature of their movement
which they may never have previously focused on (and hence
never practiced doing so). Indeed, few studies have sought to cap-
ture athletes’ attentional processes over time (e.g., between the
“off-season” and competitive season) or across different situations
(e.g., when recovering from injury). Given the dearth of stud-
ies in psychology on the temporal and/or contextual dynamics of
attentional processes, we question the degree to which available
evidence supports the received wisdom that conscious attention
will inevitably disrupt skilful performance. In fact, recent research
has begun to cast doubt upon the validity of this latter assumption.
For example, Nyberg (in press) found that elite freeskiers attended
to on-line skill execution in order to identify any features of their
movement which might require alteration/adjustment in order to
maintain performance proficiency. In addition, a large volume of
evidence indicates that elite performers are capable of flexibly allo-
cating their attention (i.e., moving from reflective to pre-reflective
modes of bodily awareness) dependent upon the context-specific
demands confronting them during training and competitive per-
formance (see Bernier et al., 2011) or the challenges (e.g., injuries,
slumps) that they will inevitably face at some stage during their
careers (see Collins et al., 1999). In stark contrast to self-focus the-
ories, these emergent findings suggest that skilled performance is
likely to be impeded if the “proceduralization” of skills is excessive
(see Ericsson, 2006) – because experts must be able to deliber-
ately access and strategically re-route any semi-automated routines
in order to facilitate “continuous improvement” (Montero, 2010;
Breivik, 2013).
Against this background, we argue that there is ample empir-
ical evidence that “continuous improvement” at the elite level is
heavily dependent upon the performer’s ability to effectively uti-
lize reflective modes of bodily awareness. Skill-focused attention
(including conscious bodily awareness) appears to be a key feature
of skilled performance because athletes operating at this level are
driven by the desire to learn “new and better techniques” (Breivik,
2007, p. 127). For example, despite having won eight medals
at the Beijing Olympics, Michael Phelps decided to change his
freestyle technique in a bid to increase his sprinting speed (Ander-
sson, 2009). Moreover, athletes will inevitably experience injury,
fatigue, growth and aging which may disrupt habitual movement
(see Bissell, 2013; Eden, 2013) and require them to correct, relearn
and adjust their spontaneous performance (Shusterman, 2008).
In fact, research on the topic of “skill recovery” or “skill refine-
ment” shows that skilled athletes who are attempting to regain
prior levels of performance often deliberately reinvest conscious
control to restore or refine habitual movements in sports such
as javelin throwing and swimming (Hanin et al., 2004). In these
studies, researchers have helped athletes regain or refine disrupted
movement patterns by encouraging them to become more con-
sciously aware of the somaesthetic differences between current
(problematic) and desired actions.
Somaesthetic awareness appears to play an important role in
“continuous improvement” by allowing performers to identify
movements that are causing them discomfort or outcomes which
are unusual or undesirable. Indeed, evidence suggests that these
forms of self- awareness are important mediators of “flow” or
optimal competitive performance in sport. On the basis of their
pioneering research on flow in sport, Jackson and Csikszentmi-
halyi (1999) argued that “without self-awareness an athlete misses
important cues that can lead to a positive change in performance”
(p. 105). According to these authors, self-awareness simply means
paying attention to cues provided by movements, and making
adjustments to your actions when something is amiss. Athletes
may use reflective bodily awareness to identify “attenuated” habits
in the performance context and subsequently adjust problematic
movements in the training context. However, evidence suggests
that performers may also choose to adjust problematic move-
ments during on-line execution during competition. To illustrate,
Collins et al. (2001) found that elite weightlifters chose to con-
sciously modify their movement during competition in order to
maintain movement proficiency. Similarly, Nyberg found that elite
freeskiers learn how to discern (i.e., through “focal awareness”)
their rotational velocity to such an extent that they “know whether
they will be able to perform the trick the way it was intended
without adjustments, or whether they will need to make adjust-
ments during the flight phase” (p. 7). In this study, elite free skiers
were video recorded during practice and subsequently interviewed
using a technique known as stimulated recall (SR – a method for
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enhancing reflection by recalling situations through audiotapes
or video recordings). Nyberg suggests that these performers rely
on their focal awareness (which is conscious and might include
knowledge of their velocity and how they need to modify it) and
their subsidiary awareness which is “less conscious” and includes
knowledge of the “particulars” such as the friction of the snow and
their feelings of previous jumps. These elite performers were found
to navigate their focal awareness by rapidly shifting its target even
in the midst of the activity itself. For one performer, this meant
that he was focally and embodiedly aware of his rotational velocity
while in the air but could quickly change his awareness to take into
account environmental conditions such as his position in relation
to the targeted landing area. Clearly, these findings suggest that
some performers seek to counteract automaticity by ensuring that
certain features of performance are subject to strategic control.
Although some performers may choose to reinvest conscious
attention by adjusting movement in the performance context, oth-
ers may choose to use cue words as “instructional nudges” (i.e.,
explicit verbal phrases or maxims: see Sudnow, 2001; Sutton, 2007)
in order to“re-route”embodied routines. According to Sutton et al.
(2011) cues may allow the performer to build and access “flexible
links between knowing and doing” (p. 95). Cue words appear
to represent forms of thinking and remembering which can, in
some circumstances, allow performers to animate the kinesthetic
mechanisms of skilled performance. To illustrate, Jenkins (2007)
interviewed 113 European tour golfers and found that 70% of
these performers used at least one “swing thought” (i.e., a form of
cue word) during on-line skill execution. Clearly, certain forms of
mindedness or conscious processing are a common feature of elite
competitive performance.
The preceding evidence would suggest that a better understand-
ing of the cognitive processes mediating continuous improvement
at the elite level of skilled performance can be achieved only
by adopting a theoretical framework which can account for the
dynamic nature of attentional processing. Therefore, instead
of explanations (e.g., self-focus theories) that emphasize the
proceduralized nature of skilled performance, we may require the-
oretical accounts which focus on the interchanging phases or stages
of learning (Shusterman, 2008, 2009) that appear to characterize
training and performance at the elite level of sport. Consequently,
we propose that Sutton et al.’s (2011) AIR approach may help
researchers to explain how performers can alternate between dif-
ferent modes of processing. Briefly, Sutton et al.’s (2011) model
is cyclical in the sense that the maintenance and enhancement of
performance efficiency requires the“rapid switching of modes and
styles” (2011, p. 93) within the training and performance context.
This framework proposes that expert skill relies on a mindedness
that“facilitates the dynamic flexibility of attention, allowing it to be
allocated freely and in a way that best meets contingent contextual
demands” (Geeves et al., 2014, p. 676). Accordingly, Geeves et al.
(2014) argue that expert performers may determine the amount
of attention they need to pay to certain processes in the practice
context (depending on their current level of performance) and
during on-line performance (according to the situational demands
presented to them).
Additionally, we propose that the AIR model may help
researchers to interpret the accumulating body of empirical
evidence which suggests that skilled performers seek to avoid auto-
maticity by ensuring that performance remains open to strategic
control in both the practice and performance context. Sutton
et al. (2011) argued that there are a number of different ways in
which embodied coping is minded or mindful (varying across
individuals, task domains, and cultures) and recommend that
we search for forms of theorizing that highlight these differ-
ences by exploring what actually happens to performers as they
“direct attention to kinesthetic cues in increasingly skilful ways”
(p. 96). Given the preceding evidence documenting the mind-
ful nature of expertise, it would also seem important to identify
methodological approaches that will help researchers capture
the attentional switching mechanisms that appear to underpin
“continuous improvement” at the elite level of sport. Specifi-
cally, in order to understand embodied perspectives of experience
researchers may wish to adopt methodological approaches that are
“truly grounded in the carnal realities of the lived sporting bod-
ies” (Hockey and Allen-Collinson, 2007, p. 116). Some researchers
have recently taken up this challenge by drawing on participants’
phenomenological insights to better understand how embodied
expertise is shaped by training and performance. For example,
Ravn and Christensen (in press) utilized a phenomenology-related
analysis of qualitative data (including participant observations and
interviews) with an elite golfer to explore how the “described
experience comes into being rather than what this experience
means to the subject” (p. 5). The principal author observed
Line (an elite golfer), between 5 and 8 h each day, over 5 days
of training. The researchers drew on notes taken during these
observations to invite Line to describe her practice sessions and
experiences in detail. The researchers subsequently analyzed the
data by looking for “petite generalizations” (i.e., generalizations
that regularly occurred in the case study) relating to how Line
used her awareness of bodily sensations during training. Over-
all, the findings suggested that training at the elite level is not
just about handling the physicality of the body but also about
listening to it and regulating how it should “feel” in order to per-
form optimally (see Nyberg, in press, for a similar methodological
approach).
In another study, Bernier et al. (2011) used a naturalistic inves-
tigation to explore the attentional foci adopted by elite golfers in
training and performance contexts. The initial phase of the study
involved filming participants (for 60 min) in a training session
during the winter (non-competitive) season. The second phase
took place during the competitive season and involved filming
participants over the course of a complete round (i.e., 18 holes
of play) in a professional competition. Self-confrontation inter-
views, based on video footage, were conducted within 2 h of the
completion of the training session and competitive performance.
The interviews sought to encourage SR by asking each partici-
pant to view the videotape with the researcher and to recall and
describe what thoughts he was processing during the training ses-
sion or competition. Initially, the participants and the researcher
watched the first situations on the video recording (i.e., the first
training exercise and the first three holes of the competition).
Having discussed the attentional foci adopted during these situa-
tions, the participant was asked to indicate specific circumstances
that he considered relevant to analyse. These situations included
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specific exercises during the training sessions or great/poorly exe-
cuted strokes during competition. Each sequence involved an
action (e.g., a practice drill or a shot), the preparatory phase
(e.g., the pre-shot routine), and the step following this action
(e.g., walking to the next shot). Participants were urged to express
their thoughts during each sequence, rather than being asked to
explain “their solution for the task or to provide a summary of
the general strategy adopted” (Bernier et al., 2011, p. 331). Induc-
tive content analysis revealed that these elite golfers adapted their
attentional focus depending on the context. That is, golfers were
found to flexibly adjust their attentional focus (moving back-and-
forth between internal and external foci) across the preparatory,
execution and evaluative stages of training and competitive
performance.
In summary, a significant volume of evidence shows that
skilled performers’ foci of attention may change dramatically over
the course of a competitive season (e.g., to deal with “attenu-
ated” movement patterns) or during a competitive event (i.e.,
between preparation, execution, and evaluation). Unfortunately,
as most studies of attentional processes in psychology are lim-
ited to static snapshots of the phenomena of interest, they shed
little light on the dynamical nature of attention. Against this
background, the current paper has argued how Sutton et al.’s
(2011) AIR approach may provide researchers with a more detailed
understanding of the embodied nature of skilful action and
performance – thereby helping to explain how athletes strate-
gically allocate attentional resources in seeking to maintain and
enhance performance proficiency. In order to shed light on
the complex and dynamic attentional mechanisms that mediate
“continuous improvement” in expert performers researchers may
need to use a variety of methods including both standardized
laboratory techniques (e.g., occlusion paradigms, eye-tracking)
and phenomenological and naturalistic investigations (e.g., SR).
Together, these approaches may help researchers understand how
and why performers alternate between reflective and pre-reflective
modes of bodily awareness across training and performance
contexts.
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Expertise is characterized by fast decision-making which is highly adaptive to new
situations. Here we propose that athletes use a toolbox of heuristics which they develop
on their route to expertise. The development of heuristics occurs within the context of
the athletes’ natural abilities, past experiences, developed skills, and situational context,
but does not pertain to any of these factors separately. This is a novel approach because
it integrates separate factors into a comprehensive heuristic description. The novelty of
this approach lies within the integration of separate factors determining expertise into a
comprehensive heuristic description. It is our contention that talent identification methods
and talent development models should therefore be geared toward the assessment and
development of specific heuristics. Specifically, in addition to identifying and developing
separate natural abilities and skills as per usual, heuristics should be identified and
developed. The application of heuristics to talent and expertise models can bring the field
one step away from dichotomized models of nature and nurture toward a comprehensive
approach to the route to expertise.
Keywords: heuristics, expertise, sport, talent development, talent identification, cues
INTRODUCTION
Most current theories of expertise are based on the principle that
knowledge underlies performance (Ericsson et al., 2006). Specif-
ically, Ericsson et al. (2006) suggest that the specific knowledge
of experts arises through about 10.000 h of deliberate practice.
More research studies have also shown that previous knowl-
edge guides attention for accurate performance (e.g., Bilalić et al.,
2010). Drawing on the importance of knowledge for performance,
the heuristic approach focuses on how that knowledge can be
effectively searched and a how solution implemented.
Heuristics are rules of thumb that allow fast and frugal decision-
making. The concept of heuristics was introduced by Simon (1982)
to explain how humans decide when they have limited resources.
He proposed that behavior could only be understood through
analyzing both the person and the environment where the behav-
ior took place. The subsequent work of Gigerenzer et al. (1999)
identified and tested specific heuristics in a number of different
environments. For instance, they found the recognition heuristic
whereby people choose the option they recognize over the option
they do not recognize (Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1999). Recently,
the simple heuristics research program has been used in the context
of sport. Raab (2012) showed that athletes use simple heuristics
both to make decisions and to implement them in the sports envi-
ronment. What is still lacking, however, is an understanding of
how simple heuristics develop in the route to expertise.
HEURISTICS AS CHARACTERISTICS OF EXPERTISE AND TALENT
DEVELOPMENT
The topic of expertise has been gaining increased prominence
in science and the media because researchers, practitioners, and
laypeople wish to replicate the route to success in the most effi-
cient way. In sport, and especially in team sports, experts are
those with repeated top-level performance who can most effi-
ciently resolve the situation put before them. The route to that level
of expertise will no doubt have involved uncountable attempts
some successful but many unsuccessful. Here we will argue that
the developmental process is inherently non-optimal and non-
linear, but that this is indispensable to acquire the highest levels
of expertise. To say that athletes show optimal adaptation to var-
ious situations related to their sport does not equate to saying
that their actions or behaviors are optimal, but rather that these
are cost-effective actions or behaviors. This is especially the case
where performance involves fast decision-making. The best deci-
sion is not the optimal decision per se, but the one that can solve
the current situation well enough and fast enough (Simon, 1982;
Raab et al., 2009; Todd et al., 2012). It is important to qualify
what is meant by optimal performance so that efforts to iden-
tify and develop talented athletes are geared toward functional
(not optimal) decision-making. The route to expertise starts by
demonstrating a talent. Talent identification is the process of rec-
ognizing the potential of an athlete to excel in a particular sport.
Talent development, on the other hand, is the process by which
an athlete can realize that potential, which includes benefiting
from the most appropriate learning and training environments
(Vaeyens et al., 2008).
CLASSICAL MODELS IN TALENT DEVELOPMENT: NATURAL ABILITIES
AND NURTURE
Natural abilities together with environmental and intrapersonal
catalysts are, according to Gulbin et al. (2010), the non-random
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factors contributing to the developmental process which leads
to specific competencies. The distinction between natural abil-
ities and catalysts reflects current views on talent identification
and development which show a facet of the nature vs. nur-
ture debate (e.g., Baker et al., 2003; Epstein, 2013). The focus
of this debate is on general natural abilities and environmen-
tal factors that lead to general competencies (cf. categorizations
by Gagné, 1999). For instance perceptiveness and coordination
are considered general natural abilities and thought to influence
talent development. Athletes are often identified on general per-
ceptual or motor skills, and their development often focuses on
these general abilities. Paradoxically, researchers and practition-
ers agree that expert athletes specialize in their sport and that
a general skill is not sufficient for expert performance. One of
the marks of expertise is the use of unique solutions to solve
situations in the playfield and in other situations related with
the sport. In other words, expert athletes are characterized by
their optimal adaptation to all things related with their sport,
including effective decision-making in situ rather than by general
abilities.
THE HEURISTICS APPROACH TO TALENT DEVELOPMENT
A useful framework to understand unique adaptations to new
situational contexts is the heuristic approach. Athletes use heuris-
tics or rules of thumb which are specific to the type of situation
and can be used rapidly without much cost. The development
of heuristics occurs within the context of the athletes’ natural
abilities, but also their past experiences, developed skills, and
situational contexts. It does not pertain to any of these factors
separately, instead, heuristics pertain to the repertoire of the
athlete and it is our contention that talent identification meth-
ods and talent development models should be geared toward the
assessment and development of heuristics. This can be done by
improving the efficiency in the use of an existing heuristic (e g.,
calibrating the heuristic to more valid cues), or learning which
heuristic fits best with a specific environment (e g., Gigeren-
zer and Gaissmaier, 2011). The heuristics repertoire consists of
psychological, neurophysiological, and perceptual-motor adap-
tations (Raab et al., 2009; Raab, 2012; Todd et al., 2012). Each
heuristic is used for specific situations in much the same way
as a hammer is used for nailing pictures but not for cutting
branches. By definition a heuristic is composed of at least three
building blocks. They are search rules, search-stopping rules, and
decision rules. Within sports a fourth building block has been pro-
posed which deals with the execution rules. We will expand on
these.
Search rules include two kinds of search: search for informa-
tion cues and search for alternatives. In most ball games the
alternatives are fixed (i.e., players can only either pass, drib-
ble, throw, etc.) so the athlete searches for information cues
to decide on which of these actions to use. While novice ath-
letes may search for information cues randomly, expert athletes
can directly use the information cues with the highest validity
(de Oliveira et al., 2009; Esteves et al., 2011). When the alterna-
tive actions are not specified, then search rules for the action
itself must be generated. In these cases the task characteristics
specify whether it is most advantageous to broaden or limit the
search. For instance in chess it is advantageous to broaden the
search for options (Bilalic et al., 2009), whereas in more time-
pressured sports it may be best to narrow the search for options
(Raab and Johnson, 2007).
Search-stopping rules are the rules by which one stops search-
ing for information cues or alternative actions. Classical models
presumed that there was a way to compute the optimal stop-
ping point where the costs of further search would exceed
its benefits. However, to say that athletes show optimal use
of heuristics does not equate to saying that their actions or
behaviors are optimal, but rather that these are cost-effective
actions or behaviors. This means that an expert athlete knows
when the search for information cues must stop and will
use whatever information was gathered to make the decision
in due time. This also means that novice athletes must be
placed in situations that potentiate their search for the most
valid information cues, and must also be placed in situations
where decisions must be made based on low-quality information
cues.
Decision rules describe how a decision is made after search has
been stopped. Decision rules define how the available informa-
tion is used to make a decision. Psychology has a tradition of
assuming that intelligent behavior implies weighting and com-
bining information cues (e.g., multiple linear regression models),
but the research on fast and frugal heuristics has shown that fre-
quently less is more. For instance, the recognition heuristic is a
decision rule whereby the option chosen is simply based on one
valid cue that point to one option and not to an alternative option
(Gigerenzer and Goldstein, 1999). Again, expert athletes have the
heuristic repertoire to make the best decisions the fastest, whereas
novice athletes must be placed in situations that build up their
repertoire.
Execution rules address questions like what action to carry
out and how to execute it as already described for decision
processes (Raab et al., 2005). Those rules are based on indi-
vidual experience (Raab and Johnson, 2007). Athletes should
be exposed to situations that force them to decide between
options to learn execution criteria and build heuristics for various
situations.
These rules are the building blocks of heuristics and they can
help explain how athletes develop their expertise in terms of
decision-making and problem-solving which are key competences
in expert performance.
HEURISTICS IN THE ROUTE TO SPORT EXPERTISE: BUILDING AN
ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX
Heuristics are domain-specific and can be used to formally
describe the link between natural and nurtured characteristics.
In fact heuristics are neutral in the nature vs. nurture debate
because they can be learned but they can also be available at birth
(cf., Baker et al., 2003, 2012). As an illustration, very small chil-
dren will naturally cluster around a ball. The building blocks of
the heuristic used might be: search for ball, stop searching when
the ball is found, decide to move closer to the ball. This behav-
ior continues until they learn that exploring the space increases
the chance of receiving the ball. Here they may change the rules
of the existing heuristic into: search for space in relation to the
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ball, stop when space is found, and decide to move the space.
Again, this behavior will continue until they learn that not only
space but also the defensive players are important in receiving
the ball. Here they may again change the rules of the existing
heuristic into: search for the space in relation to the ball and the
defensive player, stop when you found it decide to move to the
space.
Heuristics are also specific to the sportive situations that the
athlete encounters. Therefore, nature and nurture, which are
normally described separately in models of talent identification
and development, can instead be described as heuristics. This
would allow future research on expertise to conceptually integrate
phylogenetic (natural abilities), ontogenetic (development) and
situational factors. As an illustration, take the phenomenon of
less-is-more for situations where there is an abundance of cues.
We explore how athletes with different natural abilities (John and
Mary) may become experts in their sport. John may have a natu-
ral ability to focus on a small number of cues and use those cues
to maximal advantage. He will be identified as talented because
of his consistent results in particular situations (rather than his
creativity). During development, John may specialize in the use
of those cues and become an expert in using them and hence
build a narrow repertoire of expertise. Provided these are the
most valid cues for the sports situation, John will also be an
expert in his sport. If the sport offers a lot more variety, how-
ever, John will need to benefit from a varied training program
that forces him to explore and use other cues for other situa-
tions. Mary, on the other hand, may have a natural ability to focus
on a large number of cues and will therefore use various com-
binations of cues. She might be identified as talented because of
her creative solutions (rather than her consistent results). Dur-
ing development, Mary may learn which cues are most valid to
which situation and hence build a broad repertoire of expertise.
Provided a number of cue combinations is required for the sports
situation, Mary will also be an expert in her sport. If the sport
offers little variety, however, Mary will need to benefit from a spe-
cialized training program that forces her to use the most valid
cues.
CONCLUSION
The heuristics approach to expertise is useful because it takes into
account the natural abilities and development of the athlete, as
well as the situations posed by the sport and the training envi-
ronment. It partly addresses the eternal nature vs. nurture debate
and can provide suggestions for training programs which aim at
developing the individual natural abilities of athletes by providing
adequate sports situations. This is currently being developed in the
area of decision-making (Marasso et al., accepted). The practical
application of heuristics to talent identification and talent develop-
ment models will bring the field one step away from dichotomized
models and toward a true comprehensive approach to the route
to expertise. Future research can use the heuristics approach to
investigate how the route to expertise sometimes deviates from the
mainstream to create novel solutions. For instance, new techniques
like the Fosbury flop in track-and-field and the Tsukahara’s vault
in gymnastics (Bar-Eli et al., 2008) highlight alternatives found by
expert athletes who did not fit a standard model of talent.
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Bilalić, M., Langner, R., Erb, M., and Grodd, W. (2010). Mechanisms and neural basis
of object and pattern recognition – A study with chess experts. J. Exp. Psychol.
Gen. 134, 728–742. doi: 10.1037/a0020756
de Oliveira, R. F., Oudejans, R. D., and Beek, P. J. (2009). Experts appear to use angle
of elevation information in basketball shooting. J. Exp. Psychol. Hum. Percept.
Perform. 35, 750–761. doi: 10.1037/a0013709
Epstein, D. (2013). The Sports Gene. London: Yellow Jersey.
Ericsson, K. A., Charness, N., Feltovich, P. J., and Hoffman, R. R. (2006).
The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance. New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press. doi: 10.1017/CBO9780511816796
Esteves, P., de Oliveira, R. F., and Araújo, D. (2011). Posture-related affor-
dances guide attack in basketball. Psychol. Sport Exerc. 12, 639–644. doi:
10.1016/j.psychsport.2011.06.007
Gagné, F. (1999). My convictions about the nature of abilities, gifts, and talents. J.
Educ. Gift. 22, 109–136.
Gigerenzer, G., and Gaissmaier, W. (2011). Heuristic decision making. Annu. Rev.
Psychol. 62, 451–482. doi: 10.1146/annurev-psych-120709-145346
Gigerenzer, G., and Goldstein, D. G. (1999). “Betting on one good reason: the take
the best heuristic,” in Simple Heuristics that Make us Smart, eds G. Gigerenzer,
P. M. Todd, and The ABC Research Group (New York, NY: Oxford University),
75–95.
Gigerenzer, G., Todd, P. M., and the ABC Research Group. (1999). Simple Heuristics
that Make us Smart. New York, NY: Oxford University.
Gulbin, J. P., Oldenziel, K. E., Weissensteiner, J. R., and Gagné, F. (2010). A look
through the rear view mirror: developmental experiences and insights of high
performance athletes. Talent Dev. Excell. 2, 149–164.
Raab, M. (2012). Simple heuristics in sports. Int. Rev. Sport Exerc. Psychol. 5,
104–120. doi: 10.1080/1750984X.2012.654810
Raab, M., and Johnson, J. (2007). Expertise-based differences in search and
option-generation strategies. Exp. Psychol. Appl. 13, 158–170. doi: 10.1037/1076-
898X.13.3.158
Raab, M., de Oliveira, R. F., and Heinen, T. (2009). How do people perceive and
generate options? Prog. Brain Res. 174, 49–59. doi: 10.1016/S0079-6123(09)
01305-3
Raab, M., Masters, R. S. W., and Maxwell, J. P. (2005). Improving the “how” and
“what” decisions of elite table tennis players. Hum. Mov. Sci. 24, 326–344. doi:
10.1016/j.humov.2005.06.004
Simon, H. A. (1982). Models of Bounded Rationality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Todd, P. M., Gigerenzer, G., and ABC Research Group. (2012). Ecological Ratio-
nality: Intelligence in the World. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. doi:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195315448.001.0001
Vaeyens, R., Lenoir, M., Williams, A. M., and Philippaerts, R. M. (2008). Tal-
ent identification and development programmes in sport: current models and
future directions. Sports Med. 38, 703–7714. doi: 10.2165/00007256-200838090-
00001
www.frontiersin.org July 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 709 | 239
de Oliveira et al. Adaptive toolbox approach to expertise in sport
Conflict of Interest Statement: The authors declare that the research was conducted
in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed
as a potential conflict of interest.
Received: 01 April 2014; accepted: 19 June 2014; published online: 08 July 2014.
Citation: de Oliveira RF, Lobinger BH and Raab M (2014) An adaptive tool-
box approach to the route to expertise in sport. Front. Psychol. 5:709. doi:
10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00709
This article was submitted to Cognition, a section of the journal Frontiers in Psychology.
Copyright © 2014 de Oliveira, Lobinger and Raab. This is an open-access arti-
cle distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License
(CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted,
provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original pub-
lication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No
use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these
terms.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition July 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 709 | 240
